Also in the Variorum Collected Studies Series:

JEAN RICHARD
Croisades et Etats latins d’Orient

BENJAMIN Z. KEDAR
The Franks in the Levant, 11th to 14th Centuries

ANTHONY LUTTRELL
The Hospitallers of Rhodes and their Mediterranean World

ANTHONY LUTTRELL
Latin Greece, The Hospitallers and the Crusades, 1291–1400

DAVID JACOBY
Studies on the Crusader States and on Venetian Expansion

JAMES A. BRUNDAGE
The Crusades, Holy War and Canon Law

GILES CONSTABLE
Monks, Hermits and Crusaders in Medieval Europe

MICHEL BALARD
La Mer Noire et la Romanie génoise, XIII–XVe siècles

BERNARD HAMILTON
Monastic Reform, Catherism and the Crusades (900–1300)

C.F. BECKINGHAM
Between Islam and Christendom

HANS EBERHARD MAYER
Kreuzzüge und lateinischer Osten

DAVID ABULAFIA
Commerce and Conquest in the Mediterranean, 1100–1500

ELENA LOURIE
Crusade and Colonisation

JOHN GILCHRIST
Canon Law in the Age of Reform, 11th–12th Centuries
Military Orders and Crusades
Alan Forey

Military Orders and Crusades

VARIORUM
1994
# CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preface</th>
<th>vii–viii</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>The emergence of the Military Order in the twelfth century</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Journal of Ecclesiastical History, XXXVI. Cambridge University Press, 1985</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>Recruitment to the Military Orders (twelfth to mid-fourteenth centuries)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Viator, XVII. University of California, 1986</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>Novitiate and instruction in the Military Orders in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Speculum, LXI. Cambridge, MA., 1986</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>Women and the Military Orders in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Studia monastica, XXIX. Montserrat, Barcelona, 1987</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>The Military Orders and the Spanish reconquest in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Traditio, XL. New York: Fordham University Press, 1984</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>The Military Orders and the ransoming of captives from Islam (twelfth to early fourteenth centuries)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Studia monastica, XXXIII. Montserrat, Barcelona, 1991</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII</td>
<td>The Military Orders and Holy War against Christians in the thirteenth century</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>English Historical Review, CIV. London: Longman Group U.K. Limited, 1989</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII</td>
<td>The Military Orders in the crusading proposals of the late-thirteenth and early-fourteenth centuries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Traditio, XXXVI. New York: Fordham University Press, 1980</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX</td>
<td>The militarisation of the Hospital of St. John</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Studia monastica, XXVI. Montserrat, Barcelona, 1984</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>Constitutional conflict and change in the Hospital of St. John during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Journal of Ecclesiastical History, XXXIII. Cambridge University Press, 1982</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XI</td>
<td>The Order of Mountjoy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Speculum, XLVI. Cambridge, M.A., 1971</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XII</td>
<td>The Military Order of St. Thomas of Acre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>English Historical Review, XCII. London: Longman Group U.K. Limited, 1977</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XIII</td>
<td>The crusading vows of the English King Henry III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Durham University Journal, LXV. Durham, 1973</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Addenda

Index

This book contains viii + 318 pages
PREFACE

Recent decades have seen a marked growth of interest in the history of the military orders during the Middle Ages, and numerous books and articles on them have been published, both in England and elsewhere. Most studies have focused on a single order, and several of the articles in the present collection are of this kind: the histories of two minor military orders are discussed, as are aspects of the development of the Hospital of St John. But individual orders cannot be treated solely in isolation: numerous questions can be posed about military orders in general. The first eight articles reproduced in this volume seek to address some of these. The reasons for the emergence of the institution of the military order are discussed, as are recruitment and the instruction of recruits. Although military orders were predominantly male institutions, there were some sisters in most foundations, and the role of women is the subject of the fourth article. The fifth essay considers the significance of the various military orders which participated in the Spanish reconquest during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. War against the infidel was obviously the primary function of military orders, but they did not limit themselves to this task: in two further articles their involvement in ‘holy wars’ against Christians and their ransoming activities are discussed. Some diversions of energy and resources from the struggle against the infidel were, however, questioned, and they partly explain the increasing criticism to which the military orders were subjected in the thirteenth century. Proposed changes and reforms are the subject of the last article in the group.

The essay on the order of St Thomas of Acre draws attention to the relations between England and the Holy Land, and these are also at issue in the volume’s final article, which is concerned with crusades rather than military orders. This is a theme which has been elaborated more recently in the writings of Simon Lloyd and Christopher Tyerman.

I would like to thank the following for granting permission for articles to be reproduced: Cambridge University Press, for I and X; the editor, Durham University Journal, for XIII; Fordham University Press, New York, for V and VIII; Longman Group UK Limited, for VII and XII; the Medieval Academy of America, for III and XI; the Regents of the University of California, for II; and the editor of Studia monastica and
the Abadia de Montserrat, for IV, VI and IX. I am also grateful to John Smedley for his advice and help during the preparation of the volume.

ALAN FOREY

Durham
May, 1993

PUBLISHER'S NOTE

The articles in this volume, as in all others in the Collected Studies Series, have not been given a new, continuous pagination. In order to avoid confusion, and to facilitate their use where these same studies have been referred to elsewhere, the original pagination has been maintained wherever possible.

Each article has been given a Roman number in order of appearance, as listed in the Contents. This number is repeated on each page and quoted in the index entries.

Misprints and minor corrections in the articles have, as far as possible, been corrected. Some addenda, as indicated by an asterisk in the margin of the articles, are provided at the end of the volume.
The Emergence of the Military Order in the Twelfth Century

At the time when encyclopaedic works on the military orders began to be produced in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, it was widely held that the military order was an institution which had existed for most of the Christian era. Many of the orders catalogued in these volumes were reported to have been founded well before the period of the crusades, although there were often conflicting opinions about the precise antiquity of a particular foundation. Various dates were, for example, given for the establishment of the military order which the knights of the Holy Sepulchre were thought to constitute: although some held that it had been founded shortly after the first crusade, its creation was attributed by others to St James the Less in the first century A.D., while its origins were also placed in the time of Constantine and in that of Charlemagne. The foundation of the order of Santiago, which in fact occurred in 1170, was often traced back to the ninth century; yet while some linked it with the supposed discovery of the body of St James during the reign of Alfonso II, others associated it with the legendary victory of Clavijo, which was placed in the time of Ramiro I. The accumulation of myth and tradition recorded in these encyclopaedias has exercised a prolonged influence on historians of the military orders: disproof has not always been sufficient to silence a persistent tradition. It is, nevertheless, clear that the Christian military order, in the sense of an institution whose members combined a military with a religious way of life, in fact originated during the earlier part of the twelfth century in the Holy Land. The first foundation of this kind was the order of the Temple, which was established probably in the year 1119 for the purpose of protecting pilgrims visiting

---

1 See, for example, F. Mennenius, Deliciae equestrium sive militarum ordinum, Cologne 1613, 39–42, 94–5; J. Michel y Marquez, Tesoro militar de cavalleria, Madrid 1642, 14v–15, 30–31v; A. Mendo, De ordinibus militaribus dispositionum canonicarum, theologicae, morales et historicarum, Lyons 1668, 6–7, 22–3. Traditions concerning the foundation of Santiago are discussed by J. L. Martin, Origenes de la orden militar de Santiago (1170–1175), Barcelona 1974, 11–19.

the holy places and which by 1128 had become involved in the defence of the kingdom of Jerusalem and was assisting in wars against the infidel in Syria. Whatever traditions and legends may have later developed, contemporaries were well aware that it was then that the institution of the military order was emerging. St Bernard was clearly in no doubt, for he wrote of the Temple: 'novum militiae genus ortum nuper auditur in terris...novum, inquam, militiae genus, et saeculis inexpertum'. The Templar rule itself refers to 'hoc genus novum religionis', and similar phrases are encountered in various other twelfth-century works.

In undertaking the protection of pilgrims and the defence of the Holy Land the Templars were responding to an obvious need. Despite the establishment of Christian states in Syria after the first crusade, pilgrims visiting Jerusalem were still beset by dangers as they travelled through the Holy Land. The English pilgrim Saewulf, who undertook a pilgrimage in the first decade of the twelfth century, recounts that Muslims lurked by day and night in caves in the mountains between Jaffa and Jerusalem, ready to ambush Christians journeying to and from the coast. The experience of the Russian pilgrim Daniel of Kiev was similar, and Walter Map tells a story of repeated attacks at a watering place outside Jerusalem which are supposed to have occasioned the foundation of the Temple. If by protecting pilgrims the Templars were supplying an obvious need, they were doing the same when they made the transition to fighting with the Christian armies in Syria against the infidel. After the capture of Jerusalem in 1099 only a few crusaders had stayed in the East; according to Fulcher

a letter from Ivo of Chartres to Hugh of Champagne (P.L., clxii. 251-3 cp. 245) to take the origins of the Temple back several years earlier. Bulst-Thiele is certainly right in arguing that Hugh was not joining the Hospital, as was thought by H. Arbois de Jubainville, Histoire des ducs et des comtes de Champagne, Paris 1860, ii. 110-14; but it may be doubted whether the letter refers to the Temple either, for Hugh is said to have vowed himself to the militia Christi already before setting out to the East: 'Hierosolymam prefecturus militiae Christi te ipsum devovisti'; Ivo moreover speaks of the militia as fighting with 10,000 against 20,000 and it could therefore hardly refer to the Temple; and in speaking of Hugh's separation from his wife he quotes a text (1 Cor. vii. 5) which refers to a temporary separation; cf. Ivo, Ducatusm, viii. 127, 133, in P.L., clxi. 612-13. Hugh may in fact have been taking merely a crusading vow, for which a wife's consent was apparently necessary: J. A. Brundage, Medieval Canon Law and the Crusader, Madison 1969, 36.


4 La Règle du Temple, ed. H. de Curzon, Paris 1886, 58-9 cap. 51 (Latin), 57 (French).

5 Novum militiae genus': Otto of Freising, Chronica sive historia de duabus civitatibus, vii. 9, ed. A. Hofmeister, M.G.H., Scriptores rerum germanicarum, Hanover 1912, xiv. 320; Richard of Poitou, Chronicum, in M.G.H., Scriptores, Hanover 1882, xxvi. 80. 'Nova religionis institutio': Anselm of Havelberg, Dialogus, i. 10, ed. G. Salet (Sources chrétiennes, cviii), Paris 1966, 98.

6 T. Wright, Early Travels in Palestine, London 1848, 36.

EMERGENCE OF THE MILITARY ORDER

of Chartres Baldwin 1 had only three hundred knights in his service at the beginning of his reign. And amongst those who did remain the mortality rate was high. War and disease prevented the emergence of a stable knightly class in the early years of the twelfth century. At that time bands of crusaders did, of course, continue to travel out to the Holy Land and were able to provide temporary assistance, but only a few settled permanently in the East. The Christian rulers could seek military service from the native population, but the latter did not always constitute a reliable element; and although natives were also at times hired as mercenaries, difficulties in paying troops were apparently already being experienced in Baldwin 1’s reign. Yet, if in the early twelfth century pilgrims needed protection and the crusader states required military aid, it is necessary to explain why a solution to these problems was sought in the creation of an institution which combined the use of force with a religious way of life.

Some historians have discerned the influence of Islamic models. Early in the nineteenth century the Austrian orientalist Joseph von Hammer stressed the similarities between the Templars and the Assassins; and, although much of Hammer’s work on that sect has been discredited, a more recent writer has again suggested an Assassin influence on the Templars. But the parallels in organisation and dress to which attention has been drawn are based partly on questionable evidence and would in any case hardly be close enough to imply borrowing. Nor do twelfth-century sources suggest that Christian contemporaries regarded the Templars and Assassins as very alike: although William of Tyre uses the words magister and preceptor—terms employed in the military orders—to describe the leader of the Assassins, he refers to the latter as a people (populus), not an order.

In 1820, two years after the appearance of Hammer’s work, the Spanish historian José Antonio Conde suggested that the origins of the Christian

---

7 Fulcheri Carnotensis historia Hierosolymitana, ii. 6, ed. H. Hagenmeyer, Heidelberg 1913, 389; see also the letter written by Daimbert in April 1100: H. Hagenmeyer, Epistulae et chartae ad historiam primi belli sacri spectantes, Innsbruck 1901, 176–7, doc. 21.
9 R. C. Smail, Crusading Warfare (1097–1193), Cambridge 1956, cap. 3.
10 William of Tyre, Historia rerum in partibus transmarinis gestarum, xi. 21, in Recueil des historiens des croisades : historiens occidentaux (hereafter cited as R.H.C. Occ.), Paris 1844, i. 488. Smail, Crusading Warfare, 94, argues that William was here referring to payments made to mercenaries, not to holders of money-fiefs.
13 Historia rerum, xx. 29, in R.H.C. Occ., i. 995–6; cf. Arnold of Lübeck, Chronicarum Slavorum, vii. 8, ed. G. H. Pertz, M.G.H., Scriptores, Hanover 1869, xxi. 240, where they are referred to as ‘quoddam genus Sarracenorum’.
military order were to be found in the Islamic institution of the *ribat*, which has been described as a fortified convent whose inmates combined a religious way of life with fighting against the enemies of Islam; and this view has continued to receive support, especially from certain Spanish historians. The claim is not based on any direct evidence of borrowing. It rests on the supposed similarities between the Islamic and Christian institutions, and on the assumption that the combining of a religious and military way of life was alien to Christian tradition, which forbade clerics to shed blood: St Bernard’s delay in writing in support of the Templars when repeatedly petitioned by their master Hugh of Payns is taken by Castro as providing ‘a measure of the great distance that separated the new military orders from the Christian conception of life’. It might, of course, be objected that if the gulf was so wide Christians would not have copied the Muslims, but it has been argued that the barrier which had to be overcome before Christians could accept the Islamic model was negotiated by a process of ‘stimulus diffusion’: the divide was too great for the imitation to be consciously acknowledged, but the Islamic concept of the ribat acted as a stimulus, which led to its re-invention on the Christian side as the military order.

The attractiveness of this argument is that its advocates cannot be expected to produce evidence in its support. Yet the theory of borrowing would be strengthened if it could be shown in the first place that the Franks who settled in the Holy Land after the first crusade had knowledge of the Islamic institution. Evidence concerning ribats is, however, sparse, and investigation is further hampered by the fact that the term *ribat* was also used to describe buildings which were not military strongholds. Those who maintain that the Islamic institution was the model for the military orders have not demonstrated that there were military ribats along the Muslim borders with the crusader states at the time of the foundation of the Temple; and as interest in holy war was only slowly renewed in this area of Islam in the decades following the first crusade it may be doubted


whether any ribats of this kind were created during the early twelfth century in the districts bordering on the Christian states.  

Even if it were accepted that the Franks in the East knew of the Islamic ribat, it may still be questioned whether it could have provided the model for the Christian military order. Little information survives about the interior life of ribats, but it seems that at least in some instances fortresses were defended in part by garrisons of professional soldiers, who were merely assisted by volunteers who combined devotional practices with fighting. These volunteers, who have been seen as the forerunners of the Templars, in some cases decided to end their lives giving service of this kind, but the majority were individuals who served for only a limited period—often for a term of forty days or during Ramadan. Such volunteers, serving on a temporary basis, had little in common with the members of the Christian military orders. They were merely Muslims who led devout lives while fighting, and may be compared more readily with the western crusader, who was expected to live soberly and devoutly and who in some instances had to serve for a fixed term in order to obtain an indulgence. They may also be compared with the secular knights who lived and fought with the Templars for a fixed period but did not become full members of the order. To have imitated the ribat would not therefore have produced the military order.

It has recently been argued, however, that those who served temporarily with the Temple provide a link between that order and the Islamic institution. It appears to be claimed that the Templars’ vows of poverty, chastity and obedience date only from the time of the Council of Troyes in 1128, when the order’s rule was drawn up, and that before that time those giving temporary service constituted at least a major element. But this characterisation of the early Templars is scarcely substantiated. Temporary members are certainly mentioned in clauses which may have been added to the Templar rule by the patriarch of Jerusalem about the year 1130, but the only evidence for the period up to 1128 that is adduced is the preamble of a charter of donation—attributed to the year 1125—which speaks of the Templars protecting pilgrims but does not mention a religious way of life. Yet, as it does not mention temporary

---

33 G. Schnürer, Die ursprüngliche Templerregel, Freiburg 1903, 61–2.
service either, it is hardly of significance; and the document has in any
case been assigned to a later date by several commentators. It is not
known, in fact, whether there were any temporary members at all at the
outset: crusaders coming from the West might have been expected to
associate themselves more readily with the Temple once it had joined the
Frankish armies in fighting against the infidel. The evidence which does
exist concerning the period up to 1128 hardly fits the proposed
interpretation. A letter written probably in 1125 by St Bernard to Hugh
of Champagne, who had become a Templar, clearly implies a permanent
vocation of a monastic type: the abbot of Clairvaux, for example, writes
of Hugh’s becoming ‘pauper ex divite’, implying that he had abandoned
all his possessions. No very early description survives of the foundation
of the Temple, but those which were written in the twelfth century all
assume that a religious form of life was adopted from the outset; and
Walter Map is the only writer who mentions temporary as well as
permanent members when discussing the order’s early years. The rule
compiled in 1128, which depicts a religious form of life, was, moreover,
based on existing Templar observances, which Hugh of Payns expounded
to the assembled prelates at the Council of Troyes. Admittedly, it could
be pointed out that when Fulk of Anjou travelled out to Jerusalem about
1120, he stayed, according to Orderic Vitalis, with the Templars: ‘ibique
militibus Templi associatus aliquandiu permansit’. Yet this wording
itself implies that the Templars themselves were in a different category
from Fulk. The argument seems, in fact, to be based primarily on the
assumption that the Temple in its early stages was similar to the
confraternity which was founded at Belchite in Aragon in 1122. This did
include temporary members, and it has been argued that its foundation
was influenced by the ribat. Certainly there are parallels between the
confraternity of Belchite and the ribat, but even if it were accepted that
one was based on the other, it cannot just be taken for granted, without
reference to evidence, that the Temple in Jerusalem was in the beginning
similar to an Aragonese institution or that it emerged under similar
influences.

Alternatively, it could be argued that the Franks would not fully have

William of Tyre, Historia rerum, xii. 7, in R.H.C. Occ., i. 520; Chronique de Michel le Syrien, xv. 11, trans. J. B. Chabot, Paris 1905, iii. 201; Walter Map, De nugis curialium, i. 18, ed. Wright, 29–30.
It is difficult, however, to accept that Belchite also partook of the characteristics of a monastery and that it ‘could not be a lay society’: Lourie, ‘Confraternity of Belchite’, 172.
EMERGENCE OF THE MILITARY ORDER

understood the nature of the Islamic institution and that—with the inevitable tendency to assimilate alien institutions to Christian ones—they would have viewed the ribat as a kind of monastery. But there would still remain the further objection that the original function of the Temple differed from that of the ribat. The latter was a fortress near the borders of Islam established for the purpose of warfare against the infidel; the Templars, however, adopted their characteristic way of life in the first instance merely in order to afford protection to pilgrims, and they had their residence in Jerusalem and not in a frontier castle. And the later transition to fighting with the Christian armies against Islam, which did not involve any fundamental change in the Templars’ manner of life, is easily explained by the shortage of military personnel in the crusader states.

If the Temple both in its earliest known form and in its original function differed from the ribat, it must be asked whether the emergence of the military order can be explained in a purely Christian context. This question has not been considered in any detail by those who seek to link the military order with the ribat. In adopting a religious way of life the Templars and later military orders certainly modelled themselves in some respects on existing religious foundations within western Christendom. This is immediately apparent from a perusal of the rules of the military orders, which closely followed earlier rules and which in some instances borrowed directly from them. The life lived by members of the orders in their convents did not differ essentially from that of other religious in western Christendom: only minor amendments to the usual monastic regime were made to take account of such matters as the eastern climate and the need for brethren to be strong enough to fight. But it has to be discovered whether the Christian background can explain the fusion of the religious life with military activities.

As has been seen, some of those who have sought to link the military order with the ribat have pointed out that clerics were forbidden to fight; and there were obviously numerous canons containing this prohibition, even if in practice many clerics—like the priest on the first crusade described by Anna Comnena—did engage in warfare. But the Templars and members of other military orders who fought were not clerics. Only their chaplains received the tonsure and were clerics; and in all of the

---

31 Borrowings from the Benedictine rule are indicated in the text of the Templar rule published by Schnürer, Templerregel, 130-53.
32 Forey, Templars, 283. In any discussion of those serving for a term with the Templars the varied links existing between outsiders and monasteries in the West should not be ignored.
34 In some orders members were commanded to have their hair trimmed so that their vision would be unimpaired, but this did not constitute a formal ritual: Règle du Temple, 32 cap. 28 (Lat.), 21 (Fr.); M. Perlbach, Die Statuten des Deutschen Ordens, Halle 1890, 40 cap. 12; see also O’Callaghan, ‘Affiliation’, Analecta Sacri Ordinis Cisterciensis, xvi (1960), 41.
military orders the distinction was made between these clerics and the
fratres laici.96 To the latter, who included all except the chaplains, the
prohibition on bearing arms did not apply, as was made clear by
Innocent III in a letter about the Templars which was sent to the king of
Armenia early in the thirteenth century:

cum vim vi repellere omnes leges et omnia jura permittant, ab iis maxime qui vim
repellendo irregularitatem non contrahunt, cum clerici non existant, videtur plerisque
quod contra te offendentem se possint defendere tibique impugnanti valeant
repugnare.97

Yet fighting might also at first sight seem to have been incompatible
with the religious life, by means of which men sought to express their love
of God and to devote themselves to his service away from the world and
remote from secular affairs and concerns. This form of life was characterised
by a contemptus mundi, and the individual who practised it was expected,
in the words of the Benedictine rule, 'seculi actibus se facere alienum'.98
Certainly in the early Middle Ages the gulf between the military and the
religious life was seen to be wide. Smaragdus, abbot of Saint-Mihiel,
commenting in the early ninth century on the phrase 'Domino Christo
vero regi militaturus' in the prologue of the Benedictine rule, drew a stark
contrast between monks and warriors:

Sunt enim milites saeculi, sunt et milites Christi; sed milites saeculi infirma et lubrica
arma, milites autem Christi fortissima sumunt atque praecellent. Pugnanti illi contra
hostes, ut se et interfecissent aeternam perpendunt ad poenam; pugnanti isti contra vitia,
ut post mortem aeternam vitam consequi possint ad præmia; illi ut ascendant ad
tartara, isti ut ascendant ad gloriam; illi ut post mortem cum daemonibus mancipentur
in inferno, isti ut cum angelis in perpetuo possideant regnum; illi ut daemonis
suscipientur semper, isti ut cum angelis semper laetentur; illi ut cum diabolo semper
lugeant, isti cum Christo exsultent.99

Two centuries later Adalbero, bishop of Laon, again pointed the contrast,
for it was to satirise the activities of Cluny that he called the abbot Odilo
militiae princeps and referred to the Cluniacs as 'monachorum bellicos

96 J. Delaville Le Roulx, Cartulaire général de l'ordre des Hospitaliers de Saint-Jean de
Jérusalem, Paris 1894, i. 425-9, doc. 627; Martín, Orígenes, 249, doc. 73; Statuta capitulorum
generalam ordinis Cisterciensis, ed. J. M. Canivez, Louvain 1934, ii. 3-4, 13-14. The right
to admit clerics to the Temple was confirmed by Innocent III in 1139: R. Hiestand
Papsturkunden für Templer und Johanniter (Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften
F. H. Russell, The Just War in the Middle Ages, Cambridge 1975, 251, asserts that Robert
of Flamborough considered the members of military orders to be clerics, but tacitly
exempted them from the prohibition on fighting; in fact he calls them merely personas
97 P.L., ccxvn. 54-6. That Innocent does not employ a more comprehensive term than
plerisque is probably to be explained by the fact that the question at issue was the use of
force against Christians.
98 Cf. R. Grégoire, 'Saeculi actibus se facere alienum. Le "mépris du monde" dans la
littérature monastique latine médiévale', Revue d'Ascétique et de Mystique, xli (1965), 251-87.
EMERGENCE OF THE MILITARY ORDER

ordo'. In some ways the gulf would appear to have been widening in the eleventh century, for – partly as a reaction to current trends within the Church – there was a desire to demarcate more precisely the various elements in society. This is apparent in Adalbero's Carmen ad Rotbertum regem and in the writings of others such as John of Fécamp, who complained that 'clerus et populus, sacerdos et monachus nil in actibus nil in moribus different', and who argued that 'conturbat...totum corporis ordinem qui non suo contentus officio subripit alienum'. One consequence of this attitude was a new emphasis amongst religious on complete withdrawal from the world. Yet while this further retreat represented one trend in the religious life of the eleventh and early twelfth centuries, there was also a development of institutions, involving both clerics and laymen, which sought to adapt this form of life to more active pursuits, such as charitable work and preaching, as is apparent from the establishment of hospices and hospitals as well as from the foundation of houses of regular canons. To some, an active life of this kind seemed superior to a purely contemplative existence. Yet these forms of active life might appear to be far removed from the sordid business of fighting. But in seeking to explain the emergence of the military orders it is necessary to take account of the efforts which had been made by the early twelfth century to transform the warrior class and also of the new evaluation which had been placed on some forms of warfare.

Partly in response to a disorderly political situation in parts of the West, there had been an attempt to christianise knighthood: militia came to be contrasted with malitia, and the term miles Christi, formerly applied mainly to monks, came to acquire a new meaning. It was stressed that it was the function of the warrior to protect and defend the poor and weak, the Church and Christianity, and not to plunder and pillage. An early formulation of this concept was provided by Odo of Cluny, who wrote in his Vita sancti Geraldi Auriliacensis comitis licuit igitur laico homini in ordine pugnatorum posito gladium portare, ut inerme vulgus velut innocuum pecus a lupis, ut scriptum est, vespertinis defensaret. Some aspects of this topic have recently been discussed by P. Vial, 'L’Idéologie de guerre sainte et l’ordre du Temple', Mélanges en l’honneur de Etienne Fournel (Annales de l’Unité d’Enseignement et de Recherche des Lettres et Sciences Humaines de l’Université de Saint-Étienne, 1, 1978), 327-33; see also P. Rousset, 'Les Laïcs dans la croisade', I laici nella 'Societas Christiana' dei secoli XI e XII, Milan 1968, 428-43. Whether Christian ideas of holy war were influenced by those of Islam is a separate question which will not be discussed here.

Carmen ad Rotbertum regem, lines 155–6, ed. C. Carozzi (Classiques de l’histoire de France au moyen âge, xxxii), Paris 1979, 12.


Some aspects of this topic have recently been discussed by P. Vial, 'L’Idéologie de guerre sainte et l’ordre du Temple', Mélanges en l’honneur de Etienne Fournel (Annales de l’Unité d’Enseignement et de Recherche des Lettres et Sciences Humaines de l’Université de Saint-Étienne, 1, 1978), 327–33; see also P. Rousset, 'Les Laïcs dans la croisade', I laici nella ‘Societas Christiana’ dei secoli XI e XII, Milan 1968, 428–43. Whether Christian ideas of holy war were influenced by those of Islam is a separate question which will not be discussed here.

S. Anselmi Cantuariensis archiepiscopi opera omnia, ed. F. S. Schmitt, Edinburgh 1946, iii. 211, ep. 86; Baldric of Dol, Historia Jerusolimitana, i. 4, in R.H.C. Occ., iv (1879), 14.

i. 8, in P.L., cxxxiii. 647.
A fuller definition of knightly duties was given in the later eleventh century by the Gregorian theorist Bonizo of Sutri:

His proprium est dominis deferre, prede non iniare, pro vita dominorum suorum tuenda sue vita non parcer et pro statu rei publice usque ad mortem decertare, scismaticos et hereicos debelliare, pauperes quoque et viduas et orphans defensiare, fidem promissam non violare nec omnino dominis sui sui pertinare.  

A similar concept, though with a different emphasis, is also revealed by John of Salisbury, who in the mid-twelfth century defined the obligations of a true knight as:

tueri ecclesiam, perfidiam impugnare, sacerdotium uenerari, pauperum propulsare iniurias, pacare prouinciam, pro fratribus...fundere sanguinem et, si opus est, animam ponere.  

The emergence of the military orders is obviously to be related to the development of the concept of true knighthood, which they were seen to exemplify. St Bernard described both the Templars and crusaders as belonging to the true militia, which he contrasted with the old malitia, and in the De laude novae militiae he distinguished at length between the Templars and the militia saecularis, which fought for worldly glory and gain. In the prologue of the Templar rule it was said of the order that:

in ipsa namque refloruit jam et revixit ordo militaris, qui despecto justicie zelo non pauperes aut aeccliesias defensiare, quod suum erat, sed rapere, spoliare, interficere contendeabant.  

and the prologue of the rule of Santiago similarly saw the founders of that order ceasing to be the equites diaboli which they had been until then. The link between the military orders and the new concept of knighthood is made further apparent by examining contemporary descriptions of the orders’ activities, for these provide many parallels with the various definitions of true knighthood and with accounts of the functions of others, such as crusaders, who were held to belong to the true militia. The military orders’ role was commonly regarded as a defensive one. This was occasionally expressed in terms of protecting land: a charter issued by the


47 Policraticus, vi. 9, ed. C. C. J. Webb, Oxford 1909, ii. 23.  


EMERGENCE OF THE MILITARY ORDER

Castilian King Alfonso VIII in 1185, for example, speaks of the brethren of Santiago fighting for the patria and defending ‘Christianitatis loca et habitationes’, while Templar recruits had to promise to guard the lands which the Christians held in the East. Yet, although to the historian the struggle with the infidel may seem to have been primarily about land, Christian accounts of Turkish conquests before the first crusade indicate that it became widely held in the West that in the conquered territories churches were defiled, Christians slaughtered and the faith brought to nothing. It is not, therefore, surprising that the military orders were usually regarded as protecting and defending the Church, the Christian religion and the faithful: the statement in the prologue of the Templar rule that the order had been established ‘ad defensionem sanctae ecclesiae’ has many parallels in papal bulls and royal and princely charters. The terminology of defence became so much the norm that it was still used even when it was scarcely appropriate. In a charter which in 1175 assigned a fifth of Castilian conquests to the order of Calatrava the function of that order was still described merely as providing a wall and shield for the defence of the Christian faith. But the orders’ role was not always described in purely defensive terms. Like crusaders, they were also seen to be fighting a war of vengeance and expansion. St Bernard wrote of the Templar knight as ‘Christi vindex in his qui male agunt’, and a papal bull speaks of the members of that order as fighting ‘pro ulciscendis iniuriis Ihesu Christi’. And just as in 1095 crusaders were recruited ‘ad liberandam ecclesiam Dei’, so Innocent II applied this phrase to the Templars and exhorted them to fight not only for the defence of the church but also ‘pro ... ea, que est sub paganorum tyrannide, de ipsorum spuriitiae erunda’. In 1143 the count of Barcelona granted extensive properties to the Templars not merely for the defence of the Church but also ‘ad deprimendam et debellandam et expellendam gentem maurorum’, while on other occasions reference was made to extending and propagating the Christian faith. But offensive activity of this kind was to further the

---

91 J. González, El reino de Castilla en la época de Alfonso VIII, Madrid 1960, ii. 746-51, doc. 254; Règle du Temple, 544, cap. 676.
92 See, for example, Das Register Gregors VII, ed. E. Caspar (M.G.H., Epistolae selectae, ii. 1), Berlin 1920, i. 165-8; Robert the Monk, Historia Hierosolimitana, i. 1, in R.H.C. Occ., iii (1866), 727-8.
93 Règle du Temple, 12.
94 González, Renzo de Castilla, ii. 364-5, doc. 220.
95 De laude novae militiae, cap. 3, in Opera, iii. 217; Hiestand, Papsturkunden, 406, doc. 230; cf. P. Rousset, Les Origines et les caractères de la première croisade, Geneva 1945, 105-6, 126.
96 J. D. Mansi, Sacrorum conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio, Venice 1775, xx. 816; Hiestand, Papsturkunden, 204-10, doc. 3.
97 Colección de documentos inéditos del Archivo General de la Corona de Aragón, ed. P. de Bofarull y Mascaro, iv, Barcelona 1849, 93-9, doc. 43; Albou, Cartulaire, 204-5, doc. 314; Delaville Le Roulx, Cartulaire, i. 141-2, doc. 181; Martín, Orígenes, 212-15, 224-5, 309-10, docs. 42, 51, 124.
interests of the Church and Christianity, and in the context of the twelfth century referred to the recovery of territories which were thought rightly to belong to Christendom and the freeing of the Church and the faithful from oppression. 68

Although in fulfilling these functions the military orders appear at times to have been encouraged to slaughter the infidel, 69 their members were more often depicted as exposing themselves to injury and death: their own readiness to die was stressed rather than their killing of the enemy. In the bull Omne datum optimum issued by Innocent II in 1139 and in many other papal letters it was said of the Templars that they did not fear to lay down their own lives, 69 while on other occasions the dangers which brethren of the orders risked were emphasised. 61 The Templar rule states that it is a duty 'pro fratribus animam ponere', just as it is for John of Salisbury's knight, 62 and some Spanish documents of the later twelfth century represent members of the military orders as vowing to shed their blood and die: 'voverunt sponte contra crucis Christi adversarios et proprium sanguinem fundere et temporalem vitam finire'. 63 The rule of Santiago similarly makes reference to choosing to die. 64 Of course, deliberately to seek death in the way that some missionaries in Islamic lands did or as the bishop of Soissons did on Louis IX's Egyptian crusade was scarcely desirable from a military standpoint, and it was not in fact the primary objective of most of those belonging to the military orders. Although there were inevitably moments of rashness on campaign, the orders — as is clear from Templar regulations governing conduct in the field 65 — sought to provide a disciplined and effective force. Aquinas was therefore more realistic when he wrote that the military orders 'directius ordinantur ad hoc quod EFFUNDANT sanguinem hostium quam ad hoc quod EORUM sanguis fundatur'. 66 But this view was not the one most commonly expressed.

Yet, while the military orders by the nature of their activities were seen to form part of the true militia, they differed from crusaders and others by combining these functions with a religious form of life. This was possible because a new evaluation had been placed on fighting. By the early twelfth

68 The subject of conversion is mentioned only very rarely in documents concerning the military orders: Martin, Orígenes, 248-54, doc. 73; Gallego Blanco, Rule of St James, 110, cap. 30.
69 Although in chapter three of the De laude novae militiae St Bernard argued that infidels should not be killed if they could be prevented in other ways from oppressing the faithful, he had earlier appeared to encourage the Templars to seek to kill when he wrote of the miles Christi that 'cum occidit malefactorem, non homicida, sed, ut ita dixerim, malicida ...Mors ergo quam irrogat, Christi est lucrum ...In morte pagani christianus gloriatur, quia Christus glorificatur': Opera, iii. 217.
70 Hiestand, Papsturkunden, 204–10, 214–15, 222, 233–5, docs. 3, 8, 17, 27.
71 Ibid., 330–1, 379–81, docs. 138, 198.
72 Règle du Temple, 58, cap. 48 (Lat.), 56 (Fr.).
73 González, Reino de Castilla, ii. 323–4, 329–30, 376–8, 404–5, docs. 195, 199, 225, 244.
74 Gallego Blanco, Rule of St James, 96, cap. 10; Lomax, Orden de Santiago, 223, cap. 11.
75 Règle du Temple, 120–7, caps. 155–68.
EMERGENCE OF THE MILITARY ORDER

century some kinds of warfare and even some killing were no longer considered to be sinful; joining the true militia had on the contrary become widely accepted as a new way of achieving salvation. The origins of the latter idea can be traced back at least to the ninth century, and it finds frequent expression in the sources for the first crusade, where those participating in the expedition are promised remission of sins and those dying on the crusade are regarded as martyrs. This development hardly requires illustration; but it should be pointed out that in the true militia fighting was no longer devoted to the worldly ends of personal glory and material gain; it ceased to be regarded as a purely secular activity and by the beginning of the twelfth century had become commonly accepted as a work of charity and a way of expressing love of God and of one’s neighbours and brothers. Urban II wrote to the Bolognese in 1096 that the crusaders ‘res et personas suas pro Dei et proximi charitate exposuerunt’, while, in Baldric of Dol’s version of the pope’s speech at Clermont, Urban states that ‘caritas est pro fratribus animas ponere’. When Innocent II in 1139 wrote of the Templars as ‘vere karitatis flamma succensi’, and asserted that by their deeds they fulfilled the words of the Gospel, ‘maiorum hac dilitationem nemo habet, quam ut animam suam ponat quis pro amicis suis’, he was not expressing a new concept. To fight in the true militia was therefore to abandon worldly concerns and material desires. Like monks, those who went on crusade were devoting themselves to the service of God, while the activities of the true knighthood were also comparable with the charitable work undertaken by various religious institutions on behalf of the poor, the sick and pilgrims.

Despite the apparent contrast between the life of the monk and that of the warrior, the wide gulf which had earlier separated the religious from the military way of life no longer existed. Guibert of Nogent, in a frequently quoted comment, viewed the monastic life and participation in a crusade as alternative routes to salvation:

Instituit nostro tempore praelia sancta Deus, ut ordo equestris et vulgus oberrans, qui vetustae paganitatis exemplo in mutuas versabantur caedes, novum repperirent.

On martyrdom see Rousset, Première croisade, 47–8, 81–3, 121–3; references are also common in documents referring to the military orders: St Bernard, De laude novae militiae, cap. 1, in Opera, iii. 215; González, Reino de Castilla, ii. 746, doc. 492; Gallego Blanco, Rule of St James, 78.

Hagenmeyer, Epistulae, 137; Baldric of Dol, Historia Jerusolimitana, i. 4, in R.H.C. Oec., iv. 15; see also J. Riley-Smith, ‘Crusading as an act of love’, History, lxxv (1980), 177–92.

Hiestand, Papiurkunden, 904–10, doc. 3. John xv. 13 was also quoted by many others with reference to the military orders: ibid., 386, doc. 208; Letters of Peter the Venerable, ed. G. Constable, Cambridge, Mass. 1967, i. 407–9, ep. 172; Gallego Blanco, Rule of St James, 95, cap. 9; Lomax, Ordre de Santiago, 233, cap. 10; Cartulaire de la commanderie des Templiers de Sommereux, ed. A. de Menche de Loine, Paris 1924, 11–12, 70–2, docs. 6, 53–4.

Cf. the comment made, though in a different context, by the author of the Libellus de diversis ordinium et professionibus qui sunt in ecclesia, ed. G. Constable and B. Smith, Oxford 1972, 40–2: ‘Aequalem enim uideo esse misericordiam et in defensandis pro posse ab iniquis pauperibus, et in nutrientibus uel susciendiis hominibus’. He was not, however, referring to the use of force.
Stephen of Grandmont was able to say of the knight who performed God's will 'potest esse monachus clypeum collo deferens'; and while Smaragdus and St Bernard both drew a similar contrast between the miles Christi, who sought salvation, and the miles seculi, who would be damned, and used some of the same texts to illustrate their arguments, for St Bernard in his De laude novae militiae the miles Christi was a warrior and not the monk of the earlier work. It was in fact the bridging of the gulf between the two that enabled the term miles Christi to be applied to the warrior. The way was therefore open for the two kinds of miles Christi to be combined in the same person and for an institution to emerge 'qua gemino pariter conflictu atque infatigabili decertatur, tum adversus carnem et sanguinem, tum contra spiritualia nequitiae in caelestibus'.

The Temple was the first institution founded for the purpose of participating in this double conflict: at the outset the members of that order were merely extending the range of charitable activities undertaken by religious institutions on behalf of pilgrims, but they were soon also combining a religious way of life with fighting alongside other Christian forces in the East against Islam. Yet they were not the first religious to take up arms; and monks who had earlier engaged in fighting had found defenders long before the foundation of the Temple. In the early eleventh century Bernard of Angers had written approvingly of a prior of Conques who had been accustomed to wage war on malefactors. Bernard argued that 'plus hoc ad virtutem quam ad impugnationem monastice regulae poterit referre', and even went on to add:

utinam monachus desidiosus, deposita ignavia, ad utilitatem sui monasterii sic fortiter ageret, potius quam sui ordinis habitum honestum preferens extrinsecus, iniquitatis latibulum faceret intrinsecus.

The Cluniac chronicler Raoul Glaber was not so outspoken when he reported that monks in Spain had fought against al-Mansur. But he stated

---

71 Gesta Dei per Francos, i. 1, in R.H.C. Occ., iv. 124.
72 Liber de doctrina, cap. 69, ed. J. Becquet, Scriptores ordinis Grandimontensis (Corpus Christianorum, Continuatio Mediaevalis, viii), Turnhout 1968, 33.
73 St Bernard, De laude novae militiae, cap. 1, in Opera, iii. 214. J. Fleckenstein, ‘Die Rechtfertigung der geistlichen Ritterorden nach der Schrift “De laude novae militiae” Bernhards von Clairvaux’, Die geistlichen Ritterorden Europas, ed. J. Fleckenstein and M. Hellmann (Vorträge und Forschungen, xxvi), Sigmaringen 1980, 18–21, argues that, despite the christianising of knighthood and developments in monasticism, the combining of a military and religious way of life was at variance with accepted norms in the West in the early twelfth century: it was the need to protect pilgrims which led Hugh of Payns and his followers to adopt a new way of life. But he does not explain why men who had recently come from the West should have formed a religious community for this purpose, if it was out of keeping with western views.
74 Liber miraculorum sancte Fidis, i. 26, ed. A. Bouillet, Paris, 1897, 66–70.
EMERGENCE OF THE MILITARY ORDER

that 'potius ob fraterne caritatis amorem cupierant decertare, quam propter aliquam gloriam laudis ponpatice', and said that a vision had revealed that those who had died had gained salvation. Although on this occasion monks had taken up arms only out of necessity, Raoul's comment provides a clear anticipation of twelfth-century attitudes towards combining a religious form of life with fighting.

In the century before the foundation of the Temple the emergence of the military order had also been foreshadowed, though in a less significant way, by the creation — in areas away from the borders of Christendom and among those who would have had no knowledge of Islam — of secular confraternities devoted to the proper purposes of knighthood. Some sprang from attempts to enforce peace decrees. In some instances an obligation was placed on the whole population to use force if necessary to maintain the peace, but smaller associations were also founded, either at the instigation of bishops or on the initiative of groups of nobles. Wazo of Liège is reported to have exacted an oath from a small band of knights who undertook to support him and his church, and towards the end of the eleventh century a military confraternity of ten nobles was established for the protection of the monastery of La Sauve near Bordeaux: their swords were consecrated in the monastery church and they promised to defend the monks and the monastery's property and also to protect pilgrims visiting the house. Military associations were also formed among those going on the first crusade. Raymond of Aguilers mentions a confraternity established at the siege of Antioch: it had a common treasury, which was to provide money for the replacement of horses. The importance of these confraternities should obviously not be exaggerated. They appear all to have been loose associations with little formal organisation; and they were all secular groupings. Yet they should not be completely ignored in a discussion of the emergence of the military order.

If the appearance of the military order can thus be related to recent developments within western Christendom, it does not mean that the new institution failed to arouse doubts and opposition. It would be more surprising if opinion had been uniformly favourable, for the changes which had been taking place in the West had not gained universal acceptance. Critics could quote many authorities which seemed to conflict with the new attitudes to warfare, and the theoretical basis for the latter had still not been fully elaborated. But some evidence which might seem to imply uncertainty or hostility can be interpreted more satisfactorily in other

---

76 Raoul Glaber: les cinq livres de ses historias, ii, 9, ed. M. Prou, Paris 1886, 44-5.
75 Anselm of Liège, Gesta episcoporum Leodiensium, cap. 55, ed. G. H. Pertz, M.G.H., Scriptores, Hanover 1846, vii. 222.
77 Cirot de la Ville, Histoire de l'abbaye et congrégation de Notre-Dame de la Grande Sauve, Paris 1844, i. 297-9, 497-8.
ways. It is certainly true that in their early years the Templars gained little support, and this could be taken as an indication of doubts and opposition. William of Tyre’s remark that after nine years there were still only nine members can be taken as merely a play on numbers, but the chronicler was implying that during that early period there was no marked increase in membership. There is similarly little record of patronage of the Templars in the West before the later 1120s. But this absence of support is to be attributed to a lack of awareness rather than to disapproval.®

When Hugh of Payns and several of his colleagues did travel to the West, probably in 1127, the order quickly began to receive gifts in various parts of western Europe,® and ecclesiastical approval was gained at the beginning of 1128 at the Council of Troyes, which was presided over by the papal legate, Matthew of Albano, and attended by the archbishops of Reims and Sens and their bishops and also by a number of abbots, including those of Citeaux and apparently of Clairvaux.® The Templars were quickly regarded with favour by ecclesiastics drawn from all parts of the Church, including the new monastic orders,® as well as achieving rapid popularity in the lay world.

It is true, as Castro has indicated, that it was only after Hugh of Payns had made three requests that St Bernard wrote the De laude novae militiae. His own explanation for the delay was that he was unfitted for the task:

Distuli sane aliquamdiu, non quod contemnenda videretur petitio, sed ne levis praecepsque culparetur assensio, si quod melius melior implere sufficeret, praesumerem imperitus, et res admodum necessaria per me minus forte commoda redderetur.

Such expressions of modesty were not uncommon among writers,® and this explanation does not necessarily reveal the true motives for St Bernard’s delay, but Castro’s suggestion is by no means the only possible or probable alternative. The letter which the abbot of Clairvaux wrote to Hugh of Champagne when the latter joined the Templars has, however, also been seen as an indication of St Bernard’s uncertainty about the Templars’ way


Of the two recorded acquisitions which can be assigned to the earlier 1120s, one was from Fulk of Anjou, who had recently been out to the East, and the other was of property near Marseille, an obvious point of contact between East and West: Ordericus Vitalis, Historia ecclesiastica, xii. 29, ed. Chibnall, vi. 310; Albon, Cartulaire, 1-2 doc. 2. Ordericus says that many followed Fulk’s example, but no documentary evidence survives from the earlier 1120s.

See the documents published by Albon, Cartulaire; early expansion in France has been traced by V. Carrière, ‘Les Débuts de l’ordre du Temple en France’, Le Moyen Âge, xxvii (1914), 311–21.

Règle du Temple, 16–18.

See also the letter to Hugh of Payns from Guigues of Chartreux: Lettres des premiers chartreux (Sources chrétiennes, lxxxviii), Paris 1962, i. 154–60.

Opera, iii. 213.

See, for example, Peter the Venerable’s comments at the end of his Summa totius haeresis Saracenerum: J. Kritzeck, Peter the Venerable and Islam, Princeton 1964, 211.
EMERGENCE OF THE MILITARY ORDER

of life. But in that letter St Bernard is not obviously doing anything more than mourn the absence of a friend:

Ceterum, quod tua iucunda praesentia nobis ita nescio quo Dei est subtracta iudicio, ut ne interdum quidem videre te valeamus, sine quo numquam, si fieri posset, esse vellemus, hoc ac equanimitate, fateor, non portamus.*

Yet both St Bernard's De laude novae militiae and a letter written at about the same time to the Templars by a certain Hugh — it has been attributed to both Hugh of Payns and Hugh of St Victor® — reveal that there were some misgivings and difficulties. The repetition of Hugh of Payns's request to the abbot of Clairvaux could be explained at least in part by the Temple's failure to become widely known before the later 1120s; but, although St Bernard's reply is a sermo exhortationis rather than a cool analysis of objections such as Aquinas later attempted, it is an answer to criticisms which were being made of the Templars, while Hugh's letter shows that some members of the order were themselves experiencing doubts as well as being criticised by outsiders. But the grounds for the doubts and hostility require definition.

In the first chapter of the De laude novae militiae St Bernard comments:

Et quidem ubi solis viribus corporis corporeo fortiter hosti resistitur, id quidem ego tam non iudico mirum, quam nec rarum existimo. Sed et quando animi virtute vitiis sive daemonibus bellum indicatur, ne hoc quidem mirabile etsi laudabile dixerim, cum plenus monachis cernatur mundus. Ceterum cum uterque homo suo quisque gladio potenter accingitur, suo cingulo nobiliter insignitur, quis hoc non aestimet omni admiratione dignissimum, quod adeo liqueat esse insolitum.**

The wording of this extract, and particularly of the last clause, implies that one ground for criticism was merely the common suspicion in this period of any innovation: when the past provided authority, anything new was suspect, whatever its character. That this was one element in the criticism of the Templars is also suggested by the fact that later in the treatise St Bernard adopts the tactics frequently employed by those seeking to counter accusations of novelty: he attempts to root the order of the Temple firmly in the past. He cannot pretend that it is an ancient foundation,® but he quotes several biblical prophecies concerning Jerusalem to demonstrate 'quam crebra veterum attestatione nova approbatur militia'.®

---

® J. Leclercq, 'Un Document sur les débuts des Templiers', Revue d'Histoire Ecclesiastique, lli (1957), 81-91; C. Sclafert, 'Lettre inédite de Hugues de Saint-Victor aux chevaliers du Temple', Revue d'Asiologie et de Mystique, xxxiv (1958), 975-99. The question of authorship has been discussed most recently by Fleckenstein, 'Rechtfertigung', 9-10, and he is right to argue that the identity of the author must remain uncertain.
® Opera, iii. 214.
® Claims of this kind were made for the Hospital of St John in the twelfth century: J. Riley-Smith, The Knights of St John in Jerusalem and Cyprus, c. 1050-1310, London 1967, 32-3.
® Opera, iii. 219.
incurring criticism of this kind the Templars did not, of course, stand alone in the early twelfth century. All new orders were attacked for this reason. As Anselm of Havelberg reported, many were asking:

Quare tot novitates in Ecclesia Dei fiunt? Quare tot ordines in ea surgunt? ... Quis denique non scandalizetur, et inter tot et tam diversas formas religionum invicem discrepantium taedioso non afficiatur scandalo?²⁹³

But some criticism was concerned more specifically with the manner of life adopted by the military orders. Although these orders formed part of the true militia, in practice the habits of the old malitia were not easily overcome. In his letter to the Templars Hugh wrote that the devil sought to corrupt good works: 'ille autem qui semper temptat invisibilis hostis ... suggerit odium et furorem dum occiditis, suggerit cupiditatem dum spoliatis'.³³ Hugh did not consider that the Templars had succumbed to this temptation, because in his view they hated not the man but iniquity, and the infidels on account of their sins deserved to lose what was taken from them, while the Templars merited reward for their labours. Others, however, were not so convinced, and thought it necessary to remind brethren of the military orders, as well as crusaders,³⁴ that they should not fight for worldly glory or gain. When Alexander III issued a bull of confirmation for the order of Santiago in 1175 he decreed that in the annual chapter it should be stressed to the brethren that they ought to fight 'non mundane laudis amore, non desiderio sanguinis effundendi, non terrenarum rerum cupiditate'.³⁵ Similar admonitions were included in the rule of that order, and it was there further emphasised that any booty gained in war should be devoted to the ransoming of captives.³⁶ In the early thirteenth century a further warning was issued by James of Vitry, who in a sermon to the military orders maintained that war should not be waged out of greed and that brethren should be wary 'ne gloriam suam in Christi militia quaerant, vel laudibus hominum acquiescant'.³⁷

According to Hugh, the devil was also tempting the Templars to abandon their way of life in order to achieve spiritual progress, and he explained that he had heard that:

quodam vestrum a quibusdam minus discretis perturbari quasi professio vestra qua vitam vestram ad portanda arma contra inimicas fidei et pacis pro defendione

³¹ *Dialogues, i. 1*, ed. Salet, 34; cf. B. Smalley, 'Ecclesiastical attitudes to novelty, c. 1100-c. 1250', *Church, Society and Politics* (Studies in Church History, xii), Oxford 1975, 119-25.
³³ At Clermont in 1095 spiritual rewards were offered only to those who went on crusade 'pro sola devotione, non pro honoris vel pecuniae aedipston': *Mansi, Collectio*, xx. 816.
³⁴ Gallego Blanco, Rule of St James, 110-12, caps. 30-1; Lomax, *Orden de Santiago*, 295-6, caps. 34-5.
EMERGENCE OF THE MILITARY ORDER

Christianorum dedicatis, quasi, inquam, illa professio vel inlicita sit vel pernictiosa, id est vel peccatum vel majoris professionis impedimentum.

Hugh is here referring to two criticisms, the second of which regards the military order as inferior to some other religious institutions, although not to be completely rejected: it is merely a hindrance to greater progress. This is restated later in the letter when Hugh says that the devil ‘concedit bonum esse quod negare non potest, sed suadet pro majori bono minus bonum relinquendum esse’, and he further explains the objection by adding: ‘sed forte dicitur quia occupatio que vos per exteriora distrait interni proiectus et ascensionum spiritualium impedimentum adducit’. Certainly some outsiders, including St Bernard himself, regarded this form of life as inferior to that of the monk, and corroboration of Hugh’s assertion that the Templars themselves experienced doubts is possibly provided by Anselm of Havelberg, who states that when the pope – wrongly identified as Urban – gave his approval to the Templars, he affirmed that their way of life was of no less merit than that of monks or canons living a common life. Doubts of this kind could also explain why Innocent II in the bull Omne datum optimum placed so much emphasis on the Templars’ obligation not to leave their order. This objection to the military order can obviously be related to the constantly revived debate about the relative merits of various forms of religious life, although the protagonists were usually asserting the superiority of their own way of life rather than questioning its value.

The other criticism mentioned by Hugh was more fundamental, for this regarded the Templars’ way of life as inlicita and sinful: to devote oneself in this way to fighting against the enemies of the faith was wrong. The whole concept of the military order appears to be called into question. This criticism is not, however, discussed in detail by Hugh. Clarification of the issue is to be sought rather in St Bernard’s De laude novae militiae. He devoted a considerable amount of space to reassuring the Templars that to fight and kill the infidel for the sake of Christ and Christianity was not only permissible but also meritorious. The third chapter of the treatise thus begins:

At vero Christi milites securi praeliantur praelia Domini sui, nequaquam metuentes aut de hostium caede peccatum, aut de sua nece periculum, quandoquidem mors pro Christo vel ferenda, vel inferenda, et nihil habeat criminis, et plurimum gloriae mereatur.

To St Bernard this seems to have been the main issue of contention: once it had been established that fighting could be meritorious, he apparently

---

99 De laude novae militiae, cap. 3, in Opera, iii. 218.
100 Dialogus, i. 10, ed. Salet, 100.
101 Hiestand, Registernoten, 204–10, doc. 3.
102 Opera, iii. 217.
saw no substantial objection to combining a religious with a military way of life. Much of St Bernard's argument could therefore equally have been applied to crusaders, and parallels can in fact be drawn between the De laude novae militiae and St Bernard's later crusading encyclical, Sermo mihi ad vos. The evaluation placed on fighting was the central issue in discussions concerning the validity of the military orders is also apparent from later writings. In a sermon addressed to brethren of the military orders James of Vitry claimed that it was being asserted by some that:

vobis non licet pro quacumque causa gladium materialem accipere, nec contra hostes Ecclesiae corporaliter pugnare, abutentes auctoritatibus Scripturarum et frivolas rationes inducentes:

the texts from the New Testament which he listed as being used for this purpose were those which appeared to condemn the use of force, such as Romans xii. 19 and Matthew xxvi.52. Similarly, when Aquinas discussed whether a religious institution could be established for military service, the main objections which he examined were those which maintained that warfare was sinful and a secular matter. In this context reference was made to the Sermon on the Mount and to the decree which forbade religiosi to act as advocates in lawsuits. Aquinas, in response, quoted other texts to show that the use of force was lawful, provided that it was 'non quidem propter aliquid mundanum, sed propter defensionem divini cultus et publicae salutis, vel etiam pauperum et oppressorum'; it was imperfection, or even a sin, to tolerate injuries done to another. He also pointed out that the office of advocate was forbidden to religious only if it were undertaken for worldly motives; the religious life was, therefore, incompatible with fighting only if warfare was a secular undertaking. That discussion should have centred on this issue is hardly surprising, for it was obviously a subject about which the scriptures and other authorities not only had much to say but also contained many conflicting statements. On the other hand, once it had been accepted that fighting could be a charitable activity and that the religious life did not have to be a purely contemplative existence, it was difficult to advance cogent arguments against establishing religious institutions for laymen engaging in military activities.

Since the new attitudes to warfare did not gain universal support, the military orders continued to be subjected to criticism of an ideological nature; and to this was added an increasing amount of hostile comment arising from more practical concerns. The new attitudes had, however, gained widespread acceptance in the West by the early twelfth century,

105 Ep. 363, in Opera, viii. 311-17.
104 Pitra, Analecta, ii. 419. An example of this kind of criticism is provided by Walter Map, De nugis curialium, i. 20, ed. Wright, 32.
106 Summa theologica, ii. ii. 188-3, Blackfriars edn, xlvi. 188-92.
107 Aquinas also considered the argument that fighting is incompatible with the religious life because the latter is a state of penance, and fighting is forbidden to penitents. He pointed out that warfare in the service of God was sometimes imposed as a penance.
EMERGENCE OF THE MILITARY ORDER

and the military orders can be seen as a product of them. There is no need
to seek an Islamic model for the military order, and to have copied the
ribat would in any case not have produced the fusion of the military and
religious life that characterised the Christian orders. In fact, no Islamic
influence on the Temple can be perceived at all without making un-
grounded assumptions, and even then there would still be the obstacle that
the Temple differed in its original function from the ribat. It is far easier
to relate the military order to early twelfth-century Christian society in the
West.
To function effectively, the military orders had to attract both lay and clerical recruits. The former were required primarily for carrying out the orders' military and charitable functions and for administering property; the latter were expected to devote themselves mainly to spiritual matters. Of course, not all of those who took the habit in a military order were capable of assisting in these various tasks, for the custom known as ad succurrendum was common in these orders as it was in many monasteries: some were more concerned to die in the habit than to live in it. It is also true that orders did not rely exclusively on their own members for the performance of necessary tasks. All had both paid and unpaid outsiders in their service. Secular priests were frequently employed in their convents, and in the military sphere orders sometimes received—in addition to the service of vassals and mercenaries—assistance from laymen who voluntarily provided military aid for a term. But the functioning of a military order depended in the first instance on the recruitment of individuals who took the normal monastic vows and promised to spend their lives serving an order. Recruitment to the military orders has until now been the subject of only limited investigations relating to single institutions. This paper, which is concerned with the period up to the middle years of the fourteenth century, attempts a more comprehensive survey and seeks to discover from which areas the various orders drew their recruits; what entry qualifications were demanded of postulants both in theory and in practice (a topic which will involve a discussion of the social backgrounds and ages of recruits); whether an adequate supply of recruits was available; and what were the reasons and motives which led men to join the military orders during the period.

1See, for example, La Règle du Temple, ed. Henri de Curzon (Paris 1886) 325 chap. 632. No doubt most of the confrères to whom the habit was promised intended to assume it only when they were nearing death.

2Ibid. 32-33, 64-66 chaps. 5, 29, 32, 61 of the Latin rule, Alan J. Forey, The Templars in the Corona de Aragón (Oxford 1973) 290; Demecco Manella, La documentación pontificia de Honorio III (1216-1227) (Rome 1965) 251 doc. 339; Bullarium aequitum ordinum S. Iacobi de Spata, ed. Antonio F. Aguado de Córdoba, A. A. Alemán y Rosales, and J. López Agurleta (Madrid 1719) 181-182. Crusaders participating in expeditions in Prussia were often ordered to place themselves at the disposal of the Teutonic order; see, for example, Preussisches Urkundenbuch, ed. August Seraphim, 1.2 (Königsberg 1909) 85-86 doc. 99; but in the Baltic region the military orders apparently also obtained some assistance from crusaders in defending strongholds: Liv-, Est- und Curundisches Urkundenbuch nebst Regesten, ed. Friedrich G. von Bunge, 1 (Reval 1855) 109, 339-340 docs. 91, 257: Preussisches Urkundenbuch, ed. Rudolf Philipss 1.1 (Königsberg 1882) 207 doc. 275.
RECRUITMENT AREAS

Most military orders were linked with particular regions of Christendom and therefore gained the majority of their recruits from a limited geographical area. It is clear from the evidence of names that the Spanish orders drew support mostly from the Iberian peninsula and that the order of Saint Thomas of Acre mainly attracted Englishmen. The Teutonic order relied on German-speaking districts for most of its members, as did the Swordbrethren based in Livonia in the early thirteenth century. But these orders did attract some patronage from a wider area and usually also gained a certain number of recruits from farther afield. Although the order of Mountjoy was primarily a Spanish order, it was also given property in Italy and several of its members appear to have been of Italian origin; the Teutonic order did have some brethren who were not from German-speaking districts; and in 1250 the master of Santiago was dispatching several brothers to Germany with authority to receive recruits.

Yet the Temple and the Hospital were the only orders which regularly drew recruits from all parts of Western Christendom. Precise evidence about the relative importance of different regions in this context is inevitably lacking, but the statements made by Templars interrogated in Cyprus in the early fourteenth century provide an indication of the countries from which the members of the Temple’s central convent came; and presumably the composition of the convent to some extent reflected recruitment patterns. Of seventy-five Templars for whom information survives, forty had joined in France and Provence; eleven had entered the order in the Iberian peninsula; ten had been recruited in the eastern Mediterranean—in Cyprus, the Morea, and Armenia—seven in Italy and four in England, while three had joined in Germany and central Europe. The pattern in the Hospital was apparently not very different. Three of the seven tongues into which the order was divided by the later thirteenth century were French territories, and the other four comprised England, the Iberian peninsula, Italy, and Germany; and in 1302 it was decreed that forty-one of the eighty brethren who made up the military establishment in Cyprus should come from the French tongues, while Spain was to provide fourteen, Italy thirteen, Germany seven, and England five. It is clear that for both orders France was the chief area of recruitment; and the Iberian peninsula—where the Templars and Hospitalers were involved in the reconquista and may therefore have sent only a small proportion of local recruits to the East—was probably second in importance.

Kurt Forstreuter, Der Deutsche Orden am Mittelmeer (Bonn 1967) 214; Friedrich Benninghoven, Der Orden der Schwertbrüder: Fratres milicie Christi de Livonia (Cologne 1965) map 15.
Konrad Schottmüller, Der Untergang des Templer-Ordens (Berlin 1887) 2.166–217.
That France, where there was little competition from other military orders, was the main source of recruits is hardly surprising. The importance of Spain, on the other hand, is perhaps more unexpected; but in some parts of the Iberian peninsula, especially Aragon, the Spanish orders did not seriously challenge the supremacy of the Templars and Hospitalers until the early fourteenth century when the Temple was dissolved.

**ENTRY QUALIFICATIONS**

Entry was not open to all. In the military orders, as in other religious foundations, there were restrictions on membership, and those wishing to join were expected to be free from certain impediments, although in practice some individuals who did not meet the required conditions succeeded in gaining admission.

In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries entry into the military orders, as into other religious houses, was limited to freemen. Although in the thirteenth century knightly descent came to be required of those admitted to the rank of knight, the qualification for entry to other ranks, which usually comprised those of sergeant and chaplain, was merely freedom from servitude. In the Hospitalers' admission ceremony the postulant was questioned on this point: “Aussi mémens vouidriens savoir de vos si vos estes serf d'aucun seignor.” A similar inquiry was made in the Temple of those wishing to be admitted as sergeants, and many Templar sergeants interrogated after their arrest in the early fourteenth century recalled being asked this question. It was not addressed to those who became chaplains in the Temple, but only because “puis que il est prestre il doit estre franc.” Accounts of admission ceremonies do not survive for most of the lesser military orders, but the exclusion of the unfree is frequently made clear in other sources. Bulls issued by Alexander III to the order of Mountjoy in 1180 permitted the acceptance of "bert and those who were servili conditione soluti, as did papal letters sent to Calatrava and San Julián de Pereiro in the later twelfth century.

The extent to which this limitation acted as a check on recruitment in theory varied from region to region, for in the changing agrarian circumstances of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries servitude persisted to a greater degree in some areas...
than in others. But its significance was also affected by the willingness of some lords to emancipate individuals who wished to enter the religious life: Gerhard of Oberwetter, for example, was freed from serfdom by the abbess of Wetter in 1313 when he wanted to join the Teutonic order. The importance of the limitation was of course further dependent upon the rigor with which it was enforced. In the Temple, those admitting recruits were punished if they were found to have accepted individuals who were disqualified: yet it must have been difficult to ascertain the status of applicants who sought admission outside their home districts. How many serfs did this is inevitably unknown, although the records of the trial of the Templars indicate that a large proportion of recruits were of local origin and already known to those receiving them. Templar officials would have therefore often possessed a fairly precise knowledge of family backgrounds. Moreover, for the unfree who were primarily seeking a means of emancipation there were opportunities in towns and new rural settlements during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and to some serfs these would probably have been a more attractive means of escape than entry into a religious order. Those serfs who did enter military orders may not always have been automatically expelled if discovered, for although expulsion is stipulated in decrees of the Teutonic order and at one point in the Templar penal code, at the Templar admission ceremony it was merely stated that if a lord reclaimed his serf the order would return the offender to him. One lord who did so is mentioned in a Catalan version of the Templar customs, where it is related that at the time of Louis IX’s Egyptian crusade a Templar sergeant who had been a serf was reclaimed at Damietta. But for former serfs who left their home districts the risk must have been slight.

Freedom from serfdom remained a criterion for entry into the Temple up to the time of the order’s dissolution, and in the fourteenth century it continued to be a qualification for admission to the Hospital. But in Spain during the fourteenth century, when the Reconquista had come to a halt and when the role of the military orders was changing, entry was beginning to be further restricted. A Calatravan decree dating from the year 1325, which has been quoted in this context, states that the master “non nombre a ninguno que non sea legitimo o fixo de duena, de cavallero o de escudero, que cavallero pueda ser.” The significance of the word nombre

---

15Règle du Temple (n. 1 above) 158 chap. 243.
16See, for example, Edward J. Martin, “The Templars in Yorkshire,” Yorkshire Archaeological Journal 30 (1930-1931) 139.
18Marie L. Bulst-Thiele, Sacrae domus militiae Templi Hierosolimitani magistrum. Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des Tempelordens, 1118–1314 (Göttingen 1974) 340 refers in this context to a comment made by Odo of Chateauroux: “Homines consueverunt accepere signum Templariorum propter liberatum et immunitatem et tutionem”; Jean B. Pitra, Analecta novissima spicilegi Solesmensis: Altera continuatio 2 (Paris 1888) 332. But he may have been referring to those who placed themselves under the lordship and protection of the Temple and had the order’s cross on their property.
19Perlbach (n. 10 above) 127, Règle du Temple 240, 343 chaps. 445, 673.
21Joseph F. O’Callaghan, “The Affiliation of the Order of Calatrava with the Order of Citeaux,” Anna-
is, however, not free from doubt: it could refer to nominations to offices. A clearer, 
though not absolute, restriction was imposed on the order of Calatrava by the abbot 
of Morimond in 1383: "magistro mandamus ut ad suum ordinem personas honestas 
et de genere nobili in quantum potuerit recipere procurer." Later decrees indicate, 
however, that nonnobles were not always in fact kept out.21

It is not altogether easy to discover from which social groups the military orders in 
practice drew the bulk of their recruits in the period up to the mid-fourteenth cen-
tury. Various attempts have been made to trace the family backgrounds of individ-
ual brothers, and the conclusion has usually been reached that the orders attracted 
comparatively few recruits from the ranks of the upper nobility. The importance of 
recruitment from the lesser nobility—from the knightly and ministerialis classes— 
has been stressed. Thus although a few Templar grand masters, such as William of 
Beaujeu, came from leading noble families, the majority were drawn from the mid-
dle and lesser nobility; and similarly, while several Aragonese provincial masters of 
The Temple belonged to the leading Catalan families of the Torrojas, the Moncadas, 
and the Cardonas, most appear to have been of knightly stock, belonging to families 
of no great standing.22 An examination of the social origins of members of the Teu-
tonie order in Thuringia during the thirteenth century has revealed that of one hun-
dred five brethren nine came from comital families and eleven from the free nobility 
(Edelfreie); eighteen were reichsministeriales and fifty-six ministeriales; one belonged 
to a family of free knights and ten sprang from patrician and burgess families.23 
These figures have been conflated to show that sixty-four percent belonged to the 
lesser nobility and twenty-six percent to the upper nobility. An investigation into 
the origins of brethren of the Teutonic order in the first half of the fourteenth cen-
tury has similarly shown that of sixty-four brothers in Prussia and Livonia who came 
from the Saxon province, fourteen belonged to the higher nobility, forty-three to 
the lesser nobility and seven to patrician and burgess families; and also that of 
eighty-nine brethren in the district of Hesse whose origins are known, one came 
from the higher nobility and fifty-one from the lesser nobility; thirty-six were of 
urban origin and one had been unfree.24 Yet such evidence has its limitations. The 
social background of those who held high office in a military order does not necessar-
ily mirror that of the membership as a whole; and more wide-ranging surveys are hampered by the difficulty of tracing the origins of a sufficient proportion of an order's members. The one hundred five brethren of the Teutonic order in Thuringia whose origins have been traced comprise only thirty-one percent of the total of three hundred forty brothers mentioned in Thuringian documents during the thirteenth century, and the eighty-nine brethren in Hesse whose family backgrounds have been identified constitute little more than half of the total number of brothers recorded in that district in the first half of the fourteenth century. It cannot of course be taken for granted that those whose backgrounds cannot be traced were necessarily of lesser social standing, but it is usually easier to discover the origins of brethren who belonged to important families. It should also not be forgotten that complete lists of brethren cannot normally be compiled from the surviving sources; and it would not be unreasonable to assume that those not mentioned in charters and other documents tended to be brothers of lesser importance and lesser standing. That the orders drew only a small proportion of their recruits from the ranks of leading noble families is an argument that can be accepted; but this approach to the question of social origins is likely to produce an underestimate of recruitment among families of modest status.

A different approach is provided by trying to calculate the relative numbers of knights and sergeants during the later thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, for this should indicate how many were of knightly descent and how many were merely of free status. Unfortunately, most documents which mention individual members of military orders do not specify the ranks of the lay brethren named, but there are sources belonging to the early decades of the fourteenth century which can be used to calculate the proportions of knights and sergeants in the Temple and Hospital. The proceedings of the trial of the Templars provide the largest body of relevant material. These indicate that in Cyprus, where the central convent had been located since the fall of Acre, the knights were then in a majority: of the sixty-three lay brethren whose ranks are specified in the records of the trial, forty were knights and only twenty-three sergeants. But only a small proportion of the order's members were stationed in Cyprus at that time, and the preponderance of knights at the Temple's headquarters did not reflect the situation in the order as a whole. In western Europe, where most Templars lived, sergeants far outnumbered knights. Of one hundred ninety-three lay brethren who testified before the papal commissioners in Paris in 1310-1311 and whose ranks are definitely known, one hundred seventy-seven were sergeants and only sixteen were knights. An undated fragment recording proceedings which appear to have taken place in the south of France contains the testimonies of six knights and seventeen sergeants, while of the twenty-two lay

---

*It should also be remembered that the identifications of family backgrounds sometimes fall short of proof, and it could further be argued that to classify all ministernales as nobles is to over-simplify social groupings in Germany.

*Santos A. García Larragueta, El gran priorado de Navarra de la orden de San Juan de Jerusalén (Pamplona 1957) 1257-238 reports that there are references to only twenty-two Hospitaler knights in Navarre in twelfth- and thirteenth-century documents, but this is not necessarily significant.

*Schottmüller (n. 6 above) 2.143-400. Amadi also provides figures showing that knights far outnumbered sergeants in Cyprus at that time: Chroniques d'Amadi et de Strambaldi, ed. René de Mas Latrie 1 (Paris 1891) 286.

*Michelet (n. 10 above) passim. The ranks of a dozen brothers were not specified.
brothers questioned in 1310 in Roussillon—which then formed part of the kingdom of Mallorca—only three were knights. The situation was similar in England, where it has been estimated that not more than fifteen or twenty of the one hundred forty-four Templars traced in the British Isles at the time of the arrest were knights: sergeants were again in the majority. Even in Spain, where the order had still been engaged in the reconquista, knights appear to have comprised only a minority, for of twenty-eight lay brothers known to have been interrogated at Lérida in 1310 nineteen were sergeants, and the majority of those receiving pensions in the Aragonese province in 1319 seem also to have been sergeants. The Templar sources are of course fragmentary, but they are consistent with Hospitaler evidence which survives from the early fourteenth century. Knights seem to have predominated at the Hospitaler headquarters in Cyprus at the beginning of the century, for it was decreed in 1301 that the military establishment there should consist of seventy knights and ten sergeants, and this ratio was only slightly amended in the following year when it was decided that fifteen of the eighty brethren at arms should be sergeants. But Hospitaler surveys compiled in 1338 show that in the West at that time the knights were in a minority: in England, Scotland, and Wales there were seventy-eight lay brethren whose ranks are known, and these were made up of thirty-one knights and forty-seven sergeants; and fifteen preceptories in the priory of Saint Gilles contained thirty-eight knights and sixty-one sergeants.

The preponderance of sergeants in the Temple and the Hospital in the early years of the fourteenth century can hardly be doubted. Yet it might be questioned whether social origins were always accurately reflected in the ranks to which recruits were assigned in an order, and whether all knightly brethren were in fact of knightly descent and all sergeants of no more than free birth. It could be pointed out that in the Teutonic order the master was allowed to accept as knights those who were not of knightly descent, just as secular rulers reserved the right to create new knights; and no doubt there were some knightly brethren who had concealed their nonknightly origins. One who was discovered was a Templar called Oliver, who was sentenced to be expelled from the order, although it was later decided that he could remain with the rank of sergeant. Although officials admitting recruits might be on their guard against such applicants, no proofs of nobility appear to have been required and it
must at times have been difficult to check up on the origins of those who were recruited outside their home districts. But, as has been seen, these probably constituted only a minority.  

There is also the possibility, however, that some members of knightly families were admitted as sergeants. It is true that the recruit to the Temple who sought admission as a sergeant was asked whether he was a knight, and the Templar customs state that

se celui qui fust frere sergent fust chevaliers et il le niast aussi au chapistre, quant cil li demande que le devoit faire frere, et sur ce l’abit de frere sergent li fust dones, et apres il fust arains que il fust chevaliers, l’en li doit oster l’abit et mettre le en fers, et faire li de la honte asses et doner li congie de la maison; quant se il est chevaliers et tels qui le doit estre, il ne peut demorer a la maison en abit de frere sergent.  

The wording of the description of the Templar admission ceremony and of the first part of this clause could be interpreted to refer only to those who were actually knights, but the phrase tels qui le doit estre seems to indicate those who were of knightly descent. It would therefore appear that the admission of any members of knightly families as sergeants was prohibited. Yet another clause in the Templar penal code could be interpreted to signify that recruits of knightly descent who had not been knighted before entry might belong to other ranks in the order:

Nul frere dou Temple por quant que il soit gentils bons, se il n’est chevaliers devant que li habit li soit done de Temple, puis que il ait receu l’abit, ne peut jamais estre chevaliers ne porter mantel blanc si ne fust tel qui fust evesques ou de qui en sus.  

As families were in the later thirteenth century becoming increasingly reluctant—probably for economic reasons—to knight their male offspring, there may have been an increasing number of postulants in this category, and there is evidence from the trial of the Templars which suggests that such men might become sergeants: in his testimony the sergeant Amaury Cambellani said that “multotiens rogavit consanguineos suos, nobiles homines, quia ipse nobilis est, quod transferrent eum ad aliam religionem,” and another sergeant questioned at the same time claimed to be nobilis homo, while the sergeant Peter of Moidies told the papal commissioners in Paris in 1311 that he had been received into the Temple in the presence of his uncle, who was a knight in the order.  

Yet if it is possible that some sergeants were of more than just free birth, the functions performed by many of that rank in the military orders suggest that their origins are to be sought among peasants and craftsmen. The Templars mentioned in the proceedings of the trial in the early fourteenth century include many who were

88Since thirteenth-century legislation failed to create a closed knightly class, there could also be uncertainty about the qualifications of known recruits.  
89Règle du Temple 241, 343 chaps. 446, 674.  
90Ibid. 241 chap. 448.  
92Schottmüller (n. 6 above) 2.43–46. Michelet (n. 10 above) 2.265–266.
described as *agricola* or *agricultor*, and as *laborator* or *laborator agrorum*. Other sergeants were employed as shepherds, cowherds, and swineherds, while among the crafts pursued by Templar brethren were those of smith, mason, tailor, and tanner. The objection could of course be raised that the work which a brother performed in an order is not necessarily indicative of his earlier standing in the secular world, but that brethren commonly continued in the occupations which they had pursued before joining is suggested by an early thirteenth-century Hospitaler decree which states that "quiliber fratrum, intrans religionem Hospitalis, servitio quod ipse in seculo exercerbat in domo Hospitalis utatur, vel alio si exturrerit ei commissum." The evidence is obviously not free from ambiguity or conclusive, but there are clearly grounds for doubting whether in the early fourteenth century the Temple and the Hospital recruited mainly from the nobility: the majority of their members may have been of lesser standing. There is no reason to suppose that this was a new phenomenon, but whether these two orders were typical must remain uncertain. Little evidence survives concerning the proportions belonging to the various ranks in other orders, although it may be pointed out that in Calatrava, where a distinction was made between *milites* and *conversi*, references to *conversi* are very few, while in statutes issued between 1271 and 1274 the order of Santiago appears to have been placing limitations on admissions to the rank of sergeant.

In some orders those who were admitted as knights in the thirteenth century were required to be not only of knightly descent but also of legitimate birth. Knightly recruits to the Temple were asked: "Estes vos de loial matrimoine?" And a Hospitaler statute issued in 1270 stated that only those who were legitimate could be admitted as knights, unless they were the sons of princes or greater lords: the ruling elements in society could obviously not be denied a refuge for their bastards. This insistence on legitimate birth is echoed in some monastic regulations from the turn of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, but the ruling was not applied in the Temple and Hospital to sergeants: it is therefore probably to be linked with the increasing exclusiveness of the knightly class. In Santiago, however, legitimate birth

---

48 Michelet 1.39, 213, 249, 353, 452, 506, 515, 524, 555, 630 etc., cf. Forey (n. 2 above) 281
49 Michelet 1.249, 324, 581; 2.34, 76, 165, 253, 293, 320, 350 etc., cf. Schottmüller 2.21, 50
50 Michelet 2.53, Schottmüller 2.368, Forey (n. 2 above) 280-281.
51 Delaville Le Roulx (n. 8 above) 2.31-40 doc. 1193.
53 Madrid, Biblioteca nacional MS 8182, fol. 44v
54 Règle du Temple (n. 1 above) 234 chap. 431, cf. ibid. 343 chap. 673
55 Delaville Le Roulx (n. 8 above) 3.225-229 doc. 3396 chap. 7. One entrant of this kind was Hermann, the son of Godfrey of Hohenlohe, who was granted a dispensacion *super defectu natalium* in 1297 so that he could hold office in the order: ibid. 3.712-713 doc. 4372.
56 Vincent Hermans, "De novitiatu in ordine benedictino-cisterciensi et in iure communi usque ad annum 1335," *Analecta sacri ordinis Cisterciensis* 3 (1947) 38. The evidence of the Templar customs on this point is to be preferred to the statement that "nus freres ne devoit recevoir autre frere en la religion, se il n'estoit sans de toutes ses membres, et non bastard," made by a French brother during the trial of the Templars: Michelet (n. 10 above) 138. In his testimony to the papal commissioners in Paris one Templar sergeant said that he had stated that he was of legitimate birth at his reception: but he was apparently not asked to provide this information: ibid. 1496.
appears to have been demanded in the thirteenth century only of those who held
castles or were members of the order’s council, and it is not until the fourteenth cen-
tury that the question of legitimate birth is mentioned in the surviving statutes of
Calatrava.32

In the early Middle Ages there had been no age restrictions on recruitment to the
religious life: children were commonly offered as oblates by their parents. But by the
time of the emergence of the military orders this practice had aroused widespread
criticism and it was forbidden in the new monastic orders of the twelfth century,
which often set minimum age limits for admission. The military orders were in-
evitably influenced by these trends. In several of them age restrictions were imposed,
although some of these refer to age at the time of profession and not that at which
recruits could be admitted to the novitiate. No one was allowed to make his profes-
sion in the Teutonic order until he had completed his fourteenth year, and two
clauses in the rule of Santiago suggest that fifteen was regarded as the minimum age
for taking vows in that order.55 Calatrava —like other military orders which had links
with the Cistercians—was governed by Cistercian regulations, which from 1157 pro-
hibited the admission of novices below the age of eighteen.54 No minimum age was
set down in the Templar rule, but those admitted as novices were expected to be old
enough to bear arms and to make a final decision for themselves about entering the
order:

Qui vero filium suum vel propinquum in militari religione perhenniter dare voluerit,
usque ad annos quibus viriliter armata manu possit inimicos Christi de terra sancta
delere eum nutrit . . . . Melius est enim in puericia non vovere, quam postea quam vir
factus fuerit inenormiter retrahere.55

This clause might seem to suggest that the Templars refused to have children in
their houses at all, but in fact most military orders, including the Temple, allowed
boys to be reared in their convents. The rule of the Teutonic order permitted parents
and guardians to place in its convents children who were below the age of fourteen,
and an early thirteenth-century Hospitaler statute mentions sons of nobles and
knights who were reared in that order.56 In accepting children the orders were
no doubt often responding to a need occasioned by the early death of one or both
parents: in 1209, for example, a widow entrusted her three sons to the care of the
Templar house of Zaragoza in Aragon, and a charter in the cartulary of the Templar
convent of Provins relates of a certain Reynald that ‘‘dum dicta Odelina, mater sua,
viveret, primo marito, videlicet patre ipsius Renaldi, viduata, eundem ad dominum
fratrem militie Templi Pruvini adduxit.’’57 It may also not have been uncommon for

32Madrid, B.N. MS 8582, fol. 44v; O’Callaghan (n. 19 above) ‘‘Affiliation’’ 12, ‘‘Definiciones’’ 270.
279.
33Perlbach (n, 10 above) 51; Lomax (n. 22 above) 224 chaps. 19, 20, Enrique Gallego Blanco, The
Rule of the Spanish Military Order of St. James, 1170–1493 (Leiden 1971) 100–102 chaps. 15, 16.
34Joseph M. Canivez, Statuta capitularum generalium ordinis Cisterciensis | (Louvain 1933) 62.
35Règle du Temple (n. 1 above) 25–26 chap. 62 of the Latin rule. No age restrictions appear to have
been laid down in the Hospital, although a statute issued in 1262 decreed that those admitted as sisters
should not be ‘‘in juvenilit aut suspecta etate’’: Delaville Le Roulx (n. 8 above) 3.43–54 doc. 3039 chap.
22; cf. Riley-Smith (n. 7 above) 231.
36Perlbach (n. 10 above) 51; Delaville Le Roulx (n. 8 above) 2.31–40 doc. 1193.
37Forey (n. 2 above) 283; Victor Carrière, Histoire et cartulaire des Templiers de Provins (Paris 1919)
49–50 doc. 12.
the sons of nobles to be reared and trained in a convent belonging to a military order, instead of being placed in a noble household: when the Catalan noble Peter of Queralt asked the Aragonese provincial master of the Temple to accept the son of one of his knights, the master commanded the preceptor of Peñíscola to train the boy "en bons costums . . . axi avetz acostumat." In the order of Santiago it was further envisaged that members' children would sometimes be reared by the order, while in 1182 the Hospitaller master Roger des Moulins reiterated his own order's obligation to take in abandoned children, for whom increasing concern was being shown in the West during the twelfth century. Yet it was usually made clear both in regulations and in individual agreements that children who were reared in the orders' houses were under no obligation to become professed brethren later. On completing their fourteenth year, boys living in the Teutonic order's convents made their profession only "si eisdem pueros videbitur expedire et fratribus placuerit," and a similar provision was contained in the rule of Santiago. Conditions included in individual contracts often echo these regulations. When in 1217 Peter Sánchez of Sporreto arranged for his son to be maintained by the Templars for ten years in their Aragonese house of Huesca, it was agreed that "si ad finem termini vivus erit et voluerit stare in dicta domo milicie et remanere cum suo mobile, bene; sin autem, vadat ubi voluerit cum omnibus rebus suis." And although in 1256 a widow in Mainz had her son received by the Teutonic order in futurum fratrem, it was made clear that he was to be free to leave when he reached an age of discretion. Yet the wording of some agreements suggests that the practice of child oblation did not disappear altogether. In 1164 the Templar commander of Rouergue stated to one benefactor: "ai-mes e-rectuput Raimon, to-fil, e la-maiso del-Temple, qu-en-deu esser fraire en-aquel termini et en-aquella sado que esser posca ni deia," It is also apparent that some recruits to the military orders were allowed to make their profession when they were still children. The Templar Gualardus la Capela, who was interrogated at Cahors in November 1307, said that he had been admitted at the age of nine or ten, and Guy Dauphin told the papal commissioners in Paris that he had

**Barcelona, Archivo de la Corona de Aragón, Cartas reales diplomáticas, Templarios no. 458.**

**Jean Leclercq, "La vie et la prière des chevaliers de Santiago d’après leur règle primitive," Liturgica 2 (1958) 354; Lomax (n. 22 above) 224 chaps. 19, 20; Gallego Blanco (n. 53 above) 100-102 chaps. 15, 16; Delaville Le Roulx (n. 8 above) 1.425-429 doc. 627; cf. Mary M. McLaughlin, "Survivors and Surrogates: Children and Parents from the Ninth to the Thirteenth Centuries," The History of Childhood, ed. Lloyd de Mause (New York 1975) 122. According to Clement III, children were often left at the door of the Hospital: Delaville Le Roulx 1.570 doc. 898.

**Perlach (n. 10 above) 51; Léveque (n. 39 above) 354; Lomax (n. 22 above) 224 chap. 20; Gallego Blanco (n. 53 above) 102 chap. 16.**

**Fery (n. 2 above) 379-380 doc. 13.**

**Johann H. Hennes, Codex diplomaticus ordinis sanctae Mariae Teutonicorum 1 (Mainz 1845) 150-151 doc. 160.**

**Clovis Brunel, Les plus anciennes chartes en langue provençale 2 (Paris 1952) 18-19 doc. 372; cf. Elisabeth Magnou, "Oblature, classe chevaleresque et servage dans les maisons mendiandes du Temple au Xlle siècle," Annales des Mots 73 (1961) 389-390, although not all of the examples quoted were of formal oblation. The wording of early thirteenth-century Hospitaller statutes is ambiguous on this point: Delaville Le Roulx (n. 8 above) 2.38-40 doc. 119; but the puellae mentioned in the rule of the female convent of Sigena may well have been intended for the religious life: Agustín Ubieto Artea, Documentos de Sigena I (Valencia 1972) 18-40 doc. 8; cf. ibid. 42-43 doc. 10, Patent Rolls, 1225-1232 (London 1903) 266.
been about eleven years old at the time of his reception. Another French Templar who appeared before the papal commissioners claimed that he had joined the order when he was ten or twelve, and in Aragon Bernard Belissén told his interrogators that he had become a Templar at the age of twelve.

Yet these were exceptions; and only a minority of Templars appear to have made their profession while they were still in their teens. This conclusion is suggested by the records of three sets of interrogations—conducted in Paris in 1307 and 1310-1311 and at Lérida in 1310—which furnish information about ages and from which the following statistics can be compiled: only 33 of 224 brethren appearing before the papal commissioners in Paris in 1310-1311 only 33 had joined the order when they were below the age of twenty, while of a further 98 who had been questioned in 1307 only 18 had become members while still in their teens; and although 9 out of 31 Templars questioned at Lérida in 1310 were under twenty when they made their profession, they comprise less than thirty percent of the group. Of the 353 brothers in the three groups, only 60 had become Templars before the age of twenty (see table A). The average age on entry of those questioned at Lérida was twenty-five, compared with twenty-seven and a half for those appearing before the papal commissioners in Paris and twenty-eight and a half for the group who testified in 1307. There appears, however, to have been a tendency for knights to join at a lower age than sergeants and chaplains. 9 of the 98 Templars questioned in 1307 are known to have been knights, and 7 of these had entered the order when they were still below the age of twenty, while 6 of the 9 knights interrogated at Lérida had similarly joined while still in their teens. Only a quarter of the knights who testified before the papal commissioners in Paris had professed when aged less than twenty, but this is nevertheless a higher proportion than that of sergeants and chaplains who had entered in their teens. Of the overall total of 34 knights comprising the three groups, a half had become Templars before they reached the age of twenty (see table B).

This information cannot of course be taken as being absolutely accurate and exact.

---

**TABLE A**

Age on Entry to the Order: Templars Questioned at Paris and Lérida

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Paris 1307</th>
<th>Paris 1310-11</th>
<th>Lérida 1310</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 20</td>
<td>18 (18%)</td>
<td>33 (15%)</td>
<td>9 (29%)</td>
<td>60 (17%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-29</td>
<td>39 (40%)</td>
<td>108 (48%)</td>
<td>9 (29%)</td>
<td>156 (44%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>26 (27%)</td>
<td>59 (26%)</td>
<td>11 (36%)</td>
<td>96 (27%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>13 (13%)</td>
<td>17 (8%)</td>
<td>1 (3%)</td>
<td>31 (9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 and over</td>
<td>2 (2%)</td>
<td>7 (3%)</td>
<td>1 (3%)</td>
<td>10 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>353</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE B

Age on Entry of Knights, Sergeants and Chaplains

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Category</th>
<th>Knights Paris 1307</th>
<th>Paris 1310-11</th>
<th>Lérida 1310</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 20</td>
<td>7 (78%)</td>
<td>4 (25%)</td>
<td>6 (67%)</td>
<td>17 (50%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-29</td>
<td>2 (22%)</td>
<td>6 (38%)</td>
<td>2 (22%)</td>
<td>10 (29%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5 (31%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5 (15%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 (6%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 and over</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 (11%)</td>
<td>1 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ii) Sergeants, Paris 1310-11

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Category</th>
<th>Sergeants, Paris 1310-11</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 20</td>
<td>27 (15%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-29</td>
<td>86 (49%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>46 (26%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>13 (8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 and over</td>
<td>4 (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

iii) Chaplains, Paris 1310-11

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Category</th>
<th>Chaplains, Paris 1310-11</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 20</td>
<td>1 (5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-29</td>
<td>10 (50%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>5 (25%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>1 (5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 and over</td>
<td>5 (15%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The proceedings of the trials themselves show that many had no precise knowledge about ages: of many it was merely recorded that they were about a certain age; in many instances ages are given in round numbers; and a comparison of information provided by those questioned in Paris in both 1307 and 1310-1311 shows how fallible this evidence can sometimes be. Although some Templar witnesses provided consistent information on the two occasions concerning age and length of service in the order, several gave the same figure for their age in both of their testimonies, while Pons de Bono Opere's age increased from twenty-eight in 1307 to thirty-five in 1311, and Peter of Blois was reported to be about fifty-five in 1307 but to be quadragenarius in 1311. But these are extreme examples and the evidence is not to be rejected totally, for not only do the various sets of interrogations provide a fairly consistent picture, but members of the order, even if they were unable to state at exactly what age they had joined the Temple, would have known at what stage in their lives this had happened, and would have known whether they were still youths at the time or not.

If most recruits to the military orders were adults, marriage was likely to be a more common impediment to entry than it had been in monasteries during the earlier Middle Ages, although one order—that of Santiago—did not insist on celibacy and included married brethren. Marriage did not in itself preclude entry to the other military orders, and in practice they contained many brothers who had earlier contracted marriages. Yet if a wife or betrothed was still living, her consent had to be obtained, and those admitting recruits were anxious to ensure that there was no possibility of claims being made later by disgruntled spouses. The recruit to the Temple...
was therefore asked "se vos aves femme espousee ne fiancee, par quoi ele vos peust ne deust demander par le droit de sainte yglise." He was told that if he lied, and a claim was later made by his wife or betrothed, he would be put in irons and made to work with the slaves and later surrendered to the spouse. Such threats appear not always to have been effective: the Templar commander of Bellinval informed the papal commissioners in 1311 that the brothers present at his reception had included James of Vauclelles, who was later returned to the wife he had espoused before joining the Temple, and among the issues brought before a provincial council in London in 1312 were the demands which women were making about former Templars whom they claimed as husbands. While some recruits seem to have made their profession without the consent of their wives, others coerced their spouses. When during a dowry dispute in England in 1223 it was argued that Alice, the wife of William Fitzmuriel, could assert no right because she and her husband had entered the Hospital at Buckland, she claimed that "per preceptum viri sui et contra voluntatem suam posita fuit in domo illa." An unwilling wife was not always an insuperable obstacle to entry into a military order.

Parents had long regarded religious houses as suitable places of refuge for their deformed and handicapped offspring. As Ulrich of Cluny had pointed out toward the end of the eleventh century, they were very anxious to devote to the religious life any child who "claudis erit aut mancus, surdaster aut caecus, gibbosus aut leprosus, vel alud quid hujusmodi quod eum aliquo modo saeculo facit minus acceptum." Such recruits were even less welcome in military orders, which needed men who could fight, than in contemplative foundations. In some cases the handicap or affliction would have been obvious to all, but to guard against the admission of those whose infirmities were not immediately apparent the military orders adopted the practice, which is also encountered in other religious foundations, of questioning recruits about the state of their health. Those seeking admission to the Temple were asked: "Aves vos nule maladie reposte?" But the Templar customs contain several clauses detailing the fate of those who were found to have concealed an infirmity, and this suggests that not all recruits were in fact as healthy as they maintained. Regulations were flouted, however, not only by recruits who concealed their afflictions. Those who admitted applicants were sometimes prepared—no doubt under pressures of various kinds—to accept men who confessed that their health was poor.

69Règle du Temple (n. 1 above) 342 chap. 669; cf. Perlbach (n. 10 above) 127; Delaval Le Roulx (n. 8 above) 2.536-561 doc. 2213 chap. 121.
70Michele (n. 10 above) 2.44; Councils and Synods, with other Documents relating to the English Church, ed. Frederick M. Powicke and C. R. Cheney (Oxford 1964) 2 1369-1370. Much earlier Peter the Venerable had claimed that when Humbert of Beaujeu had joined the Temple "ab uxore sua . . . non legitime recesserit": The Letters of Peter the Venerable, ed. Giles Constable (Cambridge, Mass. 1967) 1.411 ep. 173
71Curia Regis Rolls, 1223-1224 (London 1955) 175-176. A brother who was anxious to abandon the habit might, on the other hand, claim that he had been admitted without the consent of his spouse: in the early fourteenth century a brother of the Teutonic order at Mainau supported a false claim of this kind made by his wife: Feger (n. 25 above) 116-117.
72PL 149.635-636.
73Règle du Temple (n. 1 above) 234, 343 chaps. 431, 672. During the trial of the Templars many recalled being asked this question, see also Perlbach (n. 10 above) 127
74Règle du Temple 237-238 chaps. 438, 439.
In the Temple it was ruled that in these circumstances the recruit ought not to be expelled; those who had admitted him were the ones to be punished. Physical or mental infirmity was therefore not necessarily a bar to acceptance in a military order.

Attention was also inevitably paid to the spiritual health of postulants. Papal letters which refer to recruitment often specifically state that admission is to be limited to those who are *absolus*, and at least in some orders applicants were questioned to ensure that they were not excommunicate. But, like other impediments, excommunication constituted no insuperable obstacle to admission: some are known to have entered military orders when under sentence, while for those who repented absolution was obtainable, in some cases from the chaplains of the order they were seeking to join: in 1257, for example, Alexander IV empowered chaplains of the Teutonic order to absolve recruits who had incurred ecclesiastical censure by supporting Frederick II, Conrad, and Manfred.

Since individuals who had entered a monastery or religious order were not allowed to leave at will, the military orders could not freely accept apostates from other religious foundations. This restriction is clearly expressed both in papal letters and in descriptions of admission ceremonies. When Innocent II confirmed the Temple's right to admit clerics, he excluded those who were bound to another religio; and all seeking admission to the Temple were asked "sc vos eussies este en autre religion, ou vos eussies fait vou ne promission." But threats of expulsion which accompanied such questions did not discourage all who had fled without permission from other religious establishments. On one occasion it was necessary for the visitor of the order of Avis to command that "todos llos religiosos mendigantes . . . que fforen recibudos sem licencia de nosso senhor o papa, ou de seus mayores, que ata dous messes que sse tornen para ssas ordenes." The military orders were themselves criticized for not being sufficiently rigorous in vetting recruits. In 1220 Honorius III ordered the Hospitalers to stop admitting apostates from Calatrava, and in the following years the same pope made further complaints against the military orders for receiving deserters from Grandmont. Transfers from one order to another could of course be made if permission had been obtained, but it was envisaged that these would involve the adoption of a stricter, not a less austere, way of life. Frequent transfers to the military orders would not therefore be expected: as Innocent III pointed out in a letter concerning a canon of Arrouaise who had later joined the Hospital, "de laxiore ascendendum sit ad ordinem arctiorem, non autem ad arctiorem ad laxiorem sit.*

---

*Ibid. 238–239 chaps. 440, 441.
*Delaville Le Roulx (n. 12 above) 31–34 docs. 1, 2; Hesand (n. 12 above) 309–312, 315–321 docs. 122, 123, 126; *Bullarium de Calatrava* (n. 12 above) 24; *Registres d’Alexandre IV* (n. 12 above) 1.478–479 doc. 1553; *Règle du Temple* (n. 1 above) 343 cap. 674.
*Bullarium* (n. 2 above) 111.
*Ernst Strehlke, *Tabulae ordinis Thutonici* (Berlin 1869) 381–382 doc. 540
*Marquis d’Albon, Cartulaire général de l’ordre du Temple, 1119–1150* (Paris 1913) 375–378 Bulla doc. 5; Hesand (n. 12 above) 204–210 doc. 3; *Règle du Temple* 342 chap. 670. In the Temple a check was also made to ensure that recruits to the rank of knight or sergeant were not ordained: Michelet (n. 10 above) 1.353, 380, 539, 548, *Règle du Temple* 166, 234, 343 chaps 272, 431, 674, cf. PL 216 890–891.
*Delaville Le Roulx* (n. 8 above) 2 278, 291–292 docs. 1699, 1724; 4 275 doc. 1770 bis, Mansilla (n. 2 above) 250 doc. 358.
ratione aliqua descendendum;''* and when Innocent IV gave the orders of friars permission to allow brethren to move to other approved foundations, he prohibited transfers to the military orders.* Nevertheless, some transfers to military orders were allowed, although these usually occurred only in exceptional circumstances. Honorius III in 1220 was prepared to allow a former Benedictine to remain a Hospitaller on the grounds that his original entry to the religious life had been simoniacal and that he had joined the Hospital after receiving permission from his diocesan to transfer to another foundation.* More common were transfers from one military order to another of individuals who had fallen out with their colleagues. Innocent IV allowed one transfer from Santiago to the Temple because the brother in question ''propter capitales inimicitias quas incurrit non posset absque periculo proprio corpore in eodem ordine remanere,''; and the transfer of a Templar to the Hospital at the beginning of the fourteenth century was permitted ''occasione . . . quorumdam gravaminum et injuriarum intollerabilium et enormium . . . in eodem ordine illatorum.''*3

While the acceptance of individuals from other orders could provoke complaints from their former superiors, there was the danger that recruits from the secular world would be pursued by creditors. Like other religious foundations, the military orders were anxious to guard against claims for debts incurred by recruits before they took the habit. Postulants were questioned about their financial affairs, and at admission ceremonies in the Temple and Hospital it was made clear that any who were found to have given false information would lose the habit and be surrendered to their creditors.*4 In some instances a recruit's family made provision for the payment of his debts,*5 but creditors were not always given satisfaction. In 1182 the order of Santiago found it necessary to secure from Lucius III a privilege which stated that the order was not to be held liable for a recruit's debts if his property had passed to his heirs and that, if there was no heir, Santiago was not to pay more than the sum which the recruit had given to the order at the time of his admission;*6 and in 1222 Frederick II conceded that no one who had been admitted to the Teutonic order should be liable for debts contracted before entry; his heirs and not the order were to be responsible for repayment.*7 The ineffectiveness of the precautions taken is illustrated in a different way by a papal bull issued in 1255 which mentions brothers of the Teutonic order who had become conscience-stricken because of the nonpayment

*1Delaville Le Roulx (n. 8 above) 1.672-673 doc. 1082.
*2Ibid. 2.636 docs. 2381, 2384.
*3Ibid. 2.278-279 docs 1700, 1701.
*5Règle du Temple (n. 1 above) 234, 337-338, 342-343 chaps. 431, 658, 671; Perlbach (n 10 above) 127; Delaville Le Roulx (n. 8 above) 2.536-561 doc. 2213 chap. 121.
*6Wyss (n. 13 above) 1.453 doc. 44.
*7José L. Martín, Orígenes de la orden militar de Santiago (1170-1195) (Barcelona 1974) 333-334 doc. 148.
*8Hennes (n. 62 above) 1.67 doc. 62.
of debts incurred before they had taken the habit; and one Templar who appeared before the papal commissioners in 1311 even claimed that he had joined the order "cum esset gravatus debitis."90

Even if recruits were free from debt, they still had to be maintained. Up to the twelfth century individuals admitted to religious foundations had commonly been expected to make a gift on entry, but at the time when the military orders were emerging canonists were beginning to question the propriety of demanding donations from recruits.91 These views spread only slowly, however, and religious foundations—including the military orders—continued to expect gifts from postulants. Inability to make a suitable donation was therefore a bar to admission. Those admitting recruits to the military orders were apparently often unaware that attitudes were changing; in 1213 Innocent III accepted that simoniacal entries to the Temple had occurred "simplicitate tamen potius quam malitia," and a few years later Honorius III similarly referred to those who per simplicitatem had been admitted simoniacally to the Hospital.92 Innocent sought to combat ignorance by ordering the Templar master to issue a prohibition to all his convents "ne pro alicujus receptione aliquid exigatur, nec etiam sub pretestu subventionis ad exactionem procedatur hujusmodi." He also decreed, in a ruling which foreshadowed the decrees of the Lateran Council in 1215,93 that in future those found guilty of simony—both the recruits and those who received them—should be expelled and transferred to a stricter order. Inability to make a donation was now to be replaced by the offence of simony as an impediment to acceptance in a military order.

In practice, however, the issue was not so clear-cut. The order of Santiago appears to have remained deaf throughout the thirteenth century to current views about simony, for between 1271 and 1274 its general chapter issued a statute which decreed that if the master or commanders gave the habit to anyone other than a knight "denlo commo a sirviente dando de sus heredades a la orden de que la orden se aproveche."94 But a change in attitude is discernible in other orders during the thirteenth century, although—as elsewhere—greater leniency was shown to offenders than was envisaged in Innocent's ruling, the strict enforcement of which would have created practical problems.95 In response to a petition from the Teutonic order, Alexander IV in 1258 agreed to moderate the severity of the Lateran decrees both for those who had entered that order simoniacally and for those who had admitted them. He conceded that some should be allowed to remain in their own convents, while the remainder were to be sent to other houses of the order; if these houses objected, the offenders "ne tanquam oves errantes lupi rapacis morsibus pateant" were to be admitted "tamquam de novo" and assigned the lowest places in choir and refectory.96 The statutes of the Teutonic order seem to reflect this ruling, since they classify simony as gravissima culpa, but do not insist on the expulsion of offenders...

---

90Strehlke (n. 78 above) 373–376 doc. 532; Michelet (n. 10 above) 2:188.
91The subject is discussed by Joseph H. Lynch, Simoniacal Entry into Religious Life from 1000 to 1260. A Social, Economic and Legal Study (Columbus 1976).
93There were also other precedents for the Lateran ruling: Lynch (n. 91 above) 126–127, 151, 156, 182, 184.
94Madrid, B.N. MS 8582, fol. 44v.
95Cf. Lynch (n. 91 above) 204–208
96Strehlke (n. 78 above) 401–402 doc. 595.
from the order.\textsuperscript{97} Templar statutes, on the other hand, do decree expulsion for those who had entered the order by simony; and the surviving account of the Templar admission ceremony shows not only that recruits were questioned about any payments made to brothers or others in order to secure entry but also that they were told that they would be expelled if their offence was later discovered.\textsuperscript{98} Templars who demanded payments from recruits were, however, to lose the habit only temporarily, although they were to be debarred from holding positions of authority over other brethren and were not to be allowed to admit recruits in future.\textsuperscript{99} But a case which occurred during the mastership of Hermann of Peragors shows that practical necessities precluded the strict enforcement of these decrees. A number of leading Templars confessed that they had entered the order simoniacally; the master—aware that the Temple could not afford to lose them—asked the pope to place the matter in the hands of the archbishop of Caesarea, who was well disposed toward the order; and when the culprits had been absolved by the archbishop they were readmitted to the order "de novo, tout aussi comme si n’eussent onques este frères."\textsuperscript{100} This evidence demonstrates, of course, not only that simony did not necessarily incur the penalty of expulsion but also that some recruits were still expected to make gifts in order to secure entry.

That this practice remained common is indicated by various sources from the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. In 1278 it was admitted that many Hospitallers belonging to the convent of Furstenfeld had entered the order simoniacally,\textsuperscript{101} and a number of Templars who were interrogated in the early fourteenth century testified that simony was common in their order. John of Châlons, who gave evidence before the pope at Poitiers in June 1308, said that "nullus recipitur in ordine nisi det magnam pecuniam," and he claimed that he himself had paid 500\,\textpounds{}; and Hugh of Narsac testified before the papal commissioners in Paris in 1311 that receptions "frequenter fiebant per symoniam, data pecunia vel alius equipolentibus."\textsuperscript{102} In addition to the Templars who made specific claims of this kind, there were several others who, while not making definite statements, said that they thought gifts were necessary to secure admission. Audebert of Porta, for example, who was preceptor of Auzon at the time of the Templars' arrest, had given rents amounting to 10\,\textpounds{}, "credens quod alterius non recepissent eundem."\textsuperscript{103} Individuals who were considering joining the Temple might therefore be deterred not only by actual demands for gifts but also by the belief that a donation would be required. And even if orders did legislate against the exaction of money and land from recruits, they still openly made some demands on postulants. A statute passed by the Hospitallers in 1263 decreed that recruits should if possible provide their own clothing.\textsuperscript{104} This was merely enforcing an existing practice, for when Julian Bonats was arranging in 1227 to enter
the Hospital at the Aragonese house of Sigena, he undertook to come equipped with a horse, clothing and a bed, "sicut statutum est in ordini Hospitalis." More significant than this Hospitaler statute were the Templar ruling which stated that recruits to the rank of knight should be knighted before entry and a decree issued by Santiago which similarly stipulated that "si algund omne fidalgo viniese pedir el abito de la nostra orden e quisiere ser nuestro freyre non sea asi rescebido nin le sea dado el dicho abito de ser primeramente cavallero." Evidence drawn from the trial of the Templars suggests that in practice it was not uncommon for knightly recruits to be knighted shortly before entering the order: Guiscard of Marsac, the former seneschal of Toulouse, who appeared as a secular witness, said that he had arranged for the admission of his kinsman Hugh of Marchant "et in die receptionis idem dominus Guischardus fecit eum multirem in magna aula domus Templariorum Tholose," and the Templar Guy Dauphin similarly said that he had been knighted on the day of his admission to the order. But, as has been mentioned, in the later thirteenth century fewer families appear to have been able to afford the expense of knightly sons. Some postulants were admittedly given clothing and equipment by patrons, but the regulations concerning knighting must to some extent have acted as a check on recruitment to the rank of knight in the military orders.

In imposing restrictions on entry the military orders were not innovating: most of the impediments encountered in these institutions are also to be found in other religious foundations. By such regulations a considerable proportion of the population was at least in theory barred from entering the religious life, although it is clear that prohibitions could not always be enforced. It is necessary, however, to inquire whether, despite the attempted exclusion of certain groups, the military orders attracted as many recruits as their resources would allow and as they needed to perform their various functions.

THE SUPPLY OF RECRUITS

Obviously any new religious foundation was likely to encounter recruiting difficulties in its early years, before it had become widely known, and the military orders were no exception. For almost a decade after its creation the Temple expanded little. Although William of Tyre's claim that after nine years there were still only nine members should not be taken too literally, it was not until the order began to become known in the West in the later 1120s that the Templars started to attract widespread support. Mountjoy appears to have found itself in similar difficulties, for in 1180—only a few years after its foundation—it asked the pope to allow the recruit—

105 Ubieto Arteta (n. 63 above) 1.175-176 doc. 118.
106 Règle du Temple (n. 1 above) 241 chap. 448; Madrid, B.N. MS 8582, fol. 44v.
107 Michelet (n. 10 above) 1.183, 186, 417.
108 In 1245, for example, the keeper of the wardrobe was ordered by the English king Henry II] to make provision for a Templar recruit "in robis et aliis necessariis sicut provideri solet regis quibus rex arma dederit": Close Rolls, 1242-1247 (London 1916) 311; see also Close Rolls, 1231-1233 (London 1927) 273; Calendar of Liberate Rolls, 1245-1251 (London 1937) 18.
ment of Brabanzon, Aragonese, and Basque mercenaries, against whom decrees had been passed at the Lateran Council in the previous year.110

While Mountjoy, like several other orders which had only a brief existence, may never have solved the problem of attracting enough recruits of any kind, the international orders seem to have experienced long-term difficulties in finding sufficient clerics who wanted to take the habit. The military orders enjoyed greater popularity in lay circles than among churchmen. Although in 1179 the master of the Hospital claimed to have more than 14,000 clerics in his service,111 many houses of the leading orders lacked a resident chaplain who was a professed brother. Thirteenth-century statutes of the Hospital and the Teutonic order indicate that some houses had no resident priest at all; and in 1338 only eleven out of thirty-four Hospitallers in England and Wales had chaplains who were members of the order.112 Further evidence of limited clerical recruitment is provided by the records of the trial of the Templars, for there were only twenty chaplains among the 213 Templars of known rank who testified in Paris before the papal commissioners, and only three of the seventy-six Templars interrogated in Cyprus are known to have been clerics.113

When examining the recruitment of laymen to established military orders, it is necessary to distinguish between different orders and different areas. Although evidence about recruitment is fragmentary, various sources suggest that in most parts of western Europe the Temple and the Hospital usually had little difficulty in attracting enough laymen. It is apparent that prospective recruits did not always find it easy to secure a place in one of these orders. During the trial of the Templars Guiscard of Marsac said that it had been at the insistence of himself and of William Flote that the son of a Lyon citizen had been admitted to the Temple, and a Templar sergeant who had made his profession about the year 1276 claimed that he had been received only after "instetisset per bienium per se et amicos suos quod recipercetur in dicto ordine," while another, who had taken the habit some twenty years later, asserted that his petition to enter had been supported by the archbishop of Béziers.114 A few years before the arrest of the Templars, the English king had asked the Hospitalers to accept Berenguer Saverteis, who after giving long and faithful service to the crown wished to take the habit.115 Much earlier in England, in the early part of Henry II's reign, William of Harcourt had similarly helped Nicholas Bernhus to gain admission to the Temple.116 Most of the examples drawn from the records of the trial of the Templars admittedly concern the recruitment of sergeants, and it is possible that in some cases where pressure was exerted there was an impediment to entry; but the wording of the thirteenth-century Hospitaler admission

110Delaville Le Roulx (n. 12 above) 54 doc. 2; Hiestand (n. 12 above) 319-321 doc. 126; Giovanni D Mansi, Sacrorum conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio 22 (Venice 1778) 232.
111Riley-Smith (n. 7 above) 235.
112Delaville Le Roulx (n. 8 above) 3.43-54 doc. 3039 chap. 17; Perlbach (n. 10 above) 87; Larking (n. 34 above) 3-101.
113Michelet (n. 10 above) passim; Schottmüller (n. 6 above) 2.143-400; see also Forey (n. 2 above) 272-273.
114Michelet 1.186-187, 359, 449.
115Calendar of Close Rolls, 1302-1307 (London 1908) 354.
ceremony seems to imply that the need to exert pressure was widespread and did not therefore involve only those who failed to meet entry requirements:

Biaus amis, vos requeres la compagnie de la maison et avez raison, car moezt de gentis homes font granz priores et ont grant joe quant il pont metre aucuns de leur enfans ou de leur amis en este religion. 117

Evidence of a different kind indicating the availability of recruits is provided by Matthew Paris in his Flores historiarum, for there he reports that after the battle of Gaza in 1244 "Templarii et Hospitalarii, ad restaurationem jacture suorum fratrum, multos secuales, quos potuerunt eligere, in suum ordinem suscipientes, in Terram Sanctam... succursum destinarunt."118 It may also be pointed out that in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries it was necessary for the Hospitallers to restrict recruitment in order to relieve pressure on declining resources. Because "nonnulli priores sunt nimis onerati fratribus militibus et donatis nobilibus," the Hospitaller general chapter in 1292 forbade the recruitment of knights without the special permission of the master; in 1301, when serious financial difficulties were being encountered in Germany, the general chapter decreed that the Hospitaller prior there should not admit any recruits at all without the license of the grand master; and in 1330 a later chapter ruled that each commandery should have the number of brethren it was considered capable of maintaining and that this figure should not be exceeded without the consent of the master.119

In contrast with this evidence about recruitment in western Europe in general by the two leading orders, there are some twelfth- and thirteenth-century Spanish sources which can be interpreted as indicating recruiting difficulties, although some of the evidence in question does admit of other explanations. The Aragonese records of the Templars and Hospitalers show that at various times individuals were entering into agreements whereby they promised to receive the habit within a fixed period of time: Peter of Barbastro, for example, in 1221 undertook to enter the Hospital at Sigena within three years: "est convenientia quod accipiam habitum Hospitalis usque ad tres annos."120 It may also be noted that in the later thirteenth century—at a time when the surviving documents are becoming fuller and more detailed—the number of Templars who can be traced in some Aragonese convents declines; and about the year 1300 the Templar commander of Mallorca was asking the provincial master to send some brothers who were needed on the island, only to receive the reply that "dels frares que demanats queus enviassem, vos fem saber que nos non..."
That the Hospital needed recruits toward the end of the thirteenth century in the peninsula is apparent from the exemption of Spain from the ban on the admission of knights imposed in 1292. Recruiting difficulties in the order of Santiago are suggested by the dispatch of brothers to Germany in 1250 with powers to admit new members: it was apparently becoming necessary to look farther afield for recruits. And the amalgamation of Santiago with the order of Santa María de España some thirty years later is a further indication of manpower difficulties.

One other area where in the thirteenth century there were problems of recruitment was the Baltic. The amalgamation which took place in 1237 between the Teutonic order and the Swordbrethren was occasioned largely by the Livonian order's lack of members.

Recruiting needs were obviously affected by changes in an order's financial circumstances: a further factor was warfare, which inevitably led to a higher death rate than was usual in religious houses. But some orders were better placed than others to attract the recruits needed to replace losses. The Swordbrethren fighting in Livonia did not possess widespread property or numerous convents outside that region, and they must have found it difficult to compete for recruits in Germany with the more powerful Teutonic order. The fifty brethren who were killed in the battle of the Saule in 1236 could therefore not easily be replaced; and whereas before that defeat negotiations for union with the Teutonic order had made little progress, after it the amalgamation was quickly effected. In the same way, the union of Santiago with Santa María de España was apparently occasioned by difficulties arising from the disaster at Moclín in 1280 when the master of Santiago and fifty-five brethren were killed. The order seems to have been unable to recruit enough new members sufficiently rapidly. All orders involved in the reconquista—including the Temple and Hospital in Spain—depended mainly on recruits drawn from within the peninsula: they did not usually receive supplies of manpower from other western countries; and although as the reconquest progressed an increasing number of their houses became remote from the frontier, these were still expected to provide contingents for campaigns against the Moors. The special problems created by the reconquista are illustrated by the Hospitaller decree of 1292 about the recruitment of knights, for in explaining the exemption granted to Spain it refers to the peninsula as a region "ubi cum Sarracenis assiduatur conflictus." It could of course be objected

---

121 Forey (n. 2 above) 278. Archivo de la Corona de Aragón. Cartas reales diplomáticas, Templarios no. 285; see also no. 371.

122 Bullarium (n. 2 above) 178.

123 See the sources listed in n. 126 below.

124 See following note.


126 Ambrosio de Morales, Ópúsculos castellanos (Madrid 1793) 2.25; Juan Torres Fontes, "La orden de Santa María de España," Miscelánea medieval murciana 3 (1977) 94-93. Juan Menéndez Pidal, "Noticias acerca de la orden militar de Santa María de España," Revista de archivos, bibliotecas y museos 17 (1907) 169-170. As the master of Sta María became the new head of Santiago, part of the problem may have been the loss of senior brethren.

127 The Templars and Hospitallers in the peninsula also had to send brethren to the eastern Mediterranean.

128 Delaville Le Roux (n. 8 above) 3.608-609 doc. 4194 chap. 2.
that by 1292 the reconquest in some parts of the peninsula had been completed, while elsewhere it had come to a halt. But the military orders were still expected to give military service against the Moors; and in the later years of the thirteenth century they were also being summoned by the Spanish kings to fight against Christian neighbors.29

Members of the Temple and Hospital outside Spain were primarily concerned with the struggle against the infidel in the East, but of the men recruited into these two orders throughout western Christendom only a comparatively small number became directly involved in the conflict in the eastern Mediterranean, especially towards the end of the thirteenth century. As has been seen, the military establishment of the Hospital in Cyprus at the turn of the century was only eighty, and only seventy-six Templars were arrested and interrogated there in the early fourteenth century.30 Many Templars and Hospitalers, particularly those belonging to the rank of sergeant, spent their whole lives living peacefully in western Europe.31 Thus only a small proportion was at risk. Those who fought in Syria during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries did of course at times suffer heavy defeats, as at Hattin in 1187 and Gaza in 1244, but very serious losses of personnel appear to have been infrequent: the appeals which Templar and Hospitaler officials in the eastern Mediterranean sent to their colleagues in the West usually requested material aid rather than manpower. When replacements were needed in the East, the problem of manpower there could be fairly quickly solved, at least in part, by calling on existing reserves in the West: when, for example, the Hospital lost forty brethren at the siege of Tripoli in 1289, the master was able to summon reinforcements from western provinces: "ordinaverimus de singulis provinciis ad partes istas de fratribus nostris, pro raparatione conventus nostri, aliquos convocare."32 When heavy defeats were suffered, new brethren obviously had to be recruited quickly in order to fill vacancies either in the East or in western Europe, but this was facilitated by the network of convents throughout Western Christendom which both the Temple and the Hospital possessed; and in many districts there were no local military orders competing for recruits. Therefore—as is implied by Matthew Paris's comment about the defeat at Gaza—even very serious losses could apparently be made good.33

While war influenced recruiting needs, the supply of recruits to the military orders in general might be affected by changing circumstances and attitudes among Western Christians: the reasons which led men to take the habit in a military order were not necessarily constant between the twelfth and fourteenth centuries. It is not,
however, easy to define with any precision the motives which persuaded individuals to enter a military order.

**MOTIVATION**

In some instances entry was not a matter of individual choice, for on a number of occasions new members were gained through the incorporation of existing religious foundations. Anricus of Faverolles told the papal commissioners in Paris that he and three companions, who had previously been *conversi seu donati* of a hospital at Mormant in the diocese of Langres, had become Templars in 1301 when their hospital had been amalgamated with the military order. Yet such amalgamations, though not infrequent, were often opposed by members of the foundation which was losing its identity. The Templars encountered difficulties when they sought to incorporate the order of Mountjoy at the end of the twelfth century and also when an amalgamation with Saint Thomas of Acet was proposed in the later part of the thirteenth. Opposition was similarly voiced when the Teutonic order tried to take over the hospital of Saint James at Andrudtha in the Latin Empire. Such amalgamations were often at best only partially successful; and they commonly involved decaying institutions with few inmates. The military orders therefore gained only a comparatively small number of recruits by incorporating existing religious foundations; and although there were a few individual transfers from one order to another, most recruits were drawn from the secular world.

The reasons which led men to abandon the world and enter a military order were inevitably complex, and are not fully described in the surviving sources. Recruits themselves may not always have analyzed their own motivation very clearly, and no doubt there was room for self-deception. It is therefore difficult to explain the motives of particular individuals. An attempt can be made to disentangle some of the influences at work, but the significance of particular motives cannot be quantified, and it is rarely possible to discern whether they gained or lost in importance.

Despite the growing respect being shown for the individual in the twelfth century and the outlawing of child oblation, parental and family pressure was obviously still an important factor. Although the admission of children was condemned in the Templar rule, it is apparent from its wording that its compilers had no intention of depriving parents of all say in the choice of their children's careers; and the words of the Hospitaler admission ceremony indicate that in practice parents still sought to place their offspring in military orders. This is also revealed by documents in which parents made arrangements about their children's future. When William VII of Montpellier compiled his will in 1172 he decreed that one of his sons should become a Templar, and similarly in 1288 Manfred of Lonning, a citizen of Coblenz, dedicated two sons to Christ and the Virgin Mary in the local house of the Teutonic order.

---

133 Michelet 1.635
134 Forey (n. 5 above) 255-263, (n. 3 above) 494-495
135 Forstreuter (n. 4 above) 73, 237-238, Stelhike (n. 78 above) 132-139 docs 131-139, Registres de Grégoire IX (n. 12 above) 3.94-96, 531 docs. 4917, 4918, 6070
136 See above at n. 55 and at n. 117.
137 Layettes du trésor des chartes, ed Auguste Teulet, 1 (Paris 1865) 100 doc 257. Hennes (n. 62 above)
Even when children placed in the custody of a military order were given the choice of staying or leaving when they reached years of discretion, they were sometimes left in little doubt as to what was expected of them: in 1267 Walter of Nordeck offered his son to the brothers of the Teutonic order at Marburg, "cum fratribus ibidem deo famulantibus perpetuo serviendum, tali condicione, si spontaneus elegerit, cum ad annos legitimos pervenerit, quod optamus," and a later sentence in the document begins: "Si vero, quod absit, apud eandem domum et fratres recusaverit permanere, cum ad annos legitimos pervenerit . . . ." 119 Evidence from recruits themselves is provided by the records of the trial of the Templars. The papal commissioners in Paris heard from Guy Dauphin that he had joined the Temple "ex quo pater et mater ejus volebant," while James of Troyes told them that he had dissuaded his mother from placing his brother in that order. 140

Parental decisions were no doubt in many instances guided by practical considerations—the desire to be rid of children who were physically or mentally infirm or the wish to preserve the unity of family estates by providing a career in the church for younger sons. It might of course be argued that the expansion of Western Christendom, together with the agrarian and urban developments which were taking place throughout the West, provided new opportunities for younger sons in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries: yet territories on the borders of Christendom did not always offer security, and in some parts of western Europe reclamation and resettlement of land were coming to an end well before the close of the thirteenth century. The placing of younger children in the church had, moreover, the weight of tradition in its favor. But it is also to be remembered that spiritual benefits were obtained by offering a son to God, just as they were by donating property. In the admission ceremony of the Hospital it was said to the recruit that

\[
\text{nos recevons l'arme de vos, et de vostre peire et de vostre meire, et de vos parens en messes, en matines, en vespres, en hores, en raysons, en jeunis, en aumonnes, en tous les bien faits, que son fais et se faron en la mayson puisque la religion fu comencee jusques au jour dou juixe;}
\]

and a similar undertaking given by the Temple is mentioned not only in the Templar customs but also in the testimonies of brothers interrogated after their arrest in the early fourteenth century. 141 Some parents may have been wishing to do no more than devote a son to the service of God and gain spiritual reward; and of course this is the aspect which is stressed in the contemporary sources.

The evidence which survives about the ages of Templar recruits implies, however, that parental desire for either material or spiritual advantage was a less important factor in bringing recruits to the military orders than it had earlier been in providing

---

1 276-277 doc 315. William of Montpellier's pronouncement does not, however, seem to have been acted upon: Jean Baumel, Histoire d'une seigneurie du Midi de la France: Naissance de Montpellier (985-1213) (Montpellier 1969) 183-184. A burgess of Montélimar who drew up his will in 1271 even assigned an unborn child to the Hospital: Ursmer Berlière, Le recrutement dans les monastères bénédictins aux XIIle et XIVe siècles, Académie royale de Belgique: Classe des lettres et des sciences morales et politiques, Mémoires, ser 2 18.6 (Brussels 1923) 8.

119Wyss (n. 13 above) 1.185-186 doc. 241.
140Michelet (n. 10 above) 1.257, 416.
141Delaville Le Roulx (n. 8 above) 2 330-361 doc 2213 chap. 121; Règle du Temple (n. 1 above) 345 chap. 677; Michelet 1.360, 382; 2 2, 93.
entrants to monasteries. But if only a limited number of children and adolescents took the habit in the military orders because of parental wishes of this kind, recruits might nevertheless be subjected to other kinds of pressure by families and outsiders. When, as sometimes happened,142 several members of the same family entered an order at the same time, it may be doubted whether all were equally enthusiastic recruits: some were perhaps only reluctantly persuaded by more determined kinsmen. Doubts may also be expressed about the commitment of those who made their profession alongside or at the behest of their lords. Peter of Dusburg reports, for example, that Conrad of Thuringia entered the Teutonic order "cum copiosa comitiva nobilium," and that when Theoderich, margrave of Meissen, was in Prussia in 1272, "XXIII viros nobiles et in armis strenuos de familia sua vestiri fecit in ordinem domus Theutonice."143

Furthermore, although the custom of child oblation had been rejected by the military orders, younger sons were often still in need of a livelihood; and as the custom of primogeniture spread and families possibly grew in size,144 an increasing number found themselves in this category. It could, of course, be pointed out that the average age of Templar recruits in some areas appears to have been twenty-seven or twenty-eight, and that few were just on the verge of manhood when they made their profession. But younger sons would not necessarily commit themselves at once to a lifelong career: it has been demonstrated, for example, that it was common for groups of young nobles, the juvenes, to spend several years seeking adventure and glory in war and tournament.145 And although comparatively few recruits entered the Temple when they were still in their teens, the majority appear to have made their profession before they reached the age of thirty. A considerable number of postulants can, moreover, be identified as younger sons.

To such men, as to some others, the military orders may have seemed to offer a more comfortable existence than the alternatives available in the secular world. The lines of Rostanh Berenguier, beginning

Pos de sa mar man cavalier del Temple,
Man cavall gris cavalcant si solombran,
E lurs cabeils saurs remiran s'enombran . . .

reflect a commonly held view that in western Europe brethren of the military orders led an undemanding life.146 The words addressed to recruits at admission ceremonies show that the orders were themselves aware of this image and, like other religious foundations, they sought to emphasize the rigors of the religious life. In the Hospital the postulant was told that

142See, for example, Delaville Le Roux (n. 8 above) 1.548 doc. 861; Feger (n. 25 above) 51.
143Chronicon terrae Prussiae 1.5, 3.133, ed. Max Toeppen, Scriptores rerum Prussiarum 1 (Leipzig 1861) 31, 116-117; cf. Wojtecki (n. 24 above) 133, 156.
144Robert Fossier, La terre et les hommes en Picardie jusqu'à la fin du XIIIe siècle (Paris 1968) 1282-286.
Those entering the Temple were warned not to be misled by

l’escorche qui est par defors. Car l’escorche si est que vos nos vees avoir beaus chevaus, et
beaus hernois, et bien boivre et bien mangier, et beles robes, et ensi vos semble que vos
fussies mult aise. Mais vos ne saves pas les fors comandemens qui sont par dedans.148

That such warnings were not always effective is apparent from James of Vitry’s critic-
imism of brethren who expected a higher standard of living than they had enjoyed in
the world:

Multi quidem, postquam ad religionem veniunt, tali volunt habere, qualia in saeculo
nequiverunt habere . . . . Audivi de quodam, qui nunquam in tota vita sua in saeculo
super cervical caput reclinaverat, quod ingressus religionem, eo quod una nocte pulvi-
nari caruit, quia abluebatur pannus lineus, qui pulvunar operiebat, totum conventum
conquerendo et mutturalando turbavit.149

James of Vitry also condemned those who, after leading a wretched and poverty-
stricken existence in the world, became arrogant and aggressive once they had en-
tered a military order. To some recruits, membership of an order offered not only an
improved standard of living but also enhanced status. Some may have thought
merely of escaping from serfdom; but for others, entry to a military order offered
further possibilities. Those who have drawn attention to the influx of ministeriales
into the Teutonic order have argued that the taking of vows often led to a marked
change in social standing. It has been pointed out that the ministeriales of the abbey
of Reichenau and of other lords who became members of the convent at Mainau not
only acquired control of considerable property rights at the abbey’s expense but also
in standing came to equal the aristocratic inmates of the abbey. The creation of the
order’s state in Prussia by the former ministerialis Hermann of Salza has been dis-
cussed in a similar context; and it has been demonstrated that throughout the
Teutonic order men of ministerialis origin commonly held posts of authority and
power.150

While those seeking a career might be drawn to a military order by considerations
of these kinds, for the elderly a religious house could be a place of refuge in old age.
In 1258 Conrad of Nürnberg, the Deutschmeister of the Teutonic order, entered in-
to an agreement with a man and his wife which included the provision that "uno
corum mortuo alius qui supervixerit cum bonis omnibus predictis ad ordinem
assumetur, si voluerit, et more solito vestibus iamdicte ordinis indue tur."151 They

147Delaville Le Roulx (n. 8 above) 2.536–561 doc. 2213 chap. 121.
149Pitra (n. 16 above) 2.410.
150Hellmann (n. 25 above) 126–140; Karol Górski, "L’ordre Teutonique: Un nouveau point de vue,"
Revue historique 230 (1963) 288–291; Scholz (n. 13 above) 379, 381–382, 391, 400; Feger (n. 25 above)
114–115.
151Hennes (n. 62 above) 1.160–161 doc. 174
were not proposing to enter immediately, but a place of refuge was being sought for the surviving partner. Possibly in some cases an elderly parent was even coerced into taking the habit by heirs who were anxious to secure control of the family property. But profession in an order was not essential for those who wished to provide for old age: the necessities of life could be obtained merely by negotiating a corody or pension.

Others were seeking to escape from financial difficulties or from the consequences of crime. The Templar Bertrand Guasc, who was said to be "quinquagenerius vel circa" in 1311, stated that he had made his profession twenty years earlier "cum . . . fuisset peregrinus ultra mare et defferent sibi expense." In 1236 the English king Henry III allowed Geoffrey Bauzan, who was then a prisoner in the Tower of London, to become a Hospitaller provided that he left the kingdom and did not return without permission; and by promising to join the Teutonic order Bruno of Berlingerode in 1266 sought to avoid the death sentence which had been imposed upon him at Duderstadt. Yet it is only rarely that secular motives are mentioned in documents relating to the admission of particular individuals.

Both in these documents and in sources of a more general nature greater stress is placed on spiritual matters. No doubt, when recording admissions, scribes were in some instances merely repeating well-worn formulas which did not reflect the true motivation of the recruit. That material considerations were commonly of importance is suggested by the testimony of the Templar knight Guy Dauphin who reported that when he took the habit "pecierunt ab eo quare hoc volebat, cum esset nobilis et dives et haberet terram sufficientem." For many recruits, on the other hand, there was little material advantage to be gained by entering an order. By no means all recruits were younger sons, and it is not difficult to provide examples of men who, in the words of Laurence of Orléans, "lessent quanque il ont pour Dieu, et s'abandonnent a morir pour l'amour de celui qui morut pour eus, ou en la terre douitremer ou ailleurs." According to the prologue of the rule of Santiago, the founder members of that order had been "armorum potentia illustres, temporalium bonorum affluentia locupletes et omni transitorie felicitatis extollentia non parum commendabiles;" and among those who testified before the papal commissioners in Paris was the Templar William of Liège, who said that on entering the order he had

133Michelet (n. 10 above) 2.258-259
136Michelet (n. 10 above) 1.416. It could also be pointed out in this context that on a number of occasions the military orders were criticized for neglecting to fight the infidel and for hindering the Christian cause, which would seem to imply no strong commitment to holy war: see, for example, Delaville Le Roulx (n. 8 above) 2. 489, 523-524 docs. 2120, 2186; von Bunge (n. 2 above) 1.41-43, 726-728, 737-744 docs. 36, 577, 594. But some criticism was merely hostile propaganda emanating from those who were in dispute with a military order, and in judging the activities of the orders it is necessary to take into account the financial and other pressures imposed by war against the infidel.
137See, for example, Wojtecki (n. 24 above) 200-201.
138René A. Gauthier, Magnanimité. L'idéal de la grandeur dans la philosophie païenne et dans la théologie chrétienne (Paris 1931) 294.
abandoned rents worth 200 l.\textsuperscript{158} Although the motives of many recruits were probably mixed, spiritual concerns should not be minimized. It is to be remembered that the military orders began to emerge at a time of renewed vigor in the religious life of the West, in a period marked by the establishment of new orders and religious communities which gave expression to the fervor of both clerics and laymen.

What was regarded as the proper motivation for entering a military order was explained to Templar recruits at their admission ceremony:

\textbf{Vos ne deves pas requerre la compagnie de la maison por avoir seignories ne richesses, ne por avoir ase de vostre cors ne honor. Mais vos la deves requerre por III choses: l'une por eschiver et laisser le pechie de cest monde: l'autre por faire le servise nostre Seignor; la tierce est por estrre poveres et por faire penitance en cest siecle, c'est por le sauvement de l'arme.}\textsuperscript{159}

These motives find expression in many documents of a more particular character. Some emphasize the abandonment of the vanity and evils—though also referred to as the delights—of the world. In recounting the foundation of Santiago, the prologue to that order’s rule describes how the grace of the Holy Spirit "\textit{nonnullus . . . christianos a fastu secularis pompe, ab operibus sathane misericorditer revocavit}"; and when a group of men from Avila joined Santiago in 1172 they gave as one of their reasons the realization that "\textit{presentis vite conversationem noscivis sollicitudinibus et infructuosis laboribus fore plena{m}}.\textsuperscript{160} Similarly in 1219 Henry and Frederick of Hohenlohe joined the Teutonic order "\textit{regno mundi et cunctis oblectamentis seculi contemptis}.\textsuperscript{161} The more positive aspect—the adoption of a life of poverty and penance as a means to salvation—was also stressed. The scribe who recorded Nicholas of Bourbouton’s entry to the Temple in 1145 thought it apposite to quote Luke, 14.33: "\textit{Nisi quis renunciaverit omnibus que possidet non potest meus esse discipulus}"; and in 1175 Alexander III described the brethren of Santiago as then doing penance for the sins which they had committed in the past.\textsuperscript{162} Some took the habit in order to atone for a particular offence. In 1232 Conrad of Thuringia had been in open conflict with the archbishop of Mainz and had attacked the town of Fritzlar; and it was this event which occasioned his entry into the Teutonic order.\textsuperscript{163} At times sinners were apparently goaded into joining an order by what were interpreted as displays of divine disfavor: although it is difficult to accept as literally true Peter of Dusburg’s story that John of Ilberstedt promised to enter the Teutonic order when demons were casting him and the bed in which he was lying into a bog,\textsuperscript{164} among contemporaries the notion that misfortune was punishment for sin

\textsuperscript{158}Leclercq (n. 59 above) 351; Gallego Blanco (n. 53 above) 76. Michelet (n 10 above) 2.8
\textsuperscript{159}Règle du Temple (n. 1 above) 340 chap. 663
\textsuperscript{160}Leclercq (n. 59 above) 351; Gallego Blanco (n. 53 above) 76; Martin (n. 88 above) 226-228 doc. 53
\textsuperscript{161}Hennes (n. 62 above) 1 44-45 doc. 43
\textsuperscript{162}Marquis de Ripert-Monclar, Cartulaire de la commanderie de Richerenches de l’ordre du Temple (1136-1214) (Avignon 1907) 9-10 doc. 7; Albon (n. 79 above) 237-238 doc. 371; Martin (n. 88 above) 248-234 doc. 73.
\textsuperscript{163}Tumler (n. 22 above) 43.
\textsuperscript{164}Chronicon terrae Prussiae 3.350 (n. 143 above) 1.189. Others, on the other hand, might join an order under apparent manifestations of divine favor, as in the story of the knight Hamrec who became a Templar, told by Walter Map: De mugis curialium 1.20, ed. Montague R. James, C. N. L. Brooke, and R. A. B. Mynors (Oxford 1983) 58-60; this is of course merely one version of a story that appears in
was commonplace. In some instances, however, no fuller explanation of spiritual motives was given than the simple statement that a recruit wanted to save his soul: this was the reason advanced by a number of Templars during questioning after their arrest. In whatever way it was described, the desire for salvation was the motive most commonly expressed in documents concerning admissions to the military orders, and this aspect was further emphasized by offers of crusading indulgences to brethren who fought against the infidel. The service to be given against non-Christians was less frequently stressed in documents recording the entry of individuals, and references to the defense of the church or of the Holy Land are comparatively rare. The Catalan noble Bernard William of Entenza, who joined the Hospital at the beginning of the fourteenth century, was unusual in stating that

purissime devocionis integritas, qua erga Terram Sanctam a longo tempore citra accensi noscimur, cuissimodi devotionem nisi sumus pro viribus usque ad diem hodiernam perfectioni dare, in Terram Sanctam venire nos monuit et induxit.167

Yet since recruits to any religious foundation might hope for material benefits and spiritual reward, it is necessary to explain why some chose to enter—or decided that their children should enter—a military order rather than a monastery or other religious community. Although it was sometimes argued that membership of a military order was of less spiritual merit than the contemplative life, to many men—especially in the early crusading period—participation in the struggle against the infidel was probably a more comprehensible way of serving God than enclosure in a monastery, and also more demanding and therefore of greater spiritual value. They would have echoed the hero of the Montage Guillaume who claimed that

Asses vaut mieux ordene de chevalier:
Il se combatent as Turs et as paiens,
Por l’amor Dieu se laissent martirier,
Et sovent sont en lor sanct batisie.
Pour aconquerre le regne droiturier;

and that

Mieu vaut li ordenes de la cevalerie,
Qu’il se combatent vers la gent sarrasine,
Prendent lor terres et conquièrent lor viles,
Et les paiens a no loi convertissent.
Moine n’ont cure fors d’estre en abeie,
Et de mengier et boire vin sor lie,
Et de dormir quant il ont dit complie.
Part of the first of these statements can be compared with the view expressed later by Geoffroy of Charny, who wrote that

qui voudroit considerer les paines, travaux, douleurs, mesaises, grans psaums, perils, frosseures et bleceures, que li bon chevalier, qui l'ordre de chevalerie maintiennent ain-

si comme il doivent, ont a souffrir et seuffrent mainte fois, il n'est nulle religion ou l'en

en sueffre tant comme font cil bon chevalier.170

He maintained that, because of the constant danger of death, knighthood itself could be superior to life in a religious order; but his words could obviously be applied to a military order as well.171

Not all of those embarking on the religious life were, however, prepared to face danger, which might—together with a lack of skill in arms—act as a disincentive to joining a military order. Guiot of Provins admitted that if he were a Templar

Tant sai je bien que je fuse

ja n'i attendroie les cols.172

Similar fears were expressed by Nigel of Longchamps, who also appears to have been reluctant to leave his native land:

Si cruce signatus rubea me confero templo,

Trans mare me mittent solvere vota Deo.173

As the international orders expanded, however, an increasing proportion of their members could expect to live out their lives peacefully in western Europe, without ever coming into contact with the infidel. To such brethren, even if they could not claim the merit of risking death, the work of providing support for the Holy Land may have seemed a more worthwhile undertaking than a purely contemplative existence. Yet in the thirteenth century probably fewer recruits were entering the military orders because of the importance they attached to the struggle against the infidel. At that time appeals for crusades to the East were receiving a diminished response, and some were advocating the replacement of crusades by missionary activity. This waning enthusiasm for crusading in the eastern Mediterranean is reflected in the declining number of donations to Templars and Hospitalers: patronage was being diverted to new ends.174 There were, of course, many who still hoped that the infidel would be expelled by force from the Holy Land, but the growing criticism which was being voiced of the military orders—especially the Templars and Hospitalers—during the thirteenth century must have raised doubts in some minds as to whether the established orders were the best instruments for this purpose. The eastern Mediterranean was of course not the only area of conflict, but as the recon-

quista in Spain was either completed or halted the desire to assist in the struggle against Islam in the Iberian peninsula probably also lost importance as a motive for joining a military order.

170Le livre de chevalerie, in Oeuvres de Froissart, ed. Kervyn de Lettenhove, 1.3 (Brussels 1873) 319.
171The argument could obviously also be used as a justification for not entering the religious life at all
172La Bible, lines 1716–1717, in Les oeuvres de Guiot de Provins, ed. John Orr (Manchester 1915) 63
173Speculum stultorum, lines 2053–2054, ed. John H. Moalely and R. R. Raymo (Berkeley 1960) 76,
see also lines 2064–2068 (ibid. 77).
174Forey (n. 2 above) 57–58: The Cartulary of the Knights of St John of Jerusalem in En-
For those whose motivation was more mundane, a military order had the advantage that the recruit did not have to abandon the world as completely as the monk did: the occupations of secular life, including fighting, could still be pursued. In the early twelfth century Guibert of Nogent had argued that with the introduction of crusading it was no longer necessary to adopt the religious life in order to gain salvation; a later, with the emergence of the military orders, those entering the religious life were no longer obliged to abandon their worldly activities, even if these were devoted to new ends. Nor, despite the warnings given to recruits, was life in a military order marked by the austerity and asceticism which characterized some monasteries.

Whether recruits had any sense of vocation or not, the military orders had the further attraction that they were not as socially exclusive as many monasteries. As has been seen, membership was open to all who were free, whereas noble descent was in practice required for entry into many other religious foundations. Nor did the military orders impose any educational qualifications: those who would gain admittance to monasteries only as conversi could become full members of a military order.

Yet probably in many instances the choice was influenced not, or not only, by considerations of these kinds, but by existing personal, family, or neighborhood links with an order. No doubt boys reared in a convent belonging to a military order in some cases later took the habit in the same order, as did individuals who had been donati or employees of an order. The Templar Peter of Neuilly told the papal commissioners in Paris that he had spent six years in the service of a Templar knight in the East before making his profession, and another Templar witness had been a donatus in the order for about ten years before taking the habit at Chamberau in the Limousin. Many joined orders which already contained one or more of their relations. In entering the Temple in 1145 Nicholas of Bourbouton was copying what his father had done six years earlier; and when questioned after their arrest many Templars stated that they had been admitted by, or in the presence of, a relation. It was also not uncommon for an individual to enter an order which had already received grants and donations from his family.

Some aspects of motivation can thus be defined and discussed, although it is never possible to explain fully why a particular individual took the habit in a military order. It is also difficult to evaluate the significance of the various motives generally, and consequently the effect of motivation on recruiting patterns must remain uncertain. Declining interest in crusades to the eastern Mediterranean would suggest a reduction in the supply of recruits to those orders which fought mainly in that area:

---

170 Gestia Des per Francos 11, in Recueil des historiens des croisades: Historiens occidentaux 4 (Paris 1879) 124
171 See, for example, Berlière (n. 130 above) 14–26.
172 Although in the 1220s and 1230s the Franciscans accepted many uneducated laymen, they soon began to emulate the Dominicans and to make literacy a prerequisite for admission; John B. Freed, The Friars and German Society in the Thirteenth Century (Cambridge, Mass. 1977) 126–127
173 For one who did not, see Michelet (n. 10 above) 1.176–177
174 Ibid. 1.614, 2.215.
yet it is not easy to evaluate exactly how important the wish to defend the Holy Land had earlier been in attracting recruits to them. It could be pointed out that, despite reduced interest in crusading, in most parts of the West the Temple and Hospital appear to have had little difficulty in finding enough recruits during the later thirteenth century; but it must be remembered that their recruiting needs were then being affected by changing political and financial circumstances. Many facets of recruitment to the military orders must therefore remain obscure; but the darkness is not complete.
Novitiate and Instruction in the Military Orders during the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries

In the twelfth century, when military orders were first being established, the custom of child oblation was in decline in western monasteries, and the novitiate was acquiring a new importance. New foundations of monks and regular canons sought to ensure that recruits were subjected to a period of testing and training before they made their profession, while at Cluny Peter the Venerable insisted on a probationary period of at least a month. Since the rules governing their conventual life were based upon those of existing religious institutions, the military orders were inevitably influenced by these trends. They rejected the practice of child oblation and in most cases instituted a period of probation for recruits.

The rule which was compiled in 1128 for the Temple — the earliest of the military orders — made provision for a novitiate, and at the turn of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries Templar regulations were adopted both by the Teutonic order and by the Swordbrethren in Livonia. The customs of the Teutonic order were in turn borrowed several decades later by the brothers of St. Thomas of Acre. Decrees concerning a probationary period were included in a new version of the rule of the Teutonic order drawn up towards the middle of the thirteenth century, and also in the rule which Urban IV gave in 1261 to the order of the Blessed Virgin Mary, which had been founded in Italy and whose members became known as *fratres gaudentes*. The military orders which were linked either directly or indirectly with the Cistercians — including not only Calatrava but also lesser foundations such as Avis — were expected to follow Cistercian practice and therefore also instituted a novitiate, as is clear from some of their decrees.

---

5 Joseph F. O’Callaghan, “‘Definiciones’ of the Order of Calatrava Enacted by Abbot William
It is questionable, however, whether it was ever the norm in the Hospital of Santiago for recruits to undergo a period of probation. A novitiate is admittedly mentioned in a sentence given by a papal judge delegate in 1228 during a dispute between the master of Santiago and the prior of Uclés, who was the head of a convent of clerics belonging to the order: the judge ruled that no one except the prior or his deputy "ad probationem seu ad professionem sui ordinis canonicum aliquem recipiat." But this is an external source and is concerned only with clerical brothers. There is no reference to a probationary period in the rule of Santiago or in Alexander III’s bull of confirmation for the order issued in 1175, and the known versions of the admission ceremony — one of which dates from the thirteenth century — imply that apart from a preliminary questioning of candidates who were not known, there was no novitiate before profession. The wording of the Hospitalier admission ceremony similarly suggests that in the thirteenth century recruits to that order made their profession immediately; and the rule of the Hospital and other Hospitalier documents provide no positive evidence of the existence of a novitiate. Although a frere novice is mentioned in an esgart which is not later than the early thirteenth century, the same ruling also refers to the promission he had made: the term seems therefore to refer to a brother who had recently taken his vows rather than to an individual who was undergoing a probationary period. And whereas in the bull Omne datum optimum Innocent II in 1139 mentioned a period of probation when confirming the Templars’ right to admit clerics, the comparable privilege issued for the Hospitallers by Anastasius IV in 1154 is silent on this point. The twelfth-century evidence concerning these two

---


11 Rudolf Hiestand, Papsturkunden für Templer und Johanniter (Göttingen, 1972), p. 208, doc. 3;
orders is, however, far from conclusive: it is possible that they instituted a novitiate which was later abandoned. There is certainly no obvious reason for their differing at the outset from other military orders in their admission procedures.

Little precise information survives about the testing and training of recruits in the military orders which did establish a novitiate. There are no references to officials who had charge of novices or to quarters specially assigned to new recruits; and the detailed regulations or descriptions of the novitiate which have survived for some other religious foundations do not exist for any of the military orders. The wording of the Templar rule does, however, imply that in that order there was a probatio praevia before the recruit was admitted to the novitiate:

Legatur igitur regula in ejus presencia, et si ipse preceptis expositis regule diligentiter obtemperaverit, tunc, si magistro et fratribus ejus recipere placuerit, convocatis fratribus, desiderium et petitionem suam trium animi puritate patfaciat.14

It was also originally intended that all Templar recruits should be admitted and, presumably, trained in the East; but as the order grew this must rapidly have become impractical. Yet as many establishments of the Temple — and of other military orders — contained only a handful of members, it would seem that there would be very few novices in any one convent at the same time and that the training they received would inevitably be rather informal. There is evidence from the period of the dissolution of the Temple which indicates that on some occasions a group of recruits was admitted at the same time, but this does not appear to have been a general practice.

The most detailed information which has survived concerns the length of the probationary period. The Templar rule leaves this to the discretion of the master, but Innocent II in the bull Omne datum optimum decreed that
clerics entering the order should be on probation for a year, and this may have become the practice for all recruits. Yet it is possible that the pope was merely assuming that a year was the norm in the Temple, since the French version of the Templar rule, which was made after 1139, differs only slightly from the Latin original and leaves the decision to the discretion of the master and brothers. The surviving version of the rule of the Teutonic order refers merely to the _debitus terminus_ of the probationary period, but a late-thirteenth-century decree mentions a probationary year as though that was the norm. Most military orders seem in fact to have followed the Benedictine example by having a year’s novitiate. In 1261 Urban IV decreed that recruits to the order of the Blessed Virgin Mary should undergo a year’s probation, and that was also the length of the novitiate in Calatrava and in other orders which adopted Cistercian usages: this is made clear in several late medieval sources relating to Calatrava and Avis.

These sources show that the orders which were affiliated to the Cistercians sought to insist on a fixed period of probation long after the end of the thirteenth century, even if the reissuing of regulations indicates that in practice they were not always observed. In many orders of monks and friars attempts were similarly being made in the thirteenth century to ensure that all recruits were still subjected to a year’s probation. Other military orders which had instituted a novitiate were, however, less strict. It is not clear how the Teutonic order at first interpreted Templar regulations concerning admissions, but in the new version of the order’s rule which was compiled shortly before the middle of the thirteenth century the period of probation was regarded as a right belonging to the recruit, which he could forgo with the consent of those admitting him. Decrees issued in 1251 might seem to go even further by ordering that “nullus recipiatur ad plenum ordinem nisi

---


20 Federici, _Istoria_, 2: _Codex diplomaticus_, p. 19, doc. 18

21 O’Callaghan, “Dithronones,” pp. 246, 248; Javierre Mur, _Orden de Calatrava_, p. 24. The length of the novitiate in Calatrava is not necessarily indicated, as O’Callaghan, “Affiliation,” p. 13, claims, by the Cistercian statute of 1199 which allowed knights of Calatrava to transfer to Citeaux without a novitiate provided that they had served in Calatrava for a year, the text of the statute is given in _Bullarium ordinis militiae de Calatrava_, ed. Ignacio J. de Ortega y Cotes, J. F. Álvarez de Baquedano, and P. de Ortega Zúñiga y Aranda (Madrid, 1761), p. 31.


23 Perlbach, _Statuten_, p. 51
Novitiate in the Military Orders

abrenuncciet probacioni"; but the inclusion of the phrase ad plenum ordinem suggests that the decree should be interpreted as signifying that no one was allowed to make his profession immediately unless he had renounced his right to a probationary period. That the novitiate had not been completely abandoned is further implied by the wording of a privilege issued by Alexander IV in 1257 — at a time when the order was facing difficult and exceptional circumstances — for in it he confirmed the right to admit those who "propter devotionis sue fervorem petunt humiliter ac instanter a vobis statim recipi et sine dilatione vestrum habitum sibi dari." This concession does not convey the impression that all joined without a novitiate. And a late-thirteenth-century decree stating that a year's probation was not to be demanded of halbbrudere also suggests that there were others who still underwent a probationary period.

In the Temple, on the other hand, the novitiate disappeared completely. During the trial of the Templars no brother sought to refute the charge that "habebant eos statim pro professis." When the change occurred is not precisely known. The section relating to the novitiate was not, as has sometimes been claimed, omitted when the rule was translated into French. It was merely moved and attached to the clause concerned with the minimum age for admission to the order. It has, however, been suggested that the change signifies that at the time of the translation a period of probation was imposed only on young recruits. Certainly by the time of the arrest of the Templars in the early fourteenth century the existence of a novitiate had become very remote. Although a few brothers were then aware that a probationary period was mentioned in the rule and in the bull Omne datum optimum, others thought that postulants had never been subjected to a period of probation: the Templar William Martorell, who was questioned in Roussillon in 1310, admitted that recruits became professed brothers immediately and said that "audivit dici quod sic fuit olim per sanctos patres qui dictum ordinem statuerunt statutum et ordinatum."
The regulations which were adopted by the military orders were not always well suited to their way of life: brothers who were on campaign, for example, or who were living in very small groups in western Europe could not easily maintain the normal conventual routine. When an explanation of the decline or absence of a novitiate is being sought it might therefore be asked whether a period of testing and training was as necessary in the military orders as in other religious foundations. Recruits to a military order clearly had less to learn than those entering monasteries. Whereas in the later thirteenth century novices in English Benedictine houses were obliged to learn the “psalterium, ymnarium, canticularium, regulam monachorum, omnia invitatioria, versus omnium responsoriorum, antiphone et cantica de laudibus et toum comune sanctorum,” most members of the military orders were not expected to participate fully in services. The role of the knights and sergeants was a passive one: they were to hear rather than to recite offices. The Templar customs thus decree that “quant les freres sont au mostier et les matines se chantent, chacun doit tenir silence et oyr le servise belement et en pais.” The lay brothers were merely expected to say a certain number of paternosters for each office. The situation was the same in other military orders. The rule of the Teutonic order states that all should attend the canonical hours, with the clerics cantantes et legentes, and the lay brothers merely repeating a fixed number of paternosters. In the regulations of some military orders it was said that the lay brothers could recite the offices if they wished and were able to do so, but this was a purely voluntary matter; and when the Templar customs refer to the hearing or saying of offices they appear in the latter case to be alluding to the recital of paternosters. Therefore, in contrast to monastic decrees, the statutes of the Teutonic order state merely that brothers should know the paternoster, Hail Mary, and creed. The demands made on lay brothers in other military orders in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries would presumably have been similar, and comparable with those made on men serving in hospitals and on conversi in other religious foundations.

---

31 Documents of the English Black Monks, pp. 73-74.
32 Règle du Temple, p. 171.
33 Perlbach, Statuten, pp. 34-35; see also Delaville Le Roux, Cartulaire, 2:558, doc. 2213; Leclercq, "Vie et prière," pp. 555-54; Lomax, Orden de Santiago, pp. 222-23; Federici, I storia, 2:Codex diplomaticus, p. 21, doc. 18. O’Callaghan, “Affiliation,” p. 28, suggests that knights of Calatrava recited offices with their chaplains, but there is no direct evidence of this practice, which would have been exceptional among military orders.
34 Perlbach, Statuten, p. 35; Federici, I storia, 2:Codex diplomaticus, p. 21, doc. 18.
35 Règle du Temple, pp. 178, 180.
Some recruits, however, obviously needed instruction even on these matters, for the statutes of the Teutonic order command that the paternoster, Hail Mary, and creed should be learned within six months of entry; and a late medieval description of the admission ceremony of the order of Santiago envisages that there might be a recruit who "muy simple fuere e non sopriere commo adorar." Moreover, even if the lay brothers of the military orders did not usually recite offices, they needed to know when to stand and kneel. Like monks, they were also expected to be acquainted with the rule of their order and with other regulations which governed their lives. On some matters, such as fasting, it was sufficient for those in authority to be cognizant of an order's regulations. But since many houses of the military orders in western Europe contained very few brothers, a considerable proportion of an order's members would have needed to know regulations even of this kind, while other observances would have to have been understood by all. There was therefore still a place for a novitiate. But it was of course possible for instruction to be given after profession, and if — as seems likely — teaching during the novitiate was of a rather informal nature, the probationary period might be regarded as important more for the testing than for the instruction of recruits.

Adults entering a military order did not, however, have to reject their former way of life as completely as those who adopted a more contemplative kind of existence. While some members of military orders continued to pursue their former activities as warriors, others were still — as in the secular world — occupied mainly with administrative, household, or agricultural tasks. Hospitaliter statutes of the early thirteenth century clearly envisaged that many brothers would normally remain in the occupations which they had pursued in the world: "quilibet fratrum, intrans religionem Hospitale, servitio quod ipse in seculo exercebat in domo Hospitalis utatur, vel alio si extiterit ei commissum."

Recruits still had to discover whether they could accustom themselves to life within a religious order, adhering to the normal monastic vows and living according to a rule, but there was a case for allowing some degree of flexibility with regard both to the necessity and to the length of a probationary period. A number of texts make it clear that a uniform period of probation for all recruits was regarded by many as inappropriate, and

---

laici, pp. 217, 239-42. On the situation in the Spanish military orders at the end of the Middle Ages, see Gallego Blanco, Rule of St James, pp. 154-52; O'Callaghan, "Affiliation," p. 29.


41 Jean Leclercq, Monks and Love in Twelfth-Century France (Oxford, 1979), p. 15, stresses the problems which adult recruits to monasteries had to overcome.

42 Delaville Le Roux, Cartulaire, 2:98, doc. 1199.
obviously circumstances did vary considerably. Some recruits already had an acquaintance with the religious life through being donati or employees of an order before making their profession. John Fabre, for example, who joined the Temple at Chamberau at the beginning of the fourteenth century, had already been a donatus for about ten years, while another brother who was recruited a few years earlier at Bordeaux had spent six years in the East in the service of a Templar knight before making his profession. Recruits probably also included some who had been reared in convents belonging to military orders, for — although child oblation had been rejected — boys were not totally excluded from the orders' houses. It was perhaps the adolescent recruits with no experience of the religious life who were most in need of a probationary period, but even for some of these it may have seemed superfluous, since the matter had already been effectively decided by their parents, who despite the abolition of child oblation were still expected to determine the fate of their offspring.

The novitiate also provided an opportunity for members of an order to judge whether an applicant was suitable. Yet in practice many recruits were already known to those admitting them. Apart from individuals who had been reared or had served in an order, there were many others who were already known through kindred and neighborhood ties. Baldwin of Saint-Just was received into the Temple at Sommereux about the year 1293 by his kinsman Robert of Saint-Just, and Baldwin himself later admitted his own nephew John of Saint-Just. The Templar knight Humbert of Saint-Georges was present when his nephew Peter of Tolvo was admitted at Neuville, near Châlons, in 1303, and also when another nephew, Aymo of Clermont, made his profession there a year later. And the records of the trial of the Templars mention many other instances of brothers either admitting relations or being present when the latter were received. At other times there were neighborhood ties, as in the case of Pons of Alundo, who was admitted to the Temple at the beginning of the fourteenth century by the brother of his secular lord. Even when there were no such close ties between a recruit and an order, the negotiations with a postulant's family or friends which often preceded admission must frequently have provided brothers with an opportunity to gain some impression of a recruit. Yet only in a limited number of cases could knowledge gained in these ways have provided a complete substitute for a novitiate.

---

43 Michelet, Procès, 1:614; 2:215; see also ibid., 1:199, 2:125, 299; Konrad Schottmüller, Der Untergang des Templer-Ordens, 2 (Berlin, 1887), 61.
44 See, for example, Règle du Temple, pp. 25–26.
45 Michelet, Procès, 1:241, 243, 468.
47 Ibid., 1:206, 265, 507, 575, 605, 611, 630; 2:27, 29, 45, 76, 93–94, etc.
48 Heinrich Finke, Papsttum und Untergang des Templerordens, 2 (Münster, 1907), 343–44, doc. 156.
The factors which have so far been considered indicate that some degree of flexibility was appropriate rather than that there was no need at all for a novitiate in the military orders. The same comment could equally be made of other religious foundations. But the records of the trial of the Templars suggest that in the course of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries the military orders' attitude to the novitiate was also affected by circumstances peculiar to them, for these sources reveal a fairly widespread opinion among Templars that recruits made their profession immediately "ut possent mitti incon- tinenti ultra mare." This evidence is to be taken in conjunction with Alexander IV's letter of 1257 to the Teutonic order, for the pope gave as the justification for his concession the fact that

Most of the military orders at times suffered heavy defeats, and the need to restore numbers as quickly as possible appears in some instances to have been an influence in bringing about the decline or disappearance of the novitiate. It should be stressed, however, that admission procedures were not all equally affected. Despite defeats the Teutonic order did not completely abandon the novitiate, and the orders which were linked with Citeaux and which were therefore under pressure to adhere to the customs prevailing throughout the Cistercian order sought to maintain their regulations unchanged. It should also be pointed out that the decline or disappearance of the novitiate was not a sign of a general relaxing of standards. In military orders, as in any religious institution, there were abuses and also some modifications of observance, but statutes and decrees issued in the thirteenth century reveal that there was still a determination to enforce rules and regulations.

The consequences of the lack of a novitiate cannot always easily be discerned. It is difficult to ascertain whether the absence of a probationary period in orders such as the Temple significantly increased the number of apostates. Obviously some brothers of that and of other military orders discovered, after making their profession, that they were not suited to the religious life, and references to apostates are not lacking. Innocent III in 1209 condemned Hospitallers who

---

* Early regulations of the Dominican order allowed a recruit who was maturus et discretus to forgo the novitiate, but this practice was later forbidden: Heinrich Denifle, "Die Constitutionen des Prediger-Ordens vom J. 1228," Archiv für Litteratur- und Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters 1 (1885), 202; Hinnebusch, Early English Friars Preachers, p. 268.

* Michelet, Procès, 1:523, 528, 607, 2:10, 451.

rejecto habitu regulari, ad illicitas voluptates seculi, quas prius salubriter abdicaverant, tanquam canes ad vomitum, redeuntes, matrimonia de facto, cum de jure non possint, contrahere propria temeritate presumunt, et, tanquam laici secularibus negotiationibus damnabiliter implicantes et diligenter ammoniti, redire ad predictum ordinem aspernantur. . . .

The same was done by Honorius III in 1217 and by Alexander IV in 1255. Yet all religious orders had their apostates, and it is impossible to determine whether desertions were in fact more common in those orders which had abandoned the probationary period than in those which retained it. Several Templars questioned in the early fourteenth century criticized the absence of a novitiate in their order, but the only grounds they gave for their objection were that immediate profession was contrary to the Templar rule and to papal decrees: they did not draw attention to the practical consequences. It should, though, be noted that even when there was no novitiate some steps were still taken to ensure that suitable recruits were admitted, although these measures were limited in scope. At the beginning of the admission ceremony the hardships of the religious life were stressed.

quant vos voudres mangier, il vous covendra a jeunier, et quant vos voures jeunier, il vos covendra a mangier. Et quant vos voures dormir, si vos covendra a veillier. Et quant vous voudres veillier, si vos covendra a dormir, et vos mandara l’en desa et dela en plassa que non vos plaira pas, et vos covendra aler la. Et si covendra que vos leises toute vostre volontes por l’autrui faire, et pluros autres dutes que vos covendra suffrir en la religion que l’on non vos pot dire.

In the Temple such warnings were repeated several times, though all on the same day, and the Templars appear to have been at pains to emphasize the hardships of the life especially to young recruits. Those seeking admission were thus given a brief opportunity to reconsider before finally committing themselves. On the other side, the decision whether to admit a recruit was not left solely to the discretion of the official in charge; in the Temple and Hospital he was obliged not only to consult other brothers but also to accept a majority decision. The account of the Templar admission ceremony refers to consultation at two stages and stipulates that brothers should be

57 This was of course also done by other religious foundations.
59 *Règle du Temple*, pp. 337-41. These warnings were mentioned by many Templars when they were interrogated after their arrest. A brother who was questioned at Poitiers in 1308 said that he had stayed at a Templar house on the night before he was admitted to the order, but there is nothing to suggest that this was a normal practice: Schottmüller, *Untergang*, 2:56.
Novitiate in the Military Orders

asked if they knew of any impediment to admission.\textsuperscript{58} Many Templars when interrogated after their arrest mentioned the practice of consultation, and several remembered brothers being asked if they knew of any impediment.\textsuperscript{60} That there was in fact genuine discussion is suggested by the comment of one Templar who said that at the central convent in the East "difficile erat illos de conventu in recepcionibus concordare."\textsuperscript{61} When the candidate was not known, the decision was presumably preceded by questioning of the recruit, as laid down in the account of the admission ceremony of Santiago.\textsuperscript{62}

In the final resort, it was apparently still possible in the Temple to undergo a form of probation, even though the novitiate had been abandoned as a normal part of the admission procedure: William Boncelli thus told the papal commissioners in 1311 that he had sought admission twelve years earlier at the house of Renneville in the diocese of Evreux "cum stetisset per dimidium annum in dicta domo, ut fratres probarent mores suos et ipse eorum."\textsuperscript{63} But the measures usually employed could have done little to ensure that only suitable postulants were admitted, and it would not be unreasonable to assume that the proportion of apostates was larger when the novitiate was discarded.

If there was no probationary period, instruction had to be provided after the recruit had made his profession. In the Temple this was given in the first place during the admission ceremony. After a recruit had received the habit, the brother conducting the ceremony was required to inform him about the penalties for certain offenses and to give him details concerning sleeping arrangements and the daily routine, including the number of paternosters to be said.\textsuperscript{64} That guidance was in fact normally given at this stage is apparent from the testimonies of many Templars interrogated in the early fourteenth century, although a few reported that they had been told that they would be instructed later.\textsuperscript{65} The manner of the instruction is, however, not altogether clear. The section in the Templar customs recording this part of the admission ceremony was in a form which could be read out to the recruit, and this was probably done on many occasions: Baldwin of Saint-Just, the commander of Ponthieu, informed the papal commissioners in 1310 that

\begin{verbatim}
 in libris eorum sunt certa statuta qualiter vivere debent dicti fratres, ire ad ecclesiam, dicere horas suas et conversari, et qualiter debent se induere, et cingi cordula supra camisiam, et calciare se caligis, et alia facere que pertinent ad
\end{verbatim}

\textsuperscript{58} \textit{Règle du Temple}, pp. 337, 340–41. The impediments in question would, however, have been specific disqualifications, such as serfdom or debt, rather than general unsuitability.

\textsuperscript{60} \textit{Michelet, Procès}, 1:508, 551: 2:86.

\textsuperscript{61} Ibid., 2:222.

\textsuperscript{63} Lomax, \textit{Orden de Santiago}, p. 85.

\textsuperscript{62} \textit{Michelet, Procès}, 2:26.

\textsuperscript{64} \textit{Règle du Temple}, pp. 345–50.

\textsuperscript{65} \textit{Michelet, Procès}, 1:188, 255: 2:36.
An English Templar called William Raven said that when he had been admitted "legebatur sibi regula ordinis per unum de fratribus, qualiter se haberet in omnibus spectantibus ad ordinem." These brothers could well have been referring to the section in the customs which is concerned with the later stages of the admission ceremony. It may also be noted in this context that the most worn part of a Catalan version of the Templar customs is the section on admissions, and many Templars who remembered being instructed at this stage recalled being informed on matters mentioned in the account of the admission ceremony found in the Templar customs. But the comments of Baldwin of Saint-Just and William Raven indicate that the brother conducting the ceremony was not himself always able to read, and it is possible that there were some occasions when no one present was able to do so. Nor should it be taken for granted that a copy of the rule and customs was always at hand when recruits were admitted. Some Benedictine monasteries are known to have lacked copies of their rule in the thirteenth century, and the Teutonic order found it necessary to decree that a copy of its rule should be kept in every house. That some who admitted recruits relied merely on their memory when giving instruction is suggested by the comment, made several times during the trial of the Templars, that the admission of new brothers was entrusted only to members of long standing who knew the rule and regulations of the order. Yet, in whatever way it was done, instruction during the admission ceremony could not have been a very effective method of informing a recruit, who was likely to be confused by hearing a long catalogue of regulations and to remember little of what he had been told.

Some knowledge would inevitably in time be acquired just by living in a community. Templars who did not know when to kneel during services, for example, were told to position themselves at the back of the chapel, and from this vantage point they would gradually have learned when to genuflect. But not all customs and usages could be assimilated merely by observation. Templars were therefore advised in the order's regulations to seek guidance from other brothers if they were ignorant of what they should do. Similar advice was given at the Templar admission ceremony, and a

---

66 Ibid., 1:243; David Wilkins, Concilia magnae Britanniae, 2 (London, 1737), 334.
69 Finke, Papittem, 2:333, 336, doc. 155.
70 Règle du Temple, p. 115.
71 Ibid., p. 115.
72 Ibid., pp. 346, 350.
number of brothers in their testimonies remembered being told when making their profession to inquire, if necessary, of more senior members. Matthew of Tilleyo, who became a Templar at Oisemont about 1276, recalled that the brother admitting him had said that "ubicumque esset in ordine, inquireret ab aliis qui erant antiquiores et qui diu fuerant in ordine modum et observanciam ordinis, et que facturus erat." Others stated that they had been told that they would be further informed later by more senior brothers. But one Templar who had joined the order in England spoke of a more formal arrangement by which he had been placed in the charge of a literate brother sergeant who had instructed him for a month, and a similar practice is mentioned in a late medieval version of the admission ceremony of the order of Santiago. Occasionally recruits appear to have learned directly from the rule and customs: Odo of Bures, a Templar sergeant who made his profession at Villemoison in the diocese of Auxerre about the year 1303, asserted that the brother admitting him had handed him "quemdam parvum librum in quo erat scripta regula eorum," and a secular priest who had been in the service of the Temple at Ribston in Yorkshire testified that a recruit there had been given a copy of the rule to transcribe. Yet this could hardly have been a common method of learning. Copies of rules appear not to have been very numerous, and orders were wary of allowing those which did exist to circulate too freely lest they fell into the wrong hands. In the Temple it was even decreed that "nus frere ne les tenist, nul frere se il ne fust bailli, tel qui le peust tenir por l'office de la balie." Although the testimony of some lay brothers of the Temple indicates that they had read the rule, it may be doubted — even though rules and statutes usually existed in vernacular versions — whether the majority of members would have been able to derive much benefit from possessing copies.

The statements made by Templars in the early fourteenth century indicate that, except in isolated instances, there was in their order no formal period of training for newly professed brothers. Nor is there any evidence to show that those recently admitted were tested to discover whether they had acquired an adequate knowledge of rules and regulations. The only surviving reference to any such examination concerns the learning of the paternoster, Hail Mary, and creed by members of the Teutonic order: a private investiga-
tion was to be conducted by a brother chaplain, and a penance was to be imposed on those who had not mastered them within six months, while brothers who were still ignorant after a year were to be punished by the loss of the pallium.90

Whether there was a novitiate or not, however, the problem was not only to assimilate rules and observances in the first instance but also to remember those regulations which had been learned but which did not become fixed in the mind through daily practice. For some, a reminder was occasionally provided through hearing the instructions given to new recruits during admission ceremonies; but many Templars interrogated in the early fourteenth century asserted that they had attended no admission ceremony other than their own. The military orders also adopted the practice, common in other religious foundations and advocated by St. Benedict, of having frequent readings of their rules: this provided an opportunity to refresh the memory and to acquire new knowledge. The rule of Santiago contains the provision that "infra mensem semel regula legatur,"81 and a decree issued by the Teutonic order stipulates that brothers should hear the rule read at least six times a year.82 But the rules of the military orders were themselves usually fairly short, and much information was contained in additional statutes and customs. This probably explains the further decree of the Teutonic order which commands that the rule and customs should be read to the brothers at three set times each year and that at provincial chapters and on every Sunday part of the rule and statutes should be expounded to those present.83 The latter part of this ruling is paralleled in the Temple by the regulation that in ordinary chapters, which were normally held on Sundays, the brother who was presiding "doit mostrer as freres et prendre consent il doivent vivre; et lor doit prendre et retraire les establissemens, une partie, et des usances de la maison." It is also mirrored in a Hospitaller statute issued in 1293, stating that in all chapters parts of the statutes should be read by the master or by the brother representing him.84 Yet, as has been mentioned, it may be doubted whether all brothers presiding over chapters would have been capable of reading them. The assistance of a chaplain might be invoked, but not all houses had chaplains who were members of the order, and the presence of a brother chaplain could not be taken for granted.85 Nor, as has also been seen, is it certain that all houses possessed

---

80 Perlbach, Statuten, p. 61; for penalties imposed on ignorant chaplains, see ibid., p. 140.
81 Gallego Blanco, Rule of St James, p. 92; this is not, however, stated in the thirteenth-century vernacular version of the rule.
82 Perlbach, Statuten, pp. 63, 71.
83 Ibid., pp. 74, 133-34.
84 Règle du Temple, p. 279; Delaville Le Roulx, Cartulaire, 3:640, doc. 4294; see also ibid., 2:745-46, doc. 2653.
copies of the order's rule and customs. In some instances, if instruction of
this kind was given at all, it may have consisted not of a reading but merely
of an exposition of what the presiding official could remember. Yet not all
brothers of the military orders were able to receive even this limited form of
instruction. Many of the Templars who were questioned after their arrest
said that they had never attended chapters. Admittedly, in some cases they
may have been referring to general or provincial chapters rather than to the
weekly meetings held in each house or convent. But the Templar customs
decreed that weekly chapters should be held only in places where four or
more Templars resided, and there were probably many minor Templar
establishments which did not reach this minimum figure. Certainly some
Templars testified that they had never heard the rule or statutes read.

It is not therefore very surprising that the records of the trial of the
Templars, while showing that some brothers were able to give a detailed and
fairly accurate account of many Templar regulations, also indicate that there
was widespread ignorance and inaccurate knowledge. One of the primary
obligations imposed on Templars was the recital of a fixed number of
paternosters every day for each of the canonical hours and for the souls of
the living and the dead, and four Templars in their testimonies provided
details of these. None of the accounts tallies exactly with any of the others or
with Templar regulations, and one brother — who provided information ut
sibi videtur — gave an account which at no point coincided with what was set
down in the order's customs. The accusation concerning the power of lay
brothers to grant absolution inevitably caused confusion in the minds of
some Templars, but varied opinions were expressed even on more
straightforward issues. The Templar ruling on making confessions was that
"frere dou Temple ne se doit confesser fors que a son frere chapelain, si ne
le feist par grant necessite, et que il ne peust avoir nul frere chapelain; mais
par congie le porroit faire." Although some Templars were aware of and
understood this regulation, many were ill-informed. Some merely expressed
ignorance on the matter; some appear to have thought that there was a total

88 Some Templars said that they had not attended any general chapters: Michelet, Procès,
1:565; 2:41, 68, 80. One brother when questioned at Poitiers in 1308 said that he had never
been present at general or provincial chapters, "sed in particularibus capitulis, que fuerunt
aliquando habita, fuit in predicta balivia de Argentesio, sed in illis capitulis, que non capitula
dicuntur, nihil agitur, nisi cum de negotiis domorum balivie habita fuit congregatio fratrum":
Schottmüller, Untergang, 2:16.
89 Règle du Temple, p. 215.
90 Michelet, Procès, 2:356; Schottmüller, Untergang, 2:29.
91 Règle du Temple, pp. 171, 180, 348-49; Michelet, Procès, 1:194, 213, 384-85; Schottmüller,
Untergang, 2:59.
92 This has been discussed by Henry C. Lea, "The Absolution Formula of the Templars,"
Minor Historical Writings and Other Essays by Henry Charles Lea, ed. Arthur C. Howland (London,
1942), pp. 97-112.
ban on outside confessions, while others maintained that they were at liberty to confess to whom they liked; and some held that only certain outsiders, such as Carmelites, could hear their confessions. There was similarly a variety of answers to the charge that “in recepcione illa faciebant jurare illos quos recipiebant quod ordinem non exirent.” The lack of knowledge displayed by some brothers questioned in Paris in 1310 and 1311 was sufficiently striking to be commented upon in some cases by the papal commissioners: even a chaplain was described as *parum sciens.* When they were interrogated, some Templars themselves confessed that their knowledge of the rule and regulations was very limited: Thomas of Quentin, for example, a sergeant from the diocese of Bayeux who had been in the order for about ten years, admitted that “pauc scit... de factis ordinis, quia erat agricola.” But clearly ignorance was not restricted to brothers who were occupied in agricultural and household pursuits. Those who during questioning revealed their ignorance or uncertainty included a number of brothers who were preceptors and who had charge of Templar houses and convents. That those who held positions of authority were sometimes ill-informed is further apparent from the Templar customs themselves, for these report that the brother who took charge of the Portuguese possessions of the order after the death of the provincial master Martin Sánchez “ne savoit especiauement les establissemens de la maison.” In the Temple, and presumably in other military orders, brothers did not all live in strict conformity with the same set of regulations and usages. There appears to have been a wide variety of practice, which no doubt in some instances reflected regional variations, but which was often caused merely by ignorance and misunderstanding.

The inadequacy of instruction was obviously often linked with the limited educational attainments of those giving or receiving it. Ignorance of rules and regulations was not confined to the military orders, but as those orders demanded no educational qualifications for admission and as they consisted mainly of laymen, many of whom would not have been able to read, the difficulties of instruction would clearly have been greater than in some other religious foundations which accepted only literate recruits. The records of the proceedings against the Templars might seem to suggest, however, that many brothers were lacking in intelligence as well as education. Templars on numerous occasions described themselves as *simplices,* and the papal com-

---

93 Ibid., 1:520.
94 Ibid., 1:555.
96 In the middle of the thirteenth century the Hospitaller grand master was trying to eradicate regional variations in observance: Delaville Le Roulx, *Cartulaire,* 2:745–46, doc. 2653
missioners referred to individual brothers as being “valde simplex vel fatuus et non bene compos mentis sue,” satis simplex, and tanta simplicitate. But it should be remembered that the commissioners were questioning men who had been subjected to torture and deprivation and who may therefore have conveyed a false impression of their abilities, while many of those who described themselves as simplices were seeking to justify their reluctance to defend the order. That their comments should not always be taken at their face value is apparent from the testimony of Gerald of Caux, who at one point referred to himself as simplex miles but who was later described as in jure peritus and showed himself to be one of the best-informed witnesses. No doubt the order did contain men of limited intelligence: one brother questioned in Roussillon in 1310, for example, said that he did not know what habentur pro professis meant, even though the words had been translated into the vernacular for him. But probably in many instances the word simplex should be understood with reference to educational attainment rather than intelligence.

In view of these educational limitations, instruction was likely to be inadequate whether it was undertaken before or after profession. Recruits to the military orders needed to assimilate a certain amount of information, but it was not easy for them to gain the required knowledge at any stage. In the military orders the novitiate was therefore valuable primarily as a means of testing a postulant’s suitability for the religious life. Yet circumstances varied and there was a case for not subjecting all recruits to the same period of probation. In practice military necessity appears to have made a flexible approach to the novitiate more acceptable in some of these orders than it was in many other religious institutions. At least in the Temple, however, military needs seem to have brought about the complete disappearance of the novitiate. When this happened and there was no probationary period, brothers may not have been noticeably worse informed: the main consequence of the lack of a novitiate was probably an increase in the numbers of apostates.

90 Michelet, Proces, 1:27, 358, 557.
100 Ibid., 1:28, 379-94.
101 Ibid., 2:479.
WOMEN AND THE MILITARY ORDERS
IN THE TWELFTH AND THIRTEENTH CENTURIES

Antiquus hostis femineo consorcio complures expulit a recto *
tramite paradisi: here the Templar rule is reiterating the commonly
expressed view that contact with women endangered the morals and
salvation of men leading a religious life.¹ According to the rule of
the Teutonic order, however, there was also a further risk. The will
to fight would be weakened by the presence of women: *viriles ani-
mos per feminarum blandicias frequenter contingat emolliri.*² Yet,
despite these fears, bonds of varying kinds were in fact established
between women and military orders during the twelfth and thirteenth
centuries, and at least four orders—the Hospital of St John, San-
tiago, Calatrava and the order of the Faith and Peace—had con-
vents of sisters dependent on them before 1300.

The links between women and male houses of the military
orders were of diverse kinds, and obviously in many instances
brought no close involvement in the life and work of a conven-
Many women entered into bonds of confraternity with a military
order:³ in return for gifts their names were included in the prayers
said in its chapels and they were regarded as participants in the
good works it performed. Some, especially widows, were placed
under the protection of a military order.⁴ Others were given mate-

¹. *La règle du Temple*, ed. H. de Curzon (Paris, 1886), p. 69 cap. 56; see also ibid.,
pp. 69-70 cap. 72: *Periculosum esse credimus omni religioni vultum mulierum nimis attendere.*
². M. Perlbach, *Die Statuten des Deutschen Ordens nach den ältesten Handschriften*
(Halle, 1890), p. 52 cap. 31.
³. References to them occur not only in individual agreements of confraternity but also
in confraternity lists; see, for example, A. Ubieta Artea, *Cofrades aragoneses y navarros
de la milicia del Temple (siglo XII). Aspectos socio-económicos*, *Aragón en la edad media*,
M. L. Ledesma Rubio, *Colección diplomática de Grisén (siglos XII y XIII)*, *Estudios de edad
media de la Corona de Aragón*, X (1973), 733-4 doc. 60.
rial aid. In some cases this was provided only in times of hardship: in 1196, for example, the Templars of the Catalan house of Gardeny promised to Nina of Talladell that they would give assistance if she became poverty-stricken. More commonly, however, orders provided regular allowances of food or money. These were sometimes in the form of an annual allocation — as in the case of Isabella, the daughter of Robert More, who in 1262 was assigned a yearly pension of 100s. by the Hospitallers of Eterpigny — and concessions of this type clearly brought recipients into only minimal contact with a male convent. But some women received maintenance, either occasionally or regularly, inside a convent. In 1176 the Aragonese provincial master of the Temple promised food to Dominic of Batizo and his wife Mary sicut est nostra consuetudo in domus nostre [sic] de Osca aut de Monson ubi recipere volueritis omnibus diebus vite vestre. As the couple lived in Pertusa, it is clear that they were merely being granted a right of hospitality which was to be exercised whenever they wished. By contrast, the Navarrese Hospitallers in 1290 promised to Elvira Iñiguez de Sada

el pan et la agua en nuestra casa de Bargota et que vos demos una casa en lo qualo vos seades en Bargota en toda vuestra vida et que prengades de la vianda conventual quada dia para vos et pora una mançeba que vos sierva quada dia.

The purpose of some allowances was merely the provision of necessities for those who could not easily maintain themselves: pensions or corrodies for them were purchased with land or money. The annual pension of ten quarters of wheat, ten quarters of barley, two oxen, four pigs, six sheep, five hundred faggots and cash allowances which Agnes, the widow of Richard of Weston, was receiving at the beginning of the fourteenth century had been assigned to her by the English Templars in return for a payment of 100 marks and a gift of a wood and eighty acres of land. Yet some of those who were being maintained by a military order were seeking to share to a certain

5. Forey, Templars, p. 46.  
7. Madrid, Archivo Histórico Nacional (henceforth AHN), Sección de Códices, cód. 499, pp. 7-8 doc. 11; Forey, Templars, p. 46.  
8. S. A. García Larrañaga, El gran priorato de Navarra de la orden de San Juan de Jerusalén (Pamplona, 1957), II. 576-7 doc. 515.  
extent in the life of a male convent. In an agreement made in 1248 the Templar commander of the Aragonese convent of Zaragoza not only promised maintenance to Dominica of Sieste but also assigned her a house in qua sedeatis circa ecclesiam nostram: the location of her place of residence is presumably not without significance. Dominica of Sieste did not surrender all her possessions, but some women who attached themselves to a male convent adopted a monastic form of life, abandoning all their property. They are not, however, always easy to identify. Documents are often insufficiently precise in wording, and employ formulae which could describe a variety of arrangements. Nor are titles a sure guide. Just as the word frater was often applied to men who had merely entered into bonds of confraternity with a military order, so the term soror was used of women who were still living in the world: Aurembaix, the countess of Urgel, gave herself to the order of Santiago as a soror in 1229, but that year was also marked by her marriage to Pedro, the son of Sancho I of Portugal. There are nevertheless some documents which are more explicit.

Templar sources provide a number of examples of women who associated themselves with the order and adopted a form of religious life. The Templar rule itself indicates that sorores had been admitted before 1128; it does not give precise information about their status, but the wording suggests that the bond was not just one of confraternity. After 1128 some women who wished to withdraw from the world still turned to the Temple even though the rule forbade any further admissions of sisters. In Roussillon a certain Acalaidis gave herself to the Temple in 1133 ad servicium Dei faciendum subitus obedientiam de ipso magistro qui ibidem est et in antea venturus est, sine uta proprietate. She further explained that she was giving the order her property propter quod Dominus meus fuit dignatus esse pauper per me: sicuti ille fuit pauper per me, sic volo esse paupercula per illum. A document from the year 1172, which was copied into the cartulary of the French convent of Sommereux, records that Robert Hardels tam cum uxore sua

10. AHN, cód. 469, p. 505 doc. 511.
12. Règle du Temple, p. 69 cap. 56.
propria relinquere et societatem factam suscipere decreverat; 14 and in Catalonia Adaladis of Subirats in 1185 gave

corpus meum deo militaturum et animam meam per oblationem ut hostiam vivam deo placentem sub obediencia et regula domini dei omnipotentis patris et filii et spiritus sancti et domus milicie Templi Salomonis suorumque fratrum. 15

In England towards the end of the twelfth century the archdeacon of Salisbury issued a certificate to the effect that Joanna, the wife of the knight Richard of Chaldefelde, in presencia officialium nostrorum castitatem servare promisit et ut ipse [sic] regule Templi subdat ultimo promisit. 16 Berengaria of Lorach, who is described as donata and soror in thirteenth century documents of the Catalan house of Barbará, was probably also pursuing a form of religious life, for in witness lists her name appears amongst those of the brethren and she is also recorded as giving counsel to the commander of Barbará. 17 Finally, a memorandum written by the commander of Payns, Ponzard of Gizy, which was produced in Paris during the trial of the Templars, mentions the admission of sisters who promised poverty, chastity and obedience. 18 Thus, despite the prohibition in their early rule, the Templars accepted women who renounced their goods and took the normal monastic vows. This practice was apparently not occasioned by any decree issued by the central authorities of the Temple. 19 In an order which expanded throughout western Christendom, however, there was inevitably scope for local initiatives.

The rule of the Teutonic order does by contrast permit the admission of consorores who were to be assigned a special residence away from the quarters of the brethren. 20 It provides no further details.

14. Cartulaire de la commanderie des Templiers de Sommerex, ed. A. de Menon de Louisne (Paris, Beauvais, 1924), pp. 31-2 doc. 20. When Peter of Cintruénigo promised the castle of Cintruénigo in Navarre to the Templars in 1173, the condition was made that if he predeceased his wife, she should retain the castle for life, unless she remarried or ad illam religionem fratrum Templi Salomonis ire voluerit: AHN, Ordenes militares, San Juan de Jerusalén, Castellania de Amposta, legajo 38 doc. 21.

15. Barcelona, Archivo de la Corona de Aragón (henceforth ACA), Cancillería real, pergaminos de Jaime I [III], no. 383.


17. ACA, pergaminos de Jaime I, nos. 716, 1143, 1282.


19. The prohibition on the admission of sisters was still retained when the rule was translated into French: Règle du Temple, p. 69 cap. 70.

20. Pellich, Statuten, p. 52 cap. 31.
about their status, but in vernacular versions of the rule the term *consorores* is rendered as *halpswesteren* and *halvensusteren*, and a decree issued later in the thirteenth century makes it clear that half-sisters, like half-brethren, were obliged to live chastely, obediently and without property. There are also documents from the thirteenth century which refer to the assumption of the habit of the Teutonic order by women. In 1258, for example, the *Deutschmeister* Conrad of Nürnberg made an agreement with a married couple which included the provision that *uno eorum mortuo alius qui supervixerit cum bonis omnibus predictis ad ordinem assumetur, si voluerit, et more solito vestibus iamdicti ordinis induetur.* Evidence of a different kind is provided by a charter drawn up in 1254 concerning a hospital which had been founded at Sterzing: it records that the founder's widow had not only subjected the hospital to the Teutonic order but also decreed that the brethren and sisters resident there should live according to the Teutonic order's rule.

Little is known of the form of life adopted by women who early associated themselves with the Hospital of St John or with Calatrava, but presumably both the Hospitaller sisters in England who were brought together to live at Buckland in the later twelfth century and also the *moniales* of Calatrava who were assembled at San Felices de los Barrios in the early thirteenth century were already leading a regular life before they took up residence in these convents.

In the rule of the Teutonic order the admission of *consorores* is explained by the comment that *quedam infirmorum in hospitalibus et pecorum obsequia apcius per muliebrem sexum efficiuntur*: it was clearly envisaged that they would undertake hospitaler and menial functions. The assumption has often been made that at an early stage the sisters of the Hospital of St John were similarly employed in caring for pilgrims and the sick, although it has also been argued that when female convents were established this activity was aban-

---

24. See below, p. 72.
doned in favour of a more contemplative form of life. In support of the first contention it may be pointed out that in the twelfth century care was provided in the Hospital for women as well as for men; that the Teutonic order, which did employ consorores in this capacity, was said to have imitated the Hospital in pauperibus et infirmis; and that hospitals founded in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries did usually contain both fratres and sorores. Yet whereas the rules and statutes of other hospitals commonly make reference to sisters, the Hospitaller rule mentions only fratres, even though it contains a section concerning the care of the sick; and when later hospitals adopted some of the regulations of the Hospital of St John, the word sorores was added where necessary. It should also be noted that in statutes drawn up for the Hospital of St John in 1182 the tasks of washing the sick, making their beds and preparing their food were assigned to servientes. Moreover, if Hospitaller sisters in England had been caring for the sick in the twelfth century, it would seem unlikely that there would have been only one or at most two resident in any commandery, as was the case before they were dispatched to Buckland; and if it is accepted that prayer rather than charitable work was the primary function of newly-founded convents of Hospitaller sisters, it may be questioned whether women who had previously been employed in caring for the sick could easily have made the transition to a life of prayer, which would have required a certain amount of liturgical knowledge.

Since the Temple and Calatrava did not normally undertake hospitaler duties, this function cannot be attributed to women who associated themselves with male houses of these orders. There were, of course, other domestic tasks to be performed, but even if these

27. Delaville le Roulx, Cartulaire, I. 425-8 doc. 627; John of Würzburg, Descriptio Terrae Sanctae, cap. 11, in Migne, Patrologia latina, CLV. 1085.
30. Delaville le Roulx, Cartulaire, I. 425-8 doc. 70.
32. Delaville le Roulx, Cartulaire, I. 425-8 doc. 627.
34. In many hospitals sisters and lay brothers were expected merely to recite a certain number of paternosters for each office: Le Grand, Statuts, pp. 18-19, 37, 46, 65, 108, 121.
were carried out by women, the latter were not necessarily leading a religious life. In the south of Europe there was the possibility of using slave labour, although in practice the employment of female slaves appears to have been rare in the military orders. Inventories compiled in Aragon in 1289 indicate that Templar houses often owned a considerable number of slaves, but almost all were male: the convent of Monzón was the only one which possessed a female slave. Women were, however, more commonly employed for pay. In a Hospitaller survey compiled in 1338 lotrices are listed among the paid employees of several English houses, and an inventory of Templar possessions at Baugy drawn up after the arrest of the brethren in 1307 notes that three women were employed for pay in the dairy there. In the following year, after the surrender of the Templar stronghold of Castellote, the Aragonese king James II ordered that the women who had been in the service of the order there should receive the wages owed to them; James was therefore doing nothing out of the ordinary when, in making provision for Templars held in custody in the convent of Valencia, he further commanded in 1308 that two women should be paid for carrying water and performing other necessary domestic duties. Although earlier evidence of women in the pay of the military orders is difficult to find, the practice of employing women in this way was not uncommon in male religious houses, and there is no reason to suppose that in the fourteenth century the military orders were departing from earlier custom.

It should not therefore be assumed that all the women adopting a form of religious life at a house of a military order were undertaking hospitaller or domestic duties: for some the religious life may have been an end in itself. Positive evidence is inevitably lacking, but —partly because of the limited number and exclusiveness of nunneries in the West— it was not unusual for women to abandon the world and adopt a life of piety and devotion in the vicinity of churches or alongside male religious houses: recluses accommodated in buildings adjacent to monasteries are recorded in all parts of

35. J. MIÑET y SANS, «Inventaris de les cases del Temple de la Corona d'Aragó en 1289», Boletín de la Real Academia de Buenas Letras de Barcelona, VI (1911), 63-9; Forey, Templars, p. 285.
37. ACA, Cancillería real, registro 291, fols. 164v-165.
38. Ibid., fol. 136; for other similar instructions, see ibid., fols. 147-147v, 266v-267.
western Christendom. Of course, some of those who gave themselves to military orders just wanted to be buried in the habit: an early-thirteenth-century Hospitalier document from the Dauphiné, for example, contains the promise made to one woman that si prius moreretur quam maritus ejus sepeliretur sicut soror cum cruce. But others—including wives of male recruits—may have been intending to live a life of devotion and prayer.

Until the later twelfth century this could only be done by establishing ties with a male house, but in the closing decades of that century the first female convents dependent on military orders begin to appear. To trace the history of the foundation of houses for women is, however, no easy task. The evidence is often sparse and there is sometimes the difficulty of determining whether the sources are referring to a female convent, with its own officials, or merely to a group of sisters attached to a male house. It is clear, however, that the number of convents for women was relatively small.

This is apparent from an examination of Hospitalier foundations in England, Aragon and France—the areas for which the fullest information is available. In England, Buckland was the only house of Hospitalier sisters which endured for any length of time. It was founded towards the end of Henry II's reign and survived until the sixteenth century. In the early thirteenth century Margaret of Lacy did subject to the Hospital the house for women which she was founding at Acornbury in Herefordshire, but after a prolonged dispute in the 1230s it severed its links with the Hospitaliers. Some sisters are also known to have been resident at Hampton in Middlesex in 1227—in that year Henry III allowed the Hospitaliers to keep dogs to guard the house there in qua manent sorores ordinis Hospitalis—but this is the only reference to sisters at Hampton in the thirteenth century and they may not have formed a separate community.

40. For surveys of the history of Buckland, see Victoria History of Somerset, II (London, 1911), 148-50; Hugo, History of Buckland.
42. Ibid., II. 362 doc. 1858; Calendar of Charter Rolls, 1226-1257 (London, 1903), p. 30.
In Aragon Alfonso II sought to found a house for Hospitaller sisters in 1177: as an endowment he granted the castle and township of Grisén, near Zaragoza. But references to sisters of Grisén cease after 1178, and that the convent there foundered is apparent from records concerning the establishment of a new house at Sigena in 1187 for it was then decreed that all Hospitaller sisters in the castellany of Amposta should reside at Sigena. At the end of the twelfth century Sigena was apparently the only female convent belonging to the Hospitallers in Aragon, but shortly after 1200 references to sisters begin to occur in the documents of San Salvador de Isot, and for part of the thirteenth century there was a comendatrix exercising authority there. In the middle of the thirteenth century several sisters, including a comendatrix, were again resident for a brief period at Grisén, but a more permanent establishment was founded at that time at Alguaire, to the north of Lérida. The original intention had been to create a convent for sisters at Cervera, farther to the east, and the castellan of Amposta had assigned the commandery of Cervera for this purpose, but in 1250 it was agreed that the foundation should be at Alguaire. But no further convents of Hospitaller sisters were established in Aragon before 1300.

At that time there were no more that three in France. In 1259 Guibert of Thémines and his wife Aigline subjected to the Hospital of St John the house which they had founded at Beaulieu, in the diocese of Cahors, and this became a convent for sisters; in 1297 the Hospitaller grand master William of Villaret assigned the order's house at Fieux, in the priory of Auvergne, to Bonsom of Thémines, who undertook to establish a convent of Hospitaller sisters there; and lastly, in the next year an existing foundation at Martel was apparently subjected to the sisters of Beaulieu.
The only other military order which possessed several female convents by 1300 was Santiago. In the later thirteenth century it had six, all of them situated in the Iberian peninsula. Sta Eufemia de Cozuelos in northern Castile was a house of canons when it was given to Santiago by Alfonso VIII in 1186, but at the end of the twelfth century it became a convent for sisters. In 1194 San Felices de los Barrios, whose origins can be traced back to the year 1219, was the only female house attached to Calatrava in the thirteenth century.


54. Lomax, Orden de Santiago, pp. 81-2; J. González, Alfonso IX (Madrid, 1944), II. 548 doc. 434; Bullarium S. Iacobi, pp. 209-10.


58. Ibid., pp. 376-7 doc. 1.

Since foundations for sisters were few, there was in some orders a marked contrast in the numbers of male and female houses: whereas new establishments for brethren were rapidly created as an order's property increased, none of the military orders possessed much more than a handful of convents for sisters. A difference may also often be noted in the manner in which male and female houses were established. While patrons assigned property specifically for the foundation of convents for sisters, the purpose of grants to brethren of the military orders was usually to provide financial aid for the struggle against the infidel. In many parts of the West new houses for men were established not as the result of a single act of endowment but when the growth of an order's property in a particular district required the creation of a new administrative centre.

One reason for the establishment of the first female houses was the desire to bring together the women who were attached to male convents. Buckland was assigned to the Hospitallers so that sisters formerly resident at Standon, Hampton, Carbrook and other English commanderies could be transferred there. In 1220 the Cistercian general chapter similarly gave permission to the brethren of Calatrava moniales dispersae in unum congregare et includere in loco competent et distanti a Calatrava per duas aut tres dietas. This concession is obviously linked with an agreement made in the previous year between the master of Calatrava and Garcia Gutiérrez and his wife, who had decided to found a house in qua vivant sorores Calatravenses, ut conventualiter habitent atque ibidem suum ordinem servent. The desire to have sisters living together is further indicated by decrees stating that sisters should live only in the houses established for them. This was stipulated when Buckland was founded as well as when Sigena was set up in 1187. In this way sisters were not only able to share fully in a conventual form of life but also freed from the moral dangers which might arise if they were attached to male houses.

---

61. J. M. Cantvez, Statuta capitulorum generalium ordinis Cisterciensis, I (Louvain, 1933), 520-1.
62. Manrique, Annales Cistercienses, IV. 170-1. O'Callaghan, «Affiliation», p. 43, sees the concession by the Cistercian chapter as conferring a right to found further nunneries, but its purpose seems to have been merely to confirm the agreement made in 1219.
63. Ducpale, Monasticum, VI. 837.
64. The military orders were not alone in seeking to group women together: see, for example, L. Mills, L'ordre des chanoines réguliers d'Arrouaise (Bruges, 1969), pp. 512, 515.
In the order of Santiago, which admitted married brethren, houses for women may originally have been established as a means of providing a refuge for members' widows, although the evidence is not conclusive. The earliest version of the rule of Santiago includes the provision that

\[ ab \ illis \ mulieribus \ que \ viros \ non \ habuerint, \ queratur \ si \ maritos \ velit \ accipere. \ Volentibus \ liceat \ nubere. \ Nolentes \ locabuntur \ locis \ aptis \ et \ monasteriis \ que \ sunt \ de \ domo \ ubi \ necessaria \ eis \ administrabuntur. \]

This version of the rule does not define who these women were, but the decree is obviously to be taken in conjunction with the statement in Alexander III's bull of confirmation of 1175 that

\[ si \ autem \ viri \ premortui \ fuerint \ et \ relicte \ ipsorum, \ que \ ordinem \ susceperunt, \ nubere \ voluerint, \ denuntietur \ hoc \ magistro \ sive \ commendatori \ ut \ cum \ illius \ conscientia \ cui \ mulier \ ipsa \ vult \ nubat, \]

and also with a thirteenth-century version of the rule which decrees that

\[ aquelas \ mugeres \ aqui \ transieren \ sos \ maridos \ esten \ en \ los \ monasterios, \ e \ si \ alguna \ bona \ vida \ fiziere \ e \ fueras \ del \ monesterio \ quisiere \ remaneçer \ si \ el \ maestro \ por \ bien \ lo \ viere \ remanexca, \ e \ si \ alguna \ quisier \ casar \ digalo \ a \ so \ maestro \ o \ a \ so \ comendador, \ que \ con \ so \ mandado \ se \ case. \]

This version of the rule also reveals that Santiago's convents were expected to house the wives of brethren during periods of fast and also when their husbands were absent; but practices of this kind would scarcely explain the introduction of houses for women.

Once it had been accepted that a military order could include convents for women, various motives would prompt patrons to add to their number. To found a religious house was not only regarded

65. Lomax, Orden de Santiago, p. 80, argues that female novices were accepted from the outset.
68. Lomax, Orden de Santiago, p. 224 doc. 1 cap. 19.
as a means to salvation: in some instances it was also seen as a way of making suitable provision for a patron's own entry to the religious life. The Hospitaller convent of Alguaire was founded by Marquesa of Cervera, the widow of William of Guardia, and she became the first head of the house, to be succeeded in 1268 by her daughter Geralda.\(^70\) It was similarly on the initiative of Constance, the widow of William of Anglesea, that Santiago's house of San Pedro de la Piedra was established, with Constance as the first prioress.\(^71\) It was also not unusual for the patron of an independent religious house to affiliate it to a well-established order as a way of ensuring the foundation's future prosperity. This was perhaps a reason for the subjecting of Beaulieu to the Hospitallers in 1259, although it can hardly explain why the viscountess of Béarn placed San Vicente de Junqueres under the authority of the order of the Faith and Peace, for the latter had only recently been established and had achieved only limited expansion. In this instance more personal influences may have been at work, for the viscount of Béarn had been among the leading patrons of this military order in the south of France.\(^72\)

While personal ties may have influenced the viscountess of Béarn, military orders may in some cases have been favoured by other patrons partly because of the moderate character of their observances. It was apparently felt in some quarters that a very strict way of life, such as that of Citeaux, was not very suitable for women.\(^73\) It should also be remembered that at the time when female convents dependent on military orders were beginning to be founded, some other religious orders were seeking —though not altogether successfully— to check admissions of sisters and to stop new affiliations of nunneries.\(^74\) By contrast, some military orders appear to have welcomed the creation of further houses for women. The foundation of a convent for sisters does not, of course, in itself necessarily indicate enthusiastic support among an order's

\(^{70}\) Miret y Sans, Algauyre, pp. 11, 14.


officials, for the latter might be subjected to external pressures which they would be unwise to resist: in this context it may be noted that a document concerning the foundation of Sigena refers to the crebras preces made to Hospitalier officials by the Aragonese queen San-
chas. But it was presumably on the initiative of the master of Santiago that Santos-o-Vello became a female convent instead of the house for clerics as Sancho I had intended; and on a number of occasions military orders contributed some of the property and revenues required for the foundation of new houses for sisters. The master of Santiago gave property in Lérida for the foundation of San Pedro de la Piedra, just as the Hospitallers had assigned the commanderies of Cervera and Alguaire for the support of the convent to be established at Alguaire. The Hospitallers were clearly also anxious to gain control over the foundation at Acorn-
bury, for it was reported that Margaret of Lacy had subjected it to them exhortationibus fratrum Jerosolimitani Hospitalis; and they were later reluctant to relinquish authority over it.

Foundation documents provide few explanations of the orders' readiness to foster the creation of further houses for women. The establishment of Alguaire was described merely as a work of mercy: the Hospitallers assigned property

attendentes et considerantes devoto corde unum ex operibus misericordie domum sanctam edificare et constituere, in quam venientes hujus mundi falacis contagia valent diluere, et suorum peccaminum veniam obtinere et celestis regni coronam possidere. It may of course be pointed out that Santiago's constitution necessitated the establishment of some houses for women, and that as the order expanded a growing number would be required, while other orders may have been concerned to provide convents where wives of male recruits could adopt a religious life: but these arguments are never advanced in the sources.

75. Delaville le Roulx, Cartulaire, I. 520-1 doc. 835; Ubieto Artega, Documentos de Sigena, I. 11-14 doc. 5.
76. Sáinz de la Maza LasoLi, Santiago en Aragón, pp. 136, 275-6 doc. 49, and «Monasterio de San Pedro», pp. 385, 401-2 doc. 2; Delaville le Roulx, Cartulaire, II. 691-3 doc. 2528; Miret y Sans, Alguaire, pp. 12-13. In 1245 Marquesa of Cervera had, however, given the Hospitallers 1,000 morabetinos.
77. Delaville le Roulx, Cartulaire, II. 451-2, 457, 472, 496-9, 500-1, 513 docs. 2047, 2059, 2086, 2138, 2140, 2167.
78. Ibid., II. 691-3 doc. 2528.
Yet, although the surviving documents offer little insight into the orders' attitudes, it is clear that houses for sisters were not founded primarily to assist in the activities which characterised the military orders. Women could in the first place take no part in fighting. But even among the brethren of the military orders only a minority was actively engaged in the conflict against the infidel, and one function of male houses away from the borders of Christendom was the provision of resources for the struggle. Women's convents were, however, usually able to give very little material assistance to their male colleagues. Nor did they participate to any extent in the charitable work undertaken by some military orders. Convents for sisters were usually called monasteria, not hospitalia: their duties did not normally include the care of the sick, the poor or pilgrims. It has admittedly been asserted that there was a hospital at Acornbury, but apparently the only evidence in support of this claim is the inclusion of the words remanentibus ibi vetulis mulieribus ad pauperum Hospitalis et infirmorum obsequium in a document issued by Gregory IX in 1233; and it would be rash to assume that the papal chancery was always adequately informed about the nature and functions of particular religious houses. The only Hospitaller house which can be definitely shown to have undertaken duties of this kind was that at Beaulieu: the document recording its transference to the Hospitallers in 1259 contains a reference to hospitality for the poor, and a hospitalaria was among the officials mentioned when a set of regulations for the house was compiled in 1298. But Beaulieu had already been a hospital, providing care for the poor and pilgrims, before it was subjected to the order of St John, and it should not be regarded as typical of female convents in that order: no reference to the office of hospitalaria occurs elsewhere.

It has sometimes been suggested, however, that women's houses undertook charitable work of a different kind by educating the young. Santiago's convents certainly provided instruction for some
of the daughters of brethren. This is clear from a clause about brothers' widows in a thirteenth-century version of the rule: aquella que non quisiere casar more en el monesterio e si fiias oviere sean nodridas consigo en la orden en virginidad e sean guardadas fasta XV annos e apprendan letras. Daughters were to be educated as well as reared in the order's houses. It may also be pointed out that Hospitaller sources contain a number of references to puellae, and that the rule drawn up for the convent of Sigena in 1188 mentions a magistra puellarum. Yet it would seem that these were girls who were intending to enter the order: in 1191 the Aragonese queen Sancha dispatched to Sigena a widow cum tribus puellis ex tribus nobilibus ortis, with instructions that they should all be admitted to the habit. There is no evidence to suggest that the education of outsiders was a normal function of female houses attached to military orders.

Houses for sisters were in fact not primarily charitable foundations. Almsgiving is the only charitable activity mentioned in the rule of Sigena, and the sisters there were expected to devote the time between services to reading and manual labour. The religious life was an end in itself. The differing emphasis in male and female convents of the military orders is exemplified by the contrasting nature of their religious observances. Whereas lay brethren of the orders were assigned a passive role in services and were merely obliged to repeat a fixed number of paternesters for each of the canonical hours, sisters participated fully in the recital of divine office.

This contrast is reflected in the existence in at least some female houses of the offices of cantrix and sacristana, for there were usually no equivalent posts in male convents of the military orders. This is the most obvious difference between the officials in male and female communities, though there were variations in...
the titles assigned to those who had charge of houses. The heads of male establishments were usually known as commanders or preceptors but, although the term *comendatrix* or a vernacular equivalent was used in some Hospitaller houses in Spain and in some convents of sisters dependent on Santiago, those in charge of female communities more commonly bore the title of prioress, while the head of San Felices de los Barrios was an abbess.

The heads of female houses —whether abbesses, prioresses or *comendatrices*— often had larger communities subject to them than their male counterparts. There were of course some small establishments for women: at Griséń between 1240 and 1260 there were apparently never more than three Hospitaller sisters resident, and in 1266 the chapter of Santiago decreed that San Pedro de la Piedra should contain no more than seven. But these were scarcely typical. In 1207 Innocent III ordered that thirty sisters should be maintained at Sigena, and in 1266 it was similarly decreed by the general chapter of Santiago that thirty sisters should reside at Sta Eufemia de Cozuelos. Sixteen years earlier a maximum of twenty had been imposed on the Hospitaller house of Alguaire, and in 1298 the Hospitaller grand master limited the numbers at Beaulieu to thirty-nine. These figures obviously do not indicate the actual size of communities, but the imposition of upper limits suggests that, as might have been expected, there was normally a plentiful supply of recruits; and it can be shown that some houses did at times contain roughly the numbers which had been laid down. In 1298 there were at least thirty-five sisters resident at Beaulieu, and in 1330 the numbers living at Alguaire totalled at least nineteen. It may also be noted that when Hospitaller houses in England were surveyed in 1338 it was reported that there were usually fifty sisters at Buckland. At that time the number of Hospitaller brethren residing in

93. *O'Callaghan*, «Affiliation», p. 43. In the Hospital the heads of male houses were sometimes called priors. Of the other offices existing in female convents, that of sub-prioress was the equivalent of the sub-preceptor or sub-commander of a male house, and those of clavigera and cellaria also had their counterparts in male convents.
95. *Urbeto Arrieta*, *Documentos de Sigena*, I. 78-80 doc. 43; see also, *ibid.*, I. 82-4 doc. 46; Delaville Le Roux, *Cartulaire*, II. 76-7 doc. 1272; *Lomax*, *Orden de Santiago*, p. 80.
the whole of England, Scotland and Wales was little more than twice that amount; and they were scattered among some fifty establishments.® In 1338 the largest male houses were at Chippenham, Clerkenwell and Buckland, and contained ten, seven and six brothers respectively. Even these were exceptional, as Chippenham had an infirmary for old and sick brethren, Clerkenwell was the Hospitaller headquarters in England and Buckland provided brothers for the needs of the neighbouring house of sisters.

Although free status was an entry requirement for both male and female recruits to the military orders,®® houses for women may have been in practice more exclusive than men’s convents. This would obviously be possible if there was considerable pressure for places in a relatively small number of convents. No detailed investigation of the family origins of sisters in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries has, however, been conducted, and there seems to be little justification for the claim that at Sigena all sisters were of noble descent.®¹ Yet most of the thirteenth-century prioresses of Sigena appear to have belonged to the upper nobility of Aragon and Catalonia, and minor officials also often came from well-known families: in the later 1230, for example, the prioress of Sigena was Sancha Jiménez de Urrea, and her subordinate officials included Sancha Jiménez de Luesia, Oria Jiménez de Luesia and Alaydis, countess of Armagnac.®² By contrast, male houses of the Hospitaliers in western Europe were often in the charge of sergeants, who were merely of free status and not of knightly descent.

Unlike men’s convents, communities of sisters could not be completely self-reliant. Women’s houses were inevitably dependent on male assistance in both spiritual and temporal matters. Some nunneries employed secular priests and lay administrators, but convents of sisters which were affiliated to a male order normally obtained help from brethren belonging to that order. Those attached

99. Ibid., passim.
100. Ubieto Arbeta, Documentos de Sigena, I. 49-51, 78-80 docs. 17, 43; Delaville Le Roulx, Cartulaire, I. 598-600 doc. 946; III. 22-4 doc. 3015; Bullarium ordinis militiae de Calatrava, edd. I. J. de Ortega y Cotes, J. F. Alvarez de Baquedano and F. de Ortega Zuñiga y Aranda (Madrid, 1761), pp. 47-9.
102. Ubieto Arbeta, Documentos de Sigena, I. 224-6, 228-30 docs. 151, 153.
to military orders usually had the services of male colleagues, though they were not always obliged to employ these. The convent of San Spiritu de Salamanca was under no obligation to have a commander from Santiago to administer its property, and the same privilege seems to have been enjoyed by San Pedro de la Piedra. A similar conclusion might be drawn from the wording of several documents concerning Hospitaller convents. When Alguaire was established in 1250, for example, the provision was made that castellanus Emposte teneatur dare preceptorem dicto monasterio, si dicta priorissa illum petierit, et indiguerit, nisi dictus frater fuerit in alia bajulia comendator. But this clause may have been explaining how a Hospitaller commander was to be provided when the need arose: it does not necessarily imply that the prioress could choose not to employ one. In the fourteenth century it was certainly accepted that there should be a Hospitaller preceptor at Alguaire. When Fieux was being established in 1297, however, no reference was made to a Hospitaller commander; it was merely decreed that one brother chaplain should reside there.

The number of brethren actually serving in sisters’ convents seems to have varied from place to place. Although the charter recording the foundation of Alguaire in 1250 refers to the sending there of other brothers as well as a preceptor, later medieval sources suggest that there was usually only a preceptor; and only one brother is mentioned in the records of Grisén when it was a female house in the mid-thirteenth century. Elsewhere there was a larger male establishment. The general chapter of Santiago in 1266 decided that the sisters of Sta Eufemia de Cozuelos should have two brother priests and three other brethren para sus labores, as well as a commander. At Buckland a male community with its own officials existed alongside the sisters’ convent, and provided both a brother seneschal to administer the sisters’ property and also

103. Lomax, Orden de Santiago, p. 82; Sáinz de la Maza Laboli, Santiago en Aragón, p. 138, and «Monasterio de San Pedro», p. 391. In 1289 the prioress of San Pedro entrusted the administration of the convent’s property to a layman, but this was apparently because the house was in debt to him.
104. Delaville Le Roux, Cartulaire, II. 691-3 doc. 2528.
105. Miret y Sans, Alguayre, p. 17.
106. Delaville Le Roux, Cartulaire, III. 714-17 doc. 4375.
107. Ibid., II. 691-3 doc. 2528; Miret y Sans, Alguayre, pp. 17-18, 28-30.
109. BN, MS 8582, fol. 62r.
brother chaplains. The male establishment at Sigena similarly resembled other male houses of the Hospital. It usually consisted of a preceptor, chaplain, claviger and sometimes a sub-preceptor, as well as other brothers who were employed in administrative or agricultural work: some, for example, were called by the titles laborator, procurator vinearum and maioralis ovium. Yet whereas the male community at Buckland was independent of the neighbouring sisters' convent and had its own property, at Sigena brothers and sisters came to form a single domus or conventus, under the authority of the prioress. When the castellan of Amposta made an agreement with the Aragonese queen Sancha in 1187 about the foundation of the sisters' convent, it was made clear that brothers living at Sigena were to be subject to the prioress, and this ruling was reiterated in a document issued by the grand master of the Hospital in 1207. At the outset the brothers may have been reluctant to accept this subordinate position, for there are several documents from the convent's early years which record transactions carried out in the name of the brethren alone: this could be explained by the fact that a male commandery had already been in existence at Sigena before the house for women was established. But for most of the thirteenth century the prioress was clearly regarded as the head of the whole community, and documents concerning the rights and properties of the convent were issued in her name. The situation at Sigena was thus markedly different from that at Buckland, but uniformity of practice should not be expected in an order whose houses were scattered throughout western Christendom.

The employment of brothers in female convents was not the only practical link which existed between the latter and the male branches of orders. Houses of sisters were as far as possible accommodated within the existing governmental and administrative structure of the military orders, which was usually characterised

111. Usieto Arteta, Monasterio de Sigena, pp. 25-32, and Documentos de Sigena, I, passim.
112. See, for example, Usieto Arteta, Documentos de Sigena, I. 52-3, 81-2, 89-91 docs. 19, 45, 53.
113. Ibid., I. 11-14, 82-4 docs. 5, 46; Delaville Le Roux, Cartulaire, I. 520-1 doc. 835; II. 76-7 doc. 1272.
114. Usieto Arteta, Documentos de Sigena, I. 48, 66-7, 74-6, 85 docs. 16, 31, 40, 41, 47.
115. Ibid., I, passim; Delaville Le Roux, Cartulaire, II. 528, 599, 651-2, 818-19, 859 docs. 2197, 2287, 2430, 2815, 2889; III. 82, 308, 313 docs. 3084, 3541, 3555.
by a marked degree of centralised control. San Felices de los Barrios became a daughter house of Calatrava and was also subject to the general chapter of the Cistercian order. In the Hospital, convents of sisters were subjected not only to the grand master and general chapter but also to the head of the province in which they were situated and to the provincial chapter; and the female houses of Santiago were similarly under the control of the ruling elements of that order. The rights which leading officials and chapters of the military orders enjoyed over sisters' houses were not, however, always the same as those exercised over men's convents.

Like abbesses and prioresses elsewhere, but unlike the heads of male houses in the military orders, those placed in charge of sisters' convents were elected officials. When new houses were being founded, the first head was sometimes appointed by a male superior acting in conjunction with the founder—as at the Hospitaller house of Fieux in 1297—but once a convent had been established, election was the norm. The procedure to be followed at Sigena was set down in the convent's rule: the whole chapter was to choose three of the sanctiores sisters, and these were in turn to select five members of the chapter; the prioress was to be elected by these five, and a majority decision among them was to be accepted. Election per compromissum was of course a method commonly used in religious houses, but in 1298 the sisters of Beau-lieu were given the freedom to choose a prioress vel per modum scrutinii, vel per modum compromissi, vel denum alio justo modo, quo potest et debet electio celebrari. At Sigena the election was always to be made with the counsel of the castellan of Amposta, but elsewhere in the Hospital the choice of a prioress was usually subject only to confirmation by the head of the province. At Beau-lieu there was, however, the further regulation that a candidate had to be chosen and presented to the prior of St Gilles for confirmation within forty days: if this was not done, the right of nomination passed to the prior. The head of a province was also sometimes empowered to intervene if there was a disputed election.

117. Delaville Le Roux, Cartulaire, Ill. 714-17 doc. 4375.
118. Ibid., I. 532-47 doc. 859; Usieto Arteta, Documentos de Sigena, I. 18-40 doc. 8.
120. Ibid., I. 520-1 doc. 835; Usieto Arteta, Documentos de Sigena, I. 11-14 doc. 5.
121. Delaville Le Roux, Cartulaire, III. 737-40 doc. 4413; at Alguaire a time limit of fifteen days was imposed in 1330: Miret y Sans, Alguaire, p. 17.
In 1207 Innocent III decreed that if the sisters of Sigena could not agree on a candidate they were to summon the castellan of Amposta, and he was to settle the issue with the counsel of the diocesan. In 1250 the castellan was similarly empowered to intervene in disputed elections at Alguaire. A disputed election did occur at Sigena in 1291, when the rival candidates were Teresa Jiménez de Urrea and Mary Martínez de Luna. The matter should have been decided by the castellan of Amposta and the bishop of Lérida, but both James II and Boniface VIII became involved and in 1295 the pope appointed judges delegate to hear the case.

Although there were occasions when there was secular interference in the election of prioresses, it is difficult to discover whether senior officials of military orders, unused to elections within convents, ever sought to suppress the right of a female house to choose its head. There was certainly disagreement between Sigena and the castellan of Amposta in 1226 about the electoral process: the convent claimed that the rule of St Augustine should be followed, while the castellan asserted that the election should be in accordance with the rule and constitution of the Hospital. But the castellan was not denying the sisters’ right to choose their prioress. The only known attempt to challenge the right of election occurred at Acornbury, but that happened at a time when the foundress was seeking to sever the house’s links with the Hospitallers. The right of election seems in fact to have been generally accepted: it was perhaps felt that, as they participated to only a very limited extent in the military orders’ activities which necessitated a strict centralisation of control, women’s convents could be allowed a greater degree of independence than was permissible in male houses.

Male preceptors or commanders who were nominated for female convents were not elected, but there were some modifications of the normal processes of appointment. Although the castellan of Amposta in 1226 decreed that the preceptor of Sigena, like other preceptors, should be nominated in the provincial chapter, the appointment was to

122. USTETO ARTETA, Documentos de Sigena, I. 78-80 doc. 43.
123. DELAVELLELE ROULX, Cartulaire, II. 691-3 doc. 2528.
124. Ibid., III. 624, 640-1, 646, 648, 672, 683, 685 docs. 4227, 4236-7, 4249, 4254, 4291, 4311, 4318; USTETO ARTETA, Monasterio de Sigena, pp. 40-2.
125. In 1305, for example, the Aragonese king James II put forward a candidate for San Vicente de Junqueres: SÁINZ DE LA Maza LASOJI, Santiago en Aragón, p. 134.
126. USTETO ARTETA, Documentos de Sigena, I. 156-7 doc. 104; DELAVELLELE ROULX, Cartulaire, II. 348-9 doc. 1833.
127. Ibid., II. 500-1 doc. 2140.
be made with the counsel of the prioress of Sigena; and at Alguaire the prioress was allowed to select a brother to act as commander, and the castellan of Amposta was obliged to accept her candidate, unless he already held the post of commander elsewhere. 128

As has been seen, the leading authorities of military orders often sought to control admissions to female houses by setting limits on the size of convents. 129 These restrictions, which are not commonly encountered in male houses of the military orders, were obviously imposed for economic reasons: at Beaulieu, for example, a maximum was decreed ad evitandum importunam et importabilem multitudinem sororum ultra ipsius loci proprias facultates. 130 The same purpose may lie behind the decree of 1187 which forbade the prioress of Sigena to admit new sisters without the counsel of the castellan of Amposta: at that time there was no fixed limit on numbers. 131 By contrast, regulations compiled in 1298 allowed the prioress of Beaulieu to accept recruits merely with the counsel of members of her convent, but in these regulations an upper limit on numbers was imposed. 132 In some instances, however, it was also thought advisable to define the powers of superior officials and curb their freedom of action. The castellan of Amposta was not allowed to impose sisters on Sigena or Alguaire, and the Hospitaller prior of Auvergne was obliged to obtain the prioress’s consent before placing more sisters at Fieux than were normally allowed. 133 Apart from these regulations affecting particular Hospitaller officials, a more general ruling about the right to admit sisters was included among the decrees issued by the general chapter of the Hospital in 1262. Its purpose was to repeal an earlier ruling by which bailiffs and brothers had been forbidden to receive sisters without the special licence of the grand master: in future provincial priors were to have the right to admit women. 134 The reason given for the change was that the order might benefit if these officials were allowed to

128. Ibid., II. 348-9, 691-3 docs. 1833, 2528; Unietto Arnteta, Documentos de Sigena, I. 156-7 doc. 104.
129. See above, p. 79.
131. Ibid., I. 520-1 doc. 835; Unietto Arnteta, Documentos de Sigena, I. 11-14 doc. 5.
132. Delaville Le Roux, Cartulaire, III. 737-40 doc. 4413. At Alguaire admissions were to be made with the counsel of the castellan de Amposta, even though an upper limit on numbers was imposed: this may be explained by the fact that regulations concerning Alguaire were partly based on those governing Sigena: ibid., II. 691-3 doc. 2528.
133. Ibid., I. 520-1 doc. 835; II. 76-7, 691-3 docs. 1272, 2528; IV. 173-4 doc. 4801; Unietto Arnteta, Documentos de Sigena, I. 11-14, 78-80, 82-4 docs. 5, 43, 46; Miravet y Sans, Alguaire, p. 17.
accept female recruits; but the significance of the ruling is obscure. The earlier prohibition, the text of which does not survive, seems to have applied only to male officials: the rulings do not therefore indicate a major change in the Hospital's attitude towards the admission of women. The decrees may have referred to districts where there were no sisters' convents and where women who wanted to join the Hospital would be admitted by male officials and attached to male houses: this would explain why those admitted after 1262 by priors were not to be in juvenili aut suspecta etate. The first decree may have been related to attempts to ensure that sisters lived only in the convents established for them, and its repeal may have been occasioned by the realisation of the disadvantages of this policy. If this interpretation is correct, neither ruling was directly concerned with the admission of recruits to female convents.

Since sisters' convents were usually dependent on the help of brothers, rights concerning the admission of male recruits also required definition. Information is provided mainly by Hospitaller sources, but these again are not free from ambiguity. At the time of the establishment of Sigena, the castellan of Amposta decreed that

\[\text{ipsos autem fratres, quos priorissa duxerit sibi necessarios, semper cum consilio magistri accipiat et ipse eos illi tradat atque concedat ... non liceat eidem priorisse ... fratrem vel confratrem sine consilio magistri recipere.}\]

Similar statements were made when Alguaire was founded in the mid-thirteenth century. The situation is perhaps clarified by the wording of a further document concerning Sigena which was issued by the grand master in 1207:

\[\text{de fratribus eiusdem domus statuimus et sancimus ut illos quos priorissa viderit sibi utiles et necessarios in baiulia Emposte postulet eos a magistro, qui ei quod ipsa voluerit dummodo commendatores non sint sine difficileitate aliqua tribuat et concedat.}\]

It seems that a distinction should be drawn between the admission of new male recruits and the transfer of existing brothers to women's

---

135. Ibid., I. 520-1 doc. 835; Ubieto Arteta, Documentos de Sigena, I. 11-14 doc. 5.
136. Delaville Le Roulx, Cartulaire, II. 691-3 doc. 2528.
137. Ibid., II. 76-7 doc. 1272; Ubieto Arteta, Documentos de Sigena, I. 82-4 doc. 46.
convents. The castellan was to allow the transfer of brothers to sisters' houses, provided that they did not hold office elsewhere, but the prioresses of Sigena and Alguaire apparently also had the right to admit male postulants with the counsel of the castellan. In practice the prioress of Sigena is certainly known to have negotiated the admission of male recruits. The prioress of Beau-lieu, on the other hand, was not allowed this power. In the regulations drawn up in 1298 it was stated that if she required brothers the preceptor of Cahors should admit suitable persons and bestow the habit on them.

In a few cases there were restrictions on the acquisition of property as well as on the admission of new members, but these were of only minor significance. When the Calatravan house of San Felices de los Barrios was founded, it was decreed that if a man and his wife both made their profession in the order, three-quarters of any donation made by them should pass to the convent of Calatrava and only a quarter to San Felices. A condition of a different kind was imposed when Sigena was established: immovable property given by recruits outside the kingdom of Aragon, but inside the castellany of Amposta, was to be under the control of the castellan, provided that he was ready to assign the convent suitable rights elsewhere in exchange: the intention was presumably to ensure that the property subject to Sigena was not too scattered.

Those who administered a convent's property were normally responsible to the head of the house, but —like their male counterparts— those in charge of women's convents could not always dispose freely of rights and possessions. The prioresses of Sigena and Alguaire required the castellan of Amposta's assent for any alienation of property, and the abbess of San Felices de los Barrios was similarly forbidden to dispose of the convent's possessions without the consent of the master of Calatrava. On the other
hand, patrons of female convents were sometimes anxious to ensure that the property which they had assigned for the maintenance of a community was not used for other purposes by male superiors. In 1219 García Gutiérrez and his wife decreed that none of the possessions of San Felices de los Barrios should be detached from it by the master and knights of Calatrava, and when Alfonso IX's daughter Sancha gave property to Sta Eufemia de Cozuelos in 1270 she imposed the condition that the house should not be deprived of the revenues of this property by any master or commander of the order of Santiago: in practice, however, the master took little notice of this restriction. 144

To ensure that property was being efficiently administered and that rules were being properly observed, convents of sisters were normally subjected to visitation and correction by superior officials. 145 In most cases the custom of visitation is mentioned without elaboration, 146 but according to a document drawn up in 1291 the visitation of the Hospitaller house of Penna in Italy was to be conducted annually by the prior of Capua, who was to be accompanied by two or three brothers; and it was not to last more than two or three days. 147 The powers of correction exercised by superior officials are similarly rarely explained in detail, but several definitions have survived of the rights which the castellan of Amposta enjoyed at Sigena. In 1187 it was decreed that an unsuitable prioress could be removed by the castellan, but only with the counsel of the convent of Sigena; and if an offence was committed in the convent which the prioress could not correct, the castellan was to be called in, though he could not expel a sister without consulting the prioress. 148 Twenty years later Innocent III ruled that if an offender could not be corrected by the prioress and convent, the matter was to be referred not only to the castellan but also to the diocesan, but in a document issued only a few months later by the grand master it was again stated that in these circumstances the castellan should act. 149 It was at the same time decreed that if the offence merited deposition or expulsion, the castellan should give judgement with the counsel of the convent of Sigena. The grand master's ruling

144. Manrique, Annales Cistercienses, IV. 170-1; Lomax, Orden de Santiago, p. 81.
145. In this they did not differ from male houses.
146. Delaville Le Roux, Cartulaire, II. 872-4 doc. 2923; III. 714-17, 737-40 docs. 4375, 4413.
147. Ibid., III. 590-1 doc. 4154.
148. Ibid., I. 520-1 doc. 835; Uriéto Arteta, Documentos de Sigena, I. 11-14 doc. 5.
149. Ibid., I. 78-80, 82-4 docs. 43, 46; Delaville Le Roux, Cartulaire, II. 76-7 doc. 1272.
also reveals that the castellan did not enjoy sole authority concerning the removal of male officials from Sigena, for it was stipulated that brothers should be removed at the request of the prioress. Only fragmentary evidence has survived about the judicial powers wielded by male superiors over other houses of sisters, but at least in the Hospital a further check on female convents was provided by the provincial chapter. Hospitaller prioresses, like the heads of male houses, were obliged to attend the annual chapter of their province, and were expected to report there on the state of their houses: in 1308, for example, the prioress of Fieux was instructed to submit a report to the provincial prior at the Auvergne chapter. 150

It was also at the provincial chapters of the leading military orders that responsions were paid by the heads of convents. These consisted of a portion of a house's revenues and were used partly for expenses incurred by the head of a province and partly as a subsidy for the struggle against the infidel. Hospitaller sources show that convents of sisters in that order were not completely exempt from this obligation. In 1187 the prioress of Sigena was asked to contribute secundum quod sibi visum fuerit, and this ruling was repeated in 1207 and 1226. 151 But usually, as with male houses, a fixed obligation was imposed upon communities of sisters. Alguavire was expected to surrender, with certain exceptions, a tenth of its revenues. 152 Other houses paid fixed sums of money: at Beaulieu, for example, the amount was 21 l. a year. 153 But the Hospital appears usually to have obtained only limited financial assistance from its female convents. The amount due from Fieux in 1297 was only half a mark, and thirty years earlier the master of the Hospital had complained that the property subject to the sisters of Alguavire was contributing less than it had when it formed part of a male commandery. 154 Of Buckland it was said in 1338 that the brethren of the Hospital gained nothing from it. 155

The Hospitaller authorities, on the other hand, were themselves often placed under an obligation to provide assistance, if necessary,
to convents of sisters. In the agreement reached between the caste-
llan of Amposta and the Aragonese queen Sancha in 1187 about the
foundation of Sigena it was stated that

si vero predicta domus aliquo casu nimia inopia laboraverit, sicut
casualiter contingere solet, sit in providentia magistri eis sub-
venire et earum inopiam misericorditer sublevare.\textsuperscript{156}

In 1250 the castellan of Amposta was similarly committed to giving
aid to Alguaire if the convent —because of crop failures or for
other reasons —lacked the necessary revenues.\textsuperscript{157} Financial hardship
was of course not uncommon in western nunneries,\textsuperscript{158} and evidence
is not lacking of difficulties in houses subject to the military
orders. In 1308 the revenues of Fieux were said to be inadequate
for the maintenance of the sisters and for building work which was
necessary there.\textsuperscript{159} In 1229 the sisters of Buckland were complaining
to Gregory IX that the vicar of Perreton was taking such a large
proportion of the revenues of the church there that they could not
support themselves from what was left; and when a survey of
Hospitaller lands in England was compiled in 1338 it was admitted
that the property belonging to the sisters of Buckland —then esti-
mated at an annual value of £122.10s. 0d.— was insufficient for their
maintenance and for other necessary expenses: the house had to
depend on alms and assistance from friends.\textsuperscript{160} Financial support
was sometimes given by sisters' families,\textsuperscript{164} but on various occasions
the Hospitallers themselves had to provide subsidies and pensions.
At the end of the twelfth century the Hospitaller prior Gilbert of
Vere assigned the sisters of Buckland an annual pension of 100 s.,
to be paid out of the revenue of the manor of Rainham.\textsuperscript{162} Towards
the middle of the thirteenth century a later prior granted them a
pension of 38 \textit{m}. 12s. 8d., to be received from the preceptor of
Buckland, although this payment appears to have been made at least

\textsuperscript{156} U\textsc{uberto} A\textsc{rteta}, \textit{Documentos de Sigena}, I. 11-14 doc. 5; \textsc{Delaville Le Roux},
\textit{Cartulaire}, I. 520-1 doc. 835.
\textsuperscript{157} \textit{Ibid}., II. 691-3 doc. 2528.
\textsuperscript{158} E. Power, \textit{Medieval English Nunneries} (Cambridge, 1922), cap. 5; P. Schmitz,
\textit{Histoire de l'ordre de Saint Benoît}, VII (Maredsous, 1956), 87.
\textsuperscript{159} \textsc{Delaville Le Roux}, \textit{Cartulaire}, IV. 173-4 doc. 4801.
\textsuperscript{160} \textsc{Weaver}, \textit{Cartulary of Buckland}, p. 9 doc. 13; Larking, \textit{Hospitallers in England}, p. 20.
\textsuperscript{161} U\textsc{uberto} A\textsc{rteta}, \textit{Documentos de Sigena}, I. 55-6 doc. 22; \textit{Close Rolls}, 1231-1234 (London,
\textsuperscript{162} \textit{Cartulary of the Knights of St John in England}, p. 570 doc. 961; H\textsc{ugo}, \textit{History of
Buckland}, pp. 94-5 doc. 5.
in part in exchange for lands belonging to the sisters; and in 1329 a further pension of 40 s. a year was assigned to them. The male house at Buckland was of course also maintaining the seneschal and chaplains who were employed in the sisters’ convent. It is not surprising that the convent at Buckland was described in 1338 as being an onus and gravamen, providing an additional drain on resources which had long been inadequate for the order’s needs. Nor is it remarkable that attempts were made to escape from the responsibility of subsidising Hospitaller sisters. As early as 1202 the Aragonese king agreed that the castellan of Amposta should not be held liable for Sigena’s debts; and in 1330 the grand master annulled the clause concerning aid which had been included in the foundation charter of Alguaire.

Yet although houses of sisters might be a burden to their male colleagues, only one attempt to suppress a female house is recorded in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. This occurred in 1267 when for financial reasons the master of the Hospital sought the pope’s permission to revoke the grant of Hospitaller property which had been made in 1250 for the establishment of Alguaire. Women’s houses participated to only a very limited extent in the work and activities of the military orders, but there was little challenge to their survival. The sisters themselves, although their functions and way of life differed from those of their male counterparts, were in turn usually ready to accept the authority of their male superiors. In the later thirteenth century there was tension between Sigena and the castellan of Amposta, who complained that the sisters were refusing to obey him, but the only female house which actually severed its links with a military order before 1300 was that at Acornbury. At the end of the thirteenth century women who wished to lead a religious life were also still forging links with male houses of the orders. Although the Hospital had sought to ensure that sisters lived only in the convents established for them, this policy was apparently abandoned, and in orders such as the Temple, which had no houses for women, the practice seems to have continued.
unchallenged. Despite the fears expressed in the rules of some military orders, contact with women was not in fact kept at an absolute minimum: the needs and pressures to which the orders were subject ensured that ties of various kinds were established and maintained.
THE MILITARY ORDERS
AND THE SPANISH RECONQUEST IN THE
TWELFTH AND THIRTEENTH CENTURIES

In recent years renewed interest has been shown in the history of the military orders in the Iberian peninsula, and a considerable number of studies have been published both in Spain and elsewhere. Yet most of the works that are concerned with the medieval period treat of a single order, and little attempt has been made to provide general surveys. Obviously much detailed research still needs to be undertaken before definitive conclusions can be formulated, and the nature of the evidence makes the discussion of some topics more difficult than that of others. The surviving sources supply more direct information about rights and privileges than about the orders’ role in the struggle against Islam. But, as the function of the military orders was to fight against the infidel, their contribution to the reconquista is a subject that merits investigation, despite the limitations of the evidence.

It was not until towards the middle of the twelfth century that the military orders began to play a significant role in the Spanish reconquest. Associations of a military character which had been established earlier in the peninsula were usually short-lived and certainly in most cases cannot be classified as military orders, in that they did not include members who had taken the normal monastic vows. The military confraternity which the Aragonese king Alfonso I had created at Belchite, to the south of Zaragoza, in 1122 is known only by one document — a confirmation issued in 1136 — and the wording of this charter suggests that it was essentially a secular institution: although it was envisaged that some might join for life, no reference was made to monastic vows, and private property was allowed. Towards the end of the third decade of the century Alfonso I had also established a militia at Monreal del Campo, farther south. This was apparently modelled on the Temple and should perhaps therefore be regarded as an early military order; but, like the Belchite con-

1 The historiography of the military orders in the peninsula has recently been surveyed by D. W. Lomax, ‘La historiografía de las órdenes militares en la península ibérica, 1100–1550,’ Hidalguía 23 (1975) 711–24 and Las órdenes militares en la península ibérica durante la edad media (Salamanca 1976).

2 P. Rassow, ‘La cofradía de Belchite,’ Anuario de historia del derecho español 3 (1928) 200–26, which includes the text of the 1136 document; A. Ubieto Arteta, ‘La creación de la cofradía militar de Belchite,’ Estudios de edad media de la Corona de Aragón 5 (1952) 427–34. The head of the confraternity was the lord of Belchite, Lope Sánchez.
fraternity, it is known by only one document. It is not mentioned in Alfonso I's will, which was compiled in 1131, and had probably ceased to exist by then. And the militia founded in 1138 for the defence of Barbastro was clearly not a military order but merely a secular confraternity.

The Christian rulers of Spain had, however, quickly sought to obtain military assistance from the Temple when some members of that order reached the peninsula towards the end of the third decade of the twelfth century. In Portugal the frontier castle of Soure was promised to them in 1128 by the countess Teresa, and some three years later on the other side of the peninsula the count of Barcelona, Ramón Berenguer III, gave the Templars the border stronghold of Grañena 'ad defensionem christianitatis secundum institutionem ordinis milicie sue.' These words were repeated in 1132 when Armengol VI, count of Urgel, made a gift of another frontier castle situated at Barbará.

The inclusion of the Templars among the heirs of Alfonso I of Aragon is also to be explained partly in this context, for Alfonso was apparently seeking to ensure the continuation of the reconquest, to which he had made important contributions in the early decades of the century. Yet, although it has been suggested that at an early stage the Templars took on greater military responsibilities in the peninsula than in the East, the hopes of the Christian rulers were not in fact immediately fulfilled: it is known, for example, that the castle of Grañena was not garrisoned by the Templars for some years. At the time of these early grants the order was interested in western Europe only as a source of manpower and revenues for the East, and it was for this purpose that Templars had been sent to the Iberian peninsula, as to other western countries, in the later 1120s; and although the order rapidly began to gain

---

4 Colección de documentos inéditos del Archivo General de la Corona de Aragón, ed. P. de Bofarull y Mascaro (Barcelona 1847-1910; henceforth Col. doc. inéd.) IV 9-12 doc. 2; S. A. Garcia Larragueta, El gran priorado de Navarra de la orden de San Juan de Jerusalén (Pamplona 1957) II 15-18 doc. 10.
6 Albon, Cartulaire 7, 25 docs. 10, 33; R. de Azevedo, Documentos medievais portugueses (Lisbon 1940-62) I 101 doc. 79.
7 Albon, Cartulaire 36-37 doc. 47.
9 H. Prutz, Die geistlichen Ritterorden (Berlin 1908) 29.
favour and acquire patronage in the West, it was no doubt reluctant to commit itself at this stage to fighting on a second front against Islam. The Spanish rulers nevertheless persisted in their attempts to involve the Templars in the *reconquista*. The undertaking given in 1134 by Ramón Berenguer IV and a number of Catalan nobles to serve with the Templars for a year appears to have been part of a plan to persuade the order to establish a convent at Grañena. But it was not until nine years later that the count of Barcelona — after lengthy discussions which were also concerned with the order's claims to the kingdom of Aragon — finally prevailed upon the Templars to agree to fight against the Muslim enemies of Aragon and Catalonia. This was the significance of the count's statement in November 1143 that

```
ad defendendam occidentalem ecclesiam que est in Ispaniis, ad deprimendam
et debellandam et expellendam gentem maurorum, ad exaltandam sancte
cristianitatis fidem et religionem ad exemplum milicie Templi Salomonis in
Iherusalem, que orientalem defendit ecclesiam, in subjectione et obedientia
illius secundum regulam et ejusdem milicie instituta heate obedientie mili-
c clam constituere decrevi.11
```

The count was, of course, interested in the Temple's participation in wars against the infidel only on the eastern side of Spain, but the agreement which he reached with the grand master inevitably affected the order's role throughout the peninsula, and it can be shown that within a few years the Templars in other Iberian states were also fighting the Moors. The earliest reference to Templar military activity in Portugal relates to the year 1144, when members of the order are reported to have fought in the neighbourhood of Soure, while in 1147 Afonso Henriques stated that they had accompanied him on his recent expedition against Santarém. And in Castile the Templars were defending the stronghold of Calatrava probably by the middle of the century.

The Hospitallers had arrived in the peninsula earlier than the Templars, but their military involvement in Spain began at a later date. This is apparent from the negotiations by which Ramón Berenguer IV sought to obtain renunciations from the three heirs named in Alfonso I's will. In these negotia-

---

11 Albon, Cartulaire 55 doc. 72; Col. doc. inéd. IV 32-33 doc. 11; Forey, Templars 16-17.
12 Albon, Cartulaire 204-5 doc. 314; Col. doc. inéd. IV 93-99 doc. 43.
14 Albon, Cartulaire 275 doc. 439; Azevedo, Documentos I 272-73 doc. 221; *Monumenta Henricina* (Coimbra 1960-74) I 3-4 doc. 2; cf. C. Erdmann, 'Der Kreuzzugsgedanke in Portugal,' *Historische Zeitschrift* 141 (1929) 38-42, where it is argued that the Templars did not fight in Portugal until 1143.
tions the Hospitallers did not act jointly with the Templars, for whom entry into the reconquista was also at issue, but with the third heir, the canons of the Holy Sepulchre; and whereas the Templars, who in 1143 were undertaking to fight against the Moors as well as renouncing their claims to Aragon, received from the count a series of strongholds and a share of future conquests, the Hospitallers — like the canons of the Holy Sepulchre — gained only minor concessions in return for the renunciation of their claims. Obviously at this stage the Hospitallers were not being brought into the reconquest. But a number of Hospitallers were present at the siege of Tortosa in 1148, and it was apparently in the following year that Ramón Berenguer IV assigned to them the castle of Amposta, which lay on the frontier near the city of Tortosa. In the charter of donation it was stated, in phrases reminiscent of the count’s agreement with the Templars in 1143, that the grant was being made

ad exaltandam Christi ecclesiam, ad propagandam sancte christianitatis fidem et religionem, ad deprimendam et confundendam gentem Mauro-
rum;

and it is clear from the wording of the document that Ramón Berenguer expected the Hospitallers to take up residence there. It may therefore be concluded that in Catalonia the Hospital had undertaken military responsibilities before the middle of the century, and it would presumably have done the same in other parts of the peninsula, although firm evidence for other areas at this time is lacking.

Whereas the international orders had been established in the peninsula for some years before they became involved in the reconquest, the Spanish military orders were founded specifically for the purpose of fighting against the Moors. The prologue to the rule of Santiago thus explains that the founders of the order

ut inimicorum Christi cursus hostiles reprimerent, ut ecclesiam Del defenderent, ut se velud murum fidellitatis infidelium furori opponerent, crucem in modum ensis cum signo et invocatione beati Iacobi pectori suo impresserunt.

The foundation dates of these orders are therefore also the dates of their entry into the reconquista. Most of the Spanish orders which existed before 1300

18 Albou, Cartulaire 339-40 doc. 553; Lacarra, ‘Documentos’ 624-25 doc. 249.
20 I have discussed the militarisation of the Hospital more fully in a forthcoming article to be published in Studia monastica.
were founded in the third quarter of the twelfth century, and were obviously established in imitation of the Templars and Hospitallers. The origins of the order of Calatrava can be traced back to the year 1158, and Santiago was founded in 1170, while the order of Mountjoy was established probably in 1173. The order of the Military Orders which fought in the reconquest during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries were thus engaged in the conflict with the Moors by the 1170s. Between then and the end of the thirteenth century only two new orders were created — San Jorge de Alfama at the end of the twelfth and turn of the thirteenth century, and Santa Maria de España in the 1270s — and these were both of limited importance.

By the time that the order of Santa Maria de España was founded, the reconquest was already far advanced and the Christians had reached the southern coasts of Spain; and although Alfonso X had abandoned his plans of conquest in Africa, sea power was nevertheless important because of the threat from the Merinids in the African territories facing the peninsula. It was apparently to increase Christian strength at sea that the order of Santa Maria.


24 The Aragonese king Pedro II gave Alfama as the headquarters of San Jorge in 1201: J. M. Font Rius, Mapas de población y franquicia de Cataluña (Barcelona 1969 —) I 203–95 doc. 214; on Santa María, see J. Torres Fontes, ‘La orden de Santa María de España,’ Miscelánea medieval murciana 3 (1977) 73–116. The thirteenth-century order of Mercy has often been regarded as a military order, but it was established for the ransoming of captives, and claims that it engaged in military activities cannot apparently be traced back further than the sixteenth century: J. W. Brodman, ‘The Origins of the Mercedarian Order: A Reassessment,’ Studia monastica 19 (1977) 354. It has also been argued that the Teutonic order fought in Spain in the thirteenth century: J. Ferreiro Alemparte, ‘Asentamiento y extinción de la orden teutónica en España. La encomienda de Santa María de Castellanos de la Mota de Toro (1223–1556),’ Boletín de la Real Academia de la Historia 188 (1971) 250; J. González, Retrato y diplomas de Fernando III (Córdoba 1980 —) I 196; yet although it received grants of property in reconquered places, such as Sevilla, no specific reference to fighting appears to have survived.

was founded: in 1272, when the institution was still just a confraternity and not yet a military order, the Infante Sancho was given the title alferez de Santa María et almirant de llv sus confreria de Espana; and in the Cortes of Zamora in 1274 the order was assigned certain revenues ‘pora fechos del mar,’ while its headquarters were established at Cartagena, and its other early establishments were also on the coast. But it was only in the later part of the thirteenth century that sea power was of constant importance. The conflict with Islam in its earlier stages had been conducted mainly on land, and when sea power had earlier been needed, recourse had at times been made to the Italian maritime cities. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries the other military orders did not commonly engage in maritime warfare. Unlike the Hospitaliers in the East who created the post of admiral in the later thirteenth century, these other orders did not have any naval officials and, although Ramón Berenguer IV promised timber for the construction of ships when he gave Amposta to the Hospitallers, it may be doubted whether even the international orders in Spain possessed any ships of their own. The military orders were essentially land forces.

One of the main tasks allotted to them was the defence and sometimes also the construction of strongholds in the frontier region. When Alfonso II of Portugal granted Avis to the master and brethren of Evora in 1211, he did so on condition that ‘in loco supradicto de Avis castrum edificetis,’ and a similar obligation was imposed on the Hospitaliers in Portugal by Sancho II when he assigned Crato to them. But in most instances the orders appear to have taken over existing fortifications. It is impossible to undertake a comprehensive survey of all the castles in frontier districts which passed into the hands of the military orders, partly because of inadequacies of evidence and difficulties of placename identification, and partly because of the incompleteness of research; but it is clear that in some frontier regions particular orders tended to predominate. In the lower valley of the Ebro, conquered by the

---

26 Torres Fontes, ‘Orden de Sta. María’ 96–97 docs. 1, 2.
27 Ibid. 88; Cortes de los antiguos reinos de León y de Castilla (Madrid 1881–1903) I 94.
28 The order of Sta. María did not, however, restrict its activities to maritime enterprises, for in 1279 Alfonso X gave it the castle of Medina Sidonia, ‘en que tengan el conuento mayor que esa orden ha de tener en esta frontera del regno de Sevilla’: Torres Fontes, ‘Orden de Sta. María’ 110–13 doc. 10; J. Menéndez Pidal, ‘Noticias acerca de la orden militar de Santa María de España,’ Revista de archivos, bibliotecas y museos 17 (1907) 177–79 doc. 4.
30 Delaville Le Roulx, Cartulaire I 141–43 doc. 181.
31 Forey, Templars 326.
count of Barcelona in the middle years of the twelfth century, the Temple and the Hospital were the orders to whom frontier defence was primarily entrusted. In 1153, for example, Ramón Berenguer IV, 'volens castrum de Mirabet quod divina tribuente clemencia maximo labore capi securis custodiabilire,' assigned that castle and neighbouring strongholds to the Templars, just as he had granted Amposta to the Hospitallers. On the other hand, in the areas conquered during the second half of the twelfth century in the district of Teruel by Ramón Berenguer's successor, Alfonso II, the order of Mountjoy was chiefly favoured by the Aragonese king, who also entrusted the castle of Alcañiz to Calatrava. The Templars gained a footing there only at the close of the century, and although the Hospitallers obtained the stronghold of Aliaga by private grant in 1163, they were not given castles in this region by the Aragonese crown until the opening years of the thirteenth century. The Templars and Hospitallers also gained a series of strongholds in the northern and central parts of the kingdom of Valencia when it came under Christian control in Jaime I's reign; but some of these acquisitions had already been promised to these orders by Jaime's predecessors, and in the period immediately after the conquest they were not assigned castles in the more southerly regions beyond the river Júcar. In this part of the kingdom Santiago was the order chiefly favoured by Jaime, whose grants to it included the castles of Enguera and Anna, given in 1244.

On the other side of the peninsula, in Portugal, the international orders of the Temple and Hospital similarly became most firmly entrenched in the more northerly regions. In the twelfth century the Templars undertook the defence of a considerable number of castles in the territories to the north of the Tagus, including Tomar and Castelo Branco as well as Soure, and the Hospital was

---

36 Forey, 'Mountjoy' 252-59; Bullarium de Calatrava 13-14.
37 Cartulario de la encomienda de Aliaga, ed. L. Esteban Mateo (Zaragoza 1979) 14, 32, 36-38 docs. 2, 19, 23; Delaville Le Roux, Cartulaire II 16-17, 54-55 docs. 1162, 1228; Forey, Templars 26-29; A. Ubieto Arista, 'La creación de la frontera entre Aragón-Valencia y el espíritu fronterizo,' Homenaje a Don José María Lacarra de Miguel (Zaragoza 1977) II 95-107.
40 Azevedo, Documentos I 344-45 doc. 271; Monumenta Henricina I 10-12, 44-45 docs. 4, 24.
given land to fortify at Belver, on the Tagus, as well as at Crato, a little farther south. Yet although the Hospitallers also received Moura and Serpa, to the east of the Guadiana, after these strongholds had been recovered in 1232, most of the castles which were entrusted to the military orders in the more southerly region — brought permanently under Christian lordship mainly in the first half of the thirteenth century — were assigned to Avis and Santiago. Sancho II thus gave to the latter order a group of castles in the Baixo Alentejo and Algarve districts, including Aljustrel, Mértola, and Ayamonte.

The international orders seem to have been least significant in the central parts of the peninsula. Even in the twelfth century, when they played an important role in other parts of the peninsula, the Leonese and Castilian kings made them responsible for few frontier strongholds. In Castile the Templars had early been assigned Calatrava, but they appear to have been given little else in the border area during the second half of the twelfth century. In 1163 the castle of Uclés was granted to the Hospitallers, but in 1174 it passed into the hands of Santiago, and the Hospital was apparently given compensation in the form of lands farther north, away from the frontier region. The only important stronghold which the Hospitallers held near the Muslim frontier in Castile in the later years of the twelfth century was Consuegra, granted by Alfonso VIII in 1183. But he favoured mainly the Spanish orders. Of these, Santiago was assigned strongholds chiefly in the eastern part of the frontier district: among its acquisitions in this area were Alharilla and Oreja as well as

---

38 Delaville Le Roulx, Cartulaire I 610-11 doc. 963; Documentos de D. Sancho I (1174-1211), edd. R. de Azevedo, P. Avelino de Jesus da Costa, and M. Rodrigues Pereira (Coimbra 1979 —) I 112-13 doc. 73.


42 J. González, Regesta de Fernando II (Madrid 1943) 376; idem, El reino de Castilla en la época de Alfonso VIII (Madrid 1960) I 321-24 docs. 194-95.

43 P. Guerrero Ventas, El gran priorato de San Juan en el Campo de la Mancha (Toledo 1969) 332-33 doc. 4; González, Alfonso VIII II 708-11 doc. 409. Alfonso VIII had, however, also given the Hospital several villages near the frontier in 1162. The Templars had received some strongholds in León in the 1160s, but most of these were soon lost to the Muslims: C. Estepa, ‘Las encomiendas del Temple en Tierra de Campos,’ Archivos leoneses 52 (1972) 49 and ‘La disolución de la orden del Temple en Castilla y León,’ Cuadernos de historia 6 (1975) 141-43.
Uclés. Calatrava predominated in the central portion of Castile’s border region, and in the second half of the twelfth century seems to have possessed more frontier castles than any other order in Castile; but in the last decade of the century a district in the western part of the frontier region was assigned to Trujillo, the Castilian branch of San Julián de Pereiro: in 1195 Alfonso VIII gave it the castles of Albalat, Santa Cruz, Cabañas, and Zueruela, which all lay near Trujillo itself. The pattern was similar in the thirteenth century. Although the Templars received the stronghold of Capilla from Fernando III in 1236 and in 1241 the Hospitallers were given the castles of Lora, Setefilla, and Almenara, which lay between Córdoba and Sevilla, the Spanish orders were again favoured in the districts conquered by the Leonese and Castilian kings during the first half of the thirteenth century. Calatrava and Santiago, were thus both entrusted with a number of castles in the Alto Guadalquivir region, where Calatrava’s holdings were centred on Martos and Santiago’s on Segura de la Sierra. In addition Santiago received strongholds in the first half of the century in Extremadura, where Alcántara also became firmly established. The Spanish orders were, however, assigned less in the middle and lower part of the Guadalquivir valley, which was dominated by Córdoba and Sevilla.

Whichever orders were favoured in the various parts of the peninsula, the Christian kings obviously relied upon them extensively for securing frontier districts, though reconquered cities were usually kept directly under royal control. Yet it may be questioned whether the military orders were always fully equipped to undertake the task ascribed to them.

Supplies of manpower and resources would inevitably be required by those who undertook the defence of frontier castles, especially as the regions in which border strongholds were situated were often lying waste or were not fully

---

44 Martín, Orígenes 220–21, 225–26 docs. 47, 52; González, Alfonso VIII II 275–77, 284–86 docs. 162, 168.
46 Ibid. III 139–41 doc. 641. These were, however, lost to the Muslims very shortly afterwards.
worked. In Syria the military orders had a clear advantage over the rulers and nobles of the crusader states in that they had a source of revenues and manpower in Europe: the western provinces of the leading orders were obliged to send a third of their income to the East, together with recruits. But the military orders in Spain did not usually receive financial assistance from outside the peninsula. The Aragonese Templars admittedly informed Jaime II at the end of 1307, after he had ordered their arrest, that the members of the order

meten de les altres terres et provinces ço quels pudien aver an ajudat ha conquere et ha mantenir et ha defendre la terra contra los enemichs de la

fe. Yet Templar officials in the East were more concerned to obtain revenues for the Holy Land from the Spanish provinces than to supply these provinces from other parts of the West, and there was in fact no regular arrangement to provide resources for the reconquista from Templar estates in other western countries. It is also true that Santiago had possessions outside Spain, especially in France where it established several encomiendas; but it has been doubted whether the members of the order in Spain received much financial benefit from these properties. The military orders in the peninsula did, however, commonly have lands in districts away from the frontier, and some of the revenues from these possessions could be used to subsidise border strongholds. But little is known of the extent of such subsidies or of the manner in which they were paid. The heads of commanderies had to surrender a portion of their revenues to their master or provincial master, and these responsions may have been used partly to subsidise castles on the frontier, although in the Temple and Hospital some of the money provided in this way was sent out to the East. In some instances strongholds in the south received revenues directly from properties farther north, but this does not seem to have been a common practice. Yet not all of the military orders in the peninsula had substantial estates away from the frontier. The order of Mountjoy, for example, in the later twelfth century possessed few properties in Aragon other than the frontier.

49 Espejel, for example, was described as a castellum heremum when it was given to Santiago by Alfonso VIII in 1185: González, *Alfonso VIII II* 749–50 doc. 435.
52 On the amounts sent by the Aragonese Templars, see Forey, *Templars* 323–24.
55 Lomax, *Orden de Santiago* 206.
castles which it had received from Alfonso II. And it is clear that Christian rulers did not always assume that castles handed over to the orders could be maintained from revenues drawn from estates farther north, for donations of border strongholds were not infrequently accompanied by grants of subsidies for their upkeep. When Ramón Berenguer IV gave Amposta to the Hospitalers he also assigned them 2,000 *morabetinos* 'ad opus illorum de Imposta,' as well as an annual subsidy of 1,000 *morabetinos*; and similarly when Alfonso VIII of Castile granted the castles of Albalat, Santa Cruz, Cabañas, and Zueruela to the order of Trujillo in 1195 he deemed it necessary to assign rents worth 3,000 *dureos* a year from Magán 'ad munitionem igitur et manutenentiam perpetuam predictorum castrorum.' Alfonso VIII was also obliged to provide subsidies to Calatrava after it had lost a series of strongholds in the frontier region following the defeat at Alarcos in 1195. The Castilian king 'condolens . . . paupertati uestre eo quod domum uestram maiorem de Calatraua uestrasque omnes fere res ex infortunio de Alarcos, in quo mecum intrauistis, amisistis,' provided assistance to relieve the order's poverty, and a further subsidy for Salvatierra, the new headquarters of Calatrava, was granted in 1201 by Alfonso, who in his will compiled three years later also assigned Calatrava 10,000 *morabetinos* a year for ten years for the construction and repair of the castle of Salvatierra. That the orders sometimes delegated to others the task of fortifying and defending frontier districts is probably a further sign of limited financial resources: when the Hospitallers in Castile gave a half of Criptana and of neighbouring villages to the Toledan noble Miguel Asarafi in 1162, for example, they imposed upon him the obligation of building a tower for the defence of the district.

As the Christian frontiers advanced and resettlement progressed, the orders' resources in regions away from the border of course increased; but financial problems were still encountered in the thirteenth century, and on various occasions appeals for material assistance were made to both secular and ecclesiastical powers. In 1233 the master of Santiago dispatched requests for help to kings and princes, pointing out that the order's resources were scarcely sufficient for the task of defending its strongholds; in the following year Greg-

---

58 Lists of the order's Aragonese properties were made when these were surrendered to the Templars at the end of the century: Madrid, Archivo Histórico Nacional, Ordenes militares, Calatrava, signatura 1541-C 135–38.
61 Ibid. III 246–47, 341–47 docs. 704, 769. Alfonso also bequeathed rents to the other military orders.
ory IX agreed that revenues intended for the fabric of Santiago's churches should be diverted for a period of three years because of the cost of defending frontier castles; and Gregory's successor Innocent IV — again stressing Santiago's limited resources — on more than one occasion offered indulgences to those who gave aid for the protection of the order's strongholds.\(^63\)

Nor did the orders have endless reserves of manpower. A ceiling on recruitment would inevitably have been imposed by their limited resources, although the measures which are known to have been taken in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries to restrict recruitment for economic reasons concern only the convents of sisters subject to the Hospital and to Santiago.\(^64\) But whether the orders could normally recruit as many members as they could maintain is not altogether apparent. Heavy losses in the field at times created problems, as in 1280 when Santiago was seriously weakened by the defeat at Moclin: it was apparently to restore the order's strength that it was then amalgamated with the order of Santa María de España.\(^65\) But most of the evidence about recruitment is somewhat inconclusive. In 1180 the master of Mountjoy asked Alexander III for permission to admit to his order men who had fought as mercenaries, even though decrees against these had been passed in the Lateran council the year before;\(^66\) but this was a recent foundation which was still trying to establish itself. Innocent IV was petitioned in 1245 by Santiago to allow those who had taken the cross to join the order instead of going on crusade, but the reasons for the request are not precisely known.\(^67\) Perhaps more obviously indicative of a shortage of recruits is a letter written by the master of Santiago in 1250 in which he stated that he was sending brothers to Germany with power to receive recruits.\(^68\) Normally the military orders in Spain, including the Temple and Hospital,\(^69\) relied upon recruitment within the peninsula, and it would seem that the master of Santiago felt it necessary to try to attract recruits from farther afield.\(^70\)


\(^{64}\) Delaville Le Roulx, Cartulaire II 76–77, 691–93 docs. 1272, 2528; Documentos de Sigena, ed. A. Ubieto Arteta (Valencia 1972—) I 82–84 doc. 46; Lumax, Orden de Santiago 80–83.

\(^{65}\) Torres Fontes, ‘Orden de Sta. María’ 94–95; Menéndez Pidal, ‘Noticias’ 169–70.


\(^{67}\) Bullarium S. Iacobi 140.

\(^{68}\) Ibid. 178.

\(^{69}\) In 1307 the Aragonese Templars told Jaime II that ‘nos tots som vostres naturals’: Finke, Papatskunst II 70–73 doc. 48.

\(^{70}\) There is some evidence to suggest a decline in recruiting in the Temple at the turn of the fourteenth century: Forey, Templars 278.
Yet, if references to recruitment are often insufficiently explicit, it is clear
that the orders established garrisons of brethren in only a limited number of
the fortified places assigned to them near the Muslim frontier. Convents
were set up in only the more important strongholds. This can be illustrated by
tracing the development of Templar organisation along the lower Ebro and in
the district of Teruel. In the Ebro valley the Templars had received in 1153
the lesser strongholds of Algars, Batea, Corbera, Gandesa, Pinell and Rasquera
as well as Miravet. They established a convent at Miravet, probably by the
year 1165, but this was the only convent founded in that locality. References
to commanders of Algars and Gandesa occur in the thirteenth century, but
these were merely subordinate administrative officials; and by the time that
the commander of Gandesa is recorded the region had ceased to be near the
frontier. Convents were also established in time in the nearby castles of
Horta and Asco, which were given to the order by Alfonso II, although it is
not known exactly when they were founded; but at Ribarroja, which the
Templars also received from Alfonso II, no convent was set up during the
period when the castle was still in the frontier region. The Templars similarly
did not garrison all of the castles which they acquired from Mountjoy in souther
ern Aragon at the end of the twelfth century. At first, groups of castles and
lordships in this area were placed under the control of brothers who were often
already heads of convents farther north. In 1196 Guillermo de Peralta was
thus commander of Alfambr, Villel, and Teruel as well as of the more northerly
convent of Novillas. In the following years convents were established in the
castles of Cantavieja, Castellote, Alfambr, and Villel, but the commander of
the castle of Libros mentioned in several documents belonging to the first half
of the thirteenth century was merely a subordinate administrative official.
At Villarluengo — where the Templars had a fortified building — there is no
evidence of Templar officials at all during the period when it lay in the frontier
district; and no brothers appear to have been stationed in the castle of Orios,
to the north-east of Alfambr. Exactly how many strongholds subject to
other orders were garrisoned with brethren of these orders is not known, but
it would be surprising if the practice in the Temple was radically different from
that of the other military orders.

70 Some fortifications were, of course, little more than watchtowers or places of refuge.
71 Col. doc. inéd. IV 208–11 doc. 77.
72 Forey, Templars 92–93.
73 No commander of Gandesa is known before 1280.
74 Forey, Templars 93–94.
75 Ibid. 94.
76 Ibid. 94–95.
77 References to commanders of Libros occur between 1212 and 1234.
Evidence is sparse concerning the numbers of brethren living in the castles which the orders did garrison, but the available information — again drawn from the Temple in Aragon — suggests that these strongholds housed only small communities. The largest number of Templars recorded at the castle of Castellote at any one time is ten, and when the Templars stationed in the order’s castles in southern Aragon were arrested in 1308, the number of brethren taken into custody ranged from three from the convent of Villel to fifteen from that of Cantavieja. And it should be remembered that not all members of the military orders were warriors: their communities usually included not only chaplains but also sergeants who normally undertook domestic and agricultural tasks.

The defence of strongholds did not, of course, depend entirely on the members of the orders. The latter were at times assisted by laymen who gave voluntary service for a limited period. As has been mentioned, in 1134 a group of Catalan nobles promised to serve with the Templars for a year, and in the middle years of the twelfth century their example was followed by others, including García Ortiz, the lord of Zaragoza, who gave service in 1148 in the Templar castle of Corbins. An inducement to furnish assistance of this kind was provided by the offering of indulgences, as happened in 1220 when Honorius III promised spiritual rewards to those ‘qui ad munitionem et custodiam castrorum fratrum Calatravensis ordinis in frontaria consistentium inipsis castris fideliter morabuntur.’ On occasion the papacy took even more positive action to secure help of this kind for the military orders. When Adrian IV was informed in 1158 that the Templars and their lands in Spain were in grave danger, he commanded the archbishops and bishops of the provinces of Narbonne, Auch, and Tarragona to persuade any who had vowed to journey to Jerusalem to go instead to the aid of the Templars in the peninsula and to serve with them for a year or two in remission of their sins. Although it is not known how much service was gained in this way, it presumably provided the military orders with a source of manpower which was not usually available to secular lords who had charge of frontier castles.

78 Forey, Templars 278.
79 Six brothers of Alfambra were arrested, and eight belonging to the convent of Castellote: Barcelona, Archivo de la Corona de Aragón (henceforth cited as ACA), Cancillería real, registro 291 fols. 134, 159v, 164v, 165v. By 1308 these castles were, of course, no longer on the frontier.
80 Albon, Cartulaire 306, 312 docs. 499, 505.
In obtaining the assistance of other laymen the orders were, however, in no better position than their secular counterparts. The inhabitants of the district subject to a castle, even if they were Moors, could be expected to help in its defence, but resettlement was commonly necessary before such aid could be obtained on any scale. Finding settlers was in fact an obligation often explicitly placed upon the recipients of castles as part of the process of establishing Christian lordship in border regions. It might be thought that the military orders, some of which had extensive estates farther north, would have been in an advantageous position for fulfilling this task and able to use their northern properties as a source from which settlers could be obtained. Certainly the transfer of men from existing estates belonging to the orders to new settlements under their control did occasionally occur, as at Castellnou, near Lérida, in 1231, when land in the new settlement was assigned by the Templars to the inhabitants of Riudovelles and other nearby places under Templar lordship. The evidence provided by names also suggests that in other Templar poblaciones some settlers came from estates belonging to that order. But the names of settlers do not imply that most were recruited in this way: those who took up residence on Templar estates in the Corona de Aragón appear to have come from all parts of Aragon and Catalonia and possibly also from southern France. The orders would certainly not have wanted to recruit settlers primarily from their own estates, for it is clear that the surplus of manpower in the more northerly regions was not very great and that in the thirteenth century many lords in these districts were suffering from a lack of tenants because of migration to rural estates in the south or to the growing urban communities in all parts of the peninsula. In the middle of the thirteenth century, for example, the newly conquered cities in the south appear to have been attracting men from the estates of Santiago farther north: amongst the settlers listed in the repartimiento of Sevilla were Martín de Uclés, Domingo Vela de Uclés, Fernando de Uclés, and Esteban Domínguez de Uclés, while several individuals bearing the

---

83 The Moors of Chivert were in 1234 placed under the obligation of defending Chivert if it was attacked by either Christians or Muslims: M. Ferrandis, 'Rendición del castillo de Chivert a los Templarios,' Homenaje a D. Francisco Codera (Zaragoza 1904) 31.
84 Lands were often given ad populandum: e.g., Delaville Le Roulx, Cartulaire II 54–55 doc. 1228.
85 Font Rius, Cartas de población I 365–67 doc. 258.
86 Forey, Templars 212.
87 Ibid.
name Uclés are also encountered in the repartimiento of Murcia. The effect which such desertions might have can be seen in the Templar lordship of Puigreig, on the upper Llobregat, where a new carta de población, favourable to tenants, was issued in 1281 in an attempt to attract newcomers; eleven years later, however, permission was being given by the Templar grand master to alienate Puigreig because it was no longer profitable to the order. The military orders in fact, like other lords in Spain and elsewhere, sometimes found it convenient to delegate the task of attracting settlers, instead of trying to recruit tenants themselves. In the early thirteenth century the order of Santiago thus granted the castle of Alhambra to Alvaro Núñez de Lara ad populandum. The donation of La Cenia to Guillermo Moragues, an inhabitant of the nearby city of Tortosa, by the Hospitallers in 1232 was made for a similar purpose; and four years later Guillermo issued a carta de población for a settlement of up to twenty-one inhabitants.

In the same district the Hospitallers in 1239 similarly assigned Alcanar to five settlers on the condition that 'illud vos superdicti populetis et mitatis ibi XX et unum populatores.' Yet, whatever the method employed, the progress of resettlement on the estates of the military orders was no more rapid than that in other lordships: along the lower Ebro, which was conquered in the middle years of the twelfth century, the settlement of lands assigned to the Templars and Hospitallers did not make much progress until the turn of the century, and it was then as well that other lords in the district were undertaking the work of resettlement.

Nevertheless the orders were described on several occasions by Alfonso VIII as constituting a wall and a shield for the defence of Christendom, and the Aragonese king Pedro II in the early thirteenth century similarly praised the efforts of the Templars and Hospitallers in defence of the Christian faith. The military orders can certainly be shown to have undertaken the construction and strengthening of castles, and on some occasions when these were threatened they provided stout opposition to the Moors. Despite the employment of catapults and other siege engines against the Calatravan headquarters
of Salvatierra in 1211 the defenders maintained a lengthy and determined resistance: Rodrigo Jiménez de Rada asserts that the stronghold fell only after nearly three months, when large numbers of the defenders had been killed and the towers and wall almost destroyed,\(^9\) while according to the account provided in the Crónica latina it was only on the king’s order that Salvatierra finally surrendered after a siege of more than two months, when it could no longer be defended.\(^8\) But there were also occasions when the orders were able to furnish little effective resistance to the infidel. Following the Christian defeat at Alarcos on July 19, 1195 a number of castles belonging to the order of Calatrava — Alarcos, Caracuel, Calatrava itself, Benavente, and Malagón — were quickly lost: after capturing them al-Mansur was back in Sevilla by August 7. At Alarcos, where the remnants of the Christian army had sought refuge and where there was apparently a lack of supplies, a surrender was negotiated, but according to some of the Muslim sources the inhabitants of Calatrava had fled even before the Muslim forces arrived.\(^9\) Further losses were sustained in the following year. In his report on the campaign al-Mansur claimed that those living in Trujillo took flight and that their example was followed by the inhabitants of Santa Cruz. On their way back to Sevilla the Muslims also attacked Piedrabuena, which was under the lordship of Calatrava, and although according to al-Mansur it had a sizeable garrison composed partly of ifrir — the term used by Muslims to denote brethren of the military orders — it quickly fell.\(^10\) Despite al-Mansur’s comment it would seem that — as in the kingdom of Jerusalem a few years earlier — there was not sufficient manpower available to provide both large armies in the field and adequate


\(^9\) Crónica latina de los reyes de Castilla, ed. M. D. Cabanes Pecourt (Valencia 1964) 40–41; see also Anales toledanos I in España sagrada, edd. H. Flórez et al. (Madrid 1747-1879) XXIII 395; Ibn Abi Zar’, Rawd al-Qirías, trans. A. Huici Miranda (Valencia 1964) 460–61, where it is claimed that the siege lasted eight months; al-Himyari, Kitab ar-Raud al-Mi’tar, trans. P. Maestro González (Valencia 1963) 223–25, 277, where the siege is said to have lasted fifty-one days; Abd el-Wah’id Merrakechi, Histoire des Almohades, trans. E. Fagnan (Algiers 1893) 278; Lucas de Tuy, Chronicum mundi, ed. A. Schott, Hispaniae illustratae (Frankfurt 1603–8) IV 110. The figure of 400 knightly defenders provided by the Anonymous of Copenhagen should not, however, be taken as an informed guide to the strength of the garrison: C. Sánchez-Albornoz, La España musulmana (Madrid 1974) II 358.

garrisons; and once forces committed to the field had been defeated, strongholds were very vulnerable.

Despite the limitations of the military orders there was no obvious alternative which could provide a more effective means of defence in the border region. The advance of the Christian frontier in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries inevitably created problems of manpower and resources. At times the only assistance available was that provided by the military orders. The order of Calatrava apparently owed its existence to the fact that no secular noble could be found who was prepared to undertake the defence of the castle of Calatrava; and when the Aragonese king Pedro II gave the stronghold of Monroyo to the same order he asserted that

nullus est in terra nostra, qui castrum istud ad populandum recipere vellet, etiam cum hujusmodi libertate prout vos predicti magister et fratres et domus de Alcaniz, qui pro hac populatione facienda personas et res periculis exponere non timetis.\footnote{Bullarium de Calatrava 40-41; O'Callaghan, 'Affiliation' 180.}

Sometimes conquests had just to be abandoned because of lack of resources, as happened at Ubeda in 1212.\footnote{González, Alfonso VIII I 1060; III 566-72 doc. 897.} In such a situation any aid that the military orders could provide was welcome.\footnote{The wording of Ramón Berenguer IV's charter to the Templars in 1143 suggests that at the outset the Christian rulers were also concerned to involve the international orders in the reconquista as a means of ensuring that manpower was not lost through the dispatch of Spanish members of these orders to the Holy Land: Forey, Templars 22.}

Yet in assigning frontier strongholds to the orders the Christian rulers were probably not influenced solely by the need to defend newly-won conquests. It has been suggested that the favour shown to the military orders helped to free the Spanish monarchies from excessive dependence on the secular nobility. This is true, although it would be wrong to assume that there was always a conflict of interest between kings and nobles; and if reliance on the nobility was undesirable, powerful military orders could also constitute a threat to royal authority. As is made clear in numerous charters of donation, one factor which led Christian rulers to patronise the orders was the necessity of rewarding those who had participated in expeditions; and gifts made to the orders brought to the donors spiritual as well as material benefits. The importance of this factor should not be minimised. It was clearly enunciated by Pedro II when he granted the castle of Sollavientos to the Hospitallers in 1205, for he explained that he had made the gift

considerans et diligenter attendens quod eilemosina liberat hominem a morte et multitudinem operit peccatorum, nec sinit ire in tenebris, cum sit fiducia magna facientibus eam, ac sicut aqua ignem extinguit peccata.\footnote{Delaville Le Roux, Cartulaire II 54-55 doc. 1228; Cartulario de Altaja 36-38 doc. 23.}
But the overriding motive for the patronage of the military orders was the need to solve the problem of holding and defending conquered territories.

The choice of order to be employed for this purpose was affected by a variety of considerations. The international orders of the Temple and Hospital were the first on the scene, and strongholds which were in the frontier region in the middle years of the twelfth century were therefore frequently assigned to them; and when more local orders were founded they inevitably became candidates for patronage in the district where they were first established: Santiago was thus used to defend frontier castles in León, as Calatrava was in Castile. But there were clearly also other influences at work. In some instances the employment of one order is to be explained by the inadequacies of another. In 1157 the Templars informed Sancho III of Castile that they could no longer defend the castle of Calatrava. The Cistercian abbot of Fitero offered to undertake its defence and in this way it became the headquarters of the new order of Calatrava. Conversely, in 1196 the Templars were assigned the strongholds in southern Aragon which the order of Mountjoy was no longer able to protect. According to the master, Alfonso II had ordered

> ut munitiones illas ei dimitteret, aut domum Montis Gaudii talii ordinii subjiceret, per quem possent ipsa domus, munitiones et alia ejus bona a Sarraceniis incursibus defensari. ¹⁰⁶

As it was felt that they could be better defended by the Templars than by anyone else, they were handed over to the Temple. ¹⁰⁷ At other times strained relations with an order which had previously been favoured might incline a ruler to turn elsewhere for assistance. It is perhaps not a coincidence that the grant of the castle of Alcántara to Calatrava in 1217 — the first important donation to that order in the kingdom of León — occurred at a time when the Leonese king Alfonso IX was in dispute with Santiago. ¹⁰⁸ There also appears to have been concern lest a particular order should become too powerful and independent. This danger was of course increased by the success of the Spanish reconquest. Whereas in Syria after the early decades of the twelfth century the Christians were mainly on the defensive and losing territory, in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries the Christian frontiers in Spain were extensively advanced; and if one order were constantly favoured it would come to possess a very considerable number of strongholds. The fear of such an accumulation of power was expressed most precisely by the Aragonese king Jaime II in the early fourteenth century, when there was the possibility that Templar property

¹⁰⁶ Delaville Le Roulx, 'Montjoye' 55-57 doc. 4.
¹⁰⁷ Kehr, Papsturkunden. Katalanien 569 doc. 254.
would be assigned to the Hospitallers; \(^{109}\) but he argued that this concern was not new and maintained that his predecessors had pursued a policy of patronising various military orders.\(^{110}\) This could explain why the Templars were at first excluded from the regions conquered by Alfonso II in the district of Teruel and why he favoured Mountjoy there, as well as assigning Alcañiz to Calatrava in 1179. It would also explain why Pedro II of Aragon extended his favour to San Jorge de Alfama a few years after the demise of Mountjoy and why he gave the castle of Montalbán to Santiago in 1210.\(^{111}\)

It has also been suggested that some donations to the military orders should be interpreted as attempts to gain assistance in conflicts between Christian rulers and to neutralise the support which an order might give to a rival Christian king. The frequently hostile relationship which existed between the kings of León and Castile up to 1230 has thus been seen as influencing royal attitudes to the Spanish orders in these kingdoms. It has been argued that the Leonese and Castilian kings saw Santiago as a potential ally, and that grants were made to gain the support of this new military force.\(^{112}\) It has similarly been maintained that the Leonese kings sought to purchase the neutrality of the Castilian order of Calatrava by making it an international institution: the gift of Alcántara in 1217 is seen to mark the culmination of this policy.\(^{113}\) That the Spanish rulers at first intended to use the orders against all enemies, whether Christian or Muslim, is not unlikely: in 1172, for example, Afonso Henriques of Portugal gave the castle of Monsanto to Santiago on the condition that the leading official of Santiago in the kingdom

\[
\text{teneat semper illud castellum et non alius comendator alterius terre, et}
\text{recipiat semper in illud filium meum vel filiam meam reginam domnem}
\text{Tarasiam si regnum meum tenuerint, et homines eorum in negociis et guerris}
\text{suis tam christianorum quam sarracenorum.}\(^{114}\)
\]

But doubts may be expressed about this interpretation of royal favour in the long term, for in the later twelfth and early thirteenth centuries the orders did not in fact become embroiled in the conflicts between Christian rulers. The neutrality of Santiago was early illustrated by the master's role as a guarantor

---

\(^{109}\) Finke, Papsttum II 212–16 doc. 113.

\(^{110}\) Ibid. II 89–90 doc. 60.

\(^{111}\) Sáinz de la Maza Laso, Santiago en Aragón 238–39 doc. 4. Guerrero Ventas, Gran priorato de San Juan 57–58 similarly suggests that Consuegra was given to the Hospitallers in order to check the growing power of the Spanish orders in the region. Minor orders, such as Mountjoy or San Jorge, would also be easy to control, but this might not be true of Santiago and Calatrava which had interests in various parts of the peninsula.

\(^{112}\) Lomax, Orden de Santiago 29.

\(^{113}\) D. W. Lomax, ‘Las milicias cistercienses en el reino de León,’ Hispania 23 (1963) 32.

of peace between Fernando II and Alfonso VIII in 1181 and 1183, little more than a decade after the order’s foundation. And if it was necessary for the Leonese kings to buy the neutrality of Calatrava, it is surprising that they did not dispense more patronage at an early stage: the donation of Alcántara was made almost sixty years after the foundation of Calatrava. Moreover, if Alfonso IX’s intention in 1217 had been to neutralise Calatrava by making it an international order, it is strange that he accepted the arrangements concerning Alcántara which were agreed in the following year, for these made Calatrava a less international institution than it had earlier been. The agreement which was made under Alfonso’s guidance in 1218 specified that Calatrava should assign Alcántara and all the other property it possessed in the kingdom of León to the order of San Julián de Pereiro. This meant that Calatrava no longer had any lands directly under its authority in the kingdom of León, and although in 1218 it was agreed that San Julián de Pereiro should be dependent on Calatrava, the latter had already gained authority over the other order well before this time. If the property it had held in León and its authority over San Julián de Pereiro had not in the past guaranteed the neutrality of Calatrava, it may be doubted whether the affiliation of San Julián alone would ensure it. It is of course true that Spanish rulers made attempts to ensure that the headquarters of Spanish orders were established in their own kingdoms: in 1181 Fernando II of León gave Valduerna and Villafafila to Santiago ‘ut in regno nostro caput scilicet principalem domum vestri ordinis construatis,’ and in 1209 Alfonso IX granted Atalaya for the same purpose, while it has been suggested that Alfonso VIII sought to transfer the headquarters of San Julián de Pereiro to Castile. But the object of these proposals could have been merely to ensure that the order in question participated fully in the reconquest which was being pursued by one kingdom and did not concentrate

115 Lomax, Orden de Santiago 30; González, Alfonso VIII II 614–23, 701–8 docs. 362, 407. It has been argued by Lomax, ‘Santiago and the Kings of Leon’ 12–13 that the Portuguese king Afonso Henriques did not favour Santiago after 1179 because the order in that year gave its support to Fernando II and fought against the Portuguese at the battle of Argañal. But the only evidence for support of Leon is provided by a grant made by Fernando to Santiago in return for a horse ‘de quo ductus ad campale belhum, per Dei misericoerdiam, regem Sanctum [sic] Portugalesam deviei lustra Civitatem Roderici’; there is no reference to participation by members of Santiago: Martín, Orígenes 282–83 doc. 100.
117 O’Callaghan, ‘Foundation of Alcántara’ 479–81.
118 The international character of an order did not, of course, guarantee its neutrality, as is apparent from the use made of the Templars and Hospitallers in wars between Christians towards the end of the thirteenth century.
119 Martín, Orígenes 309–10 doc. 124.
120 González, Alfonso IX II 336–38 doc. 248.
121 Lomax, ‘Milicias cistercienses’ 35.
its efforts elsewhere: this desire is illustrated by Alfonso IX’s decree in 1218 that the revenues from Alcántara should not be sent out of the kingdom of León.¹²² Such a concern is understandable in view of the fragmented nature of the reconquista, which comprised a series of campaigns undertaken by individual Christian kingdoms rather than a combined offensive against the infidel.

As was made clear in some charters of donation, castles were not only defensive centres but also bases for attack: Fernando II when giving Alcéncher to the order of Santiago thus described it as ‘apte situm ad expugnandos Christi inimicos.’¹²³ In addition to the defence of strongholds, it was the function of the military orders to provide forces to fight in the field. Many of the statements which have been made by historians about the orders’ activities in this sphere cannot now be substantiated from the surviving evidence, but the orders’ participation in campaigns and expeditions can be traced in part not only from narrative sources — including letters as well as chronicles and annals — but also from charters. The value of the latter is obvious when they record grants made explicitly for aid during a particular campaign: in 1248 Fernando III, for example, rewarded the brothers of Avis ‘por muchos servicios que me fízistes siempre e me fazedes cada dia e sennaladamente por el servicio que me fízistes en la hueste de Sevilla.’¹²⁴ But use may also be made of charters which, while not specifically referring to service, mention agreements made by military orders during campaigns, or which record donations assigned to them at the time of expeditions. The order of Santiago’s participation in the siege of Cuenca, for example, is implied by the charter issued there at the beginning of October 1177 — just after Cuenca had fallen to the Christians — in which Alfonso VIII allocated property in the town to Santiago.¹²⁵ Charter evidence is particularly valuable for revealing the activities of some of the lesser orders, which tend not to be mentioned in the narrative sources. That San Jorge de Alfama took part in the siege of Burriana in 1233 is known only because Jaime I assigned it land there during the siege.¹²⁶

In the field the military orders often formed part of royal armies, and the presence of at least some orders on major campaigns can usually be demonstrated; but they also frequently acted independently of royal forces. A Muslim letter records a raid undertaken by ifrîr and the inhabitants of Ávila into the Córdoba region in 1173, and among the activities of this kind mentioned in the chronicle and annual sources is the conquest of a number of castles by Santiago and Calatrava in the late 1220s and early 1230s, while charter evidence shows

¹²² González, Alfonso IX II 463-64 doc. 354.
¹²³ Martín, Orígenes 223–24 doc. 50.
¹²⁴ Javierre Mur, Calatrava en Portugal 49–52 doc. 3.
¹²⁵ González, Alfonso VIII II 479-80 doc. 291; Martín, Orígenes 268-67 doc. 87.
¹²⁶ Documentos de Jaime I 1 312 doc. 181.
that the Templars captured the stronghold of Pulpis in northern Valencia about the year 1190.\textsuperscript{127} In many instances the sources do not indicate whether the orders were acting on their own initiative or at the king’s command, but several entries in Jaime I’s chronicle reveal that the initiative did not always rest with the king: the attack on the Valencian castle of Villena which took place in 1240 was decided upon by Calatrava and several Aragonese nobles, and the wording of the chronicle also implies that the Templars and Hospitalers took the initiative in negotiating the surrender of Chivert and Cervera a few years earlier.\textsuperscript{128}

The orders were encouraged to act on their own initiative by the terms of royal charters, for these not infrequently promised to them the territories which they succeeded in gaining from the Moors. In 1173 Calatrava thus received from Alfonso VIII of Castile the concession of ‘omne castellum quod de Sarracenis deinceps quolibet modo adquirere potueritis.’\textsuperscript{129} Other charters encouraged action in particular districts by allowing the orders to expand existing lordships at the expense of the Muslims. When Alfonso II of Aragon granted the castle of Villiel to the order of Mountjoy he also ceded to it ‘hec omnia que de Sarracenis deinde adquirere poteritis,’ and a similar concession was made by his successor Pedro II in 1202 when he gave the frontier stronghold of Fortanete to the Hospitalers.\textsuperscript{130} Encouragement of a different kind was provided by Alfonso VIII’s promise to Calatrava in 1183 that

\textsuperscript{127} Lévi-Provençal, ‘Recueil de lettres’ 52-53 doc. 25 bis; Anales toledanos II in España sagrada XXIII 408; Forey, Templars 373-74 doc. 8. The wording of fueros issued by the military orders also points to independent action: in those issued by the Templars for the commandery of Cantavieja in southern Aragon during the thirteenth century the obligation of cabalgada was limited to once a year with the Templar provincial master and twice with the commander of Cantavieja. The latter obligation would seem to refer to localised raiding: Forey, Templars 203.


\textsuperscript{129} González, Alfonso VIII II 305-7 doc. 183.

\textsuperscript{130} F. D. Gazulla, ‘La orden del Santo Redentor,’ Boletín de la Sociedad Castellonense de Cultura 9 (1928) 375; Delaville Le Roulx, Cartulaire II 16-17 doc. 1162; Cartulario de Alia-ga 32 doc. 19; cf. González, Alfonso VIII II 915-17 doc. 534; III 83-85 doc. 610. Not all promises of territory still in Muslim hands, however, should be regarded as encouragement to independent action. The assigning of places still under Moorish rule was a very common practice in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries and was in some instances a way of rewarding an individual or institution at no immediate expense. The wording of charters often shows that the recipient was not himself expected to conquer the place in question: when Alfonso II of Aragon promised the Valencian castles of Chivert and Oropesa to the Temple in 1169 he stated that the grant was to take effect ‘quandocumque ego vel successorus mei predicta castra de manu sarracenorum per nos vel per nostros homines vel quolibet allo modo habere potuerimus,’ and the same king’s gift of Montornés in 1181 to the same order was to be effective ‘quandocumque dominus deus illud castrum in manus Christianorum pervenire
Yet whereas in Syria some Christian rulers were prepared to allow the military orders to pursue their own foreign policies, the Iberian kings sought to maintain a firm control over the reconquista and relations with the Moors. When Alfonso IX gave Alcántara to the order of Calatrava in 1217 he decreed that 'semper guerram et pacem de ea quandocumque et quibuscumque mandaveris facatis,' and this statement was echoed in many other charters issued to the military orders. They were expected not only to make war at the king's command, but also to observe royal truces and peace with the Muslims. This restriction was not, however, always readily accepted by the papacy. In 1193 Celestine III commanded the military orders in Spain to continue the struggle against the infidel despite the truces which then existed between Christian rulers and the Muslims, and in 1225 Honorius III similarly told the orders to assist Alfonso Téllez in defending the castle of Albocácer from Muslim attack even at times when the Spanish kings had truces with the infidel. Yet, although in 1193 Celestine threatened to excommunicate any who tried to prevent the orders from fighting, royal wishes seem usually to have prevailed, and royal truces were observed by the orders. In 1205 Pedro II sought permission from the pope to use the order of Calatrava on the Aragonese frontier because its members did not dare to break the truce which the Castilian king then had with the Moors; and it was because of enforced inactivity in

131 González, _Alfonso VIII_ II 714–15 doc. 412.

132 See, for example, the agreement made between the Hospitallers and Bohemund III of Antioch in 1168: Delaville Le Roulx, _Cartulaire_ I 266–68 doc. 391.


135 _Bullarium de Calatrava_ 683–85.
Spain that the abbot of Morimond — to which Calatrava was affiliated — put forward in the following year the proposal that the order should transfer its activities to the East. The overriding weight of royal influence was further made clear in 1220, when Calatrava complained to the pope that it was being forbidden to retaliate against Muslim attacks. If the orders appear to have been reluctant to go to war against royal wishes, in 1221 the orders of Santiago and Calatrava did envisage that they might make a separate truce or peace with the Moors. It was agreed that neither order would make a truce without the counsel of the other and that each would observe any peace made by the other order. But the agreement may have referred to merely temporary and localised cessations of hostilities which were likely to characterise any period of conflict. It does not necessarily signify that the orders intended to flout royal commands.

The contingents which the military orders put into the field consisted in the first place of the brethren themselves. These provided a mounted force but were not necessarily all knights. The international orders and Santiago recruited men to the rank of sergeant as well, and according to Templar and Hospitaller statutes the sergeants-at-arms were mounted troops, although they were more lightly equipped than the knights. The orders could in addition call upon those living on their estates to furnish service, and from this source were obtained both cavalry — including the caballeros villanos — and infantry forces. Assistance in the field was also provided by volunteers: in 1250, for example, Innocent IV ordered the Spanish prelates to exhort the people to fight or to send men to fight alongside the brothers of Santiago when attacks were being launched against the Muslims. But whether the military orders in the peninsula employed paid troops during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, as they did in the East, is not altogether clear.

The precise importance of the contingents which the military orders put into the field is difficult to assess. Charters of donation certainly often imply that they gave very valuable assistance: when rewarding the Templars after the capture of the city of Valencia in 1238 Jaime I thus recalled the ‘multa grata servicia’ which they had given in the conquest of the kingdom of Valencia.

137 Mansilla, Documentación de Honorio III 251 doc. 340.
138 Bullarium de Calatrava 683–85.
140 Bullarium S. Iacobi 181–82.
141 D. W. Lomax, ‘Algunos estatutos primitivos de la orden de Calatrava,’ Hispania 21 (1961) 480 draws attention in this context to mercenarii mentioned in some early statutes of Calatrava; but the nature of their employment is uncertain.
and in the siege of the city. Yet comparatively few references to the orders are to be found in most of the narrative sources. The orders are not usually singled out for special comment and they feature considerably less prominently in the chronicles of the reconquista than in those recounting the conflict between Christian and Muslim in the East. The absence of comment is particularly noticeable on the Islamic side, for the Muslim chroniclers who report the fighting in the peninsula refer scarcely at all to the orders. A brief survey of the Christian and Muslim narratives of the Las Navas campaign in 1212 will serve to provide an illustration. In the account of the expedition which Alfonso VIII sent to Innocent III the Castilian king mentioned the military orders only once, and that was merely a passing reference: in the course of his narrative he told the pope that it had been decided not to undermine the walls of the stronghold of Calatrava because the order of Calatrava would then have had difficulty in holding the castle once it had fallen to the Christians. The archbishop of Narbonne, who participated in the campaign, reported that the brethren of Calatrava had taken part in the assault on the castle of Calatrava in the early part of the campaign, but did not refer to the orders in his account of the battle of Las Navas itself. In his De rebus Hispaniae Rodrigo Jiménez de Rada mentioned the presence of the orders of the Temple, Hospital, Santiago, and Calatrava and listed their leaders, but as he provided a catalogue of the leading participants in the battle the reference to the military orders is not necessarily significant. No comment at all about the military orders was made by the author of the Crónica latina or by Lucas de Túy, while on the Muslim side there is only an ambiguous reference in the Rawd al-qirtas to the servants of St. Mary, which has been taken to refer to the military orders. It is in the narratives of the siege of Sevilla that the fullest comments on the orders are found, but the account in the Primera crónica general is in the form of a series of anecdotes and it is therefore difficult to assess the overall contribution of the orders from this source, while a late medieval translation of Lucas de Túy, which draws attention to the exploits of the master of Santiago, Pelay Pérez, and of his followers, may have included material drawn from a lost biography of the master and could therefore exaggerate his role. It may of course be

148 Documentos de Jaime I II 43–44 doc. 277.
149 González, Alfonso VIII 111 566–72 doc. 597.
145 8.3 in Opera 177–78.
146 Ibn Abi Zar', Rawd al-Qirtas 462; Lomax, Orden de Santiago 10.
objected that some of the narrative sources are brief and that on the Christian
side they concern themselves mainly with the activities of kings. Yet they do
at times allude to the exploits of nobles: Rodrigo Jiménez de Rada, for example,
mentions some of the nobles who distinguished themselves at Las Navas, but
he does not draw attention to the orders’ contribution to the Christian victory.148
And even in the more detailed narratives, such as Jaime I’s chronicle, the
military orders do not feature very prominently.

The relative paucity of comment in the narrative sources is in itself sug-
gestive, but more precise evidence is sparse. An indication of the scale of aid
which the Spanish rulers expected from the military orders is perhaps provided
by the rewards which they offered to them. In 1143 Ramón Berenguer IV
assigned to the Templars a fifth of all lands which he conquered from the
Moors, and a similar concession was made to Calatrava in 1174 by the Castilian
king Alfonso VIII.149 In Portugal the Templars were in 1169 promised a third
of territories gained to the south of the Tagus, while twelve years earlier the
count of Barcelona had conceded to the Hospitalers a tenth of the lands which
he won without foreign aid.150 But these promises were not in fact implemented
and were in several instances formally repudiated. In 1185 Calatrava’s share
of Castilian conquests was reduced to a tenth,151 and the Temple’s right to a
fifth of Aragonese gains was revoked when Jaime I issued a confirmation of
Templar privileges in 1233.152 That Jaime was justified in taking this step is
apparent from the records of the distribution of conquered lands in Mallorca
after the island’s capture in 1229. All who had provided troops for the expedi-
tion were assessed at a certain number of shares or caballerías, according to the
size of their contingents. The Templar assessment of 525½ caballerías was
the sixth largest, coming after those of the king, Nuño Sánchez, Gastoneto de
Moncada, the bishop of Barcelona, and the count of Ampurias; but it comprised
less than a twenty-fifth of the total assessment of nearly 13,450 caballerías.153

This is the only evidence which provides precise information about the
proportional contribution made to a Christian force by a military order. Nor
is it easy to reach firm conclusions about the numerical size of the orders’
contingents, and it is in particular difficult to discover the numbers of brethren

148 De reb. Hisp. 8.11 in Opera 187.
149 Albon, Cartulaire 204–5 doc. 314; Col. doc. inéd. IV 93–99 doc. 43; González, Alfonso
VIII II 831–32 doc. 200.
150 Azevedo, Documentos I 384–85 doc. 295; Col. doc. inéd. IV 243–45 doc. 94; Delaville
Le Roux, Cartulaire I 190–91 doc. 251.
152 Foeray, Templars 33; A. L. Javierre Mur, Privilegios reales de la orden de Montesa en la
edad media (Madrid s.a.) 124 no. 35.
who served. But the figures which do survive again suggest that the orders made only a limited contribution to Christian armies. Only in a few instances were the military orders under an obligation to provide a fixed number of troops for their properties. For the lands assigned to them in Mallorca the Templars were obliged to furnish four knights, and in 1307 Jaime II claimed that the castle of Carmogente in Valencia had been granted to the order of Santiago for the service of seven knights. Yet grants of this kind appear to have been exceptional. Nevertheless, towards the end of the thirteenth century the Aragonese kings did begin to make arbitrary demands for fixed amounts of service. In May 1287 the Templars and Hospitallers were each ordered by Alfonso III to station thirty knights on the Valencian frontier, while Calatrava was required to provide twenty. In the autumn of 1303, when preparations were being made to repel a threatened attack from Granada, Jaime II demanded 100 knights from the Temple, sixty from the Hospital, thirty from Calatrava and twenty from Santiago. Some of these figures are not very large when compared with the forces which the nobility was obliged to provide. The contingents demanded of the military orders in 1287 were all smaller than the quotas of the leading Aragonese nobles, who at that time were bound to furnish forty to fifty knights each. Nor should it be assumed that contingents of the size demanded were always in fact provided. Further summons to the Aragonese Templars in 1303 and 1304 merely demanded that they should send as large a force as possible, and in October 1304 the king was ready to be satisfied with a Templar contingent of twenty to thirty knights. And although in 1342 the service of 110 knights was sought from the Hospitallers in Aragon and Catalonia, towards the end of Jaime II’s reign they had apparently had difficul-

154 Ibid. XI 38; with the increase of Templar property on the island the figure was raised to seven, but then reduced to six: ACA, reg. 15 fol. 108.
155 ACA, reg. 307 fol. 96v.
156 ACA, reg. 70 fol. 101r.
157 ACA, reg. 307 fol. 96v. The contributions of the Spanish orders were, of course, relatively more important in the centre of the peninsula; see, for example, the size of the rewards promised to the various orders by Fernando III during the siege of Sevilla: González, Repartimiento de Sevilla II 297–98.
158 L. González Antón, Las uniones aragonesas y las cortes del reino (1283–1301) (Zaragoza 1975) II 307, 316–18 docs. 137, 151–52. It could be objected that the comparison is unjust, because the summonses to the military orders would refer to brethren of the orders only, and these would be the equivalent merely of the household knights of secular lords: yet although most of the summonses refer just to equites or equi armati, in several the king uses the phrases ‘fratrum vestrorum et aliorum equitum comitiva’ and ‘fratrum vestrorum et equitum comitiva’: ACA, reg. 307 fols. 107, 128r.
159 ACA, reg. 307 fols. 96v, 107, 120, 128v, 131v.
ty in supplying a force of thirty, even though they had by then been assigned Templar properties in Aragon and Catalonia.¹⁶⁰

The size of the contingents provided at the end of the thirteenth and turn of the fourteenth century is not, of course, necessarily indicative of the numbers of troops furnished by the military orders at an earlier stage. But early fourteenth-century claims that the orders had previously supplied larger contingents are of questionable value. Jaime II's assertion that by the arrest of the Templars he had lost the service of 300 knights is hardly supported by the evidence of the late thirteenth century; and as the Aragonese king was at the time seeking to secure financial concessions from the pope, some degree of exaggeration would be expected.¹⁶¹ His later assertion that the Hospitallers had provided between seventy and 100 knights before they gained Templar property is again hardly borne out by late thirteenth-century evidence and was also made in circumstances which were conducive to exaggerated claims.¹⁶² Nor are offers of service outside the peninsula made in the thirteenth century necessarily a sure guide of what the military orders usually in fact contributed in Spain. By an agreement with the Latin Emperor Baldwin II in 1246 the master of Santiago undertook to take 300 knights and also other troops to Constantinople for a period of two years in return for the sum of 40,000 marks; but it was stipulated that the knights did not all have to be members of the order and it was envisaged that some would be crusaders; and the Infante Alfonso sought to ensure that not more than fifty knights of the order were sent.¹⁶³ Since the project foundered, it is not clear whether Santiago could in fact have supplied a force of 300 knights. But, as Jaime I noted in his chronicle, that order later failed to provide the aid which it had promised for his crusade to the Holy Land: although it had undertaken to furnish 100 knights, its contingent consisted in fact of only twenty.¹⁶⁴

This last figure is not very different from some found in accounts of thirteenth-century expeditions within the peninsula. It is reported in Jaime I's chronicle that, when the Aragonese king set out towards the city of Valencia in 1238, those accompanying him included a Templar commander with about twenty knights: among other contingents were those of Guillermo de Aguiló and Rodrigo de Lizana, which numbered some fifteen and thirty respectively.

¹⁶⁰ J. Vincke, Documenta selecta mutuas cisalpinae Arago-Catalaanicae et ecclesiae relationes illustrantia (Barcelona 1938) 302–3, 381–82 docs. 419, 516.
¹⁶² Vincke, Documenta 302–3 doc. 419.
¹⁶³ E. Benito Ruano, 'Balduino II de Constantinopla y la orden de Santiago,' Hispania 12 (1952) 30–34.
¹⁶⁴ Chronicle of James I cap. 480 (trans. Forster 598–99); F. Carreras y Candi, 'La creuada a Terra Santa (1269–1270),' Congreso de historia de la Corona de Aragón (Barcelona 1909–13) I 121, 126, 131–32, 134.
while the king's retainers totalled between 130 and 140 knights. And although the Primera crónica general records that in the early stages of the siege of Sevilla the master of Santiago had 280 knights under his command, these were not all brethren of the order; and the same work states that at a later stage of the siege the master was accompanied by only twenty-five brothers of Santiago. It has admittedly been calculated that the Templars had about a hundred knights in the attack on Mallorca, but these may not have all been brethren of that order; and when the provincial prior of the Hospitallers arrived in the island he was said to have been accompanied by only fifteen brother knights.

The losses incurred by the military orders in serious defeats also suggest that their numerical contribution was of only moderate significance. According to the Kalendario of Uclés, nineteen brothers of Santiago died in the disaster at Alarcos in 1195, and in the further defeat at Moclin in 1280 the master and fifty-five members of the same order were killed. The author of the Crónica de Alfonso X nevertheless claimed that in this battle 'murieron y todos los mas de los frailes de la orden de Santiago,' and — as has been mentioned — the loss was apparently serious enough to occasion the amalgamation with Santa María de España. By comparison, the Templars in the East admitted to losing 230 brothers in the defeat at Hattin, and when it was reported that the convents of the military orders had been almost completely destroyed in the battle of La Forbie in 1244, the patriarch of Jerusalem put Templar and Hospitaller losses at 312 and 325 respectively.

There is obviously a danger of trying to read too much into figures whose precise significance is often uncertain. The problem concerns not only the reliability of the figures themselves but also the identity of those to whom they refer. But it would be safe to conclude that the military orders' contribution to Christian armies was noticeably smaller in the Iberian peninsula than in the Holy Land, where the Templars and Hospitallers are thought to have furnished as many troops as the entire feudal levy.

---

267 Forey, Templars 32.
268 Chronicle of James I cap. 95 (trans. Forster 183).
269 A. de Morales, Opúsculos castellanos (Madrid 1793) II 25–26.
270 Crónica de Alfonso X cap. 74, ed. C. Rosell (Biblioteca de autores españoles 66; Madrid 1953) 58.
271 Chronica collecta a Magno presbytero in MGH SS 17.507; Annales de Burton in Annales monastici, ed. H. R. Luard (Rolls Series 36; London 1864–69) I 280–61; Cronica fratris Salimbene de Adam in MGH SS 32.177. The patriarch claimed that only thirty-six Templars and twenty-five Hospitallers escaped.
In Syria the military orders not only provided a considerable portion of the armies of the crusader states: they also gained a reputation for their wide experience of eastern warfare and for discipline in the field. Fewer details have survived about the orders' conduct on campaign in the peninsula. As in the East, there were inevitably moments of rashness in the field — as at Moclin, where the master of Santiago attacked without waiting for support — but their members were bound by vows of obedience and probably provided a more disciplined force than other levies. They were certainly not fanatical opponents of the infidel in the way that some crusaders and even some brethren of the military orders going out to the East from other western countries were. As has been noted, the brethren in Spain were usually natives of the peninsula and did not share the blind hatred of Muslims felt by many Christians living in kingdoms more remote from Islam. The counsel proffered by the masters of the military orders, who were often among a ruler's leading military advisers, was therefore normally sane and at times cautious. When Jaime I, for example, was at Inca during the conquest of Mallorca the prior of the Hospitallers is said to have advised against attacking the Muslims in the neighbouring hills because he thought it too dangerous, and a few years later the Templar provincial master opposed an assault on Moncada because of its proximity to the Muslim city of Valencia. The orders also understood the complexity of the relationships between Christian and Moor in the peninsula, and were not averse to fighting alongside Muslims or even in the service of Muslim rulers when circumstances demanded it. In 1304 the Aragonese Templars were raiding into Granada in the company of a Muslim force led by Alabes Abenraho, which was in the service of Jaime II; and in 1225 the forces which Fernando III left on the frontier, including contingents from Santiago and Calatrava, assisted the Muslim ruler of Baeza in gaining castles and towns from Sevilla.

In the Holy Land the orders' wide experience led to their being assigned tasks of special importance on campaigns and expeditions. The last Templar grand master went so far as to maintain that when crusading armies came out

---

178 See, for example, C. Kohler, 'Deux projets de croisade en Terre-Sainte, composés à la fin du xiiie siècle et au début du xive,' Revue de l'orient latin 10 (1903-4) 442.
174 Crónica de Alfonso X cap. 74 (ed. Rosell 58).
175 In the later thirteenth century the Templar grand master Guillaume de Beaujeu was opposed by young Templar knights, 'gueram appetentes,' who did not understand his friendly attitude towards the Mameluk sultan: J. Michelet, Procès des Templiers (Paris 1841-51) I 44-45.
178 Crónica latina 86-87.
to the East the Templars and Hospitallers always provided the vanguard and rearguard. This claim was no doubt exaggerated, but the military orders did in fact often undertake this task in Syria. That a similar function was fulfilled by the orders in the peninsula might seem to be suggested by the statement 'statuimus simul in exercitu habitare in prima acie et in ultima,' which was included in an agreement made between the Temple, Hospital, and Santiago at Salamanca in 1178; but in the accounts of twelfth- and thirteenth-century campaigns there is little to indicate that the orders were normally assigned a particular role. On the approach to Las Navas in 1212 the foreign contingents were led by Diego López de Haro, not by the orders; and in the battle itself the orders' troops were placed in the second line: Diego López was in the van, and the rear was brought up by Alfonso VIII. The provincial master of the Temple was certainly among the first of the Christian leaders to land in the attack on Mallorca, but this was perhaps not entirely a matter of calculation. And the surviving descriptions of Jaime I’s later campaigns on the mainland do not suggest that the orders normally provided the rearguard or vanguard: on the expedition which the Aragonese king led into Murcia in 1265, for example, the van was under the command of the king’s sons, while Jaime himself brought up the rear.

Although the importance of the military orders in the East was widely recognised, many contemporaries maintained that their contribution would have been of greater value if there had not been so much rivalry and hostility between them, especially between Templars and Hospitallers. Whether or not these charges were valid when applied to the Holy Land, there is little sign that the reconquista was harmed by animosities of this kind. Although rival claims to property were at times bitterly disputed, a number of agreements have survived which provide for close co-operation in the field. The undertaking to fight together which is contained in the pact made in 1178 was also included in an agreement reached between Santiago and Calatrava in 1221. It was then also decided that if the master or comendador mayor of only one order was present, the members of the other were to serve under him; and joint

---

181 Rodrigo Jiménez de Rada, De reb. Hisp. 8.5 in Opera 179.
182 Ibid. 8.9 in Opera 184–85.
183 Chronicle of James I cap. 60 (trans. Forster 122).
185 That the criticisms were exaggerated has been argued by M. L. Bulst-Thiele, Sacrae domus militiae Templi Hierosolimitani magistri: Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des Templerordens 1118–1314 (Göttingen 1974).
186 Bullarium de Calatrava 683–85.
expenditions launched from Uclés were to be commanded by the comendador mayor of Uclés, while those setting out from Calatrava were to be led by the comendador mayor of Calatrava. The undertaking to fight side by side was renewed in a further pact made in 1224 between Calatrava, Santiago, and the Templars and Hospitallers of León and Castile, and the 1221 agreement between Calatrava and Santiago was ratified and extended in 1243: all knights were now expected to defend the standard of the other order as if it were their own, and to surrender their horses to the master or comendador mayor of either order if one of these officials had lost his own. Little is known of the working of these agreements, although the orders did fight in the same line at Las Navas. It could be suggested that the renewal of pacts implies that they were not being fully observed, but the later agreements were usually more than just repetitions of earlier ones; and the extent of the co-operation envisaged seems to indicate a desire not only to avoid harmful friction but also to provide as much mutual assistance as possible.

Up to the middle years of the thirteenth century, moreover, the military orders did in several ways compare favourably with the other forces available to the Spanish rulers. Whereas secular levies could not be relied upon to appear when required, the orders seem usually to have been able to mobilise at least some of their brethren quickly. According to one version of the Primera crónica general some nobles did not arrive at Alarcos in 1195 until after the battle was over, and it was reported that when the Moors besieged Salvatierra in 1211 Alfonso VIII had in his service the men of only a few towns: 'paucam namque concilia secuta fuerant ipsum in illo tempore.' The difficulty of mobilising secular forces rapidly is also revealed in the accounts of Jaime I’s campaigns in Valencia, and these show that the military orders helped to form the nucleus of a campaigning army. According to Jaime I’s chronicle, the forces for the assault on Burriana in 1233 should have mustered at Teruel. On the appointed day none of the ricoshombres appeared, but it was reported to the king that the provincial masters of the Temple and Hospital, together with the Calatravan commander of Alcañiz and the commander of Montalbán, had been waiting near Murviedro for two days. These then joined the king, and the attack on Burriana appears to have been launched by Jaime, the military orders, and the men of Teruel and of the bishop of Zaragoza, who were only later assisted by

\[\text{\[187\] J. F. O’Callaghan, ‘Hermandades between the Military Orders of Calatrava and Santiago during the Castillian Reconquest, 1158–1252,’ Speculum 44 (1969) 617–18.}
\[\text{\[188\] Bullarium de Calatrava 685–86.}
\[\text{\[189\] Rodrigo Jiménez de Rada, De reb. Hisp. 8.9 in Opera 184.}
\[\text{\[190\] A. Huici Miranda, Las grandes batallas de la reconquista durante las invasiones africanas (Madrid 1956) 213; Crónica latina 40.}
other lay contingents. Similarly, when the Aragonese king set out towards the city of Valencia in 1238 he was accompanied by his own retainers, the provincial prior of the Hospital, a Templar commander, the commander of Alcañiz and some almogavares, but only three nobles are reported to have been present at that stage; other contingents from Aragon and Catalonia did not arrive until later.

Nor was the service given by the military orders subject to the limitations of time and distance which characterised the obligations of secular forces. A king might, of course, seek to keep nobles and townsmen in the field by offering them payment, and secular troops might be prepared to waive their privileges in the hope of gaining booty. But town militias also had other concerns. During the siege of Burriana Jaime I was told that the townsmen wanted to return home to harvest their crops, and in the same year the inhabitants of Toro, Zamora, Salamanca, and Ledesma abandoned the siege of Ubeda when their term of service was completed. Nor was it easy for Jaime I to persuade the Aragonese nobles Blasco de Alagón and Jimeno de Urrea to garrison Burriana for two months after its capture in July 1233. The brethren of the military orders could be expected to give prolonged service more readily. The Crónica latina records that after Fernando III's expedition in 1225 the brethren of Calatrava and Santiago were among those who remained on the frontier; and when Jaime I went to Montpellier after the capture of the city of Valencia, those left in charge of the new conquests included the provincial masters of the Temple and Hospital.

In the later part of the thirteenth century, however, there is increasing evidence of a reluctance on the part of the orders to provide service in the field against the Moors. The claim made to Jaime II by the Aragonese Templars in 1307 'quels frare del Temple hi son los primers en defensio del vostre regne et de la fe de nostre senyor' may have been true of an earlier period, but it is of doubtful validity when applied to the second half of the thirteenth century. The first clear indication of changing attitudes is provided by a papal bull

---

191 Chronicle of James I caps. 153–57 (trans. Forster 253–59). The siege was over when the townsmen of Zaragoza arrived.
194 The importance of booty is apparent from the arrangements for the division of spoils included in numerous fueros: see, for example, Pescador, 'Caballería popular' 172–89.
195 Chronicle of James I cap. 166 (trans. Forster 269–70); Crónica latina 107.
196 Chronicle of James I cap. 179 (trans. Forster 283–84).
197 Crónica latina 86–87; Chronicle of James I cap. 295 (trans. Forster 408).
198 Finke, Papsttum II 70–73 doc. 48.
issued in 1250, in which Innocent IV ordered the Templars and Hospitallers to assist in the struggle against the Muslims in Spain.199 This letter was sent in response to a petition from Jaime I, who had obviously complained about the orders’ conduct. Fuller evidence is found in the Aragonese royal registers belonging to the later part of the century. In order to enforce service at the end of 1286 and early in 1287, for example, Alfonso III had to issue repeated summonses and also found it necessary to threaten action against property. On April 7, 1287 he wrote to the commanders of Alcañiz and Montalbán

cum iam per nos et nobilem virum domnrum P. Ferrandi procuratorem Valencie moniti et requisiti fueritis quod, cum Janeti intrarent vel pararent se intrare aut invadere regnum nostrum Valencie, pararetis vos et habere-tis atque teneritis ibi familia ad defensionem ipsius regni tam militum quam peditum, et istud minime feceritis, ut intelleximus, de vobis non mo-dicum admiramur. Quare iterato per presentes vobis dicimus et mandamus quatinus cum familia militum et peditum paretis vos ad tenendum ibi frontiam ad defensionem regni predicti, ita quod per totum mensem aprilis sitis ibidem; aliter scitis pro certo quod bona que habetis in regno Valencie faceremus vobis penitus emparari;200

and a fortnight later a further threat of confiscation of property was dispatched both to the commander of Alcañiz and to the Templars and Hospitallers.201 Jaime II encountered similar difficulties in 1304. When summonses were issued at the beginning of the year, the orders were informed that if they neglected to provide service throughout January ‘providebit dominus rex circa id prout fuerit faciendum.’202 And although the Templars did furnish troops in the early months of 1304, in May the provincial master was writing to the king from Lorca, seeking to excuse his order from further service;203 and it is doubtful whether Jaime obtained any aid at this time from Calatrava and Santiago. Certainly when fresh summonses were dispatched to these orders in June it was stated that earlier demands for service had been ignored.204

199 Delaville Le Roulx, Cartulaire II 686 doc. 2517; H. Prutz, Entwicklung und Unter-gang des Tempelherrenordens (Berlin 1888) 283 doc. 7. S. A. Garcia Larragueta, ‘La orden de San Juan en la crisis del imperio hispánico del siglo xii,’ Hispania 12 (1952) 483–524 argues that even before the middle of the thirteenth century the Hospitallers had participated little in the reconquista; but his argument relies heavily on the absence of evidence, and his interpre-tation of some documents is to be questioned.

200 ACA, reg. 70 fol. 93.

201 Ibid. fol. 106. Already at the beginning of January Alfonso had reminded the Templars that they had been given property on the understanding that they would always be ready to fight, and he had threatened to seize enough Templar lands to be able to make good any de-ficiency: Forey, Templars 403 doc. 31.

202 ACA, reg. 307 fol. 96v.


204 ACA, reg. 307 fol. 97.
In further summonses issued in September of the same year the orders were told by Jaime not to delay ‘si ordini vestro satisfacere et voluntati nostre proponitis complacere.’ On this occasion the Templars agreed to serve, but did so only reluctantly. Most of the evidence of this kind comes from the Aragonese royal registers, but that the situation was not peculiar to Aragon is indicated by John XXII’s instruction to his legate in 1320 to compel the orders of Santiago, Calatrava, Alcántara, and the Hospital in Castile to furnish as many knights for frontier defence as they were capable of maintaining.

The explanation of the orders’ attitude is at least in part a financial one: in the later thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries they did not have adequate resources to meet royal demands. In the early part of 1304 Calatrava claimed that it did not have sufficient land to maintain the number of knights which the Aragonese king was asking of it, and when the Templar provincial master sought to excuse his order from further service in May of the same year he pointed out that the Templars had incurred heavy expenses on the frontier and that it had already been necessary to contract loans to cover expenditure. And although the Templar provincial master told the commander of Alfambra in the autumn of that year that he was then intending to furnish troops, he also asserted that he would have been justified in excusing the order because of the large sums of money already expended on the frontier in that year. These incidents reflect the orders’ deteriorating financial situation in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. That loans obtained at that time were not just short-term anticipations of revenues is indicated by an account compiled by the Aragonese Templars in 1277, for this lists a number of long-term debts, while in 1287 the order of Santiago was still making provision for the repayment of money borrowed by Pelay Pérez, who had died twelve years earlier. In explanation of these financial problems, it can be pointed out that — apart from being affected by general economic trends — the orders’ resources were being reduced, at least in Aragon, by royal encroachments on rights and privileges; and the Templars and Hospitallers were being faced by growing demands from the Holy Land as the Christian hold there weakened. By the late thirteenth century, moreover, the flow of gifts to the orders was slackening or
stopping. The Aragonese king Jaime II appears to have recognised that the military orders were experiencing financial difficulties, for he sought to ensure that all of their resources in his kingdom were used there and not taken out of Aragon. In 1304 he asked the pope to command

\[\text{ales persones religiosas militars del Temple e del Spital e de Calatrava e Ducles, qui son dins la senyuría del dit senyor rey Darago, que ells neguna responsio no traguen de la dita terra per a lurs majors.}\]

Nevertheless, he still expected the orders to give service whenever required. Yet it may be questioned whether financial difficulties provide a complete explanation, for there is evidence to suggest that attitudes towards the conflict with Islam were changing and that the orders were to some extent diverting their energies into other activities. It was reported to Boniface VIII in 1300 that a group of brothers belonging to Santiago had occupied several frontier castles and were using Muslim aid to oppose both their superiors and their Christian neighbours; they were even said to be threatening to surrender the strongholds to the Muslims if they were not assigned certain encomiendas.

There are also signs of growing involvement in the internal political disputes of the Christian kingdoms and in the conflicts between Christian states. In 1282 the Infante Sancho gained support from the military orders in his quarrel with Alfonso X concerning the succession, and the orders also became involved in further disputes occurring in Castile during the remaining years of the century. It would be surprising if interests and attitudes had not altered at this time, as the reconquista in some parts of the peninsula had already been completed by 1250, and the Castilian advance was coming to a halt in the second half of the thirteenth century. But the changes which were taking place at this stage should not be exaggerated. Although in the later decades of the century the Aragonese kings were seeking to use the military orders against Christian neighbours, the orders appear in the main to have refrained from

---


212 Finke, Acta aragonensia I 157–58 doc. 108; V. Salavert y Roca, Cerdeña y la expansión mediterránea de la Corona de Aragón, 1297–1314 (Madrid 1956) II 102 doc. 72. After the dissolution of the Temple further attempts were made by the Aragonese kings to reduce or cancel altogether the responsibility which the Hospitallers sent to the East: A. T. Luttrell, 'The Aragonese Crown and the Knights Hospitallers of Rhodes: 1291–1350,' English Historical Review 76 (1961) 10.

213 Registres de Boniface VIII, edd. G. Digard et al. (Paris 1884–1939) II 542–43 doc. 3334.

taking sides in the struggle during the 1280s between the crown and the Aragonese union. And expressions of devotion to duty and of enthusiasm for the continuance of the struggle against the infidel can still be encountered at the turn of the century. In the autumn of 1304 the Templar provincial master informed the commander of Alfambra that he had made his decision to give service on the frontier ‘volens fer lo servii de deu e lo honor del Temple’; and earlier in the same year he had written to Jaime II encouraging him to undertake the conquest of Granada.

The late thirteenth century was thus a transitional period. The roles which the orders had formerly fulfilled were losing importance, and their resources were beginning to be put to new uses not envisaged by their founders. But the military orders had during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries made a valuable contribution to the reconquest, even if it was not as outstanding as some generalised comment has in the past suggested. It was not limited solely to the activities which have been discussed: several of the Spanish orders maintained ransom hospitals, and in 1205 Calatrava had been placed under the obligation of providing medical services on campaign. But it was probably in securing the frontier by taking over strongholds and resettling border territories that the military orders contributed most to the Christian cause in the peninsula.

\[\text{\textsuperscript{115}}\text{Forey, Templars 133-37; González Antón, Uniones aragonesas I 377.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{116}}\text{ACA, Cartas reales diplomáticas, Templarios no. 383; Finke, Acta aragonensis I 146-47 doc. 99.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{117}}\text{Bullarium de Calatrava 38-39.}\]
THE MILITARY ORDERS AND THE RANSOMING OF CAPTIVES FROM ISLAM
(TWELFTH TO EARLY FOURTEENTH CENTURIES)

«It was his custom to massacre the Templars and Hospitallers, because of the violent hatred which they bore against the Muslims and because of their bravery.» This comment about Saladin was made by Ibn al-Athir when describing an incident in the year 1188; and although on that occasion two Hospitallers were spared, there are a number of instances, both during the time of Saladin and under other Muslim rulers, when brethren of the military orders who had been captured in Syria were put to death. The best known example concerns those who fell into Muslim hands at the battle of Hattin: of the Templar and Hospitaller prisoners only the Templar grand master, Gerard of Ridefort, was spared. After this victory, according to Imad ad-Din, Saladin expressed the desire to be rid of these two orders and offered fifty dinars for every brother brought to him. Thirty years earlier Nur ad-Din had similarly ordered the killing of prisoners when a Templar and Hospital force had been intercepted near Banyas; and in the thirteenth century the garrison of the Templar stronghold of Safed was executed after the castle fell to the Mamluk sultan Baibars in 1266. Yet the killing of captives was sometimes occasioned by ex-
ceptual circumstances, and for most of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries death was not the automatic fate of captured brethren. There were indeed numerous instances when brothers of the military orders were able to negotiate a safe-conduct for themselves when they surrendered strongholds. Those who were defending the castles of Belvoir and Safed when these fell after the battle of Hattin were promised safe-conduct to Tyre, which was still in Christian hands. The Hospitallers who were besieged at Crac des Chevaliers in 1271 were similarly granted safe-conduct to Tripoli, and in the same year the garrison of the Teutonic order's castle of Montfort was treated in the same way. Those surrendering the Hospitaller castle of Margat in 1285 were also allowed their freedom.* But the extent of Muslim generosity was no doubt influenced in part by the circumstances of a siege, and could not be relied upon. In fact, both in the Holy Land and in Spain many members of the military orders who fell into Muslim hands during sieges or in the field were held in captivity by their opponents. The Templar master Bertrand of Blanquefort, for example, was held prisoner after he had been captured just north of the Sea of Galilee.

5. The killing of prisoners in 1157 may have occurred because a truce had been breached: Ibn al-Qalanisi, Damascus Chronicle, pp. 331-2. According to the Gestes des Chiprois, cap. 347, ed. Raynaud, pp. 179-81, the execution of the garrison of Safed in 1266 was occasioned by the sultan's desire for vengeance for the losses inflicted by the besieged. Some Muslim sources, on the other hand, relate that the defenders broke an agreement by seeking to take arms and money from the castle: Makrizi, trans. Quatremère, i.11.30; Ayyubids, Mamlukes and Crusaders, ii.95. It was also said that they were killed because they refused to apostasise: two lay knights who gave evidence in Cyprus in 1310 during the Templar trial claimed that they had heard from reliable sources that the Templars captured at Safed were decapitated because they would not renounce their Christian faith, and papal commissioners in Paris were told the same story by Templars themselves. Another witness in Cyprus further reported that he had been informed by a Genoese who had long been imprisoned in Cairo that when some forty Templars captured on the island of Ruad in 1303 had refused to abjure their faith, the Mamluk sultan had ordered that they should be refused bread and water, and the Templars had died in prison. K. Schottmüller, Der Untergang des Tempel-Ordens (Berlin, 1887), ii.166-2, 387-8; T. Michélet, Procès des Templiers (Paris, 1841-51), i.170; cf. Continuation de Guillaume de Tyr (1184-1197), cap. 76, ed. Morgan, p. 87. Yet, although Christian captives who refused to apostasise were occasionally killed (C. E. Dufourco, L'Espagne catalane et le Maghrib aux XIIe et XIVe siècles (Paris, 1966), p. 75; Beira ed-Din, Life of Saladin, p. 29; H. Finke, Acta aragonensia (Berlin, 1908-22), iii.514), and although the Templar Customs report a case of a captured brother who claimed that he had been forced to convert (La règle du Temple, ed. H. de Curzon (Paris, 1886), pp. 296-7 cap. 549), these statements about the choice of death or conversion in 1266 and the early fourteenth century should be treated with caution. Several sources state that a Templar sergeant, who had been sent to negotiate the surrender of Safed, converted to Islam, and this incident could have given rise to the rumour that others were killed because they refused to abandon the faith: Eracles, xxxiv.9, in RHC Occ, ii.455; Gestes des Chiprois, cap. 347, ed. Raynaud, pp. 180-1; Ayyubids, Mamlukes and Crusaders, ii.95; and although the Genoese mentioned in the second story is known from other evidence to have been in prison in Cairo in the early years of the fourteenth century, many captured Templars and Hospitallers survived in Egyptian prisons at that time; A. Masà de Ros, La Corona de Aragón y los estados del Norte de África: Política de Jaime II y Alfonso IV en Egipto, Ifriquia y Tremecén (Barcelona, 1951), pp. 299-300 doc. 32.

6. Ibn al-Athir, in RHC Or, i.735, 737
in 1157, and the Templars and Hospitallers taken by Nur ad-Din at the battle of Artah in 1164 were put in chains and taken to Aleppo.  

Among the brethren in Syria held in captivity in the thirteenth century were those taken near Ramleh in 1218 and at the battle of La Forbie in 1244, as were those who surrendered at Tripoli in 1289, while in Spain the Templar provincial master Peter of Moncada was held, together with some of his brethren, after being captured by the Muslims at Lluchente in the kingdom of Valencia in 1276.

Peter of Moncada managed to escape with Muslim help shortly after his capture, but successful escapes from prisons in Muslim lands, especially in North Africa, were probably few. Freedom could usually be obtained only by agreement and payment. Yet to persuade the Muslims to permit the release of brethren was for various reasons not always easy. The attitudes which at times led to the killing of captive brothers could also occasion a reluctance to allow their liberation; in periods of strained relations between Christian and Muslim states or of internal tensions approaches might not be welcomed or even possible; and there might be a desire to retain prisoners as a diplomatic pawn for the future. According to William of Tyre, Nur ad-Din was always reluctant to release Christian prisoners, and the English chronicler Matthew Paris reports that when the Templars and Hospitallers in 1246 sent envoys to the Egyptian sultan to negotiate the release of imprisoned brethren, they were criticised by him for betraying Frederick II and for the rivalry which existed between the two orders: he advised them to ask Frederick to intercede on their behalf, which the envoys were unwilling to do. This incident is not mentioned in other sources, and the speech attributed to the sultan represents Matthew Paris’s views rather than those of the Egyptian ruler; but intercession by kings on behalf of imprisoned brethren was often necessary. In 1196 the master of the Hospital wrote to Sancho
of Navarre that 'the voice of our captive brothers calls to you from prison'.

Whether Sancho took any action is not known, but brothers of the military orders captured at the battle of La Forbie in 1244 were not released until Louis IX had negotiated for their freedom six years later; and in the closing years of the thirteenth and opening decades of the fourteenth centuries James II of Aragon was in frequent negotiation with Egyptian rulers about the freeing of captives who included Aragonese Templars and Hospitallers, although his approaches did not always meet with immediate success. When he was ruling in Sicily before becoming king of Aragon, James was asked by the Templar grand master to intercede on behalf of the Templar Hugh, son of the count of Ampurias, who had been captured during the siege of Tripoli. In a reply to the grand master which was sent between 1289 and 1291 James promised to act; but in June 1294 he was writing to the sultan, presumably for a second time, requesting him to allow the release of Hugh and also of other brothers, including the Templars Bartholomew of Villafranca and G. of Villalba and the Hospitaller Lope Jiménez.

Hugh of Ampurias was apparently quickly freed, but the other two Templars are known to have been still detained, for in 1303 these brethren were among the captives for whom James II was then interceding with the sultan. The embassy sent in 1303 produced no immediate result, and further envoys were dispatched by the Aragonese king two years later. In his reply, written in February 1306, the sultan agreed to the release of twelve captives and promised that others would be freed later. But some of those released, including the Templar Dalmau of Rocabertí, were quickly re-arrested.

According to Makrisi, this happened because the sultan had been told that one of the prisoners was a king's son, for whose freedom a shipload of gold

14. S. A. Garcia Larrague, El gran priorado de Navarra de la orden de San Juan de Jerusalén (Pamplona, 1957), ii.89-90 doc. 87.
15. Matthew Paris, Chron. maj., vi.196, 204-5; Eracles, xxxiv.1, in RHC Occ, ii.439; Continuation de Guillaume de Tyr dite du manuscrit de Rothelin, in RHC Occ, ii.625.
19. Masía de Ros, Aragón y África, pp. 104, 293-3 doc. 28; Golubovitch, Biblioteca, iii.77-9; Atiya, Egypt and Aragon, pp. 26-7.
20. Masía de Ros, Aragón y África, pp. 104-5; Los documentos árabes diplomáticos del Archivo de la Corona de Aragón, ed. M. A. Alarcón y Sastre and R. García de Linares (Madrid, 1940), pp. 355-60 doc. 148.
could be obtained, although western reports suggest that there were also political considerations involved. In consequence, only two Aragonese brothers—the Hospitaller Lope of Linares and the Templar G. of Villalba—were freed at this time. For them it meant the end of more than fifteen years' imprisonment, for they had been captured before the fall of Acre. But Dalmau of Rocaberti and others remained in prison, and later in 1306 they appealed to James for fresh assistance. The Aragonese king sent further letters to the sultan in 1307 and 1309, but little further progress was made until the middle of the following decade, after a period of civil war in Egypt. James II despatched envoys in the autumn of 1314, and in the following spring the sultan expressed his willingness to free Dalmau of Rocaberti and other brethren. By this time some had been in captivity for more than twenty-five years, but apparently not all secured their release at this stage, for in 1318 James was again requesting the liberating of several former Templars.

The Templar Hugh of Ampurias clearly had to find the money to pay his ransom himself, for after his release he wrote to James II from Barcelona expressing regret that he could not visit the king, 'since, burdened by debts arising from loans taken out for my release, I have to remain hostage in this region'. In 1318 the English Hospitaller Roger of Stanegrave, who had been taken prisoner in the Holy Land and held in Muslim captivity for many years, was similarly seeking to raise a ransom of 12,000 gold florins from friends and relations in England. That the leading military orders in the East did not usually expend large sums in ransoming their own brethren is in fact stated in several sources. Robert of Torigny reports that when the Templar master Odo of St. Amand was captured in 1179 he rejected an offer of freedom from Saladin, because 'it was not the custom of the knights of the Temple for any ransom to be given for them except a sword-belt

22. MAKRIZI, ibid. QUATREMÈRE, II.ii.229.
23. MARÍA DE ROS, Aragón y África, p. 290 doc. 25; GOLUBOVICH, Biblioteca, iii.75-6; AITIÉ, Egypt and Aragon, pp. 20-1.
24. MARÍA DE ROS, Aragón y África, pp. 299-300 doc. 32.
25. Ibid., pp. 110-11, 300-3 docs. 33, 35.
26. Ibid., pp. 112-13, 304-7 doc. 37.
27. Ibid., pp. 113-14; Documentos árabes, pp. 360-5 doc. 149.
29. FINKB, Papsttum, i.2 doc. 1.
and a knife, and he therefore died in captivity. A similar idea is ex-
pressed in Matthew Paris’s account of the supposed attempts by the
Templars and Hospitallers to ransom their brothers in 1246, for he
claims that when they offered large sums, the sultan replied that ‘we
know that according to the custom of their order they are not to be
redeemed except for a certain belt or halter’. On the Muslim side,
al-Fadil, the head of Saladin’s chancery, reported that when the Templar
stronghold of Darbsak capitulated in the aftermath of Hattin, the
Templars agreed to pay a heavy ransom with money from their treasury,
which was something unheard of.

The accuracy of these reports should not of course be accepted
without question. The fate of Odo of St. Amand is not in fact certain:
although several sources relate that he died in prison, other reports
state that he was killed in battle. Matthew Paris’s account of the
events of 1246 is also suspect, and there is nothing in the Templar rule
and customs to support these stories. Yet there was clearly a fairly
widespread and persistent view that the Templars and Hospitallers did
not usually expend large sums in ransoming their colleagues from the
Muslims.

It is not easy, however, to discover how frequently the Templars
and members of other military orders actually paid ransoms to free
captured brethren. Only in a relatively few instances are the condi-
tions of release known in detail. Certainly the sources provide little
evidence of the payment of ransoms in cash by the orders themselves,
although it was reported that in 1188 the Templar master Gerard of
Ridefort was freed in return for the surrender of Gaza and several other
Templar strongholds. The situation at that time was, however, excep-
tional and no parallels are known. Joinville even reports that, when
the Muslims were demanding the cession of Templar and Hospitaller
castles in return for the freeing of Louis IX and his followers in 1250,
it was stated that this could not be done, because ‘when castellans are
appointed, they have to swear on the relics that they will not surrender
any castle in return for the freeing of a captive’; but such a statement

(Rolls Series, 1885-90), iv.288.
32. Chron. maj., iv.525
34. William of Tyre, Chronicon, xxi.29, ed. Huygens, p. 1002. Ibn al-Athir, in RHC Or, i.636, Abu-
Shama, in RHC Or, iv.198, 200, 202. Chromique d’Ernoul et de Bernard le Trésorier, ed. L. de Mas Latrie
Revue de l’orient latin, XII (1911), 279-82.
35. Itinerarium peregrinorum, p. 275; Ralph of Diceto, Opera historica, ed. W. Stubbs (Rolls Series,
1876), iii.56; Abu-Shama, in RHC Or, iv.313.
is not found in surviving regulations. 36 On some occasions orders did give their own captives in exchange for imprisoned brethren. The release by the Templars of Shahinshah, the son of Saladin's nephew Taqi al-Din, was made partly in exchange for brethren held by the Muslims. 37 In Spain the exchange of Muslim slaves for brethren who had fallen into enemy hands was similarly envisaged in an agreement made between the orders of Calatrava and Santiago in 1243. 38 In some other cases ransoms are known to have been paid by outsiders: in 1238, for example, the English king Henry III gave 500 marks for ransoming Templars recently captured in the district of Antioch, and Louis IX paid the ransoms of brothers who had been captured at La Forbie in 1244. 39 In some instances, however, the evidence of payment is ambiguous: the Gestes des Chiprois report of Templars captured by Turcomans during a raid with John of Beirut in 1260 that 'brother William of Beaujeu was freed by his friends, as were his companion and brother Theobald Gaudin and thirteen other brothers', and the Annales de Terre Sainte merely comment on this incident that 'our people lost 200,000 besants in ransoms'. 40 It is not clear whether Templar funds were used. The evidence is not therefore sufficient to reject out of hand the assertions of Robert of Torigny and Matthew Paris, even if the precise significance of the items which were supposedly handed over in exchange for brothers is not clear: they possibly symbolised a brother's undertaking to raise the money for a ransom himself, but the chroniclers' statements do not in themselves imply this. 41 Not that all orders necessarily adopted the same stance, for —as will be seen— there were Spanish military orders which devoted part of their income to freeing Christian captives and which would presumably have been ready to ransom their own brethren for money, although positive evidence about this is apparently lacking. If, however, there was a reluctance on the part of some orders to pay ransoms, the reason may have been to avoid spending sparse resources needed elsewhere, when there

was little difficulty in obtaining new recruits: money was probably a greater problem than manpower.\textsuperscript{42}

The military orders were not, however, content to abandon their brethren to a lifetime of captivity. Their desire to obtain the release of captives is apparent not only from their requests for intercession but also from the fact that when leading officials were captured their posts were not filled: when the Hospitaller master was taken in 1244 at La Forbie, the order was administered for some six years by a lieutenant: the order did not proceed to the election of a new master.\textsuperscript{43} In 1262 in fact the Hospitaller general chapter defined the procedure to be followed for appointing a lieutenant if the master was captured; and it was decreed that the brother nominated was to swear not only to govern the order well but also to do his utmost to secure the release of the imprisoned master.\textsuperscript{44}

As has been noted, in seeking the liberation of their brethren from Muslim captivity the military orders appear to have relied primarily on royal assistance, and kings also of course acted on behalf of other prisoners. Treaties between Christian and Muslim rulers in the Mediterranean region often included provisions concerning the mutual release of captives.\textsuperscript{45} Measures to free those held by Islam were also taken by kings ruling in the more northerly parts of Europe, as well as by the authorities in the Italian maritime cities and by the papacy.\textsuperscript{46} But in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, when western Christians were confronting Islam on land at both ends of the Mediterranean, as well as at sea, a more general concern for the plight of captives was being shown, which expressed itself both in legislation and in practical action. Municipal \textit{fueros} in Spain often included clauses which sought to encourage and facilitate the freeing of prisoners from Islam.\textsuperscript{47} Also in Spain the offices of \textit{exea} and \textit{alfaqueque} emerged, whose function

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{42} On recruitment, see A. J. Forey, 'Recruitment to the Military Orders (Twelfth to Mid-Fourteenth Centuries)', \textit{Viator}, XVII (1986), 157-62.
\item \textsuperscript{43} Matthew Paris, \textit{Chron. maj.}, v. 211.
\item \textsuperscript{44} Delaville Le Roulx, \textit{Cartulaire}, iii.45-6 doc. 3039 cap. 10.
\item \textsuperscript{45} L. de Mas Latrie, \textit{Traité de paix et de commerce et documents divers concernant les relations des chrétiens avec les arabes de l'Afrique septentrionale au moyen âge} (Paris, 1866), ii.301-3, 304-6 docs. 11, 13; J. M. Ramos y Loscertales, \textit{El cautiverio en la Corona de Aragón durante los siglos XIII, XIV y XV} (Zaragoza, 1915), pp. 180-8; Masía de Ros, \textit{Aragón y África}, pp. 404-6, 418-20 docs. 124, 133; C. Verlinden, \textit{L'esclavage dans l'Europe médiévale} (Bruges, 1955-7), i.406-7; Ferrer Mallo, 'Redención de captivos', pp. 247-50.
\end{itemize}
was to negotiate the freeing of prisoners. Confraternities sometimes undertook to assist in the payment of ransoms if any of their members were captured. Ransom hospitals were established, which devoted part of their revenues to the payment of ransoms, and two redemptionist orders — the Trinitarians and the Mercedarians — emerged for the purpose of freeing captives from Islam.

Yet although specialised institutions were being founded for the freeing of Christian prisoners, the redeeming of captives was regarded as a charitable and meritorious duty which was incumbent on all who could undertake it. The military orders were not considered exempt because of their military responsibilities. When the patriarch of Alexandria and a group of captives detained there wrote about the latter's plight to Innocent III, they asked the pope to invoke the assistance not only of the secular rulers and princes in the Holy Land but also of the Templars and Hospitalers, and when Innocent transmitted this request to the patriarch of Jerusalem in 1212 he quoted Matthew xxv.39-41 and asserted that 'since therefore this tender solace is owed to captives both as a charitable duty and by the precept of the Lord, those who are able to undertake the redemption of captives but are unwilling to do so are to be regarded as sinners'. Nor was he the only pope to turn to the military orders. Honorius III in 1220 expected the Hospitalers and Templars to redeem a group of men from Gaeta, who at the time of the fifth crusade had been blown into the port of Alexandria when they were making for Damietta; and these two orders were similarly approached by Gregory IX in 1237.

Although some military orders were involved in charitable work for the poor and sick and might therefore have been expected to concern themselves with captives as well, only two military orders, both based in Spain, regarded the freeing of Christian captives as part of their normal obligations. The first was Santiago, which in the later


52. MGH, Epistolae saeculi XIII, ed. C. Rodenburg (Berlin, 1883-94), i.98 doc. 135; DELAVILLE LE ROULX, Cartulaire, ii.272-3, 517 docs. 1682, 2179, L. DE MAS LATRÉE, Histoire de l'île de Chypre sous le règne des princes de la maison de Lusignan (Paris, 1852-61), ii.61.
twelfth and early thirteenth centuries established a series of ransom hospitals, most of which were situated in Castile. These were among the earliest hospitals of this kind to be founded in the Iberian peninsula and they were able to act as a channel for funds which were given or bequeathed for the freeing of captives from Islam. The first of Santiago’s hospitals had been founded at Toledo by 1180, and a second was set up farther east at Cuenca in 1182. To the south and east of Cuenca two further ransom hospitals were established in the early thirteenth century at Alarcón and Moya. That at Alarcón was in existence by 1203, while the hospital at Moya was founded by 1215. In 1226 provision was also made for establishing a ransom hospital at Talavera, to the west of Toledo, and in the following year another hospital was established for the same purpose at Uclés. In the early decades of the thirteenth century Santiago thus had ransom hospitals in all parts of the Castilian frontier region. It had fewer establishments of this kind in Aragon. By the turn of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries a hospital at Zaragoza, which had been in existence at least since 1191, had apparently been assigned to Santiago, and this was referred to in 1228 as a hospital ‘of mercy’; but this is the first indication that Santiago had a ransom hospital in Zaragoza: the only function of the brethren of Santiago there mentioned in earlier sources is the maintenance of the Alcántara bridge over the Ebro. The only other ransom hospital belonging to Santiago in the kingdom of Aragon was at Teruel. A document drawn up in the year 1200 refers to the ‘brothers of charity of Teruel of the order of St James’ and alludes to revenues which were to be used for ransoming captives, while in a further document writ-

53. Not all of the money given for ransoming captives, however, passed through Santiago’s hands.
55. González, Alfonso VIII, iii.306-7, 695-7 docs. 745, 982. The wording of a document drawn up in 1198 could be interpreted to indicate the existence of a ransom hospital at Huete, to the north of Uclés, but it is not clear whether Santiago ever in fact had an establishment of this kind there: P. Isabel Murugarren, ‘Bases económicas del hospital de Santiago en Cuenca: tendencias del desarrollo económico y estructura de la propiedad agraria’, Anuario de estudios medievales, XI (1981), 218-19 doc. 2.
57. Colección diplomática del concejo de Zaragoza, ed. A. Canellas López (Zaragoza, 1972- ), i.112-13, 121-2 docs. 23, 32.
59. Colección diplomática de Zaragoza, i. 21-2 doc. 32. Sainz de la Maza Lasoli, Santiago en Aragón, p 125, argues that the ransoming of captives was the main purpose of the hospital already in the twelfth century, but no documentary source for this statement is given.
ten some forty years later a 'ransom house of mercy' is mentioned. But no other sources have survived about this foundation, which is not to be confused with the ransom hospital of the Holy Redeemer at Teruel. Similarly in the kingdom of Leon only two ransom hospitals subject to Santiago are known. By 1220 a foundation of this kind had been established at Castrotoraf, to the north of Zamora, and three years later the priory of the Holy Spirit in Salamanca was assigned to Santiago 'for establishing there a hospital for the ransoming of captives from the land of the Saracens'. The other Spanish military order which assumed the task of freeing captives was the minor foundation of Mountjoy, the earliest references to which date from the year 1174.

Mountjoy's involvement in ransoming was occasioned by its amalgamation in 1188 with the hospital of the Holy Redeemer in Teruel, which had recently been founded by the Aragonese king Alfonso II, but the reasons for Santiago's ransoming activities are not so obvious. The argument has been advanced that the brethren of the order showed no interest in ransoming before Alfonso VIII's gift to them of the ransom hospital at Toledo in 1180, and that the initiative lay with the Castilian king. Yet although in 1219 Fernando III referred to the hospital at Toledo as 'built by my most illustrious grandfather the lord king A.', and the members of the order in 1250 told Innocent IV that it had been founded by Alfonso, in 1180 the Castilian king was merely making a donation to a ransom hospital which Santiago already possessed. It is of course possible that Alfonso had earlier been responsible for founding the hospital — the wording of Innocent IV's letter could be taken to imply the existence of another charter from Alfonso VIII which has not survived —, but the charter recording his gift in 1180 does not refer to it as a royal foundation, and the thirteenth-century identification of Alfonso as the founder may have been occasioned by a misinterpretation of this charter.

Santiago did admittedly receive considerable encouragement to undertake ransoming work both from Spanish kings and also from the

60. A. Lopez Polo, 'Documentos para la historia de Teruel', Teruel, I (1949), 185-7 doc. 1; SAINZ DE LA MAZA LAZULI, Santiago en Aragón, p. 127. The latter writer, ibid., pp. 127-8, argues that there was also a ransom hospital established at Castiel in the diocese of Segorbe and bases this assertion on a reference to a comendador de la Merced de Castiel found in a document drawn up in 1234. But the document mentions merely a comendador de la casa del ospital de Castiel: IRARAPERRE, 'Bases económicas', pp. 228-9 doc. 19.
64. J. GONZALEZ, Reino y diplomas de Fernando III (Córdoba, 1980-6), ii 96-7 doc. 78; Bullarium S. Iacobi, p. 180.
church and towns. The hospitals at Cuenca and Alarcón were certainly founded on the initiative of Alfonso VIII of Castile, and the order received the house of the Holy Spirit at Salamanca from Alfonso IX of Leon; in 1184 the bishop of Cuenca offered a remission of forty days' penance to those who patronised the hospital at Cuenca, and a few years later benefactions for Santiago's hospitals were also encouraged by Urban III and Gregory VIII; and in 1184 the concejo of Cuenca decreed that annual contributions, varying according to status, should be made by all the inhabitants of Cuenca—an action which was later imitated by the concejos of Huete, Alarcon, Moya and Uclés, the last of which was responsible for the foundation of the hospital at Uclés.

Yet, even if it were accepted that Alfonso VIII founded the hospital at Toledo, Santiago may have undertaken ransoming in the first instance on its own initiative. By 1187 it was assigning all booty it gained from the Moors to this purpose, and this practice may first have been adopted as a result of comments made by Alexander III when he issued a bull of confirmation for the order in 1175. Santiago was departing from the accepted norms of religious life by accepting married brethren, and the pope appears to have feared that its members would not abandon other worldly concerns either, for he decreed that at the order's general chapter each year

strict instructions are to be given that war is not to be waged against the Saracens out of worldly love of praise or out of a desire to shed blood or out of greed for earthly possessions; their only purpose in fighting should be either to protect Christians from infidel attack or to win the Saracens over to the cult of the Christian faith.

This injunction clearly influenced the wording of later versions of the order's rule:

they are not to attack Saracen lands for the sake of pillage or out of cruelty; whatever is done against them is to be done for the exaltation of the name of Christ, and is to have the purpose of defending Chris-
tians against infidel attack or of winning the Saracens over to the cult of the Christian faith.\textsuperscript{72}

And it was this consideration which according to the rule led to the assigning of booty to the ransoming of captives, for it continues:

Therefore we order and command that everything which, with God's will, they can gain in person from the Saracens is to be charitably devoted to freeing captives from the power of the infidel.\textsuperscript{73}

The order may therefore have undertaken the ransoming of captives in response to Alexander's strictures, and royal and other benefactions may have begun because the order was already devoting itself to the work of redemption.

The obligations assumed by Santiago and by Mountjoy consisted in the first place in the provision of money for the payment of ransoms. When the hospital of the Holy Redeemer was amalgamated with Mountjoy in 1188 it was agreed between Alfonso II and the members of Mountjoy that a quarter of the joint order's revenues should be expended on the freeing of captives.\textsuperscript{74} Presumably in Santiago all the available revenues of ransom hospitals were to be devoted to the work of ransomning. Certainly some donors stipulated that income derived from benefactions should be used exclusively for that purpose. When the concejo of Huete promised annual subsidies to Santiago in 1198 it made it clear that 'the concejo will give the aforesaid alms to the brothers, as long as the brothers devote these alms to captives';\textsuperscript{75} and in 1180 Alfonso VIII had stated even more explicitly that revenues worth annually 300 aureos which he was giving from the portazgo of the Visagra gate in Toledo were to be used to provide ransom payments of ten aureos for thirty captives each year.\textsuperscript{76} Part of the revenues


\textsuperscript{73} GALLEGO BLANCO, *Rule of St. James*, p. 112, cap. 31. The vernacular version reads: *Por esto mandamos que tod aquello que ganaren en tierra de moros la part de sos cuerpos den por cativos sacar de tierra de moros.* Lomax, *Orden de Santiago*, p. 226.

\textsuperscript{74} Forey, 'Order of Mountjoy', p. 258; GATULLA, 'Orden del santo Redentor', pp. 38-40. In 1198 Innocent III decreed that the Trinitarians should devote a third of their revenues to ransomning: *Migne, Patrologia latina*, cccxv, 444-9.

\textsuperscript{75} IRANIER MURUGARREN, 'Bases económicas', pp. 218-19 doc. 2.

belonging to Santiago's ransom hospitals may, however, have been used not in paying ransoms directly but—like some of the income of the Trinitarians and Mercedarians—in purchasing Muslim slaves who could then be exchanged for Christian captives, for reference was made in 1234 to seven Moors who had escaped from the prison of the ransom hospital of Moya.  

Santiago's ransoming activities were not restricted merely to providing money. In 1239 Gregory IX ordered the absolution of brothers of the order who had been excommunicated for handing over animals and other goods to the Muslims when redeeming captives. From the wording of this letter it is clear that Santiago was also involved in negotiating and arranging the release of captives.

The ransoming activities of Mountjoy and Santiago were, however, relatively short-lived. After a period of divisions and difficulties Mountjoy was amalgamated with the Temple in 1196, and Santiago was abandoning its work in this field by 1250. In that year Innocent IV approved the diversion of the revenues of the Toledo hospital to other purposes, after the master of Santiago had complained that the descendants of some patrons were seeking to recover gifts because funds were no longer being used for ransoming. The change was clearly not restricted, however, to the hospital at Toledo, for in 1260 the concejo of Moya was maintaining before Alfonso X that it should not be bound to provide the annual subsidies it had earlier promised, since these were not being devoted to the freeing of captives. Santiago's justification for the change is found in Innocent's letter of 1250: 'now that the Saracens have with the grace of God been driven out of those parts, you cannot devote those rents and income to ransoming'. It is true that towards the middle of the thirteenth century the Christian frontiers had been considerably advanced, so that only Granada remained in Muslim hands, but there were still many Christian captives to be freed, and it was not essential for ransom hospitals to be situated very close to the frontier. If the work of Santiago in this field was no longer needed as much as it had been, this was because the Trinitarians and Mercedarians had established themselves in the peninsula rather than because ransomers were not required. But
possibly the real reason for the change is to be found in the growing financial difficulties faced by the order during the mastership of Pelayo Pérez Correa. This is suggested by the action of the chapter general of 1275, which—as part of a more general reaction to Pelayo’s policies—sought to limit the master’s freedom to dispose of the revenues of hospitals. The chapter apparently wanted funds to be used for their original purposes. Yet the decree seems to have had little lasting effect, for in 1299 Boniface VIII was obliged to reiterate that the master and brethren should not grant away the hospital at Toledo to anyone or use its revenues for any purpose other than those to which they had been devoted in the past. At this time Boniface also sought to encourage ransoming activity by seeking alms for Santiago’s hospitals. It would appear therefore that in the second half of the thirteenth century Santiago was contributing little to the task of freeing captives from Islam. It did not, however, completely abandon its efforts in this sphere: in the fifteenth century some of the revenues of the Toledo hospital were still being allocated to ransoming, and the hospital at Cuenca was still freeing captives in the sixteenth century.

No other military orders are known to have established ransom hospitals or to have set aside revenues for the freeing of Christian prisoners, although several did show concern for the welfare of captives once they had been freed. The claim that a ransom hospital at the Calatravan stronghold of Salvatierra is mentioned in charters drawn up in 1182 and 1210 cannot be accepted: the hospicium referred to in the first document (issued in 1183, not 1182) was apparently the convent of Calatrava itself, and the second charter alludes merely to a hospital: in neither document is there any mention of ransoming. In 1214 the order of Avis did have a hospital at Evora in Portugal ‘for receiving poor pilgrims, orphans and captives who have escaped from Saracen servitude’; but there is nothing to suggest that this was also

---

85. Madrid, Biblioteca Nacional, Ms 8582 fo. 66v.
88. *Ibid.*, pp. 13-16, Lomax, *Orden de Santiago*, p. 96. In 1481, however, the concejo of Moya was again claiming that it was not liable to pay subsidies because these had for a long time not been used for their intended purpose: VerlinDEn, *Esclavage*, i.609
a ransom hospital in the sense of an institution which devoted revenues to the ransoming of captives. In Hospitaller statutes drawn up in 1182 it was stated that it was the custom to give 12d. 'to each captive when he is first freed from the yoke of captivity', and it was probably to such payments that a benefactress of the Hospital was referring in 1201 when she mentioned the 'benefits and alms which are constantly bestowed on the sick, the poor and captives in the sacred house of the Hospital of St John of Jerusalem'. There is certainly no evidence to indicate that any of the order's establishments was a ransom hospital. Nor do any sources suggest that the Templars maintained the hospital of the Holy Redeemer at Teruel as a ransoming institution. It became a dependency of the Templar convent of Villel, and when grants to it were made for specific purposes in the thirteenth century they were for the church and for the maintenance of chantry priests and lamps, not for ransoming. There is similarly nothing which implies that once it had become a military order St Thomas of Acre continued the work of ransoming captives to which the foundation had apparently devoted part of its revenues when it had earlier been a house of canons. The Templars and Hospitallers admittedly provided some money for freeing Christian inhabitants of Jerusalem in 1187, but this appears to have been an isolated occurrence, and even then it was claimed that they did not contribute as much as they should have done.

Nor did the remaining orders exchange the Muslim slaves they possessed in return for Christian captives. The military orders owned a considerable number of slaves, both in the East and in other parts of the Mediterranean.

91. Delaville Le Roulx, Cartulaire, i. 425-9 doc. 627; ii.8-9 doc. 1146.
92. Archivo Histórico Nacional, Sección de Códices, códice 466 pp. 252, 354-5, 356, 359, 363 docs. 260, 423, 429, 433, 440. In 1249 an individual who left property to the church of the Holy Redeemer and money to the chaplain there also bequeathed two shillings to be used for the ransoming of captives; but this was a separate bequest and was not made to the church of the Holy Redeemer: ibid., pp. 360-1 doc. 436.
94. Eracles, xxiii.61, in RHC Occ., ii 95; Chronique d'Ernoul, p. 226; Continuation de Guillaume de Tyr, 1184-1197, cap. 57, ed. Morgan, p. 70. When condemning rulers and others who demanded military service against Christians from the orders' vassals, however, the papacy sometimes argued that military orders had to spend money in ransoming these vassals which should have been used for the defence of Christendom: see, for example, E. Strehlke, Tabulae ordinis teutonicus (Berlin, 1869), pp. 332-3 doc. 461.
96. See, for example, Annales de Terre Sainte, p. 451; Finke, Acta aragonensis, iii.122-4 doc. 54;
vassals, who were often obliged to give a proportion of their booty to their lords. Some were given to orders by benefactors, and military orders were also purchasers of slaves. But, unlike the Trinitarians, most military orders did not purchase Muslim captives for the purpose of exchanging them for Christians held by the infidel. For these orders Muslim slaves were primarily a source of profit and manpower. Profit was gained partly in the form of ransoms paid by captives’ relations or friends. In 1154, for example, the Templars ransomed Nasr, the son of the Egyptian vizir Abbas, for 60,000 dinars, and later in the twelfth century they received payment for Shahinshah, the son of Saladin’s nephew Taqi al-Din, while in 1266 a Damascus merchant was ransoming prisoners held by the Hospitallers of Crac des Chevaliers. Slaves could also purchase their own freedom by redeeming themselves, although they often then remained in Christian territories. In 1226 a Templar slave at Tortosa in Spain freed himself on payment of sixty mazmodinas, but a condition of his release was that he should remain under Templar lordship and live like the order’s other Muslim tenants; the Templars were also to provide him with a wife. In 1262 the Hospitaller general chapter sought to regulate the terms under which slaves might redeem themselves by decreeing that it must be at a price for which two or three further slaves could be acquired. While they were in an order’s possession slaves provided manpower for various tasks. Some were probably employed as household servants, but others were agricultural labourers and craftsmen: among the occupations of slaves taken into royal hands in Aragon when Templar property was seized were those of labourer, smith, carpenter and shoemaker. Thus, although the papacy sought on
various occasions to encourage military orders to exchange their Muslim captives for Christian prisoners, most of these orders were reluctant to use their own slaves to obtain the release of Christians in general. Hospitaller statutes in 1262 decreed that no slave should be given away unless he was 'old or ill', and when in the following year the Mamluk sultan Baibars proposed an exchange of prisoners, the Temple and the Hospital refused to agree, saying that their slaves were of great value to them, for they were all craftsmen; for this reason the orders were unwilling to accept the proposal.

At least in Syria, however, the leading orders at times made loans to facilitate the payment of ransoms and also negotiated the freeing of captives, although the wording of documents is not always precise enough to allow a clear definition of their role in every case. In 1174 Raymond III of Tripoli stated that the Hospitallers 'used all their efforts and faithful endeavours to secure my freedom with the aid of divine mercy'. As a later document reveals that Raymond owed the Hospitallers 37,000 bezants, they had presumably advanced money for his ransom, but Raymond's comment suggests that their role may have extended beyond merely providing money. The same may be said of the Hospital's actions on behalf of Renard II of Dam-pierre, who was freed from Aleppo, probably in 1232, after some thirty years of captivity. In 1234 his son assigned property to the Hospitallers partly 'for the redemption of my father, who had returned from prison in Aleppo through their aid'; they had obviously provided money for the ransom. But as in a further charter drawn up in

105. Migne, Patrologia latina, ccxvi507-9; MGH, Epistolae saeculi XIII, i.98 doc. 135; Delaville Le Roux, Cartulaire, ii.272-3, 517 docs. 1662, 2179.
106. Ibid., ill.43-54 doc. 3039 cap. 48.
108. The military orders were, of course, not alone in advancing money for this purpose: see J. M. Lacarra, 'Documentos para el estudio de la reconquista y repoblación del valle del Ebro', Estudios de edad media de la Corona de Aragón, III (1947-8), 514-16 doc. 111; Broadman, Ransoming Captives, p. 105.
109. Delaville Le Roux, Cartulaire, i.319-20 doc. 467.
112. A. de Barthélémy, 'Chartes de départ et de retour des comtes de Dampierre-en-Astenois (IVe et Ve croisades)', Archives de l'orient latin, II (1884), ii.206-7 doc. 20.
1233 Renard himself stated that the Hospitallers ‘secured his liberation with great honour’,\textsuperscript{113} they may also have negotiated his release. This more clearly happened or was at least expected in some other cases. When the count of Flanders promised in May 1212 to pay the Hospital 700 livres Valenciennes if an agreement concerning the freeing of Gerard of Mons was not observed, he imposed the condition that if the captive was not returned to Christian hands by Christmas of the following year, he would cease to be under any obligation.\textsuperscript{114} On this occasion the Hospitallers were presumably expected to conduct negotiations as well as to provide the ransom money. A similar conclusion may be drawn from a further document, written in 1215, which records that Rosceline of La Ferté promised rents worth ten livres per annum ‘if the Hospitallers returned Guiard, her son, who was held in Saracen captivity, freed and under no obligation in the city of Acre’.\textsuperscript{115} A third example of this kind is perhaps provided by a document drawn up on behalf on William of Queivillers in Acre in 1227. William stated that when his father was being held by the Muslims in the castle of Sahyun, he had sought the assistance of the Hospitaller prior of France; later, when he went out to Syria, he secured the support of the grand master, but his father had died ‘when we were negotiating his release’; he was apparently referring here to himself and the Hospitallers.\textsuperscript{116} In the East the Hospitallers thus both advanced money and negotiated on behalf of individual Christian captives. As is apparent from the last example, they had the advantage of possessing convents throughout western Europe, and captives’ relations or friends could in the first instance approach them locally, without the necessity of travelling to the East. The leading orders were in addition well-practised in moneylending, while in Syria they also had contacts with neighbouring Muslim powers. The examples which have been quoted, however, suggest that action was taken only on the initiative of a captive’s relations or friends. It may also be noted that they all refer to the Hospital, and it is well known from Joinville that the Templars were reluctant to lend money towards Louis IX’s ransom in Egypt in 1250.\textsuperscript{117} But the Temple’s unwillingness to act on that occasion was prompted by the fact that deposits held by the order were to be surrendered to no one other than the depositors; and it is clear from Joinville’s account that the Templars were making merely a token protest, for the marshal of

\textsuperscript{113} Ibid., pp. 197-8 doc. 11; Delaville Le Roux, Cartulaire, ii.450-1 doc. 2044.
\textsuperscript{114} Ibid., ii.142 doc. 1385.
\textsuperscript{115} Ibid., ii.171 doc. 1434.
\textsuperscript{116} Ibid., ii.363-4 doc. 1861.
\textsuperscript{117} Joinville, Histoire de St. Louis, cap. 75, ed. de Wailly, pp. 134-6.
the order was quite prepared to acquiesce in the seizure of money from the Temple’s coffers. It should also be remembered that very few sources concerning the Templars in Syria have survived, and that there is evidence of their advancing money in the West for the ransoming of men captured in conflicts between Christian powers.  

In addition to lending money and conducting negotiations for the freeing of prisoners, military orders in Syria did also on occasion participate in military actions whose purpose was the release of men held by the Muslims. In 1264 Templars and Hospitallers were reported to have participated in a raid in the district of Ascalon in order to free the castellan of Jaffa, Gerard of Picquigny. Yet the activities of the leading orders in the sphere of redemption were limited. For them the freeing of Christian prisoners seems to have been a source of profit and advantage rather than a charitable function. Yet to expect the military orders in the Holy Land to have assumed a larger role would be unrealistic, for although in some ways they were well suited for the task, to have assigned a portion of their revenues to the freeing of captives would have placed an additional burden on finances which in the thirteenth century were already becoming inadequate for the military and other obligations for which they were responsible.

In the western Mediterranean the orders’ failure to participate in, or to maintain, ransoming activities was probably not of great significance, for there were numerous other institutions and organisations which were involved in redeeming prisoners in that region. In the East their stance was probably of greater consequence. There were admittedly some organisations in Syria which assisted in the ransoming of captives. Like some confraternities in Spain, that of the Holy Spirit in Acre in the thirteenth century provided money towards the ransoms of any members who fell into Muslim hands. The Trinitarians were established in the Holy Land, and although their houses in the West away from the Mediterranean appear to have been primarily concerned with the care of the poor and sick, they were usually obliged to devote a third of their revenues to ransoming activi-

118. L. Delisle, Mémoire sur les opérations financières des Templiers (Paris, 1889), p. 19. It may also be noted that in the East the Templars had a part in freeing Isaac Dukas Comnenus after he had been captured by the Armenians and sent to Antioch: O City of Byzantium, Annals of Niketas Choniates, trans. H. J. Magoulias (Detroit, 1984), p. 161; Gesta regis Henrici secundi, ed. W. Stubbs (Rolls Series, 1867), i.254-5.
119. Annales de Terre Sainte, p. 451. According to Ibn al-Furat, however, he was released by the sultan: Ayyubids, Mamlukes and Crusaders, ii.68.
120. In addition to benefiting financially, they were also sometimes afforded opportunities for purchasing property when individuals had difficulty in obtaining the sums needed for ransoms.
121. Registres d’Alexandre IV, i.103-5 doc. 346, Riley-Smith, ‘Note on Confraternities’, p. 305
122. Brodman, Trinitarian and Mercedarian Orders, pp. 144, 240.
ty; and crusaders going to the East from the more northerly parts of Europe sometimes made gifts to the Trinitarians before departing, which suggests that they hoped that these would assist in ransoming them if they were captured on crusade. Yet the Trinitarians in the thirteenth century appear to have concentrated their ransoming activities mainly in Spain and North Africa, and the Mercedarians were active only in the western Mediterranean.

Captivity in any region was a testing experience, with prisoners held in irons, poorly fed, ill-treated and under pressure to apostasise: the Templar Gerard of Châtillon told that

because of the multitude of his sufferings, it would almost challenge credibility to narrate how many misfortunes and hardships and how much suffering from hunger, toil and grief he had sustained, when he was incessantly carrying stones on his shoulders for building the walls of the said sultan.

But for those in the East the chances of liberation were probably smaller than in the Iberian peninsula. It might be months or years before their relations and friends learned of their fate; and ransoming would be difficult to arrange and to achieve. Many Christians captured in Syria no doubt spent the rest of their lives in captivity. It is therefore not surprising that fear of captivity was seen as one of the hindrances to crusading in the eastern Mediterranean: not all of those who were apprehensive about the possibility of imprisonment and servitude would have been wholly consoled by the Dominican John Bromyard's assertion that 'all these things are of greater value to the soul than prosperity'.

123. There were, however, an increasing number of exceptions to this practice: BRODMAN, Trinitarian and Mercedarian Orders, pp.158-9, 237, 239.
125. BRODMAN, Trinitarian and Mercedarian Orders, p. 144.
126. MOVSE, 'Hospitaliers de Besançon', p. 514; cf. J. M. DE Cossio, 'Cautivos de moros en el siglo XIII', Al-Andalus, VII (1942), 74-83. Comments about imprisonment were also made by the Hospitaller Roger of Stanegrave, but the manuscript containing these is in a very poor state of preservation: London, British Library, Cotton MS Otho D V.
127. Uncertainty in the West about the fate of crusaders often finds expression in the proceedings of lawsuits: see Curia Regis Rolls (London, 1922- ), iii, 205; ix, 334; xi, 85.
128. J. Bromyard, Summa predicantium, 'Crux' (Venice, 1586), 1.184v-165
The Military Orders and Holy War against Christians in the Thirteenth Century

Unti the end of the twelfth century the Crusade was a weapon that appears to have been used exclusively against the infidel,¹ and it was similarly for the purpose of combating non-Christians that Military Orders were established during the twelfth century in the Holy Land and Spain. In the thirteenth century, however, a growing number of Crusades were launched against Christians. The faithful were encouraged to take the cross not only against heretics, schismatics and other enemies of the Church, but also in support of secular rulers whose cause was favoured by the papacy: in the 1260s, for example, Urban IV and Clement IV were both prepared to order the preaching of the cross against Henry III's opponents in England.² It is not surprising therefore that in the thirteenth century the role of the Military Order was also extended. Once fighting against heretics and other enemies of the Church was thought worthy of spiritual reward and regarded as a means of salvation,³ participation in such warfare could be considered a fitting task for a Military Order. Of course, to divert the manpower and resources of Orders which had been founded for the purpose of fighting against the infidel might provoke criticism; and in thirteenth-century statutes of the Teutonic Order brethren were in fact expressly forbidden to give any aid to those embarking on military campaigns against Christians: nulius fratrum scienter prestet equitaturam vel aliud subsidium eunti ad exercitum contra christanos vel

¹ The validity of this statement depends, of course, on the precise way in which the term 'crusade' is defined; but see N. Housley, 'Crusades against Christians: their Origins and Early Development, c. 1000-1216', in P. W. Edbury (ed.), Crusade and Settlement (Cardiff, 1985), p. 28: 'strictly speaking, ... the crusade launched in 1208 should be regarded as the first fully-authenticated crusade against Christians'.


³ This was happening well before the thirteenth century, although the practice did arouse criticism: Housley, 'Crusades against Christians', pp. 17-36.
ad aliquod malefactum. Yet the Military Order had clearly come
to be seen as an institution which might legitimately be used against
certain groups of Christians. In the early thirteenth century James of
Vitry could state, without feeling the need to provide any special justifi-
cation, that

ad hoc igitur fratres ordinis militaris ordinati sunt, ut Christi ecclesiam gladio
materiali defendant, maxime contra eos qui extra sunt, id est contra Sarrace-
nos in Syria, contra Mauros in Hispania, contra paganos in Prutia, Livonia
et Comania, et nihilominus de mandato superioris contra schismaticos in
Graecia, et contra haereticos ubique dispersos in universali ecclesia;²

and when Aquinas later discussed whether a religious institution could
be founded for military purposes, he concluded that

convenienter institui potest aliqua religio ad militandum, non quidem propter
aliquid mundanum, sed propter defensionem divini cultus et publicae salutis,
vel etiam pauperum et oppressorum.³

He did not argue that such foundations should fight only against the
infidel.

Already in the first decade of the thirteenth century the leading Mili-
tary Orders were being assigned lands in the newly-formed Latin
Empire of Constantinople, which faced opposition from eastern Chris-
tians on both its European and its Asiatic frontiers. In 1205, for exam-
ple, the Emperor Baldwin I granted the Hospitallers a quarter of the
Duchy of Navarino, and the Temple, the Hospital and the Teutonic
Order each received four fiefs in the Morea. The assigning of lands
to these Orders does not, of course, necessarily indicate that their
members were expected to fight in person against Greek opponents:
it may be noted in this context that according to a papal letter issued
in 1210 the legate Benedict, Cardinal of St Susanna, had given the
Templars a church outside Thebes ad Terrae Sanctae subventionem.³

1. M. Perlbach, Die Statuten des Deutschen Ordens nach den ältesten Handschriften (Halle, 1890),
p. 52. Recruits to the Temple were merely asked to promise que vos jamais ne serés en Inec ni en place ou nous crestiens soit deserts a tort ne a desraison des soes choses ne par vostre force ne
Templar statutes and Hospitaller regulations define the penalties to be imposed for striking a Christian, but these decrees are concerned with individual quarrels: ibid., pp. 155, 243 caps. 335, 452; J.

2. J. B. Pitra, Analecta r pricing: Spicilegii Scelesmenis altera continatio (Paris, 1881-8), ii. 495.


4. Delaville Le Roulx, Cartulaire, ii. 47-8 doc. 1213; H. E. Lurier (trans.), Crusaders as Conquer-

5. J. P. Migne, Patrologia latina (Paris, 1844-55), ccxxvi. 327-8 ep. 143. Similar phrases are found
in several other documents referring to gifts to the Military Orders in the Latin Empire: ibid.,
ccxxvi. 324, 328 ep. 137, 145. In a letter to the Emperor Henry, Innocent III wrote that the Templars
But another letter sent by Innocent III at the same time reports that after they had received the lordship of Lamia in Thessaly the Templars had built a castle there *ad defensionem terrae.* That the Orders were expected to assist in the defence of the Empire is also apparent from the wording of a document drawn up in 1237 concerning a proposed amalgamation of the Hospital of St James at Andravida with the Teutonic Order: after decreeing that the brethren of the latter Order should establish their chief residence there, Geoffrey of Villehardouin, the Hospital’s patron, added: *habeant domum unam, in castro nostro Clarimontis, quod si expedierrit pro defensione ipsius castri, totus conventus residenciam faciat in eodem.* The purpose of grants to the Temple, the Hospital and the Teutonic Order was clearly not always just to provide revenues for the benefit of the Holy Land. The fullest evidence about military commitments in the Latin Empire, however, concerns the Spanish Order of Santiago. In 1246, when he was touring the West in search of aid, the Emperor Baldwin II entered into an agreement with Santiago’s master, Pelay Pérez Correa, who undertook to take 300 knights, 200 archers and 1,000 foot to the Latin Empire and to stay for a period of two years; it was also agreed that a convent of the Order of Santiago should be established there permanently to provide military assistance to the emperor. Because of the changing situation in the Iberian peninsula and Baldwin’s inability to find the sum of 40,000 marks which he had promised to Santiago, this agreement was never implemented; but some twenty years later, shortly before the sealing of the treaties of Viterbo, Baldwin was similarly seeking to persuade the prior of the Hospitallers in Hungary to bring men to assist in the recovery of Constantinople — a proposal which finds an echo in the writings of some crusading theorists of the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries: in his *Tractatus de modo convertendi infideles,* for example, Raymond Lull advocated that the forces of the Military Orders should be stationed in *frontaria Grece,* while in the

1. Ibid., ccxv, 323 ep. 136.
3. E. Benito Ruano, ‘Baldwin II de Constantinopla y la orden de Santiago’, *Hispanía,* xii (1952), 30-4 doc. 3.
4. Ibid., pp. 25-8.
5. Delaville Le Roulx, *Carnadeire,* iii. 155-6 doc. 3153.
Liber de acquisitione Terrae Sanctae he proposed that Constantinople should be subjected by Charles of Naples and the Hospitallers.¹

The amount of military assistance which the Orders gave during the thirteenth century in defending former Byzantine territories against eastern Christians is not precisely known, but it was probably limited in amount. This is suggested first by the sparseness of the evidence concerning their military activities in this region; and the few references which do survive relate to the fourteenth rather than to the thirteenth century.² It should also be remembered that at the time of the establishment of the Latin Empire the Templars and Hospitallers were already heavily committed in Syria and Spain and that it would not have been easy for them to provide a very substantial force for the defence of the Latin Empire. At the beginning of the thirteenth century the brethren of the Teutonic Order were admittedly fighting only in the Holy Land, but this Order was then still in its infancy, and from 1230 onwards it was devoting a considerable part of its resources to the Baltic region.

There was also, however, conflict between eastern and western Christians in the Baltic, and the involvement of the Military Orders in wars against the Russians in this area is clearly brought out in the surviving sources. Henry of Livonia, for example, provides a detailed description of campaigns undertaken in the second decade of the century in which the Swordbrethren of Livonia fought against the Russians, and the defeat of the Teutonic Order by Alexander Nevsky in 1242 is recorded in the Novgorod Chronicle as well as in western sources.³

In the Baltic the Orders’ ambitions inevitably brought them into conflict with Russian princes, and they were also encouraged by some popes and papal legates to take the offensive against schismatics in this area.

---


² A. Morel-Fatio (ed.), Libro de los fechos et conquistas del principado de la Morea compilado por comandamiento de Don Johan Fernandez de Heredia (Paris, 1885), pp. 141, 143; Ludolf of Sudheim, De omnere Terrae Sanctae liber, cap. 17, ed. F. Deysch (Stuttgart, 1851), p. 23. At the beginning of the fourteenth century the Hospitallers had of course seized Rhodes from the Greeks. According to the Chronicle of Morea, fiefs of the Military Orders were confiscated and held for three years in the second decade of the thirteenth century by Geoffrey of Villehardouin when they refused to provide military service in return for their lands: Crusaders as Conquerors, pp. 148–51; A. Bon, La Morée franque (Paris, 1969), p. 95. In 1238 the Hospitallers were accused of giving aid to John Vatatzes against the Latin Empire: Delaville Le Roulx, Cartulaire, u. 523–4 doc. 3186; Reg. Grégoire IX, ii. 919–20 doc. 4156.

CHRISTIANS IN THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY 5

region.¹ This they were capable of doing because they had a concentration of manpower there. The Swordbrethren’s activities were centred in Livonia, and after they had been incorporated into the Teutonic Order in 1237, it became an important frontier region for the latter Order. But the Orders’ chief opponents in the North were pagans, not Russians.

Although several thirteenth-century canonists elaborated justifications for the coercion of schismatics,² the sources relating to the Military Orders rarely seek to defend the use of force against Greeks or Russians. The Greeks were occasionally described as inimici fidei,³ and thus placed on a par with the infidel, and when exhorting the Order of Santiago to give assistance to the Latin Empire Innocent IV voiced the commonly expressed view that the defence and preservation of the Empire were necessary for the welfare of the Holy Land;⁴ but most documents are silent on the matter. Yet special justifications were presumably considered hardly necessary, especially as the Military Orders were not usually regarded as the aggressors. After a brief period of expansion, the westerners in the Latin Empire were concerned to defend what they held rather than to take the offensive against the Greeks; and in most of the conflicts in the Baltic the initiative was seen to lie with the Russians, who entered into alliances with the Orders’ pagan enemies. Any reservations which did exist were concerned with the diversion of resources from the ends originally intended, not with the legitimacy of employing Military Orders against schismatics. Thus in 1246 the Castilian Crown was anxious to ensure that not more than fifty brethren of Santiago served in the Latin Empire;⁵ but the proposal concerning Santiago was an isolated project which came to nothing. There was also some general criticism in the West of the diversion of Crusades and crusaders from the Holy Land to Constantinople,⁶ but at least some of the resources used by the Military Orders in defence of the Latin Empire had been assigned to them specifically for that purpose; and there is no evidence to indicate that they were diverting resources from outside the Empire which had been given for the support of the Holy Land.

A few years after the Fourth Crusade had been diverted and the Latin Empire established, Innocent III was ordering the preaching of

² Innocent IV, Apparatus, lib. iii, de baptismo (Trino, 1511), fo. 193v; Hostiensis, Summa aurea, lib. iii, de voto (Lyon, 1588), fo. 217v.
³ Benito Ruano, ‘Balduino II’, pp. 30-4 doc. 3.
⁵ Benito Ruano, ‘Balduino II’, p. 30 doc. 2.
a Crusade against the Albigensians in the south of France, and in this region steps were taken in the early decades of the thirteenth century to create two new Military Orders to assist in the suppression of heresy and the maintenance of peace. In 1221 — when hostilities had still not been concluded — several references occur to a militia of the Faith of Jesus Christ which was being set up there. Nothing is known of the exact circumstances of its foundation or of its master P. Savary. It may, however, have originated as a lay confraternity which was to be disbanded when it was no longer needed, for in February 1221 the papal legate Conrad of Urach decreed that all the lands and revenues which had been, or might in future be, conferred on it by Amaury of Montfort and other patrons would revert to the donors. Yet in the summer of the same year permission was being sought from Honorius III for its members to adopt the observances of the Templars and to fight in the south of France just as the Templars did in the East. The master defined the purpose of the institution as the defence of the person and lands of Amaury of Montfort and also ad quirendum et destruendum pravos hereticos et terras ipsorum et etiam illos qui contra fidem sancte ecclesie sunt rebelles; and the latter aims were reiterated in two letters issued by the Pope in the summer of 1221. But it is possible that the proposals being made at that time were never implemented, for the wording of the second of Honorius’s letters suggests that the Pope was beginning to have doubts about the project. Whereas in his first letter, written early in June, Honorius gave his approval and granted his legate permission to establish an Order which would adopt the observances of an established institution, in the second — issued in the middle of July — the Pope expressed himself in more guarded terms: the legate was merely commanded to do what he thought fitting. As no further references to the Order survive, the project may have foundered at this stage.

It has admittedly been argued that the institution did survive beyond this time, and that at the end of the decade, when it no longer had the support of Amaury of Montfort, its members decided to affiliate themselves to the Order of Santiago. But the only evidence adduced

1. D. M. Federici, Istoria de' cavalieri gaudenti (Vinegia, 1787), ii, Codex diplomaticus, p. 6 doc. 8; G. G. Meerseman, 'Études sur les anciennes confréries dominicaines. IV. Les milices de Jésus-Christ', Archivum fratrum predicatocorum, xxvi (1953), 286–7. Meerseman argues that the document should be understood to mean that property would revert to the donors if papal approval was not forthcoming; but no condition is expressed in the text. It is possible, however, that a form of religious life had already been adopted, for P. Savary entitled himself humilis et pauper magister, which could be taken to imply a vow of poverty, and the legate referred to the institution as an ordo; nevertheless it would probably be unsafe to attach too precise a significance to the use of these terms. The exact implication of the legate's decree must remain uncertain.

2. Federici, Cavalieri gaudenti, ii, Cod. dipl., pp. 4–6 docs. 6, 7.


4. Ibid., vii, 540–1; Meerseman, 'Confréries dominicaines', p. 288.
CHRISTIANS IN THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY

in favour of this assertion is a letter issued by Gregory IX in 1231, and there are several grounds for distinguishing between the Order of the Faith of Jesus Christ and the institution to which Gregory was referring. The Pope’s letter was addressed to magistro militiae ordinis sancti Jacobi ejusque fratibus tam presentibus quam futuris ad defensionem fidei et pacis in Gnasconia constitutis; and in later documents this institution is called the Order of the Sword or of the Faith and Peace, not the Faith of Jesus Christ. Those who established it were said by Gregory to have been acting on the exhortations of Amanieu, Archbishop of Auch, who was not appointed until 1226, and the Pope made no reference to Conrad of Urach, who had been involved in the founding of the Order of the Faith of Jesus Christ; and whereas the latter sought to adopt Templar observances, the foundation to which Gregory referred followed, with certain exceptions, the rule of the Order of Santiago. Moreover, in defining its purpose, Gregory placed greatest emphasis on its function of maintaining peace rather than combating heresy:

Cum enim in Auxitana provincia usque adeo multiplicata esset superborum iniquitas et superbia iniquorum, quod, veritate obruta in plateis et justitia profugigata, pax omnino perisset, ita ut qui a malo recederent, perversorum prede patarent, et qui seviret immanius magnificentior haberetur, vos fidei et pacis zelo succensi, ad utrisque defensionem Dei armatura muniti, contra inimicos pacis et fidei statuistis laudabiliter dimicare.

Lastly, the possessions listed by Gregory lay mostly to the west of Toulouse, in the dioceses of Auch, Lescar, Comminges and Bayonne, and the leading patron mentioned was the Viscount of Béarn, not Amaury of Montfort.

But if the Order of the Sword or of the Faith and Peace is to be distinguished from that mentioned in the documents of 1221, no record has survived of its activities in maintaining the peace; and within a few decades it was in decline. In 1262 the master of the Order

attento et considerato se nimis seculariter vivere in ordine supradicto, et se et fratres et sorores ejusdem ordinis et ipsum ordinem hostilitate faciente desolatos existere, intendentes et volentes ad frugem melioris vite transmigrare,

2. See, for example, Delaville Le Roulx, Cartulaire, ii. 425, 638-9 docs. 2114, 2392; iii. 112 doc. 3162; H. Prutz, Malteser Urkunden und Regesten zur Geschichte der Tempelherren und der Johanniter (Munich, 1883), pp. 76-7 doc. 332.
3. Amanieu’s action had perhaps been prompted by a letter from Gregory IX in 1227 in which the Pope ordered the Archbishop to seek to bring peace to the province: C. Lacave La Plagne Barriès (ed.), Cartulaires du chapitre de l’église métropolitaine Sainte-Marie d’Auch (Paris, Auch, 1899), pp. 143-4 doc. 121. Gregory confirmed the new Order after Amanieu had visited Rome, accompanied by several members of the new foundation: ibid., pp. 138-40 doc. 119.
amalgamated the Order with the Cistercian monastery of Feuillant.¹ Yet, although the Cistercians later used the document of union drawn up in 1262 to justify their claims to lands previously held by the Order of the Faith and Peace,² the latter did not altogether disappear in that year. Five years later Clement IV was deposing the master, stating that the Order had declined because of the malice and neglect shown by this official and by others, both lay and ecclesiastics.³ An attempt to restore the foundation was made by the Archbishop of Auch, who in 1268 bought the Hospital of Pont d’Artigues from Santiago for the Order and who appointed his nephew as master.⁴ But the attempted restoration was evidently unsuccessful. In 1273 Gregory X decreed with reference to Gregory IX’s privilege of 1231 that per hoc autem nullum volumus de novo alicui ius acquiri; and the Order’s possessions passed into other hands, including those of Santiago and the church of Auch.⁵

In addition to these foundations, a number of confraternities with military functions had been created in the early thirteenth century in the south of France, and their establishment is paralleled in Italy by the creation of similar societates.⁶ There was also, however, one Military Order which was founded in Italy in the thirteenth century. It became known as the Order of the Blessed Virgin Mary and received its rule from Urban IV in 1261. In this the Pope defined the military responsibilities of the brethren: liceat autem eis arma portare pro defensione catholice fidei et ecclesiastice libertatis, cum eis per Romanam ecclesiiam fuerit specialiter demandatum; pro sedendis etiam tumultibus civitatum arma protegentia tantum de sui diocesani licentia portare valeant.⁷ Among its founders was Loderingo degli Andalò, who came from Bologna and who belonged to a Ghibelline family,⁸ and he and another brother called Catalano di Guido, who was a member of the

---

¹ Gallia christiana, xiii, Instrumenta, pp. 167-8.
⁸ O. Holder-Egger (ed.), Cronicum fratris Salimbene de Adam, in MGH, Scriptores, xxxii (Hanover, 1905–13), 467; Albert Miholi, Liber de temporibus, ed. O. Holder-Egger, MGH, Scriptores, xxxi (Hanover, 1903), 527.
Guelph house of the Catalani, were given authority in Bologna in 1265 in an attempt to bring peace between rival factions there.¹ In the following year they were similarly placed in charge of the city of Florence by Clement IV, following the defeat and death of Manfred at Benevento.² But the activities of Loderingo and Catalano in Florence soon aroused criticism, which is reflected in various sources, including Dante’s *Inferno*, where the two are placed among the hypocrites in the eighth circle of Hell:

Frati godenti fumo, e bolognesi;  
io Catalano e questi Loderingo  
nomati, e da tua terra insieme presi  
con suole esser tolto un uom solingo,  
per conservar sua pace; e fumo tali,  
ch’ancor si pare intorno dal Gardingo.³

The reputation of the Order quickly fell. Not only did it fail to perform its functions effectively; its members were also accused of avarice, and criticised for seeking to evade taxation, and their way of life earned them the epithet of *fratres gaudentes*.⁴ The Order nevertheless survived well beyond the end of the thirteenth century.⁵

The Orders founded in France and Italy were clearly of only marginal importance, but this should not be taken as an indication of widespread hostility to the creation of Military Orders for the purpose of fighting against Christians. The problems encountered by the Order of the Faith and Peace were similar to those troubling several Military Orders which devoted themselves to combatting the infidel. A parallel is provided, for example, by the history of the Spanish Order of Mountjoy.⁶ It has also been pointed out that the two functions assigned to the Order of the Blessed Virgin Mary by Urban IV were scarcely compatible with each other: this foundation was thus hampered by the lack of a simple and clearly-defined purpose.⁷

Although the papacy was prepared to approve the creation of new Orders in the south of France and in Italy, it made little attempt to

---

⁵. The most detailed work on the Order is Federici, *Cavalieri gaudenti*; there is no adequate modern study, but see A. de Stefano, ‘Le origini dei frati gaudenti’, *Archivum romanicum*, 8 (1926), 405–50.
use brethren of the older Military Orders against heretics or other Christian enemies of the Church within western Europe. Innocent III seems not to have invoked the aid of the Templars and Hospitallers during the Albigensian crusade, and their involvement in the fighting in southern France was minimal. They are mentioned only three times in the *Chanson de la croisade albigeoise*, and of these references only one occurs in a military context: the French army marching on Toulouse in 1219 is said to have included some Templars.  

In Italy during the thirteenth century popes usually called upon the services only of individual Templars and Hospitallers. Templars sometimes occupied the post of papal marshal, and brothers were also employed as castellans of castles in papal territories: in 1262, for example, the Templar Bernard of Gallerceto was put in charge of Cesi,


It has been argued that already in the twelfth century the Templars had become involved in the Church’s efforts to maintain the peace in southern France: the peace decrees promulgated by Archbishop Arnaud I of Narbonne shortly before the middle of the century are thought to have been issued at the instigation of the Templars, and it has been claimed that ‘this enactment secured for the Templars (apparently) the whole province a major role in peacekeeping together with a fiscal endowment pegged to that role’: T. N. Bisson, ‘The Organised Peace in Southern France and Catalonia, ca. 1140–ca. 1253’, *American Historical Review*, lxxii (1971), 296, 299–300. In his decrees the Archbishop of Narbonne certainly assigned to the Templars the proceeds of an annual imposition of one sétier of corn per plough in the region: R. Hiestand, *Papsturkunden für Templer und Johanniter* (Göttingen, 1972), i. 335–5 doc. 27. Yet in Adrian IV’s confirmation of the peace, from which the Archbishop’s decrees are known, the Templars themselves are not mentioned as a party to the proposals: the decrees were drawn up by the Archbishop, the Counts of Rodez and Toulouse, the Viscout of Carcassonne and other nobles. Nor in Adrian’s confirmation is the Order specifically assigned any role in keeping the peace. The only comments made about enforcement are that *adstrutores* and *defensores* of the decrees should receive spiritual rewards and that ecclesiastical censures were to be imposed for breaches of the peace. The preamble to the papal confirmation suggests that the purpose of the payments to the Templars was in fact the provision of financial aid for the Holy Land rather than compensation for expenses incurred in keeping the peace. It may also be noted that in a later document Alexander III mentioned the payments without any reference to peace decrees: W. Wiederhold, *Papsturkunden in Frankreich. VII. Gascony, Guienne and Languedoc* (Nachrichten von der königlichen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen. Phil.-hist. Klasse, 1915), pp. 130–30 doc. 80. That payments of this kind should not necessarily be taken as an indication of a peacekeeping role is also suggested by the wording of a decree issued by the Bishop of Béziers about the year 1170 for, although in this the Templars were again assigned dues levied on every yoke of oxen, the populace at large was placed under the obligation *ad sequendum pacem et cogendum illos qui eam infrigerunt*: Devic and Vaissete, *Hist. de Languedoc*, viii. 275–6. It is true that the proceeds of such taxes were sometimes used to meet military expenses incurred in enforcing the peace, as well as to provide compensation for those who had suffered losses: Bisson, ‘Organised Peace’, pp. 301–2; C. Brunel, ‘Les juges de la paix en Gévaudan au milieu du Xle siècle’, *Bibliothèque de l’Ecole des Chartes*, cix (1951), 18–9; yet the terms of the decrees mentioning the Templars do not justify the assumption that the Order was becoming involved in the maintenance of peace in the West.

near Spoleto, ne remaneret custodis cura et vigilantia destituta.¹ Clement IV is the only pope who is known to have envisaged using contingents of Templars and Hospitallers in the field in the peninsula. In 1266, when Charles of Anjou was establishing his authority in south Italy and Sicily, Clement wrote to the grand masters of the two Orders asking that the Templar Amaury of Roche and the Hospitaller Philip of Egly—candidates put forward by Charles—should be placed in charge of their respective Orders' properties in the southern kingdom,² and in the autumn of the following year he broached the question of fighting against Charles's opponents. Yet it was done in only a half-hearted manner. In a letter to the Hospitallers in Sicily he did not order them into the field, but merely gave them permission impugnandi eos cum armis viriliter et potenter; and this licence was to be valid for only a year.³

In the later years of the century the papacy similarly showed little inclination to involve the Templars and Hospitallers actively in offensives against Aragon after the Sicilian Vespers, despite the papal award of the Aragonese throne to Charles of Valois and the proclaiming of a Crusade against Pedro III. In 1283 the Military Orders in Aragon, like other inhabitants of the kingdom, were instructed by Martin IV not to obey Pedro III nor to aid him, but they were never asked to give active assistance to the French.⁴ The Temple and Hospital were among those in the south of France who were told by Honorius IV in 1286 to surrender to Philip IV for a year all the castles they held near the Aragonese frontier, but this instruction indicates that the brethren were not themselves expected to participate in the conflict.⁵ And there is no evidence to show that Honorius responded to the demand made by Philip in the same year that the grand masters of the Temple and Hospital should be ordered by the Pope to appoint provincial masters in Aragon who would favour the French cause.⁶ It is true that, after James of Mallorca had—at the instigation of the French King—seized the Templar house of Mas-Deu in Roussillon on the


³. Delaville Le Roulx, Cartulaire, iii. 160 doc. 327; Martine et Duras, Thesaurus, ii. 532 doc. 541. It is asserted by Delaville Le Roulx, Cartulaire, iii. 539 doc. 404; that in 1289 Nicholas IV ordered the three leading Orders in the Kingdom of Naples to resist James of Sicily; but the document in question is merely concerned with taxation: Regul. Nicholas IV, p. 239 doc. 1142.


⁶. G. Digard, Philippe le Bel et le Saint-Siège, 1285-1308 (Paris, 1936), ii. 219 doc. 2. The Templar Berenguer de San Justo held office as provincial master from 1283 until 1290, while the Hospitaller Raymond of Ribelles was castellan of Amposta from 1276 till 1300.
grounds that it was subject to the Aragonese Templars, Nicholas IV did order that it should be entrusted to brethren who were faithful to the Church and to the King of Mallorca; but obviously the purpose of this decree was merely to placate and reassure James.\footnote{S. Baluzius, \textit{Vitae paparum Avenionensium}, ed. G. Mollat (Paris, 1914-27), iii. 7-8 doc. 5.} The Aragonese King Alfonso III on the other hand complained in 1288 to the marshal and convent of the Hospitallers that some brethren \textit{cum vestris navibus nostrisque hostibus se jungentes, ad hexeredationem nostram per operis evidentiam aspectantes, cum armate illustri regis Francie terram nostram hostiliter invaserunt; but if this is an accurate report, the Hospitallers were apparently not acting on papal orders.}\footnote{Delaville Le Roulx, \textit{Cartulaire}, iii. 518-19 doc. 4007. For other complaints by Alfonso III against the Hospitallers at this time, see H. Finke, \textit{Acta aragonensia} (Berlin, 1908-22), iii. 5-5 doc. 2.}

The papacy was more ready to invoke the assistance of the older Orders when there was conflict between western Christians in the eastern Mediterranean. In 1218, shortly after the accession of the infant King Henry I, Honorius III commanded the Templars and Hospitallers to assist in quelling disorders in the Kingdom of Cyprus, and in 1226 they were again asked by the Pope to give aid and counsel to Henry against \textit{indebitos molestatores.}\footnote{P. Pressetti, \textit{Regesta Honoriani papae III} (Rome, 1888-91), i. 352-5 no. 1524; ii. 401 no. 5822; C. Baronius, O. Raynaldeus \textit{et al.} (eds.), \textit{Annales ecclesiastici} (Lucca, 1747), i. 456-7; Delaville Le Roulx, \textit{Cartulaire}, ii. 549-50 doc. 1835.} Already before this Innocent III had turned to them when the stability of the Kingdom of Jerusalem seemed threatened: in 1213 he commanded the Templars and Hospitallers \textit{qua tenus regi predicto [Hierosolymitano] contra quoslibet regni sui perturbationes in debitos fideliter et viriliter assistentes, terram ejus et iura sicut vestra propria defendatis.}\footnote{Ibid., ii. 154 doc. 1407; Migne, \textit{Patrologia latina}, ccxvi. 737-8.} This was an appeal in support of John of Brienne, whose claim to rule was jeopardised by the death of his wife Mary. Nearly twenty years later, in 1232, when there was conflict between Frederick II's representatives and the Ibelin faction, the Military Orders in the Holy Land were asked by Gregory IX to assist the papal legate \textit{ad reformationem regni} and to support those acting on behalf of Frederick, and in 1235 the same Pope instructed them to give military aid if necessary for the defence of Tyre and other places under imperial authority.\footnote{Delaville Le Roulx, \textit{Cartulaire}, ii. 439-40, 487-8 docs. 2026, 2118; \textit{MGH, Epistolae saeculi XIII}, ed. C. Rodenberg (Berlin, 1883-94), i. 584-5, 548-9 docs. 477, 649; J. L. Huillard-Breivolles, \textit{Historia diplomatica Frederici II} (Paris, 1852-61), iv. 376-9, 726-8.} Towards the end of the next decade, however, the papacy was seeking to ensure that Hohenstaufen claims in the Holy Land received no support. In May 1248 Innocent IV wrote to the Military Orders and others stating that some elements in the Kingdom of Jerusalem wanted it to be under the rule of Frederick II and his son Conrad: the Pope ordered them to remain faithful to
Rome and commanded *nec quantum in vobis est ab aliquo permittatis ipsius regni dominium aliquatenus inmutari.* In a further letter dispatched at the same time the Pope also claimed that Frederick’s representative Thomas of Acerra was causing harm in Tripoli and he therefore ordered the prelates, Military Orders and barons of the Holy Land *quatinus quod idem comes de partibus illis omnino recedat sollicite laboretis.* Later in the century when Paul, Bishop of Tripoli, complained that Bohemund VII had despoiled him of his possessions and ejected him from his see, Nicholas III threatened to coerce the prince *per spiritualem et temporalem penam maximo in brachio dilectorum filiorum magistrorum et fratrum domus Templi, hospitalis Sancti Johannis Ierosolimitani, Sancte Marie Theotoniorum aliorumque Christi et ecclesie Romane fidelium religiosorum.* And when a commune was formed in Tripoli following the death of Bohemund in 1287, Nicholas IV commanded the Military Orders to give assistance to Bohemund’s sister Lucy in securing her rights in Syria. It may of course be argued that popes did not necessarily envisage the use of force on every occasion when they invoked the aid of the Military Orders in the Holy Land and Cyprus: the term *auxilium* could be interpreted in various ways, and in some instances letters sent to the Military Orders were also dispatched to prelates in the East. But the wording of some documents – such as Gregory IX’s letter in 1235 – indicates that the papacy was quite prepared to use the military strength of the Orders in conflicts among Christians in the eastern Mediterranean.

To assess the extent to which the papacy sought to utilise the older Orders in wars between Christians, it is necessary to consider not only whether brethren were expected to fight but also whether popes made use of the Orders’ financial resources. Although the Military Orders were normally exempted from taxes imposed for the benefit of the Holy Land, they had been given no formal or permanent exemption from all papal taxation. The bull *Quanto devocius divino,* which was frequently re-issued in the second half of the thirteenth century, merely conceded that

> ad contribuendum in aliquibus talliis, collectis, subsidiis, seu pecunie summis aut exactionibus aliis, quocumque nomine censeantur, aut ad exhibendum vel prestandum easdem pro quavis persona aut ex quacumque causa ipsis imponi contingat, ratione ecclesiarum, domorum seu quacumque possessionum vestrarum, minime teneamin nec ad id compelli aliquatenus valeatis, auctoritate litterarum apostolice sedis vel legatorum ipsius impetratarum

---

vel etiam impetrandarum, absque speciali mandato sedis ejusdem faciente plenam et expressam de indulto hujusmodi mentionem.¹

Contributions were in fact demanded for various military enterprises within western Christendom, but thirteenth-century popes did not pursue a consistent policy. In the second half of the century papal taxes were assigned to various secular rulers for the ‘Sicilian business’, but the Orders were required to contribute to only some of these. Although they were instructed to pay the tenths levied for Charles of Anjou and his son by Martin IV and Nicholas IV, Clement IV had earlier waivered between exempting the Orders and enforcing payment from them;² and Boniface VIII did exempt the Military Orders from the tenths imposed in 1295 for Charles of Naples and from the taxes granted to the Aragonese King James II for the conquest of Sicily. Boniface did, however, require them to contribute to the tenth granted for the same purpose to Charles of Valois in 1300.³ Of the taxes imposed for the Crusade against Aragon, the Military Orders were obliged to contribute to the tenth levied by Martin IV, but in 1288 they were exempted by Nicholas IV when a further triennial tenth was assigned to Philip IV for use against the Aragonese.⁴ And while some popes made demands on the Orders for the papacy’s direct needs, Innocent IV on several occasions granted exemptions from subsidies of this kind.⁵

A number of reasons may be advanced to explain the varying use which the papacy made of the older Orders’ manpower and resources within western Christendom. In some instances little was to be gained by requesting military assistance from brethren of the Orders, since they would not have provided a force which was both dependable and substantial. There was sometimes the possibility, or at least the fear, that the Orders would refuse to support the papacy in the field. During the Albigensian Crusade the Hospitallers in southern France appear to have remained on good terms with Raymond VI of Toulouse, for in 1218 they received him into their confraternity and promised

⁵ Delaville Le Roulx, Cartulaire, ii. 682–3 docs. 2105–6, 2109; iii. 88 doc. 1096; E. Berger (ed.), Les Registres d’Innocent IV (Paris, 1881–1900), i. 401 doc. 2562; Reg. Urban IV, i. 136–7 doc. 470; Reg. Boniface VIII, ii. 29–31 docs. 2446–8; W. E. Lunt, Financial Relations of the Papacy with England to 1327 (Cambridge, Mass., 1939), pp. 207, 222; Forey, Templars in Aragon, p. 165. Innocent IV did not, however, always completely exempt the orders: see Delaville Le Roulx, Cartulaire, ii. 656 doc. 24443; Reg. Innocent IV, i. 440 doc. 2753
him the habit, even though he was excommunicate; and in 1222, according to William of Puylaurens, they placed the habit on him when he was dying and took his body to their house in Toulouse. When the papacy was in conflict with Frederick II, the loyalty of the Teutonic Order was inevitably suspect: in 1239 Gregory IX was complaining that it was supporting the Emperor, and papal suspicions were again given expression in 1247 when Innocent IV granted his legate in Germany the power to deprive the Order of its privileges if it disobeyed the Church. In Aragon later in the century brethren of the Military Orders openly sided with the deposed Pedro III against the French, even though the latter were seeking to implement a papal award.

On this occasion, of course, the Pope could have called upon brothers in France to give military service, but in areas away from the borders of Christendom the leading Military Orders could not supply a very substantial contingent of well-equipped brethren. Although the Templars and Hospitallers had houses scattered throughout western Christendom, these usually contained very few brothers, and most of those resident in western Europe were sergeants — often non-military sergeants — and not knights; and inventories compiled in the early fourteenth century after the arrest of the Templars reveal that few arms and little military equipment were kept in most of their convents in the West. It was only in the regions where they were engaged in the struggle against the infidel that these Orders could furnish a substantial and well-equipped contingent of brethren.

In all western countries, on the other hand, the Templars and Hospitallers possessed considerable properties which could be taxed by the papacy. As the Military Orders were usually exempted from crusading taxes, however, they would not automatically be assessed for other forms of papal taxation: a positive decision would be required, and popes might for various reasons be reluctant to take it. To utilise either

2. Epist. saeculi XIII, i. 645 doc. 749; ii. 327 doc. 535; cf. ibid., i. 409, 525 docs. 681, 745. In 1237 Hermann of Salza was reporting on the belligerent stance being adopted by brethren at a chapter held at Marburg: Huillard-Breholles, Hist. dipl., v. 93-9.
3. Forey, Templars in Aragon, p. 346; H. Finke, Papsttum und Untergang des Templerordens (Münster, 1907), ii. 70-3 doc. 48; see also Dugerd, Philippe le Bel, ii. 144-7 doc. 3.
the manpower or the revenues of such Orders within western Christen-
dom could be viewed as a diversion of resources away from their proper
purposes; and although the amount of criticism levelled at the papacy
for preaching crusades against Christians has apparently sometimes
been exaggerated,¹ popes were probably wary of diverting resources
at times when Christian fortunes in the eastern Mediterranean were
at a low ebb and when the Military Orders were themselves pressing
for exemptions. It was thus in response to petitions from the Orders
that Boniface VIII released them from the obligation to contribute to
the tenth assigned to the King of Naples in 1295, and in a letter sent
to the Teutonic Order on this occasion the Pope acknowledged the
*gravia personarum discrimina, iacturas innumeratas et multitoda damna
rerum, que dudum in civitate Aconensi miserabili plenaque doloribus
captione Christi prosequentes obsequia pertulistes.*²

Popes were, however, also under pressure from secular rulers who
would benefit militarily or financially from demands made on the Mili-
tary Orders. In the 1260s, for example, Clement IV’s actions were
clearly influenced by the wishes of Charles of Anjou. When Urban
IV had granted a triennial tenth to Charles in 1264 he had not specifically
exempted any religious orders.³ But those which did not usually con-
tribute to papal taxation voiced their objections, and in the middle
of March 1265 Clement IV granted a temporary exemption to the Mili-
tary Orders and the Cistercians: payment was not to be demanded
until further instructions were issued.⁴ Yet in another letter written
on 16 March the Pope told his legate Simon of Brie that if Charles
was angered by this exemption he could be informed that Clement
would *super hoc ordinare... quod ecclesie ac ipsius comitis honori melius
viderimus expedire,*⁵ and on 30 March another letter was dispatched
to the legate stating that

>si contigerit ex hoc forte, quod absit, dictum impediri negotium, ac prefatum
scandalizari comitem et turbari, tu... ejusdem decime negotium, quoed
religiosos predictos, in eum statum auctoritate nostra reducas, in quo erat
priusquam a nobis littere hujusmodi emanarent.*⁶

The decision was being left in the hands of the legate and of Charles
of Anjou. The latter obviously urged payment, and papal acquiescence
is apparent from a further letter which Clement wrote to his legate

¹. Siberry, *Criticism of Crusading,* cap. 6.
². Strehlke, *Tabulae ordinis thronum,* p. 428 doc. 670; *Reg. Boniface VIII,* i. 131 doc. 369;
Delaville Le Roulx, *Cartulaire,* iii. 669-70, 671 docs. 4288, 4297.
⁴. *Reg. Clement IV,* pp. 5, 59-60 docs. 6, 2171 N. J. Housley, *The Italian Crusades. The Papal-
216.
in November 1265. In this the Pope claimed that he had exempted no-one but had merely conceded that some should not be required to contribute without a further papal order; this had been done in the hope that provision could be made for Charles in some other way; but when no alternative could be found he had ordered collection to proceed. Clement therefore instructed Simon of Brie to enforce payment from those who were resisting, unless they could produce privileges establishing their exemption. Although it might appear from the wording of the letter that the Pope had taken an independent decision, Clement’s subservience to Charles finds clear expression in the final sentence: In his igitur ea vigiles diligentia ut eidem regi Sicilie non supersit materia conquerendi.

Royal pressure was, however, not always successful in forcing the pope’s hand. When Boniface VIII in September 1297 exempted the Military Orders from the tenth assigned to the Aragonese King James II, the latter protested and argued that if they did not contribute the income from the tenth would be reduced by at least a third and that it would be necessary to extend the tax for a further two years. In December Boniface postponed making a decision until he could discuss the matter with James; but in the end the grant of the tenth was merely extended.

No doubt the varying personalities and attitudes of the popes themselves also provide a partial explanation of the differing policies pursued by the papacy: the Frenchman Martin IV, for example, was more ready than some other popes of the period to give wholehearted support to the Angevin cause. The degree of papal involvement was probably another factor. Thus in 1298, when Boniface VIII was refusing James II’s request for contributions from the Orders, the Pope was demanding a subsidy from them for his conflict with the Colonna. When money was needed for more than one purpose, the Military Orders would be expected to give assistance to the cause with which the papacy was most directly concerned.

Papal sources themselves provide no adequate explanation of the variations in papal demands, but they do often seek to justify the diversion of the Orders’ resources and manpower. In some instances justifications were worded in very general terms, which ignored the primary functions and obligations of the Orders: when Boniface VIII, for example, sought subsidies in 1298, he merely asserted that it was only fair and just that the Military Orders, as honourable and powerful members

1. Ibid., ii. 244-5 doc. 183; cf. ibid. ii. 245-6 docs. 187, 188; Reg. Clément IV, pp. 50-1 doc. 191.
4. Ibid., ii. 39-41 docs. 192-6; Delaville Le Roulx, Cartulaire, iii. 734-5 docs. 4407-8.
5. In some instances, however, popes apparently concealed the real reason for financial demands: Reg. Boniface VIII, i. 914 doc. 223; cf. Housley, Italian Crusades, p. 183.
of the Church, should provide aid against the Colonna. Elsewhere, however, popes did seek to advance arguments which took account of the fact that the Orders’ resources were normally employed against the infidel. The ideas expressed in this context were not, however, very original: most are found in earlier sources unconnected with the Military Orders.

In some papal documents concerning these Orders Christian opponents were linked with or likened to Muslims. In 1267 Clement IV admitted that it was the Hospital’s custom to fight only against the infidel, but to justify his appeal for support of the Angevin cause he sought to stress the links between Charles’s opponents and the Muslims of Tunis by stating that the rebels

primo ad Sarracenos Tunicii transfugerunt, et inde postmodum ingressi Siciliam, cum incredule gentis auxilio quietem provincie perturbarunt, se Deo et Romane ecclesie ac ipsi regi pruditionaliter opponentes.

A similar point had, however, already been made much earlier by Innocent III when he was seeking Sicilian support against Markward of Anweiler.

In his letter to the Hospitallers in 1267 Clement also maintained that those opposing Charles were little different from Muslims, immo aliqui sunt deteriores eisdem. The assertion that some Christian enemies of the Church were worse than infidels is found in many earlier sources, and had been employed in the context of the Military Orders already in the twelfth century by Peter the Venerable when he was trying to persuade the Templars to allow their colleague Humbert of Beaujeu to remain in the West so that he could help to restore order:

Sed forte dicitis: contra paganos, non contra Christianos, arma sumpsimus. Sed quis magis a vobis vel a vestris impugnandus est, deum nesciens paganus, aut ipsum verbis confitens et factis contra eum dimicans Christianus? Quis magis persequendus est, ignorans et blasphemus, an agnoscent et impugnantes?

In these instances a moral judgement was apparently being passed on the Church’s enemies; but in surviving documents concerning the Military Orders the further argument that some opponents of the Church were also more dangerous than Muslims and that it was more essential

2. Ibid., iii. 164 doc. 3379; Martène and Durand, Thesaurus, ii. 132 doc. 341.
4. See, for example, Manegold of Lautenbach, Liber ad Gebehardum, cap. 40, ed. K. Francke, MOH, Liberii de his (Hanover, 1897–77), i. 583; Migne, Patrologia latina, ccxv. 1339–9.
to overcome the enemy close at hand was not employed, even though it is found in other papal sources of the thirteenth century.¹

The materials relating to the Military Orders do, however, often include the frequently expressed idea that action against enemies within Christendom could be of assistance to the Christian cause in the Holy Land. This argument could be most easily applied to the Kingdom of Jerusalem itself. When Gregory IX asked the Military Orders to defend imperial rights there against John of Ibelin in 1235, he stated that

evidens est et ambiguitatis nubilum non admittit, quod ad hoc potissime religionis habitum assumpsistis, ut in Terre Sancte partibus ampliationi vacando fidei possitis patrie superne civibus aggregari. Digne igitur vobis suadere possumus et debemus ut, cum propositum vestrum ex eo precipue promoveri valeat, quod Sirie partibus aliquod adversitatis nubilum non incumbat, illa promptis affectibus studeatis efficere, per que possit eadem pacis et quietis gaudiis exultare.²

It was also an argument which had commonly been applied to Sicily since the time of Innocent III,³ and it is encountered in this context in various papal documents in which aid for the Angevins was sought from the Military Orders. When Martin IV asked the Orders to give financial assistance to Charles of Anjou and Philip III in their conflict with the Aragonese, he not only sought to blame the Aragonese King Pedro III for the lack of help sent to the Holy Land, but also maintained that if the Aragonese were victorious all the efforts made by Gregory X and others to bring aid to the Holy Land would be frustrated.⁴

A similar theme occurs in several bulls issued by Boniface VIII. When, as part of the peace settlement in 1295, the Pope wanted the property of the Templars and Hospitallers in Aragon to be pledged as security for the dower of Blanche of Anjou, he argued that if the treaty were implemented it would be followed by other settlements and that in consequence aid could be brought to the East.⁵ The Peace of Anagni did not of course solve the Sicilian problem, and when seeking further tenths from the Military Orders for the ‘Sicilian business’ in 1300, Boniface claimed that the continuing conflict over the island was preventing him from dispatching aid to the Holy Land: once peace had been brought to Sicily and other rebels in Italy subjugated, help could be provided for the East.⁶ And in a further letter issued a few months later Boniface asserted that, although he had entered into negotiations which, if successful, would have allowed aid to be sent to the Holy

¹ See, for example, J. D. Mansi, Sacrorum conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio (Florence, Venice, 1759–98), xxiii. 584–6.
² Epist. saeculi XIII, i. 348–9 doc. 649; Delaville Le Roulx, Cartulaire, ii. 487–8 doc. 3118.
³ Housley, ‘Crusades against Christians’, p. 371; Roscher, Papst Innocenz III, pp. 88–90.
⁵ Reg. Boniface VIII, iv. 70–1 docs. 3567–8.
⁶ Ibid., ii. 561–4 doc. 5917.
Land, Frederick and the Sicilians were in revolt and imped ing the dis patch of assistance. The opinion that peace must be achieved in the West before effective help could be provided in the East finds expression in numerous sources of the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, but the various arguments advanced by the papacy would have been more convincing if papal policy towards the Military Orders had been more consistent.

The Orders’ response to papal demands was mixed. There was a clear reluctance to contribute to papal taxes. Exemptions were sought, as has been seen, and resistance was shown to collectors: in 1269, for example, the Hospital llers in France were still refusing to pay the tax first imposed by Urban IV in 1264. Opposition of this kind may, however, reflect the increasing financial difficulties faced by the Orders rather than hostility to papal policy. That the Orders were not uniformly resistant to papal demands is shown by the fact that the Hospital llers gave a positive response to Clement IV’s request for military assistance in Italy and fought for Charles of Anjou under the leadership of the provincial prior Philip of Egl y. This action nevertheless provoked criticism from the Hospital ller grand master Hugh Revel, who in 1268 complained not only that Philip of Egl y had used up all Hospital ller revenues in the Kingdom of Sicily in aiding Charles but also that Hospital ller properties there had been laid waste by Charles’s enemies because of the Order’s support for the Angevin cause. And there is little sign that in the eastern Mediterranean the Orders automatically implemented papal requests for military aid against Christians. In the 1230s, when Gregory IX was seeking support in the Holy Land for the imperial cause, the leading Orders adopted a neutral stance; and by 1248, when Innocent IV wanted action against Hohenstaufen representatives, the Hospital llers had moved into the imperial camp. It is true that in 1288 the masters of the three

1. Ibid., iii, 125-8 doc. 427.
3. R. Filangieri di Candida et al. (eds.), I registri della cancelleria angioina ricostruiti (Naples 1950-55), iii, 144-5 (reg. 8, no. 555); Housley, Italian Crusades, p. 218.
5. Ibid.
7. Ibid., pp. 170-1.
8. J. Prawer, ‘The Military Orders and Crusader Politics in the Second Half of the XIllth Century’, Die getzinlichen Ritterorden (Vorträge und Forschungen, vol. xxvi, Sigmaringen, 1980), p. 220, argues that in July 1239 Frederick II accused the Military Orders of working against him, but the document to which he refers does not mention the Military Orders: Huillard-Bréholles, Hist. dipl., v. 360-2. In June 1239 Frederick had in fact taken the Hospital under his protection; ibid., v. 354-6. In 1244 the Emperor claimed that the Templars had acted ad speculum nostre causam odum, but the point of criticism concerned the policies adopted by that Order towards the Muslims; ibid., vi, 236-40, 244-9. For an imperial complaint against the Templars in Italy, see ibid., v. 725-8.
leading Orders went to Tripoli to intercede on behalf of Lucy, who had papal support, but it is not clear that this was in response to Nicholas IV's request, which they may not have received by then.  

It is certainly possible that leading officials of the Orders in the Holy Land were more reluctant to implement papal demands than some of their subordinates in the West, for the latter often had close links with western rulers and sometimes with the papacy. The Templar Amaury of Roche, who held the post of provincial master in France in the 1260s, was appointed to that office at the request of Louis IX, who was said to have had great faith in his abilities and loyalty, and this Templar was also a familiaris of both Urban IV and Clement IV, who wrote of the devotione quam ad nos et Romanam gerit ecclesiam et magna industria.  

In some cases, of course, local loyalties led brethren in the West to oppose the Pope, as in Aragon, but on other occasions these ties would bring them into the camp of the papacy and those who enjoyed its support. The viewpoint of central officials was likely to be somewhat different. They would be more inclined to regard the western provinces primarily as a means of support for the Holy Land and would therefore be reluctant to allow resources and manpower in western Europe to be diverted to other ends. And as the Orders enjoyed a more independent position in the Holy Land than in western countries, their actions in the East would probably be determined in the main by their own interests.

Yet, if the priorities of central officials sometimes differed from those of their provincial colleagues, it was not easy for the grand master and convent of an Order to keep a close watch over the activities of subordinate officials in Europe. The slowness of communications ensured that the latter enjoyed considerable independence. Control was to be achieved not so much by subjecting all decisions to a central veto, but by appointing brothers who could be trusted to act in accord with the best interests of an Order. The Templars in the Holy Land thus refused Clement IV's request that Amaury of Roche should be placed in charge of the Order's properties and houses in the Kingdom of South Italy and Sicily. The Hospitallers did acquiesce in the Pope's demand that Philip of Egly should be set over their possessions in the Sicilian kingdom, but in 1268 they sought to remove him from office, only to be thwarted by Clement, who ignored complaints from central officials and who prolonged Philip's tenure of office until Easter 1269.

In Syria the Orders were affected not only by the papacy’s desire to use their own manpower and revenues in wars against Christians: the whole papal policy of preaching Crusades against opponents in western Europe and of diverting resources of various kinds to these ends – whether it involved the Orders directly or not – made the task of defending the Holy Land more difficult. The Military Orders might therefore have been expected to be among those who criticised papal policy in general. They were certainly given encouragement to protest by papal opponents who – especially at times when the situation in the Holy Land was becoming desperate – saw in the Military Orders an obvious target for their propaganda. When the Templar master William of Beaujeu informed Alfonso III of Aragon of the fall of Tripoli in 1289, the King replied regretting that he could not send help and pointing out that the Pope had preached the cross against him and sent armies against Aragon, convertentes predicacionem crucis, que consequit fieri in subsidium Terre Sancte, et thesaurus ecclesiae ad liberacionem illius per universum orbem terrarum congregatos ad acquisitionem regni nostri; and Alfonso’s brother James of Sicily similarly wrote to William of Beaujeu after the fall of Tripoli, saying that he would come to the aid of the Holy Land if only the Pope would make peace with him.

According to the Sicilian chronicler Bartholomew of Neocastro, a Templar called Guy, who was sent as an envoy to the Pope after the loss of Tripoli, did express open hostility to papal policies concerning Sicily and bluntly criticised Nicholas IV:

Potuisti namque de regum exforcio et aliorum Christi fidelium viribus Terrae Sanctae succurrere, et tanta mala gentis non debuisses aliquatenus sustinere; sed pro recuperanda terra Siciliae, quae contra stimulus calcitans arma justa suscepit, reges in regem armasti, quaerens offendere Siculos Christianos, et cum contra perfidos Saracenos Christianorum passagium retractaveris, in Christianorum confusionem populum congregasti universum.

He was said to have called upon the Pope to bring peace in Sicily and send aid to the Holy Land before it was too late. But it may be doubted whether the Military Orders were in fact so openly critical of the papacy, from which they received wide-ranging privileges and support. Although in the Holy Land the Orders were at times prepared to ignore papal calls for action, public condemnation of papal policy would have placed their privileges more obviously at risk. Certainly the surviving letters which were sent by the masters and leading officials of the Military Orders to the West in the second half of the thirteenth century were merely appeals for help and did not include criticisms

1. Finke, Acta aragonenmnia, iii. 9-10 doc. 3; cf. the letter sent by Alfonso III to the Hospitaller master on 30 April 1288: ibid., iii. 4 doc. 2.
2. Finke, Papsttum, ii. 1-2 doc. 1.
of papal activities. Even when Hugh Revel wrote to his subordinate prior of St Gilles in 1268 about the order's misfortunes in Sicily, he did not blame the pope or Charles of Anjou, and asserted that Philip of Egly had acted *pro sue libito voluntatis*.\(^1\) It was apparently left to ordinary brethren to voice what many probably felt. The Templar poet Ricaut Bonomel was probably speaking for many when following the loss of Caesarea and Arsuf he wrote:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Lo Papa fai de perdon gran largueza} \\
\text{Contrals Lombartz a Carl'e als Frances;} \\
\text{E sai, ves nos, en mostra gran cobeza,} \\
\text{Que nostras crotz perdona per tornes;} \\
\text{E qui vol camjar Romania} \\
\text{Per la guerra de Lombardia,} \\
\text{Nostre Legatz, lor en dara poder;} \\
\text{Qu'il vendon Dieu el perdon per aver.} \\
\text{Senhors Frances, Alexandria} \\
\text{Nos a pièz fag que Lombardia} \\
\text{Que sai nos an Turc sobratz de poder,} \\
\text{Pres e vencutz e donatz per aver.} \(^2\)
\end{align*}
\]

Yet, although there was some criticism of papal policy, Military Orders contributed comparatively little in the thirteenth century to the implementation of that policy. The new Orders founded in southern France and Italy were of minor significance, and in most areas where the Church was promoting war against Christians the older Orders could not supply worthwhile contingents of troops. They did have forces in Livonia and the Holy Land, but in the former these were used primarily against pagan opposition and in the latter the Orders did not automatically obey papal commands. Military Orders were therefore less important than Crusades as a source of manpower for use against dissident Christians. Admittedly, it is sometimes difficult to assess the effectiveness of crusading preaching — especially as in the thirteenth century those participating in crusading expeditions often included paid contingents — and at times the preaching of Crusades against Christians evoked little response: the repetition of papal orders for preaching the cross in Germany against Frederick II in the later 1240s suggests that few answered Innocent IV's summons, and in England in 1255 the call for a Crusade against Manfred was without consequence. But many took the cross against the Albigensians and some preaching for campaigns in Italy appears to have been effective.\(^3\) The Military Orders did contribute financially to holy wars against Christians, but demands for subsidies were made only intermittently and

---

2. V. de Bartholomaeis, *Poesie provenzali storiche* (Rome, 1931), ii. 324.
were sometimes resisted. Thus, although the role of the Military Order was extended in the thirteenth century, it remained an institution whose main function was combatting the infidel.
VIII

THE MILITARY ORDERS IN THE CRUSADING PROPOSALS OF THE LATE-THIRTEENTH AND EARLY-FOURTEENTH CENTURIES

The most outstanding event in the history of the military orders at the end of the thirteenth and start of the fourteenth centuries was, of course, the dissolution of the Temple. This was not, however, an isolated happening. Although the accusations which led to the abolition of that order had been publicly voiced only shortly before the Templars' arrest, the proceedings against the Temple took place at a time when criticism of the military orders in general was mounting, and this growth of hostile opinion no doubt facilitated Philip IV's attack on the Templars. Ever since their foundation the military orders had been subjected to some criticism, but much early censure had been of a kind which might be directed against any religious establishment, especially by members of the secular clergy who found that their authority and resources were being impaired by the privileges which the military orders and other religious institutions enjoyed: it was not primarily concerned with the orders' contribution to the struggle against the infidel. But as the fortunes of the crusading states declined, the military orders became increasingly criticised for their inadequacies as defenders of Christendom. Defeat in the Holy Land had to be explained by faults on the Christian side rather than in terms of Muslim superiority, and the military orders were an obvious target for attack. The authors of the numerous crusading proposals which were put forward in the late-thirteenth and early-fourteenth centuries were inevitably influenced by this growing criticism, and many crusading plans therefore included suggestions concerning the military orders. Those who drew up proposals did not themselves provide a reasoned or detailed account of the orders' faults or attempt to judge to what extent these failings contributed to Christian defeats, but the criticisms on which they based their plans were clearly not altogether groundless: although some strictures were ill-informed or excessive, the policies which the orders themselves pursued certainly provided a starting-point for the growth of hostile opinion. Yet some writers did not seek merely to remedy existing defects in the orders; they sought also to discuss what the role of the military order should be in the struggle against the infidel, and thus viewed the subject in a rather wider context.

Both on the rectifying of faults and on the defining of roles, similar proposals are encountered in a number of schemes. In many instances the author of a crusading plan was clearly influenced by other theorists or by popular opinion,
although it is usually not possible to trace with certainty the origins of a particular proposal.\(^1\) Discussion repeatedly turned, therefore, on the same issues.

One of the reasons for the collapse of Christian power in the East was seen to be the lack of an effective overall authority on crusading expeditions and in the crusading states: there were too many groups which were not subject to control, and in the Holy Land these included not only the baronage and the Italians, but also the military orders. The latter's independence of action had become apparent and to some extent accepted even in the twelfth century: as early as 1168 Bohemund III of Antioch had promised to observe truces made by the Hospitalers and had agreed that they could ignore any which he himself made without their counsel.\(^2\) And by the later-thirteenth century many complaints had been voiced about the independent policies which they pursued, although some of the charges made against them on this score need to be viewed with caution. In his *Abbreviatio chronicorum* even Matthew Paris withdrew an accusation of betraying Frederick II to the Muslims which he had earlier made against the Templars and Hospitalers in the *Chronica majora*.\(^3\) It is not surprising therefore that several crusading plans contained proposals for the subordination of the military orders to a single central authority. After pointing out in his *Liber de recuperatione Terre Sancte* that the military orders and others did not obey the king of Jerusalem, the Franciscan Fidentius of Padua stressed the need for all Christian forces to be subject to a single leader: 'oportet ergo quod omnes Xpistiani habeant unum capud per quod dirigantur, uniantur et corrigantur';\(^4\) and in 1292 — the year following the completion of Fidentius' work — the same point was made in a letter to the pope by the archbishop of Canterbury, John Pecham: the military orders should be compelled to obey the leader of the proposed crusading expedition and should later be subordinated to the king of Jerusalem once the Holy Land had been recovered.\(^5\) But neither indicated very precisely how this

---

1 Various links between writers have been suggested: see, for example, R. Scholz, *Die Publizistik zur Zeit Philippes des Schönen und Bonifaz* VIII. (Stuttgart 1903) 387; G. I. Brătianu, ‘Le conseil du roi Charles: Essai sur l'internationale chrétienne et les nationalités à la fin du moyen âge,’ *Revue historique du sud-est européen* 19 (1942) 297, 317-318.
4 *Liber de recuperatione Terre Sancte* II 11, 48, 112 in G. Golubovich, *Biblioteca bio-bibliografica della Terra Santa e dell'oriente francescano* II (Quaracchi 1913) 15, 41, 50.
5 *Councils and Synods, with Other Documents Relating to the English Church* edd. F. M. Powicke and C. R. Cheney (Oxford 1964) II 1113.
obedience was to be enforced. Fidentius of Padua argued that the leader of the Christian forces should be great and powerful enough to inspire respect and fear, but he did not suggest where such a man might be found.®

The authors of crusading schemes devoted more attention, however, to what could be regarded in part as a consequence of the lack of an accepted central authority: namely, the rivalry and absence of co-operation between the military orders, especially between the Temple and Hospital. Although the two orders were frequently criticised at the time, the degree of hostility and rivalry which in fact existed between them has recently been called in question.® Certainly on many occasions they co-operated in the field or at the negotiating table; and references to the Hospitallers which are found in the Templar Customs reveal a not unfriendly attitude.® Late-thirteenth-century evidence also reveals a desire among leading officials of the orders to settle disputes quickly: at the time of the Second Council of Lyon, for example, Templars and Hospitallers in Aragon were commanded by their superiors to bring a quarrel there to a speedy end, and the Grand Master of the Temple was at pains to point out that ‘inter nos et venerabilem religionem Hospitalis secundum Deum pax et concordia debeat nutririi, ne in scandalum utriusque religionis ceteris detur materia murmurandii.’® But both in the struggle against the infidel and in political disputes within the crusading states the two orders at times pursued conflicting policies,® and these differences — coupled with the inevitable disputes over property — no doubt encouraged the growth of the assumption that the Temple and the Hospital were always bitter rivals and that any Christian setback was to be partly ascribed to discord between the military orders. Such an assumption perhaps helps to account for the conflicting explanations put forward for the fall of Acre in 1291, for though some attributed

® Lib. de recup. Terre Sancte 49 (II 41 Golubovich).
® Bulst-Thiele, Sacrae domus, passim; see also the same author’s ‘Zur Geschichte der Ritterorden und des Königreichs Jerusalem im 13. Jahrhundert bis zur Schlacht bei la Forbie am 17. Okt. 1244,’ Deutsches Archiv für Erforschung des Mittelalters 22 (1966) 204–90.
® Barcelona, Archivo de la Corona de Aragón, Gran Priorato de Cataluña, Casas Antiguas, pergaminos no. 46. Templars and Hospitallers in Aragon were not as anxious to reach a quick settlement, however, for the dispute dragged on for several years.
® It is difficult, however, to accept the claim of J. Riley-Smith, Knights of St. John in Jerusalem and Cyprus, c. 1060–1310 (London 1967) 151–152 that ‘in nearly every political crisis the Hospitallers were royalist, the Templars baronial,’ and that ‘for reasons now unknown to us each Order seems to have adopted a consistent political philosophy.’
the Christian defeat at least in part to hostility between the military orders, others did not attach blame to them in this way.

In his *Tractatus de modo convertendi infideles*, written shortly after the fall of Acre, Raymond Lull sought a solution to the problem of rivalry by suggesting that once the Holy Land had been recovered the military orders should fight on different fronts: one of the two leading orders should be stationed in North Africa and the other in 'Turquia,' while the Teutonic order should be established in Lycaonia. He maintained that in this way 'ipsi in concordia et amore permanebunt,' although he did not develop his plan in detail. If a scheme of this kind had been put into effect, it would no doubt have helped to reduce the friction between the orders, but its implementation would have given rise to practical problems concerning such matters as property rights, and it promised only a long-term solution to the problem of rivalry. In another work written at about the same time, however, Lull sought a more immediate remedy in the amalgamation of the military orders: 'dominus papa et cardinales faciant quod fiat unusus ordo de ordine Hospitalis, Templi et Hospitalis Alemnorum, fratum de Doncles, de Calatrave, et iste ordo vocetur ordo de Spiritu Sancto'; and a similar proposal was put forward in several of Lull's later writings, especially the *Liber de fine*, composed in 1305, which contains his most detailed crusading plans. A proposal for the union of the military orders

---

11 This explanation is found both in some detailed accounts of the siege and in general histories. See, for example, *De excidio urbis Acconis* in E. Marténe and U. Durand, *Veterum scriptorum et monumentorum amplissima collectio* 5 (Paris 1729) 766, 770–771; Bartholomew of Neocastro, *Historia Sicula* in *HIS* 13.1182–1184; *Annales Dunstapliae* in *Annales monastici* III (ed. H. R. Luard, Rolls Ser. 36; London 1866) 366; Eberhard, *Annales* in *MGH SS* 17.594.


15 A. Gottron, *Ramon Lulls Kreuzzugsiden* (Berlin 1912) 74. See also Blanquerna 30 (ed. S. Galmés, Barcelona 1947, II 152); *Lectura super artem inventivam et tabulam generalem* 316 in *Beati Raymundi Lulli opera* V, ed. I. Salzinger (Mainz 1729); *Desconort line* 670 ed. S. Galmés in *Obres de Ramon Lull* XIX (Mallorca 1936) 247; *Disputatio Raymundi christiani et Hamar sarraconi* 47 in *Opera IV*, ed. Salzinger (Mainz 1729); *Liber clericoarum*, ed. A. Alcover and M. Obrador in *Obres I* (1906) 385; *Liber de acquisicione Terre Sancte* in E. Longpré, *Le Liber de acquisicione Terrae Sanctae du bienheureux Raymond Lulle*, *Critetion* 3 (1927) 270 and E. Kamar, 'Projet de Raymond Lull "De acquisitione Terrae Sanctae,"' *Studia orientalis christianae: Collectanea* 6 (1981) 114; *Liber natalis pueri parvuli Christi Iesu in Raimundi Lulli opera latina* VI (ed. H. Riedlinger, CCL cont. med. 32.70); *Petitio Raymundi*
was also included in many other crusading treatises and plans produced at the turn of the century. About the year 1291 Charles II of Naples advocated an amalgamation of this kind, as apparently did the French king Philip IV in 1305, and a union of the military orders was again suggested by Peter Dubois in his De recuperatione Terrae Sancte. It might be argued, however, that in the last two instances the ultimate purpose of the proposal was the furtherance of French interests, rather than just the acquisition and defence of the Holy Land for Christendom.

In suggesting the union of the military orders the authors of these plans were merely echoing a widely held opinion, and the question of amalgamation was considered on a number of occasions in the late-thirteenth and early-fourteenth centuries by the ecclesiastical authorities. It was apparently discussed at the Council of Lyon in 1274, while in the summer of 1291 — a few months after the fall of Acre — Nicholas IV ordered the summoning of provincial councils to consider the matter. A series of assemblies was in consequence convened in the later part of 1291 and early in the following year, and all the conciliar recommendations on the issue which have survived — from England, France, Germany, and Italy — were in favour of union. Nicholas IV died, however, in April 1292, before anything further could be done. The matter was nevertheless taken up again by both Boniface VIII and Clement V, although by the time of the Templars' arrest there had still been no attempt to put proposals into practice. Yet the dissolution of the Temple did lead to a revival of the issue in a rather different form; for among the matters discussed at the Council of Vienne was the question whether Templar property should be as-


16 Brătianu, 'Le conseil du roi Charles' 356; H. Finke, Papsttum und Untergang des Tempelordens II (Münster 1907) 118 doc. 75; cf. ibid. 51 doc. 34; Peter Dubois, De recuperatione Terrae Sancte, ed. C. V. Langlois (Paris 1891) 13, 133; E. Baluze, Vitae paparum Avignonensis III (ed. G. Mollat, Paris 1921) 155–156.


18 Cotton, Hist. angl. 203–204; Delaville Le Roulx, Cartulaire III 597–598 docs. 4165–4166. According to Nicholas IV the communis vox was demanding the amalgamation of the Temple and the Hospital.

19 Eberhard, Annales in MGH SS 17.594 (Salzburg); Mansi 24.1079–1080 (Milan); John of Tielrode, Chronicum in MGH SS 25.581–582 (Siena, Reims); Cotton, Hist. angl. 213–215 (Lyons, Arles); Councils and Synods II 1108, 1113 (London).

20 Baluze, Vitae III 150; Lizerand, Dossier 2–4; cf. Finke, Papsttum II 13–14 doc. 11.
signed to the Hospitallers, thus bringing about a kind of union, or whether it should be used to endow a new military order.™

Since the subject of union was usually discussed in the context of the Holy Land, the military orders under consideration were normally those which fought in the East. No doubt the primary concern was the amalgamation of the Temple and Hospital, but the records of the councils held at the end of Nicholas IV's pontificate suggest that the extent of the proposed union was often not very carefully defined. An account of the decisions taken at the council of Arles at one point states that all the military orders should be amalgamated, but reference is later made to the proposed union only of the Temple and Hospital;24 and while a report of the proceedings of the London council held in February 1292 asserts that the Hospital and Temple should be amalgamated, in a letter sent to the pope after this council the archbishop of Canterbury proposed that there should be a union of all the military orders which fought in the Holy Land.25 Some of those who wrote treatises, however, maintained that the amalgamation should not be restricted to the orders fighting in the East. Lull, who considered that the objectives of a crusade should include the conquest of Granada and North Africa as well as the Holy Land, at times advocated the union of all the military orders;26 and Charles of Naples sought to amalgamate not only the military orders but also Grandmont, Prémontré, the Antonines, the Trinitarians, Roncevalles, Altopascio, and all other hospitals.27 He did not explain his reasons for the extent of the proposed union, but presumably the intention — besides the avoidance of conflict among the military orders — was to provide additional resources for the Holy Land.

Yet, although attempts in the past to amalgamate religious foundations had often provoked opposition and resistance,28 neither Charles of Naples nor Lull devoted much attention to the practical difficulties of achieving the union of a number of orders. It was only when he was discussing the habit to be adopted by the new foundation that Charles II gave any thought at all to the members of the existing orders: since the habit was to be red and was to have a white cross on it,

cascun del hospital ou dou temple de cest habit . . . . se deuroient tenir per paies disant cest raison par quoy que li temple portoient la crois uermelle

23 Councils and Synods II 1108, 1113.
24 See the works mentioned in n. 15 supra. Lull was not, however, always consistent in his statements on this point.
26 See, for example, A. J. Forey, 'The Order of Mountjoy,' Speculum 46 (1971) 259–264 for opposition to amalgamations involving a military order at the end of the twelfth and early in the thirteenth centuries.
et par la crois uermeille conseille le dis roys que tous eusent manteaus uermells. Et par raison de hospital qui porte la crois blanche mostre la crois blanche sur le mantel vermell.37

In the Liber de fine Lull similarly argued that the Templars and Hospitallers should be satisfied with the black habit and red cross which he was proposing, since the Templars had worn a red cross and the Hospitallers a black habit. But the desire to placate the existing orders was only a minor factor in determining Lull’s choice of these colours. He favoured them primarily because of their symbolic significance — the cross should thus be red partly because the original cross had been stained with Christ’s blood; he was also influenced by aesthetic and utilitarian considerations: black and red went well together, and black was held not to show the dirt as much as some other colours.38 His proposal that the son of a king should become the head of the combined order was also made partly with the intention of winning over the members of existing foundations; but he clearly felt that the latter should not raise objections, for, he went on, ‘omnes ordines milicie debent multum unanimiter gratulari propter nomen milicie et maxime propter intencionem ad honorandum nostrum dominum Ihesum Christum.’ He apparently hoped that the members of the existing orders would give ready assent to the unification, as they do in his romance Blanguerna.39 The prelates who attended the provincial councils in 1291 and 1292 seem to have been more aware of the problems surrounding the proposed amalgamation; for in the decrees of several of the councils it was stated that the union should be effected, provided that it could be achieved without scandal.40 The prelates did not, however, indicate how this was to be managed.

That strong resistance would come from the existing military orders is apparent from a memorandum drawn up in the early years of the fourteenth century by the last Templar Grand Master James of Molay.41 Some of the objections to union voiced by Molay were not in themselves of much significance, but serve to provide an indication of the strength of feeling in the established orders: the grand master thus maintained that in the past one order had provided the vanguard and the other the rearguard for crusading forces, and ‘si due religiones essent in unum, oportet quod ali quas ipsi facerent

38 Cottron, Kreuzsugeideen 78–79.
39 Ibid. 74.
40 Cap. 80 (II 152 Galmés).
41 Cotton, Hist. angl. 213; MGH, SS 25.581–582.
sive avangardium sive reregardium." Every possible argument, however weak, was brought into play.

Yet although Molay's memorandum has attracted some severe judgements, it does contain a number of valid criticisms of the proposed amalgamation. If the Temple and Hospital were united, then existing rivalries would merely be transferred to the combined establishment, which would be rent by faction. In addition, some officials would become redundant, and the consequent dismissals would be opposed both by those who were to be deprived of office and by their colleagues. And although at the beginning of the fourteenth century few would have supported Molay's claim that the existence of two orders stimulated healthy competition, within thirty years of the dissolution of the Temple it was apparently being widely suggested that some of the Hospital's possessions should be used to endow a new foundation, so that the earlier fruitful competition between the orders might be revived. Clearly any attempt to enforce union would be vigorously resisted, for both good and bad reasons, by members of the existing orders; and although in 1312 union of a kind was achieved between the Temple and the Hospital, this was an amalgamation of property and not of men.

Molay was prepared to admit that union might produce a few benefits, but some of the consequences to which he was referring were viewed by others in a different light. Thus while the grand master saw the increased strength of a combined order as an advantage in that its members would be better able to defend themselves against attempted encroachments upon their rights and privileges, for others the power which such an order would enjoy constituted an objection to union. The concern of the Spanish kings on this point had apparently already been voiced at the time of the Council of Lyon; and during the proceedings against the Templars it was given clear expression by the Aragonese king James II, who argued that if the Hospitallers gained the Temple's property

\[\text{tanta esset potestas, quod inde generari posset maximum periculum regi predicto, gentibus et terris suis, oo quia, si hospitalaril vel eorum magister}\]

---

33 Later in the fourteenth century Philip of Mézières was confident that his proposed Order of the Passion would be able to provide both a vanguard and a rearguard; see A. H. Hamdy, 'Philippe de Mézières and the New Order of the Passion,' *Bulletin of the Faculty of Arts, Alexandria University* 18 (1964) 49.

34 See, for example, H. Prutz, *Die geistlichen Ritterorden* (Berlin 1908) 467; M. Barber, 'James of Molay, the last Grand Master of the Order of the Temple,' *Studia monastica* 14 (1972) 106.


nollent observare fidelitatem ipsi regi, quod absit, esset in eorum manu inducere in terram dicti regis quamcumque aliam potestatem vellent, nec posset eis inhiberi propter magnum opportunatem, quam inde haberent, consideratis dictis castris et eorum fortitudinibus, que tenerent in frontarlis et allis partibus regnorum dicti regis.\(^7\)

And in the Iberian peninsula some of the Temple’s property was used to endow the new orders of Christ and Montesa. Opposition to union was thus not restricted to the members of the existing military orders.

At the Council of Vienne the transfer of Templar possessions to the Hospitallers was opposed by some prelates on the further ground that the Hospitallers would fail to make proper use of them; it would be better to create a new military order.\(^8\) Towards the end of the thirteenth century the military orders were reproached for wasting their resources almost as frequently as they were condemned for pursuing rivalries. Long before this, of course, Templars and Hospitallers had been accused of avarice,\(^9\) but as the thirteenth century progressed and the situation in the East became more desperate, attention was increasingly focused on the use which the orders made of their wealth. It was argued that the Holy Land did not receive as much material assistance from them as it should have done. Already in the earlier part of the century they had been warned by James of Vitry to be careful how they used the wealth which had been given for the defence of the Church;\(^10\) and when recounting the events of the year 1244 Matthew Paris had claimed that a fully

---

\(^7\) Finke, Papsttum II 212–216 doc. 113; cf. ibid. 217–219, 230–238, 262–265 docs. 115, 125, 133; J. Vincke, Documenta selecta mutuas civitatis Arago-Cathalaunicae et ecclesias relationes illustrantia (Barcelona 1936) 246–249 doc. 347. In the early-fourteenth century James II was also trying to ensure that the revenues of the military orders in Aragon were employed there and not sent out to the East. In 1304 he had attempted to persuade the pope to prohibit the dispatch of responses by the Aragonese Templars and Hospitallers. See H. Finke, Acta Aragonensia I (Berlin 1908) 158 doc. 108; V. Salavert y Roca, Cerdeña y la expansión mediterránea de la Corona de Aragón II (Madrid 1958) 102 doc. 72. And when the fate of Templar property was being discussed a few years later, he stressed to his envoys at the papal court that ‘les dits bens foren donats per les predecessors del senyor rey al orde del Temple a defensio dela esgleya occidental e a offensio e impugnacio dels Sarrahins De­spanya’: Finke, Papsttum II 230–239 doc. 125. It could therefore be suggested that any widescale amalgamation of the military orders would also have been opposed in Spain because of the fear that it would lead to a further diversion of resources from the peninsula to the East.

\(^8\) Finke, Papsttum II 258–261, 294–302 docs. 132, 145–146.


equipped knight could be maintained in the Holy Land from the revenues of each of the Temple’s 9,000 and the Hospital’s 19,000 manors: ‘unde hec recolentes Christiani autamant semper ipsos fraudem palliare, et lupinas insidias sub ovina pelle latitare. Quia si non subesset simulatas cum fraude, tot strenui milites occidentales omnium orientalium obstacula violenter penetrarent.’

Thirty years later another Englishman, Richard of Mepham, who was dean of Lincoln, similarly argued at the Council of Lyon that the possessions of the military orders were sufficient to provide for the defence of the Holy Land if proper use were made of them; and he maintained that this was a commonly held opinion. Most of those who expressed themselves on the subject did not go so far as this, but certainly towards the end of the thirteenth century many thought that the military orders’ resources were not being properly utilised. This view was advanced in several of the councils summoned at the end of Nicholas IV’s pontificate, as well as at the Council of Vienne later. It was also propounded in treatises such as that of Peter Dubois, while among the poets of the time Rostanh Berenguier commented

Pos de sa mar man cavaller del Temple,
Man cavall gris cavalcant si solombran,
E leurs cabells saurs remiran s’enembran...
Diguas mi, Bort, per quel papa los sufre,
Pos sap e ves qu’èhn mans pratz, sotz verssims,
Don lur ressort deshonors e grieus crims,
Guastan lo ben que hom per Dieu lur hufre.
Car pos ho an per cobrar lo Sepulcre,
E guastan ho menan rumor el segle...
Per quem par tort quil segle non en purgua.

While these critics wanted the orders to provide more help for the Holy Land, the Aragonese kings were making a similar demand with regard to the Spanish reconquista. On a number of occasions in the late-thirteenth and early-fourteenth centuries they complained that the military orders were not providing the amount of assistance which they were capable of giving against the Moors. The first indication of this dissatisfaction is found in a papal bull in which

---

41 *Chronica majora* IV (1877) 291.
42 *Councils and Synods* II 815.
44 After the Council of Vienne Philip IV stated that he had accepted Clement’s rulings on the Temple partly because the pope had promised that measures would be taken to ensure that proper use would be made of the Hospital’s resources: Lizerand, *Dossier* 200–202.
45 *De recuperatione Terre Sancte* (ed. Langlois) 13; cf. *ibid.* 91.
Innocent IV, at the request of James I, ordered the Templars and Hospitallers to assist the Aragonese king in fighting against the Moors. Later in the century the kings' displeasure finds frequent expression in the royal registers: in one letter issued in 1287, for example, Alfonso III forcefully reminded the Templars that his predecessors had given them property on the understanding that they would always be ready to fight against the infidel.

It was certainly true that the Holy Land received only limited aid from the orders' properties in the West. The European provinces of the leading orders were obliged to send only a third of their revenues to the East, and at the end of the thirteenth century even this amount was not always in fact transmitted. And at that time these orders kept only a small proportion of their members in the East. At the beginning of the fourteenth century the Hospital's fighting establishment in Cyprus consisted of only eighty knights and sergeants-at-arms, and the Templars who were interrogated in the East at the end of the first decade of the century totalled only seventy-six: there was almost twice that number of Templars in the British Isles alone at that time. It may be doubted, of course, whether prelates or the authors of treatises were in possession of precise information about the resources and contributions of the military orders; but they were aware that the latter had extensive possessions in the West and that many of the orders' members resided in western Europe. And the suspicion that the military orders were

67 Delaville Le Roux, Cartulaire II 666 doc. 2517; H. Prutz, Entwicklung und Untergang des Tempelherrenordens (Berlin 1888) 283 doc. 7.
70 Delaville Le Roux, Cartulaire IV 14–23 doc. 4549; Riley-Smith, Knights of St. John 328.
71 K. Schottmüller, Der Untergang des Tempel-Ordens (Berlin 1887) II 143–400; C. Perkins, 'The Knights Templars in the British Isles,' English Historical Review 25 (1910) 222. According to Amadi and Bustron there were 118 Templars in Cyprus at the time when members of the order were arrested, but this figure is still smaller than that for the British Isles: Chroniques d'Amadi et de Strambaldi I (ed. R. de Mas Latrie, Collection de documents inédits sur l'histoire de France; Paris 1891) 285; Chronique de l'île de Chypre par Florio Bustron ed. R. de Mas Latrie in Mélanges historiques V (Coll. doc. inéd. hist. France; Paris 1886) 167.
72 Forey, Templars 340 n. 137; in 1329 Marino Sanudo estimated that the Hospitaller responsals totalled 180,000 florins, which is rather more than the amount specified at the chapter general in the following year: J. Bongars, Gesta Det per Francos (Hanover 1611) II 315–316; C. L. Tipton, 'The 1330 Chapter General of the Knights Hospitallers at Montpellier,' Traditio 24 (1968) 300, 304.
not doing their utmost to defend the Holy Land was no doubt strengthened by reports brought back by disgruntled crusaders, who told of the Templars' and Hospitallers' reluctance to engage in major enterprises in the East. When therefore news of disasters in the Holy Land reached Europe and the question of providing assistance was raised, it was almost inevitable that Christians in the West would argue that the military orders were not fulfilling their obligations properly; and the frequency of appeals for aid by or on behalf of the military orders themselves no doubt made westerners all the more ready to voice their criticisms. Among the clergy the desire to ensure that the orders pulled their weight was increased still further by repeated papal demands for subsidies from the Church in aid of the Holy Land. Thus at the Council of Lyon the dean of Lincoln's comment on the military orders was linked with a request that taxation for the Holy Land be restricted to a triennial tenth; and the two issues of papal taxation and the resources of the military orders were similarly brought together in a letter sent to the pope by the archbishop of Canterbury in 1292.

Criticism of this kind had prompted Nicholas III in 1278 to write to the three leading orders, commanding them to maintain an appropriate number of warriors continuously in the East and threatening both spiritual and temporal penalties if they failed to comply. But the whole letter was couched in general terms, and more drastic action was advocated by the orders' critics. It was commonly suggested — especially in the councils held in 1291 and 1292 — that the properties of the military orders should be assessed to discover how many knights could be maintained from their lands, and it was argued that the orders should be obliged to keep this number in the East. A proposal of this kind was made at the council held in London in February 1292, and the archbishop of Canterbury therefore advised the pope that 'taxatis...ad verum valorem reditibus et proventibus suis cogantur perpetue in Terra Sancta adquirenda et conservanda exhibere tot strenuos ut premittitur bellatores quot ex suis facultatibus possent rationabiliiter sustentatur.' A similar suggestion was made at the council of Arles, and some years later the same

---


64 The situation was no doubt made worse by the activities of impostors, who pocketed the alms which they claimed to be collecting in the name of the military orders: Forey, Templars 173; Delaville Le Roulx, Cartulaire III 556, 573-574, 587-588 docs. 4082, 4122, 4149.

65 Councils and Synods II 815.

66 Ibid. 1112.


68 Councils and Synods II 1113; cf. ibid. 1106; Cotton, Hist. angl. 208–209.
argument was advanced by Philip IV’s counsellor William of Nogaret. The implication was, of course, that only a few members of the orders should be allowed to remain in the West, and this was explicitly stated in a letter sent to Nicholas IV by the French clergy.

Yet suggestions of this kind were more easily made than implemented, for some difficult decisions would have to be taken before such proposals could be put into effect. It would certainly have been possible to assess the military orders’ income in the West, although the amounts revealed would probably have been smaller than expected: encroachments on privileges, the effects of war, the sterility of land, the alienation of property to meet current needs, and inefficient and corrupt administration were all reducing the orders’ revenues in the late-thirteenth and early-fourteenth centuries, while at least in some countries — such as Aragon — new acquisitions of property were at that time of only minor importance. But it would be more difficult to determine how much of that income should normally be available for the support of troops in the East. Some of the demands made on revenues were irregular and outside the control of the orders: into this category would fall the subsidies paid to secular rulers and to the pope, for although the orders were exempted from taxation for the Holy Land, they were expected to

60 Cotton, Hist. angl. 213.
62 Forey, Templars chaps. 4, 5; Perkins, ‘Knights Templars in the British Isles’ 213-214.
63 Delaville Le Roulx, Cartulaire III 291-293, 769 docs. 3308, 4450; IV 48-49, 111-112 docs. 4588, 4686; Prutz, Entwickelung 313-314; Larking, Knights Hosp. 52, 129, 133, 201.
65 Delaville Le Roulx, Cartulaire III 484-485, 486 docs. 3917, 3920; IV 23-24 doc. 4550; Forey, Templars 62.
66 Apart from the limitations characteristic of all medieval administrations, there were also instances of serious corruption; on the activities of the Templar William le Bachelor in Ireland, for example, see D. Wilkins, Concilia magnae Britanniae (London 1737) II 346; H. Wood, ‘The Templars in Ireland,’ Proc. Royal Irish Acad. 26 (1907) 333.
provide money for papal undertakings in the West. But even to define how much needed to be set aside for routine expenditure in the western provinces was not easy. As has been seen, critics maintained that too many of the orders’ members resided in western Europe, and indeed later in the fourteenth century Gregory XI proposed that all Hospitallers who were not ordained should be sent out to the East. But this was too crude a solution and was not put into effect. Various factors needed to be taken into consideration before a proper decision could be made about personnel in the West. One was that not all of those living in the western provinces would be of any use in the East; in 1338 the largest Hospitaller establishment in England was at Chippenham, where the aged and infirm lived. It would be better to maintain such men in the West rather than incur the additional cost of transporting supplies out to the East for them. It would also be necessary to consider the effect which any drastic reduction in personnel would have on the administration of European properties. In 1373 Gregory XI was proposing that the Hospital’s western estates should be farmed out to laymen; but — in view of the remoteness of these properties from the Hospital’s headquarters and the consequent difficulty of supervision — it may be doubted whether this would have provided a very reliable method of administration, and it could be argued that virtually to abolish the orders’ establishments in the West would have had an adverse effect on recruitment and patronage. It could also be doubted whether the employment of laymen as administrators would have saved much expense. Although the majority of the military orders’ members lived in the West, the numbers in individual houses or convents were usually small: in 1307 there were only two Templars resident in Scotland, and the 114 Hospitallers living in England, Wales, and Scotland in 1338 were scattered among fifty different establishments. A large proportion of those resident in the West would therefore have been engaged in administrative tasks, and the argument could be put forward — as it was in 1373 — that if this personnel were transferred to the East a comparable number of laymen would have to be paid to perform administrative duties. Expenditure in the West would therefore not necessarily fall, and there was no certainty that additional resources would become

68 Delaville Le Roulx, Cartulaire III 571-572, 734-735 docs. 4116, 4407-4408.
70 Larking, Knights Hosp. 80. The largest Templar community in England in the early-fourteenth century seems similarly to have been at Denney, where the sick and aged were housed: Wilkins, Concilia II 346-347; Victoria County History, Cambridge and the Isle of Ely II (London 1948) 260-261. The return of unfit brothers to the West is mentioned in Règle du Temple 83 cap. 93.
72 Wilkins, Concilia II 380-381; Larking, Knights Hosp., passim.
73 Glénisson, ‘L’Enquête pontificale de 1373’ 100.
available in western Europe to support brothers transferred to the East. Of course, many contemporaries would probably have maintained that laymen would have been cheaper to employ because the members of the military orders in the West were accustomed to a life of unnecessary luxury and extravagance. But although this view appears to have been widely held, its accuracy needed to be tested before any reasoned action could be taken.74

It is clear from such considerations that it would be no easy task to decide how many men the orders could maintain in the East, and the difficulty of finding a solution may help to explain why at the end of the thirteenth and beginning of the fourteenth centuries little action was taken on the matter. Clement V appears at one time to have put pressure on the Hospital to send more troops to the East; and it was reported in 1323 that the pope wanted the Hospitallers to provide 1,000 men for an expedition which was then being planned;75 but this figure was fixed arbitrarily. Similarly the demands made by the Aragonese kings for contingents of a fixed size were not based on any detailed assessment of what the orders could provide.76 The only indication of any attempt to assess how many troops the military orders could support is found in a letter from John XXII to his legate in Spain in 1320: the latter was to obtain information about the revenues of Santiago, Calatrava, and Alcántara, and was then to ensure that these orders maintained as many men as they could on the Muslim frontier.77

74 Such a view might seem to be borne out by what was said in Templar and Hospitaller admission ceremonies about fine horses, equipment, and food, and also by thirteenth-century Hospitaller decrees against excesses in clothing and equipment: *Règle du Temple* 338–339 cap. 661; J. Michelet, *Procès des Templiers* I (Coll. doc. inéd. hist. France; Paris 1841) 379; Delaville Le Roux, *Cartulaire* II 536–561 doc. 2213 cap. 121; Riley-Smith, *Knights of St. John* 257. But the clothing and equipment in question were probably sometimes brought by new recruits or provided by friends and relations: *Règle du Temple* 84–85, 113–114 caps. 96, 144; Michelet, *Procès* I 186; II (1851) 380; Delaville Le Roux, *Cartulaire* II 259 doc. 1652; III 75–77 doc. 3075 cap. 3. And inventories of Templar possessions drawn up after the arrest of the order’s members usually reveal few signs of luxury, except sometimes in the Temple’s chapels, where it might be taken as an indication of devotion rather than of extravagance: J. Rubió, R. d’Alós, and F. Martorell, ‘*Inventaris Inèdits de l’ordre del Temple a Catalunyà,*’ *Anuari de l’institut d’estudis catalans* 1 (1997) 391–407; Wood, ‘*Templars in Ireland*’ 344–348, 371–374; C. Perkins, ‘*The Wealth of the Knights Templars in England and the Disposition of it after their Dissolution,*’ *American Historical Review* 15 (1910) 254; cf. Michelet, *Procès* I 43; Schottmüller, *Untergang* II 160.


The prelates at the council of Reims in 1292 appear to have envisaged the confiscation of the military orders' property if they were unwilling to provide an adequate force of troops for the Holy Land, and a few years earlier Alfonso III had informed the Aragonese Templars that if they did not furnish a sufficient contingent he would take as much of their land as was needed to make good the deficit. Others, however, wanted to proceed more directly to the appropriation of property. In his *De recuperatione Terre Sancte* Peter Dubois argued that the Templars and Hospitallers should subsist from their properties in the Holy Land and Cyprus: their lands in the West should be confiscated and used both to provide subsidies for crusaders and to endow schools, whose purpose would be the furtherance of the Christian cause in the East; the members of the military orders who were resident in the West should be thrust into Cistercian monasteries to do penance for their excesses. The possibility of appropriation was also raised at the time of the dissolution of the Temple; for some argued that Templar property should not be assigned to the Hospital or to a new military order, but be used in some other way for the benefit of the Holy Land. William le Maire, the bishop of Angers, proposed that until a general *passagium* was undertaken Templar property should be administered by bishops or other clerics; these should render account annually at provincial councils, and no payments from revenues collected should be made without papal permission. Proposals of this kind were no doubt in some cases inspired purely by the conviction that the military orders were wasting their resources, but in other instances an ulterior political motive may be discerned or suspected. Among those who apparently sought to derive political advantage from the orders' supposed shortcomings was William of Nogaret, who — while maintaining that Templar revenues should be expended on a crusade — wanted the sums collected to be placed in the keeping of the French king; and he argued that the same should be done with the surplus revenues of other military orders. Philip IV himself may also have sought to manipulate criticism of the orders in the interests of his family, for in 1309 envoys of the Aragonese king James II reported from Avignon that in the view of one cardinal the French king 'cercava que tots les bens del Temple, en qualque terra fossen, fossen dun seu fill, qui fos rey de Iherusalem,' and a similar opinion

73 MGH, SS 25.581; Forey, Templars 403 doc. 31. In 1320 James II threatened to confiscate property to the value of 75,000 solidi from the Hospital in Aragon when it failed to provide the contingent demanded of it: Luttrell, 'Aragonese Crown and Knights Hospitallers' 8-9.
70 Ed. Langlois 13-15, 49-50, 103.
81 Boutaric, 'Notices et extraits' 202-203.
is found in several English chronicles. But such proposals did not find acceptance. There was certainly some appropriation of Templar lands by individuals in various parts of the West, but this was done without papal approval and was no more than remotely linked with earlier criticisms concerning the utilisation of resources. Following Clement V’s ruling in 1312 most Templar estates, except in parts of the Iberian peninsula, passed into the hands of the Hospitallers; and inevitably criticism of the Hospital’s use of its resources continued during the fourteenth century. In 1343 Clement VI informed the master that ‘habet namque cleri et populi quasi comunis et vulgaris opinio . . . quod tu, fili, et alie persone Hospitalis predicti de bonis innumeris ipsius Hospitalis in transmarinis et scismarinis partibus boni faciatis quasi nihil.’ Gregory XI’s proposals thirty years later were clearly prompted by similar considerations.

Although the appropriation of property would no doubt in practice have led to a diminution of the military orders’ role in the conflict with the infidel, writers did not explicitly advocate such a reduction. Many assumed that in the future the orders would continue to play much the same part in the struggle as they had in the past; and a few — especially Raymond Lull, Charles of Naples, and the author of the anonymous *Memoria Terre Sancte* — considered that a combined order created out of the existing foundations should occupy a more important place in the relations between Christendom and Islam than the Templars, Hospitallers, and others had done until then. They not only expected the new order to make a major contribution in manpower both during the recovery and later in the defence of the Holy Land; they also considered that it should assume the control and leadership of the Christian effort to regain and protect lands in the East.

This view was advanced in its most precise form with reference to the period which would follow the recovery of the Holy Land, for it was argued that the head of the unified order should then become king of Jerusalem. This suggestion seems to have been made first by Charles II of Naples early in the last decade of the thirteenth century. The master was if possible to be the son of a king and ‘cestui maistre la terre conquise fust Roys de Jherusalin en receuant a soy et al dite religion toutes rentes, toutes possessions, tous biens appartenans audit royaume que roys porroit auoir audit royaume se il es-

---


84 Charles of Naples proposed that 2,000 knights should be maintained at the central convent: Brătianu, ‘Le conseil du roi Charles’ 358.
toit. Lull’s ideas may have been tending in the same direction at this time, for in his *Epistola summo pontifici Nicolao IV pro recuperatione Terrae Sanctae* he proposed that the office of master in the combined order should be assigned to a king who was not married or to one who was willing to put away his wife. But it was perhaps not until 1305 that Lull explicitly advocated that the head of the order should become king of Jerusalem. In the poem *Desconhort*, which may date from that year, he maintained that the master *fut rey del santi Muniment*, and this proposal was further elaborated in the *Liber de fine*: the head of the order was to be the son of a king and was to be called *rex bellator*; he was to be assigned the kingdom of Jerusalem when this became possible and in the meantime was to be given a kingdom which was obtainable.

In the *Liber de acquisitione Terrae Sanctae*, written some four years later, Lull was apparently still advocating a similar scheme, for although he no longer gave the title of *rex* to the head of the order, the latter was to be the *feudatarius* of the pope and was to rule the lands conquered. The ideas put forward by Charles of Naples and Raymond Lull were reiterated in the anonymous *Memoria Terrae Sanctae*, in which it was argued that

> bonum esset statuere quod capitaneus dicte religionis esset rex Jerusalemitanus, et quod talis rex haberet privilegium et posset cum consilio suorum

---

85 Ibid. 356.
88 Gottron, *Kreuzzugszeiten* 74. It has sometimes been suggested that Lull may have had in mind Philip IV or James II as the *rex bellator*: Kamar, ‘Projet de Raymond Lull’ 68–69; F. Giunta, *Aragonesi e catalani nel Mediterraneo II* (Palermo 1959) 103. But Lull stated that the post should be held by the son of a king; cf. Hillgarth, *Ramon Lull* 66.
89 Longpré, ‘Liber de acquisitione Terrae Sanctae’ 270–271; Kamar, ‘Projet de Raymond Lull’ 114–115. Hillgarth, *Ramon Lull* 105–106 argues that ‘Lull avoids entirely in this book his former concept of a “Bellator Rex” of royal blood, to be succeeded by other sons of kings’ and that he ‘deliberately excluded kings’ from the mastership. But when Lull writes ‘de regibus non est sic, quoniam uno mortuo forte filius illius non habebit talem devotionem ad Terram Sanctam sicut pater habebat, etiam aliqui optant terram acquirere propter filios,’ he seems merely to be contrasting the elective mastership with secular hereditary monarchies, and arguing that the struggle with the infidel cannot be left in the hands of the latter. Kamar, ‘Projet de Raymond Lull’ 70 maintains that in the *Liber de acquisitione Terrae Sanctae* Lull rejected the idea of hereditary succession envisaged in the earlier work; but it is clear in the *Liber de fine* that Lull was then thinking of an elected *rex bellator*. 
At one time proposals of this nature were also attributed to Philip IV. During the proceedings against the Templars it was reported that after the death of his wife, which occurred in 1305, the French king had intended to renounce his throne in favour of his son, so that he could then become both the head of the proposed combined order and king of Jerusalem; he apparently further planned that the office of master and king of Jerusalem should always be held by a son of the French king, and that the latter should have the right to nominate a master if he lacked a son who could occupy the post. A variation on this theme was lastly provided by Peter Dubois in a postscript to his De recuperatione Terre Sancte. He maintained that the king of Cyprus should become the head of a combined order. But in this instance the leadership of the Christian cause was not to rest with the master, but with the king of Acre, who was to be a son of Philip IV.

The role of the military order during the recovery of the Holy Land was not usually defined so precisely, but in several works it was clearly envisaged that the passagium was to be under its control. In his Epistola summo pontifici Nicolao IV Lull merely referred to the order as holding the frontier in Armenia without mentioning other forces, and in the Liber de acquisitione Terre Sancte the relationship between the military order and other contingents was similarly not defined; but it was made clear in the Liber de fine that the war of reconquest was to be led by the rex bellator, and in this work Lull assumed that secular forces would place themselves under the command of this leader: 'multi milites seculares et multi burgences sive alii homines seculares et populares cum suis propriis sumptibus seu expensis irent ad exercitum taliter ordinatum et se regis dominio bellatoris unanimiter subjugarent.' It was similarly implied in the Memoria Terre Sancte that the command of a passagium should be entrusted to the master of the military order. Leadership of a crusade at this time might involve not only control of land forces, but also command at sea, for it was commonly being argued that war on land could be successful only if it were preceded by naval action, comprising an economic

---

91 Finke, Papsttum II 114-119 doc. 75. Christian Spinola was presumably reporting a version of the same proposal when he informed the Aragonese king James II that Philip wanted to make one of his sons the king of a combined military order: ibid. 51 doc. 34.
92 Ed. Langlois 133; Baluze, Vitae III 155-156.
94 Gottron, Kreuzzugszeiten 76, 81.
95 Kohler, ‘Deux projets de croisade’ 442-443.
blockade and raids on enemy coasts. And in some of his writings Lull clearly placed naval operations under the control of the military order. In the *Epistola summo pontifici Nicolao IV* he proposed that a member of the order should be given the post of admiral and should be *dominus maris*; this suggestion was repeated a few years later in the *Liber de fine*.

In some works it was envisaged that the order's role in a crusading expedition would extend beyond the leadership of land and sea forces to include control over the disbursement of crusading money. Charles II thus argued that the crusading dues collected from a variety of sources should be placed in the hands of the master of the military order; and although during the last decade of the thirteenth century Lull was advocating that a cardinal or papal legates should supervise the spending of crusading resources, in some works written early in the fourteenth century he argued that this task should be entrusted to the head of the military order. The *Liber de fine* included the proposal that the ecclesiastical tenth should be assigned to the *rex bellator*, and in the poem *Del consili*, composed at the time of the Council of Vienne, it was said, with reference to the master,

\[
\text{La deena li fayts donar} \\
\text{per lo Sepulcre a cobrar.}
\]

Missionary work, of course, occupied a place of fundamental importance in Lull's proposals, and the *Epistola summo pontifici Nicolao IV* could be interpreted as implying that even this sphere of activity was to be brought under the control of the combined military order. Its members were to include a master of theology, and he was to have under his authority brothers who would learn various Oriental languages and who would then win over schismatics and infidels by preaching. In Lull's later treatises, however, the military order was assigned a lesser role in the work of conversion. Although in the *Liber de fine* it was envisaged that the order would contain clerics versed in Oriental languages, some of the functions attributed to them were of a political nature. Their linguistic ability would be valuable in the business of diplomacy, and they could also be sent into Muslim lands as spies. It is true that Lull saw

---

96 *Opera latina* III 96.
98 The money which the master was to expend was usually said to be for the 'sustenance' of the Holy Land, but it is clear from the wording of some parts of the treatise that the master was to control expenditure during the crusade as well as after the Holy Land had been recovered: Brátlam, 'Le conseil du roi Charles' 357.
99 *Opera latina* III 97, 101; Wieruszowski, 'Ramon Lull et l'idée de la Cité de Dieu' 101; Golubovich, *Biblioteca* I 374.
100 Gottron, *Kreuzzugsdeen* 74–75; *Del consili* 172–173, ed. S. Galmés in *Obres* XX (1938) 262.
101 *Opera latina* III 96–97.
their diplomatic activity as furthering the task of conversion, for he argued that the *rex bellator* should dispatch these clerics to neighbouring rulers with offers of land in return for an acceptance of Christianity; and they were also to dispute with captives in the hope of gaining converts. But in the *Liber de fine* Lull did not suggest that all preaching and missionary activity should be brought under the control of the order, 103 and in the *Liber de acquisitione Terrae Sanctae* he argued that only some of the clerics trained in Oriental languages should be members of the order. 104

Although their treatises often contain more description than argument, those who wanted the role of the military order to be enlarged usually sought to provide some justification for their proposals. They clearly were not always motivated solely by a concern for the practical needs of the Holy Land. One of the reasons advanced for assigning the kingdom of Jerusalem to the head of the military order was the special character attaching to the Holy Land. It was not thought fitting that its government should be left in the hands of an ordinary lay ruler. The author of the *Memoria Terrae Sanctae* was thus of the opinion that ‘regnum illud est sanctius ceteris et sic merito persona eciam religiosorum indiget gubernari.’ 105 Another motive, although not openly admitted, was political and dynastic ambition. Philip IV appears to have regarded the linking of the throne of Jerusalem with the office of master as a convenient way of providing for a member of his family; the latter would receive resources as well as position. Most writers, however, were trying to discover the best means whereby the Holy Land could be recovered and maintained in Christian hands.

For achieving this end the military order was considered to be of value partly because it could provide an element of continuity, which was needed not only after the Holy Land had been regained but also during the campaigns leading up to its reconquest, for many writers saw the recovery of Jerusalem as the culmination of a long series of territorial conquests at the expense of Islam. The continuous nature of the war to be fought by the military order was therefore emphasised in a number of treatises. In the *Liber de acquisitione Terrae Sanctae*, for example, Lull argued that the pope should decree perpetual war against Islam by means of a military order, while in his *Disputatio Raymundi Christiani et Hamar Sarracen* he stressed that the members of the

---

103 Gottron, *Kreuzzugsidéen* 88–89.
105 Kohler, ‘Deux projets de croisade’ 441. In the *Liber de fine* Lull wrote that the *rex bellator* should be assigned the kingdom of Jerusalem ‘quoniam iustum est propter hoc, quia nobilissimus officium habebit talis rex quam alius rex huius mundi’: Gottron, *Kreuzzugsidéen* 74.
military order ‘continue et semper starent in fronteria seu confiniis contra Sarracenos,’ fighting first in Granada and then advancing through North Africa to the Holy Land.\textsuperscript{106}

The continuity provided by the military order was seen to comprise both uninterrupted leadership and the constant availability of manpower. The author of the \textit{Memoria Terre Sancte} argued that a crusade led by the master of the combined order would be assured of continuous direction, for

\begin{quote}
\textit{si statueretur passagium et esset unus rex vel plures, per mortem unus vel duorum posset anichilari passagium; sed si dicta religio esset fundata, ut predictur, et continget caput ipsius decedere, subrogaretur statim alius loco sui.}\textsuperscript{108}
\end{quote}

In the \textit{Liber de fine} Lull similarly pointed out that the election of a new \textit{rex bellator} immediately after the death of his predecessor would ensure continuity of leadership.\textsuperscript{107} In putting forward his scheme for an elected \textit{rex bellator} who was to hold Jerusalem, Lull was probably influenced in part by the fate of the monarchy in the Holy Land during the thirteenth century; it certainly is true that his plan would have obviated some of the problems encountered then, although — as was pointed out by the Schoolmen\textsuperscript{108} — elections themselves could provoke dispute. But Lull was also concerned with ensuring continuous leadership during the expeditions leading up to the conquest of Jerusalem. In the \textit{Liber de acquisitio} he questioned the wisdom of leaving the recovery of the Holy Land in the hands of secular monarchies, since sons might not have their fathers’ devotion to Jerusalem; and he saw as a further disadvantage that ‘aliqui optant terram acquirere propter filios,’ by which he seems to imply that a king with family concerns might devote his energies to furthering the interests of his sons — a thing that the master of a military order could not do.\textsuperscript{109}

The claim that a military order could ensure a constant supply of manpower was based on the assumptions that its members could be stationed permanently in the East and that any losses of personnel could be quickly replaced. In Charles of Naples’ plan the 2,000 knights in the order’s central convent were each to have two esquires, and ‘li escuier fussent tel que se il auenoit que leur maistre morust que lom peust faire frere de lun de II; thus

\textsuperscript{106} Longpré, ‘Liber de acquisitio Terrae Sanctae’ 270; Kamar, ‘Projet de Raymond Lull’ 114; \textit{Disputatio Raymundi} 47 in Opera IV (ed. Salzinger).

\textsuperscript{108} Kohler, ‘Deux projets de croisade’ 442-443.

\textsuperscript{107} Gottron, Kreuzzugsiden 82.

\textsuperscript{108} Trends in Medieval Political Thought, ed. B. Smalley (Oxford 1965) 68-69.

\textsuperscript{109} Longpré, ‘Liber de acquisitio Terrae Sanctae’ 270; Kamar, ‘Projet de Raymond Lull’ 114. The interpretation of the quoted passage suggested here differs from that given by Hillgarth, \textit{Ramon Lull} 108, who argues that \textit{ terram} refers to the Holy Land.
if a knight died, 'lom peust tant tost recourer I autre.' In the Liber de fine Lull likewise argued that on the death of one knight another could be admitted to the order.

The continuous leadership and the constant supply of manpower provided by the order would, in the view of such writers, affect both Christian and Muslim attitudes. Lull maintained that the permanent stationing of the combined military order on the frontiers of Christendom would encourage laymen to participate in the conflict against the infidel. He and other writers also expected a change of attitude to occur on the opposing side. In the Liber de fine Lull argued that the Muslims would despair when they realised that the order's strength and leadership would always be maintained; they would therefore retreat and their lands would be easily taken. The author of the Memoria Terre Sancte thought that many renegades who had abandoned Christianity would be inclined to return to the faith; in consequence — since these were the best warriors that Islam possessed — Muslim power would be considerably weakened. The same writer further maintained that, once the order was stationed permanently in the East, races such as the Kurds and Khwarismians, who lived in the mountains and desert, would easily be won over to the Christian side, since they were accustomed to allying with the stronger power. Presumably Lull and the author of the Memoria Terre Sancte thought that a combined order would have more effect than the existing orders because it would possess greater resources and would not be beset by rivalries; but they failed to make their views explicit on this point.

Nor did they discuss in any detail whether continuity could be achieved as effectively in any other way, even though alternative suggestions were being put forward by other writers at this time. Some felt that the problem of leadership on a crusade could be solved in a more conventional way. Thus in 1292 the archbishop of Canterbury advanced the opinion that there should always be a deputy commander nominated by the papacy, who would be ready to assume control if the leader of the expedition either died or became incapacitated. At a time when secular armies were becoming composed increasingly of mercenary contingents, it is not surprising that it was also being argued that a constant supply of manpower could be ensured by the hire of paid troops. In the Collectio de scandalis ecclesie, which was submitted

---

110 Brătianu, 'Le conseil du roi Charles' 358.
111 Gottron, Kreuzzugsdeenen 82.
112 Ibid.; Wieruszewski, 'Ramon Lull et l'idée de la Cité de Dieu' 105.
113 Gottron, Kreuzzugsdeenen 82.
114 Kohler, 'Deux projets de croisade' 442–444.
115 Councils and Synods II 1111; cf. Dubois, De recuperatione Terre Sancte (ed. Langlois) 129–130.
to Gregory X, it was proposed that mercenaries should be engaged, 'qui successuris vicissitudinibus renovati in terra illa [santa] iugiter commorantes, bellum Domini et ecclesie negotium prosequantur'; and when writing of the need for a permanent force in the Holy Land, Fidentius of Padua mentioned not the military orders but troops who were to be supported from the surplus revenues of bishoprics, abbeys, and cities. But no writer provided a full discussion of the relative merits of the various types of military force.

Those who favoured the military order made only a few comparisons in justification of their preference. Thus the author of the Memoria Terre Sancte argued that the members of the order, through fighting continuously, would be more experienced in eastern warfare than secular forces. He drew a contrast between the brothers who would serve throughout their lives and lay knights who would want to return to their homeland after two or three years in the East: when the latter had departed, 'postea mitterentur novi qui nichil de condicione dicte guerre in illa patria scirent'; and Lull similarly maintained that their constant experience of war would make the members of the order preferable to other Christian troops. No doubt these writers were thinking primarily of the crusader who came out to the East for a short period and whose ignorance of Muslim tactics had often led to disaster in the past; but the same argument could be applied to any forces which were sent out to the East in relays. The author of the Memoria Terre Sancte sought further to justify his preference for the military order by pointing out that lay knights were lacking in obedience and that defeats such as that suffered by Louis IX on his Egyptian crusade had occurred because lay crusaders had failed to carry out commands. Members of a military order, on the other hand, were bound by a vow of obedience, and if they disobeyed they could be punished more easily than laymen. On this point he had the support of James of Molay, the last Grand Master of the Temple; and, even if in the past members

---

116 Ed. A. Stroick, Archivum franciscanum historicum 24 (1931) 40. This passage is mistranslated by P. A. Throop, Criticism of the Crusade (Amsterdam 1940) 100–101.
117 Liber de recup. Terre Sancte 89 (II 58–59 Golubovich). In his Opusculum tripartitum 26 Humbert of Romans wrote that common opinion ‘sentit, quod ordinaretur, quodulli qui sunt ultra mare apti ad proelium, tam religious quam alii, adderetur tanta multitudo pugnatorum, tam equitum quam peditum, qui continue essent in hoc exercitio, quod speraretur probabiliter, quod possent semper contra Saracenos nostri prevalere. Ad hoc autem essent eligendi viri potentis ad hujusmodi labores et bonae vitaeae, et tales qui non solum ad stipendia oculum haberent, sed fidei zelum haberent’: E. Brown, Appendix ad fasciculum rerum expetendarum et fugiendarum (London 1690) 205.
118 Kohler, ‘Deux projets de croisade’ 442.
119 Gottron, Kreuzzugsideen 82.
120 Kohler, ‘Deux projets de croisade’ 442.
121 Lizerand, Dossier 12–14; Baluze, Vitae III 153; Delaville Le Roulx, Cartulaire IV 105 doc. 4680.
of the military orders had on occasion disobeyed commands in the field, the
claim was just, though Marino Sanudo maintained that the solution to the
problem of enforcing obedience was to be found in the employment of paid
troops. Molay was also in agreement with the author of the *Memoria Terre
Sancta* on the question of costs. Despite the repeated claims that the existing
orders were wasting their resources, both held that it was cheaper to maintain
a member of a military order than a lay warrior. But this was the extent of
the comparisons made between the different types of military force.

The amalgamation of the existing orders was, of course, a necessary prelimi-
nary to the implementation of the schemes put forward by writers such as
Lull and the author of the *Memoria Terre Sancta*; and the future of the throne
of Jerusalem was not likely to become a matter for serious discussion until
the recovery of the Holy Land was more than just a remote possibility. But
even if these preliminaries had been achieved, the proposals would still have
been far from realisation, for there would still have existed formidable obstacles
to their implementation. The author of the *Memoria Terre Sancta* saw the
need to obtain renunciations of existing claims to the throne of Jerusalem and
to other rights in the Holy Land, but he assumed that this would present no
problem: *domini ad hec faciliter se inclinabunt*. Yet although Charles II of
Naples was apparently ready to surrender his claim to the throne, this would
hardly be the normal reaction. Even when there was no immediate prospect
of the recovery of the Holy Land, the royal title carried prestige and could be
a useful bargaining counter in diplomatic exchanges. Resistance to the pro-
posal that the master should be king of Jerusalem would also come from those
who lacked claims but had ambitions in the East, unless they could make it
serve their own ends, as in the case of some of the French schemes. The

---

123 Liber secretorum fidelium crucis super Terrae Sanctae recuperatione et conservations
2.4.19 in Bongars, *Gesta Del II* 74. In the fourteenth century the dispatch of mercenaries to
the East was seen to have the further advantage that it would rid the West of companies of

122 Kohler, ‘Deux projets de croisade’ 442; Lizerand, *Dossiers* 12–14; Baluze, *Vita* III
153; Delaville Le Roux, *Cartulaire* IV 105 doc. 4680; cf. Gottron, *Kreuzzugsdenken* 75 where
it is pointed out by Lull that crusading money assigned to laymen was often diverted to
other uses.

124 Kohler, ‘Deux projets de croisade’ 440–441; cf. Dubois, *De recuperatione Terrae Sanctae*
(ed. Langlois) 133, 140; Baluze, *Vita* III 155–156, 161.

125 Among those who had shown an interest in the kingdom of Jerusalem were the Ara-
gonese. In 1295 James II was assigned Charles of Naples’ claim to Jerusalem as a pledge
when the latter undertook to persuade the pope to cede Corsica and Sardinia to Aragon:
Salavert y Roca, *Cerdeña* II 16–17 doc. 18. At the end of the first decade of the fourteenth
century James’s envoys were seeking to induce Robert of Naples to confer his rights to
And when a few years later James II married Mary of Cyprus, he was interested in the succes-
fall of the last Christian strongholds in the Holy Land in 1291 did not mean that claims and ambitions in the East were no longer of any significance. If the master’s occupation of the throne of Jerusalem would be opposed, so would his leadership of a general passagium. Western rulers were unlikely to submit willingly to the authority of the master of a military order. Some support was admittedly gained for the crusading expedition proposed by Clement V in 1308, which was to be led by the Hospitallers, but none of the kings or leading princes of the West was personally involved. And even on this occasion Philip IV expressed his opposition to the plan, apparently on the grounds that a crusade under Hospitaller leadership would not serve French interests; he complained that the number of Frenchmen at the Hospital’s central convent had declined and that the grand master had paid too little attention to France in recruiting for the expedition. He wanted someone whom he could trust as leader, and on hearing of the pope’s plans he suggested that Robert Fitzpayn should be given command of the passagium.

Nor do the heads of the military orders themselves seem to have aspired to a leading role in the Christian struggle against Islam. In a plan submitted to Clement V, the Hospitaller master Fulk of Villaret suggested that in a future passagium the precedent set on the first crusade should be followed: the pope should appoint a legate, who should be assisted by a secular knight, just as — according to Fulk — Adhemar of Puy had been aided by Peter the Hermit. Similarly, when James of Molay in another memorandum to Clement proposed a naval blockade of Islam, he advised against placing the fleet under the command of the military orders, for fear that the Italian maritime cities would take vengeance on them, as in fact happened a few years later when the Hospitallers seized a Genoese ship on its way to Egypt. He wanted command to be given to ‘talis capitaneus, qui non dubitet perdere temporalia bona per potentiam civitatum maritimarum,’ and suggested Roger of Loria
These proposals were admittedly made at a time when there was still a multiplicity of military orders in the East. But even when — following the dissolution of the Temple and the transfer of the Teutonic order's headquarters to Marienburg — the Hospital was the only leading order still active in the eastern Mediterranean and unity had thus in a sense been achieved, the Hospitallers showed little desire to initiate and lead a common Christian offensive against Islam. Although they participated in alliances involving various Christian powers, they did not assume the leadership of composite expeditions, and the initiative for joint enterprises came from others, such as the Venetians, rather than from the Hospitallers.

It could of course be argued that at that time the Hospital was hampered by a lack of manpower and revenues, and that far greater resources would be needed before a military order could assume the leading role in the East. But the theorists who assigned this role to a military order did not indicate very adequately how it was to obtain sufficient recruits and revenues. Charles of Naples, writing at a time when some of the existing orders were facing recruiting problems, did not explain how his military order was in the first place to enlist the 2,000 knights who were to serve in the central convent or how it was to recruit the esquires who were to be used to replace losses. Such writers were more aware of the problem of financial resources, and argued not only that the money raised by traditional methods should be assigned to the orders, but also that new sources — such as the tithes on sales — should be tapped to provide additional revenues. But such proposals would hardly commend themselves at a time when the existing military orders were being criticised for wasting their resources and when secular lords were often seeking to avail themselves of the money collected for crusading purposes.

---

180 Baluze, Vitae III 148-149.
182 Delaville Le Roulx, Hosp. à Rhodes 12 maintains that the Hospitaller Grand Master Fulk of Villaret 'se crut l'arbitre de la chrétienté dans le Levant,' but he does not substantiate this claim. For Venetian initiatives, see A. T. Luttrell, 'Venice and the Knights Hospitallers of Rhodes in the Fourteenth Century,' Papers of the British School of Rome 26 (1958) 196, 205; F. Thiriet, La Romanie vénitienne au moyen âge (Paris 1959) 165-166. In 1345 the Hospitaller prior of Lombardy was named as capitaneus armate generalis, but this was only after some of the leaders of the Christian league had been killed: Clément VI: Lettres closes I 516 doc. 1675; Delaville Le Roulx, Hosp. à Rhodes 95-96.
184 Forey, Templars 278. Admittedly, it was said that some Hospitaller priories had a superfluity of knights in 1292, but at the end of the thirteenth century that order was not maintaining a large military establishment in the East: Delaville Le Roulx, Cartulaire III 608-609 doc. 4194 cap. 2.
185 Brătianu, 'Le conseil du roi Charles' 357.
Although the authors of crusading proposals took as their starting point the existing situation, and in this sense were not putting forward merely utopian schemes, it could be argued that they did not take sufficient account of the practical difficulties attaching to their plans. If the military orders were to be less independent than they had been in the past, a means of ensuring their obedience would have to be found; and strong opposition would have to be overcome before any successful amalgamation of the orders could be achieved. Difficult decisions would have to be taken before the capabilities of the military orders could be accurately assessed; and any attempt to assign the leadership of the Christian cause to a military order was likely to provoke considerable hostility. It might be argued in defence of some — such as the prelates attending provincial councils at the end of Nicholas IV’s pontificate — that they were merely seeking to indicate areas where action ought to be taken, leaving to others the elaboration of detailed plans. But this could not be said of all authors of treatises. Several writers, such as Philip of Mézières later in the fourteenth century, discussed in superfluous detail matters such as dress and the organisation of a military order. These were not just outlining draft proposals. It could of course be maintained that, for solving practical problems, negotiations and inquiries were needed rather than elaborate paper plans: the capabilities of the orders could be discovered only by investigation, and negotiations would be necessary if resistance to amalgamation was to be overcome. But these writers omitted even to lay down any guidelines as to how such negotiations should be conducted. Perhaps of some authors, such as Lull, it could be suggested that they had little contact with the realities of politics and administration, and therefore did not fully realise the obstacles to the implementation of their plans. Although many authors had experience of the East, an awareness of what was feasible within western Christendom was also needed before realistic proposals could be advanced. But this criticism could not be made of all who wrote at length, and in some cases the explanation for the inadequacy of the proposed schemes is probably to be found merely in the difficulty of the task which these authors set themselves. While it was simple enough to elaborate proposals on matters such as dress or to indicate the spheres where reform was desirable, there was no easy way of showing how changes could be put into effect. Of some reformers it may therefore be asked how far their schemes were intended as practical proposals which they ex-

---

pected to see implemented. While not necessarily admitting it, perhaps some were just seeking to show that the West had the means for overcoming the infidel and that, if only there was the will, the Holy Land could be recovered and kept in Christian hands; therefore, despite repeated defeats, belief in the superiority of Christendom could still be maintained. But this was no more than an illusion: the crusading proposals of the late-thirteenth and early-fourteenth centuries in fact reflect the hopelessness of the Christian situation in the East and show that in reality there was little which could be done to save the Christian cause in the Holy Land.
THE MILITARISATION OF THE HOSPITAL OF ST. JOHN

When did the Hospital of St. John become a military order and how is the change in its character to be explained? These are questions which have often been asked and varying answers have been given: some, for example, have argued that brethren of the Hospital were already engaged in fighting in the 1120s, while at the other extreme it has been maintained that there is no clear evidence of the existence of a military element among the order’s members until about 1160. Doubts have also been expressed concerning the importance which the brothers attached to military activities once the Hospital had become a military order. These controversies and uncertainties are an inevitable consequence of the sparseness and ambiguity of the surviving sources, which preclude any definitive answers. There is, however, still room for further discussion of the evidence which does exist.

Various indications of military activity may be considered in order to discover when militarisation occurred, and of these the most obvious comprises evidence of Hospitaller participation in particular campaigns and expeditions. The sources for the Spanish reconquista as well as those for the wars against the Muslims in Syria require examination, since several historians have suggested that the Hospitallers may have fought in the Iberian peninsula earlier than in the East.¹ These sources provide, however, little clear information relating to the first half of the twelfth century. Baldwin II of Jerusalem is reported to have had the master of the Hospital, Raymond du Puy,

in his company at one stage during an expedition against Ascalon in 1128,\(^2\) but this does not of course prove that the Hospitallers were then involved in fighting; and the same comment can be made about Raymond’s presence at the assembly held near Acre in June 1148, when it was decided that the armies of the second crusade should attack Damascus.\(^3\) It has, however, been asserted that in the ensuing campaign the Hospitallers ‘were an important enough element in the army to be blamed by some for its failure’.\(^4\) Yet accusations against the Hospitallers are encountered in only a few late sources, where they are blamed jointly with the Templars.\(^5\) John of Salisbury, on the other hand, whose report is closer in time to the second crusade, makes no reference to the Hospitallers and says merely that some imputed treachery to the Templars—a charge which is also recorded in a number of other chronicles and annals;\(^6\) and no accusations against the Hospitallers alone are recorded. The view that both orders were involved in treachery may therefore be merely a late distortion of charges originally made only against the Templars. A misunderstanding of this kind could easily have occurred when both orders had long fulfilled similar functions and were for this reason more closely associated with each other in men’s minds than they had been in the first half of the twelfth century. If this interpretation is accepted, it would not necessarily follow that the Hospitallers were absent from the siege of Damascus; yet as numerous and wide-ranging accusations of treachery were made after the failure of the expedition the absence of charges against the Hospital would suggest that its role in the siege could have been at most of limited significance. The first engagement in the East for which there is clear evidence of Hospi-

2. The document recording this is known only from an eighteenth-century inventory: J. DELAVILLE LE ROULX, Cartulaire général de l’ordre des Hospitaliers de S. Jean de Jérusalem, i (Paris, 1894), 78 doc. 83; ibid., «Inventaire de pièces de Terre-Sainte de l’ordre de l’Hôpital», Revue de l’orient latin, iii (1895), 46 no. 11.


taller involvement is the siege of Ascalon in 1153. William of Tyre mentions the presence of brethren of the Hospital as well as of the master, and states that they pressed for the continuation of the siege when the Jerusalem barons advocated its abandonment.7 There is no specific reference to their participation in fighting, but it is difficult to understand why a group of Hospitallers would have been there if they did not have a military role. Before this, however, Aragonese Hospitallers had been present in 1148 at the siege of the Muslim city of Tortosa, near the mouth of the Ebro in Spain.8 In this instance the evidence consists merely of an agreement concluded with the Templars during the siege, and there is again no clear statement that the Hospitallers assisted in the attack on the city. But participation in the siege is the most plausible explanation of their presence at Tortosa at that time. The references to Hospitallers at these sieges reveal, of course, merely the time by which brethren of the order were engaged in military activities: participation in earlier expeditions could easily have escaped mention in the sparse surviving sources.

It is therefore necessary to turn to other indications of military activity to discover whether there is any earlier evidence of Hospitaller involvement in warfare. Among these are references to military officials and knights within the order. It was at one time assumed that the existence of the office of constable in the year 1126 proved that by that date the Hospital had become a military order.9 But it has been objected that, although in the West in this period a constable was often a military official, the Hospitaller bearing this title may have been just a minor administrative official or have had charge of the stables: he may not have had military responsibilities.10 The next reference which has been discussed in this context does not however

7. William of Tyre, Historia rerum, xvii. 28, in RHC Occ. i. 807-8.
occur until 1148, when a certain Gilbert, *miles et frater Hospitalis*, witnessed a document drawn up in the Holy Land.\(^\text{11}\) This could be taken to signify that the rank of knight existed in the Hospital by that date; but the wording is open to more than one interpretation. It is not even certain that Gilbert was a brother of the Hospital, since the terms *frater* and *confrater* were used interchangeably at this time; he may have been no more than a lay associate.\(^\text{12}\) The term *miles* could therefore refer to secular rank, and it is certainly used in this sense of the other witnesses to the charter in question. There is similar ambiguity about the significance of the wording of a document, drawn up in 1144, which has not attracted attention but in which the archbishop of Arles confirmed possession of the church of St. Thomas de Trinquetaille to the Hospitaller prior of St. Gilles and to his *confratres*, who included Peter Lupe, described as *miles*.\(^\text{13}\) In this instance it would seem likely that the *confratres* were brethren of the order; and if Peter Lupe was a brother of the Hospital, the term *miles* would probably refer to his standing in the order rather than to secular rank. But an element of doubt remains. Yet if there is no clear evidence of the existence of Hospitaller knights before the middle of the twelfth century, it does not necessarily follow that there were none, for most of the surviving documents concerning the order in the first half of the twelfth century are charters recording gifts of lands and privileges to the Hospital, and these could not be expected to provide much information about Hospitaller organisation. Even documents of the later twelfth and thirteenth centuries rarely specify the ranks of the order’s lay brethren.

If references to military personnel are lacking before the middle of the twelfth century, it may be asked whether earlier sources by their phraseology or content ever imply a military function. Papal documents certainly give little indication of military obligations at an early stage. The only apparent exception is a bull, supposedly issued by Innocent II in 1131, in which the Hospitallers are described as those *per quos Deus orientalem ecclesiam a paganorum sparcitia liberat, et Christiani nominis inimicos expugnat*;\(^\text{14}\) but it has been demonstr-
trated that this is not a genuine letter of Innocent II. Other papal letters of the first half of the twelfth century regard the Hospital as a purely charitable institution, which did not go beyond employing outsiders to protect pilgrims visiting the Holy Places. When he granted them the exemptions in 1137 Innocent II told the Hospitallers that omnia vestra sustentationibus pauperum et peregrinorum debent cedere, and in the bull Quam amabilis Deo, issued between 1139 and 1143 to attract support for the Hospital, the same pope depicted the order as being concerned solely with pilgrims and the poor:

«Ibi enim indigentes et pauperes reficiuntur, infirmis multimo-da humanitatis obsequia exhibentur, et diversis laboribus atque periculis fatigati, resumptis viribus, recreantur et, ut ipsi ad sacrosancta loca domini nostri Ihesu Cristi corporali presentia dedi-cata securius valeant proficisci, servientes, quos frates ejusdem domus ad hoc officium specialiter deputatos propriis sumptibus retinent, cum oportunitas exigit, devote ac diligenter efficiunt». 16

In Milites Templi Ierusalemitani, the comparable bull issued on behalf of the Templars, the latter were by contrast described as those per quos Deus orientalem ecclesiam a paganorum spurcitia liberat et Christiani nominis inimicos expugnat. Too much significance should not, however, be attached to the absence in papal documents of any reference to military commitments, for the papal chancery continued to describe the Hospital as a purely charitable institution long after it had assumed military responsibilities: it was not until the closing years of Alexander III's pontificate that the order began to be referred to at all frequently as a military institution in papal documents. Established formulae did not disappear as soon as they became outdated.

15. For the most recent discussion, see Hiestand, «Anfänge», p. 72.
18. Delaville Le Roux, Cartulaire, i. 290-1, 401-2 docs. 420, 590; C. Erdmann, Papsurkunden in Portugal (Abhandlungen der Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen. Phil.-hist. Klasse, N.F., xx. 3, Berlin, 1927), pp. 250-1 doc. 76; J. von Pflug-Hartung, Acta pontificum Romanorum inedita, i (Tübingen, 1881), 267 doc. 298. Earlier references were made in exceptional circumstances: Hiestand, Papsurkunden, pp. 251-3 doc. 53; Delaville Le Roux, Cartulaire, iv. 249-50 doc. 391 ter. This last bull, which belongs to the years 1168-70, shows that the papacy did not then consider military activities a recent innovation. It cannot be accepted, however, that the wording of a letter issued by Eugenius III in 1152 (Delaville Le Roux, Cartulaire, i. 163 doc. 212), shows that the Pope knew that there was a fighting element within the Hospital: Riley-Smith, Knights of St. John, p. 58. The word militanter was certainly used to describe the Hospitallers in this letter, but it is doubtful whether the pope was here referring to fighting, especially as the phrase which he employed was in servitio pauperum militanter.
Although the papacy continued to describe the Hospital as a charitable institution until well into the second half of the twelfth century, it has been argued that St. Bernard took a rather different view and was in 1146 encouraging the Hospitallers to assist in the second crusade: this argument rests on the existence in a thirteenth-century manuscript of a version of St. Bernard’s crusading encyclical *Sermo mihi ad vos* addressed to *Hierosolymorum fratri hospitalis*. Yet it is odd he should have sent to a member of an order based in Jerusalem a letter in which he exhorted men to take the cross and go on crusade; and the wording of this version of the encyclical gives grounds for doubting whether it was in fact dispatched to the Hospitallers. The address is suspect, for it is not only corrupt but also much longer and more elaborate than that found in other versions of the letter. This copy of the encyclical is, moreover, headed *Ad fratres hospitalis S. Mariae*, which can hardly refer to the Hospital of St. John.

The documents issued by the Hospitallers themselves in the first half of the twelfth century give little indication of military functions. In the early 1120s Raymond du Puy admittedly used the word *militamus* of his brethren, but the verb *militare* was commonly employed of activities which were in no way military and its use in this instance cannot be taken to imply that at that time the Hospital was a military order. The Hospitaller Rule itself speaks of the brethren as *ad servitium pauperum venientes* and makes no reference to military obligations; and at the middle of the century the Hospitallers were still buying land merely *ad utilitatem pauperum*. But wording appropriate to a purely charitable institution is still encountered in Hospitaller documents at a time when brethren of the order were definitely engaged in fighting. The descriptions of the Hospital found in most secular documents up to the middle of the twelfth century similarly depict it as

20. «Bernardus Clareuallensis abbas d[ictus], Hierosolymorum fratri hospitalis, per orbem terrae Christi militibus ad christianum decoris integritatem pro Domini templi libertate sustentabimus, ultra suae sustentacionem, s[cilicet] stipendia conuertanti, et quibus huius negotii auctoritatem detulerit, uniuerso clero et populo» (this is taken from the version published in the *Revue Mabillon*).
a charitable institution. It is true that in 1147 Baldwin III made a
grant to the Hospital *ad provectum et ad ampliationem et liberatio-
* * * 

tem regni Iherosolimitani*, and on the basis of this wording it has
been asserted that 'in accepting this donation the Order accepted mi-

Itallics: *ad provectum et ad ampliationem et liberatio-
tem regni Iherosolimitani*,

But this document in itself does not provid-

e conclusive evidence. The king's intention could have been the sa-
me as that of Hugh de Puiset when in 1126 he made a donation to
the Hospitallers *pro statu christianitatis .... et ut Deus civitatem re-
bellem Ascalonem tradat in manus christianorum.* Baldwin could
have been seeking divine aid rather than the military assistance of
the Hospitallers.

Yet, although none of the sources mentioned so far provides
clear evidence of Hospitaller involvement in fighting until almost the
middle of the twelfth century, there are other secular documents
which suggest that members of the order had begun to participate
in military activities at an earlier date. The arrangements which Ray-
mond of Tripoli made with the order in 1142/4 about the division of
booty certainly imply some Hospitaller involvement in campaigns;
and that it was the brothers themselves who were to participate is
indicated by the count's undertaking —given with the assent of his
nobles— not to make truces with the Muslims *absque consilio et as-
sensu fratrum ejusdem domus.* This promise would hardly have been
made if the brethren had still been concerned solely with the care of
pilgrims and had themselves had no military role. More positive evi-
dence is also provided by the nature of some gifts to the Hospital
recorded in documents belonging to the first half of the twelfth cen-
tury. In a roll listing donations apparently made before 1143 in the
neighbourhood of St. Martin de Gap a number of gifts of horses and
arms are included; * and in a Spanish charter drawn up in 1136 it was
stated that those who gave horses and arms to the military confraterni-
ty at Belchite near Zaragoza should receive *eandem remissionem quam
si ad hospicium Iherusalem uel templum dimisisset.* It could of

of Queen Melisende of Jerusalem*, Dumbarton Oaks Papers, xxvi (1972), 126.
27. Ibid., i. 116-18, 130 docs. 144, 160; in 1143 the count of Barcelona made a similar under-
taking when the Templars were brought into the Spanish reconquest: Albou, *Cartulaire*, pp.
204-5 doc. 314.
28. Devalille le Roulx, *Cartulaire*, i. 3-8 doc. 4 nos. 31-5, 47, 49, 57, 58, 61.
29. P. Rasuw, *La cofradía de Belchite*, Anuario de historia del derecho español, lli
(1926), 225.
of the servientes, mentioned in Quam amabilis Deo, who were employed by the Hospitallers to protect pilgrims. Yet it was also in the mid-1130s that frontier strongholds in Syria began to be assigned to the Hospitallers. In 1136 Fulk granted to the order the newly-constructed castle of Beit-Jibrin, whose strategic importance in relation to the Muslim city of Ascalon is made clear by William of Tyre. Fulk’s example was followed by Raymond of Tripoli, who in 1142/4 assigned to the Hospital a series of castles, including Crac, which lay in a district exposed to Muslim attack near the borders of his county; he also surrendered to the order rights of lordship over Ba’rin and Rafaniyah, which had been in Muslim hands since 1137. Farther north, in the principality of Antioch, the Hospitallers were at about the same time granted territory by the lord of Mares on the condition that they fortified it within a year; and at the other end of the Mediterranean Raymond-Berenguer IV gave the order the frontier stronghold of Amposta in 1149. In accepting these gifts the Hospitallers were obviously assuming military responsibilities, involving both defensive and offensive warfare: according to William of Tyre, Beit-Jibrin was to be used as a base for attacks on Ascalon, and Raymond of Tripoli appears to have hoped that the Hospitallers would recover Ba’rin and Rafaniyah.

It has been suggested, however, that the granting of strongholds to the Hospital need not imply the existence of a group of brethren

---

30. Delaville Le Roux, Cartulaire, i. 97-8 doc. 116; William of Tyre, Historia rerum, xiv. 22 in RHC Occ. i. 638-9. Delaville Le Roux, Cartulaire, i. 78 doc. 53, refers to the gift of a castel to the Hospital in the East in 1128; but the grant was in fact of a casale: ibid., i. 78-9 doc. 84; Delaville Le Roux, 'Inventaire', p. 46 no. 11.


32. Delaville Le Roux, Cartulaire, i. 226-7 doc. 313; on the date of this document, see Caren, Syrie du Nord, p. 314 note 22.

33. Delaville Le Roux, Cartulaire, i. 141-3 doc. 181. It is asserted by the Conde de Cedillo, 'Carta puebla de Cedillo con algunos apuntamientos históricos', Boletín de la Real Academia de la Historia, lixiii (1918), 106-7, that the Hospitallers were given the castle of Olmos in the Toledo region in 1144. The document recording the promise of Idanha in Portugal to the Hospitallers, which Delaville Le Roux, Cartulaire, i. 32 doc 34 assigns to the year 1114, is not genuine: R. de Azevedo, 'Algumas achegas para o estudo das origens da ordem de S. João do Hospital de Jerusalém, depois chamada de Malta, em Portugal', Revista portuguesa de história, iv (1949), 317-20. In his will compiled in 1131 the Aragonese King Alfonso I did promise the city of Tortosa to the Hospitallers, if he captured it from the Muslims: S. A. García Larracueta, El gran priorato de Navarra de la orden de San Juan de Jerusalén (Pamplona, 1957), ii. 15-18 doc. 10; but the intention was probably to provide revenues for the order rather than to entrust Tortosa’s defence to the Hospitallers; this was certainly the purpose of the grant of rights over the castle of Ventoses made in the same year by the viscount of Gerona and Ager: J. Miret i Sans, Les cases de Templers i Hospitalers a Catalunya (Barcelona, 1910), pp. 40-1.

34. William of Tyre, Historia rerum, xiv. 22 in RHC Occ. i. 639.
within the order who devoted themselves to fighting. It has been argued that garrisons could have been provided by paid retainers and by vassals settled in the surrounding districts. But it may be questioned whether such vassals were always readily available. Although there were some settlers at Beit-Jibrin before Ascalon fell to the Christians in 1153, it was only after that Christian success that the main task of establishing a Latin settlement there appears to have been undertaken successfully. To attract settlers to a frontier region was not easy, and it could hardly have been assumed by the king and his barons that the defence of Beit-Jibrin could have been assured in this way. It may certainly be argued that the Hospitallers—because of the revenues they received from their properties in the West—could make good any shortage of vassals by hiring paid troops, and it can be shown that they later employed native turcoples to add to their military strength. Yet the view has been advanced that the Hospital used servientes who were westerners of knightly origin. But this would hardly be the normal sense of the term serviens when employed in a military context, and it may further be questioned to what extent westerners of any rank would have been available to provide permanent garrisons as mercenaries. Native troops would have been the most readily available forces. Yet if the Hospitallers could have solved the problem of manpower in this way, it was nevertheless necessary for troops to be commanded and controlled; and this was a task which apparently would have fallen to the Hospitallers themselves, for the previous tenants of the castles which were assigned to the order surrendered all their rights: William de Crac abandoned his claims to Crac, and Gilbert de Puy-
laurens similarly renounced his rights over Fellicium and Lacum. In the same way Hugh of St. Abraham gave up his powers over Beit-Jibrin. The Hospitallers were being assigned direct control over strongholds and were not just receiving rights of overlordship. To have entrusted strongholds on the frontier in these circumstances to an institution which contained no military element would have been rash and foolhardy.

It could, of course, be maintained that this may have been done in Castile in 1158, when the frontier stronghold of Calatrava was entrusted to the Cistercian abbot of Fitero. His original intention may not have been to create a new military order —although this did happen— but to undertake the defence of the castle by using paid troops and crusaders: the archbishop of Toledo offered indulgences to those who undertook to assist in the defence of Calatrava, while the abbot of Fitero brought goods from his monastery, together with multitudinem bellatorum quibus stipendia et viatica ministra-vit. Yet certain differences should be noted. Sancho of Castile did not take the initiative in assigning Calatrava to the abbot of Fitero: he merely agreed to the abbot’s request when none of the Castilian nobility was prepared to undertake the defence of the stronghold. In Syria, by contrast, frontier districts were ceded to the Hospitallers at the instigation of the rulers of Jerusalem and Tripoli: Fulk stated that Hugh of St. Abraham had given his rights over Beit-Jibrin to the Hospital rogatu nostro, and although the lords of Crac and the other castles in the county of Tripoli were said to have surrendered their rights sponte, Raymond of Tripoli nevertheless gave compensation to these previous lords, indicating that he was responsible for arranging the transfer. Moreover, while in Castile some were reported to have described the abbot of Fitero’s proposal as fatuum, Beit-Jibrin was assigned to the Hospitallers tocius regni tam cleri quam populi hortatu. These contrasts are most easily explained if it is assumed that the Hospital was already a military order, capable

40. Ibid., I. 97-8 doc. 116.
42. Rodrigo Jiménez de Rada, De rebus Hispaniae, vii. 14 in Opera, p. 158; Delaville le Roulx, Cartulaire, I. 97-8, 116-18 docs. 116, 144.
of undertaking the defence of frontier strongholds and of launching
attacks against the infidel. 44

Yet if the granting of frontier strongholds to the Hospital sug-
suggests that some of its members had taken up arms by the mid 1130s,
this conclusion would be valid only for Syria, for it is clear from
the negotiations which took place at the end of the 1130s and early in
the 1140s concerning the will of Alfonso I of Aragon that the Hospi-
tal had not by then undertaken military obligations in the Iberian
peninsula. Alfonso had in 1131 bequeathed Aragon and Navarre to
the Temple, the Hospital and the canons of the Holy Sepulchre, 45
but after the king’s death in 1134 the terms of the will were not carried
out; and towards the end of the decade the count of Barcelona, Ray-
mond Berenguer IV, who then wielded authority in Aragon, sought
to gain renunciations of their claims from the orders. The count used
the occasion to introduce the Templars into the reconquista, and
they agreed to this in 1143 in return for the cession of a number of
castles and various privileges. 46 But in the negotiations concerning
Alfonso’s will the Hospitallers acted not with the Templars but with
the canons of the Holy Sepulchre; and in 1140 the Hospital and the
Holy Sepulchre accepted merely minor concessions in return for a
renunciation of claims to Aragon. 47 It is obvious that at this stage
the Hospital was not becoming involved in the Spanish reconquest;
it was only later in the 1140s that it began to assume military respon-
sibilities in the peninsula.

In the early thirteenth century James of Vitry asserted that the
Hospital had become militarised in imitation of the Temple, and his
comment has been repeated by many modern writers. 48 Some have
argued that the Hospitallers were forced to adopt a military role
because of the competitive power of the Templars, who had a wide
appeal and threatened to surpass the purely charitable order. 49 Re-
cently, however, it has been doubted whether the Templars were in

44. It may be noted that when Raymond Berenguer IV gave Amposta to the Hospitallers
he expected them to establish a domus there: Delaville Le Roulx, Cartulaire, i. 141-3 doc. 181.
45. García Larragueta, Gran priorato, ii. 15-18 doc. 10.
46. Furet, Templars, pp. 21-3.
47. Delaville Le Roulx, Cartulaire, i. 111-12 doc. 136; Colección de documentos inéditos
del Archivo General de la Corona de Aragón, ed. P. de Boranull y Mascaró, iv (Barcelona,
1849), 70-5, 78-81 docs. 32, 36.
48. James of Vitry, Historia orientalis seu Hierosolymitana, ed. J. Bongard, Gesta Dei per
Francos (Hannover, 1611), ii. 1064; King, Knights Hospitallers, p. 37; Camen, Syrie du nord,
p. 310.
49. Ambraskibi, Studien, p. 37; J. Frawier, The Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem (London,
any condition to arouse jealousy in the 1130s, since it is known that in its early years the Temple gained little support and that some of its members had doubts about their vocation. But once the Temple became known in the West it quickly gained favour. Ecclesiastical approval was obtained at the Council of Troyes in 1128 and from that time onwards gifts to the order rapidly increased in number and importance. In the 1130s the Templars were becoming strong contenders for patronage, although it would be difficult to prove that the favour shown to the Temple was regarded as a serious threat to the fortunes of the Hospital: increased patronage of the Temple is more likely to have been at the expense of older foundations. Nevertheless it is plausible to suggest that the Hospitallers were influenced by the Templar precedent in undertaking the necessary task of protecting pilgrims, and this was probably the first step towards militarisation, as indicated by the bull Quam amabilis Deo. The wording of Innocent II’s letter implies, however, that at least at first this function was performed by paid servientes, and it has been suggested by one writer that the transition to using Hospitallers themselves was achieved by means of Gastritter. The latter are encountered in Templar records, and in the East consisted of crusaders who stayed out in the Holy Land for a period and lived and fought alongside the Templars. The suggestion is that some knights undertaking the task of protection for the Hospitallers on a temporary basis wished to enter the service of the Hospital permanently. Yet no evidence of the presence of Gastritter in the Hospital during the first half of the twelfth century has been produced; and, until the Hospitallers were fully involved in the struggle against the infidel, westerners coming out on crusade were more likely to attach themselves to the Templars or enter the service of the king of Jerusalem, for they would then have the opportunity to fight against Islam. In fact, if the Hospitallers did at first use only servientes for the protection of pilgrims, the example of the Templars and the existence of Hospitallers who were capable of bearing arms could easily have led

50. RILEY-SMITH, Knights of St. John, p. 54.
52. See the documents published by Arson, Cartulaire.
53. AMBRAZIEJUTÉ, Studien, p. 31.
54. La règle du Temple, ed. H. de Curzon (Paris, 1886), pp. 64-6 caps. 5, 32, 61 (Latin), 65-7 (French); cf. FOREY, Templars, p. 290.
to the use of brothers for this task; and, once this step had been taken, the growing threat from the Muslims and the lack of manpower in the crusading states would soon have forced the Hospitallers to follow the Templars a stage further and assume military duties.

While the date of, and the reasons for, the militarisation of the Hospital have aroused controversy, doubts have also been expressed concerning the extent of the order’s commitment to fighting once it had assumed a military role. It is true that documents written in the Holy Land after the middle of the twelfth century still often describe the order as a purely charitable institution and its members as merely serving the poor. Yet little significance should be attached to this phraseology: although in the 1160s the Hospitaller master Gilbert d’Assailly was given the title domus sanctorum pauperum minister, he is known to have been heavily involved in military enterprises and on one occasion wrote that

«nos itaque et fratres nostri, religioni miliciam commiscentes, in ejus [Terre Sancte] defensione continuo labore insudamus, inimicis crucis resistendo, [et] nostrum sanguinem effundere non recusamus». 57

It is also true that military officials are not recorded until the 1160s and that military personnel are not mentioned in surviving capitular decrees until 1182. But, as with an earlier period, conclusions cannot be drawn from the absence of references to military officials in charters of donation; and, apart from the Rule, only two sets of capitular decrees exist for the years up to 1182: both are short and each is concerned with a particular topic—the first with the provision of revenues for the maintenance of the sick and the second with churches and church services. The master Raymond du Puy, who died between 1158 and 1160, is nevertheless reported to have issued decrees concerning military activities, although the text of these has not survived. These decrees, which are mentioned in later papal letters, have however been used to indicate a limited involvement in military

55. Hiestand, 'Anfänge', p. 78, argues that before the Hospital could become a military order a change in recruitment was necessary, as warfare was the preserve of the nobility, while the Hospital in its original form was a creation of townsfolk. But it may be doubted whether all early Hospitallers were townsmen, and it would be wrong to assume that townsfolk were incapable of bearing arms.

56. Delaville Le Roux, Cartulaire, i. 154-5, 179-80, 183-4 docs. 199, 237, 244.

57. Ibid., i. 222-3 doc. 309; iv, 247-8 doc. 310 bis.

58. Ibid., i. 240, 257, 429 docs. 345, 375, 627.

59. Ibid., i. 331-40, 345-7 docs. 494, 504.
affairs in the middle years of the twelfth century. According to Alexander III, Raymond had ordered the Hospitallers not to bear arms

«nisi forte tunc cum vexillum sancte crucis aut pro defensione regni aut pro obsidione alicujus civitatis paganorum delatum fuerit, pro quibus subsidium necessarium esset armorum».

This evidence is not altogether free from doubt, for Alexander thought that the Hospital's military activities were having an adverse effect on its charitable work, and he was anxious to ensure that responsibilities to pilgrims and the sick were not reduced: the earlier military involvement of the Hospitallers may therefore have been minimised. But if the pope's statement is accepted as an accurate account of Raymond's decree, the master's pronouncement still covers both offensive and defensive operations, though not raiding; and although it speaks of necessity, the shortage of manpower and resources in the crusading states would have made this the norm rather than the exception. On hearing that Vladislas of Bohemia was proposing to undertake a crusade, Raymond du Puy did nevertheless in the 1150s offer him the stronghold of Crac for the period of his stay in the East, and this has been taken «to imply no very heavy commitment». But the offer may have been no more than an astute piece of fund-raising, for Vladislas in return granted several properties in Bohemia to the order. It may reflect the order's financial position rather than the extent of the Hospitallers' commitment to military enterprises.

There can be no doubt about the degree of Hospitaller involvement in military affairs in the 1160s: at that time the order was not only receiving further gifts of castles but also beginning to purchase strongholds in Syria, and Gilbert d'Assailly was pressing for an invasion of Egypt, for which he promised to provide 500 knights. In the later 1160s the Hospital's military obligations were already a cause of concern to the pope, who warned the order to maintain its charitable work and not to undertake greater military responsibili-

60. Riley-Smith, Knights of St. John, p. 59.
61. Delaville Le Roux, Cartulaire, i. 360-1 doc. 527.
62. Hiestand's comments on this point («Anfänge», p. 73) do not seem to be consistent with the wording of the texts in question.
63. Delaville Le Roux, Cartulaire, i. 280-2 doc. 405; Riley-Smith, Knights of St. John, p. 58.
64. Delaville Le Roux, Cartulaire, i. 228, 271-2 docs. 317, 398.
65. Ibid., i. 275-6 doc. 402; William of Tyre, Historia rerum, xx. 5 in RHC Occ. i. 948-9.
ties than in the past. It has been suggested, however, that anxiety was not limited to the pope and that there was also a group within the order «that was opposed to the policy of active participation in military enterprises». It has been argued that this group made its attitude clear during the crisis which followed the resignation of Gilbert d'Assaillly about the year 1170, for a demand was then made that in future the master should not accept strongholds on the frontier without the knowledge of the chapter. But at that time the Hospital was heavily in debt because of the extensive military responsibilities assumed by Gilbert d'Assaillly: according to William of Tyre the sum owed amounted to 100,000 besants. The most obvious interpretation of the demand is therefore not that there was a party opposed to military activities, but that there was a general concern within the order —for the demand is said to have been made by the chapter unanimously— because the Hospital was accepting more commitments than it could manage: it was felt that it should limit its activities in the military sphere to what it could afford.

It is clearly difficult to trace changes which were probably gradual and to assess attitudes when the surviving sources are sparse and often ambiguous. Yet, although some evidence which has been taken to indicate a military function is to be rejected, there are grounds for arguing that in the Holy Land, though not in Spain, some Hospitallers had taken up arms by the mid 1130s. The suggestion that the transition was made in a half-hearted manner and that it aroused marked opposition within the order may also be called doubt.

67. Riley-Smith, Knights of St. John, p. 73.
68. Delavelle Le Roux, Cartulaire, i. 276-9 doc. 403.
69. William of Tyre, Historia rerum, xx. 5 in RHC Occ. i. 949.
Constitutional Conflict and Change in the Hospital of St John during the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries

The leading studies of the Hospital of St John in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries have presented somewhat differing accounts of the power structure at the centre of the Order. Delaville Le Roulx in his brief analysis of government provides an essentially static picture and maintains that although in theory the plenitude of power rested with the chapter general, which delegated executive authority to the master, in practice the latter's power was almost absolute: although the master had few rights of his own and on most matters was expected to seek the counsel of the central convent or of the chapter general, these bodies would not refuse assent to measures which did not conflict with the statutes and usages of the Order; and, as the chapter general met only infrequently, the master enjoyed a considerable freedom of initiative. Therefore, despite the restrictions on his authority, 'le rôle du grand-maître était prépondérant'. More recently, Riley-Smith has argued at greater length that the relationship between the master, the central convent and the chapter general did not remain unchanged and that during this period the convent and chapter general assumed predominance, as is shown by the convent's victory in 1299 over the master William de Villaret, who was obliged to travel out to the East and hold a chapter general there against his will. The power gained by the convent and chapter general was not the outcome of a process of gradual evolution, but resulted from a series of bitter constitutional conflicts, in which the convent and chapter general— influenced by current baronial ideas— demanded not only government in accordance with law and custom but also the right to be consulted. Yet Riley-Smith also asserts that for part of the thirteenth

century the master's power was increasing, and in this context draws attention to a statute enacted in 1265, which 'made it virtually impossible to question a magistral order'. Although these two accounts are not as completely opposed to each other as they might seem at first sight, they do obviously contain substantial differences of interpretation and emphasis. But it may be argued that neither provides an altogether satisfactory explanation. The purpose of the present paper will therefore be to examine again the relations between the master, the convent and the chapter general, particularly during periods of crisis, and to discover to what extent the relationship changed. A different interpretation and emphasis will be suggested, though it should be pointed out that because of the paucity of the evidence available the most that can be expected of any interpretation is a reasoned and coherent hypothesis.

Delaville Le Roulx's explanation of the theoretical relationship between the master and the chapter general presents a more precise and clear-cut definition of functions than was probably ever attempted in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, but in order to understand the conflicts of this period it is necessary to draw the distinction between theoretical authority and actual power. The crisis which occurred in the Hospital about the year 1170, following Gilbert d'Assailly's resignation from the post of master, certainly seems to have led to a diminution of the master's theoretical rights, although the extent to which they were then reduced may have been exaggerated. By the end of that crisis, however, the master's rights were in theory closely circumscribed, and later conflicts did not produce any further major restrictions on his theoretical authority or increase that of the convent and chapter general to any extent. These subsequent disputes were characterised rather by attempts to ensure that the established theoretical limits were observed in practice and reveal that the master in fact continued to enjoy a very considerable freedom of action.

At one stage in the crisis which followed Gilbert d'Assailly's resignation it was proposed — apparently by the whole convent — that he should return to office provided that:

\[\text{implerisque actus suos corrigeret, videlicet ne in confiniis Turcorum castella et munitiones susciperet, ne in superfluis et supervacuis expensis domum gravaret, ne fratribus et capitulo [inscio] magnum negocium tractaret.}\]

This proposal was not put into effect, but in 1172 Alexander III decreed that the master who was then to be elected should promise to observe the ancient customs and statutes of the Hospital and should not make
important decisions ‘sine communi consilio capituli vestri vel majoris et sanioris partis’: the matters to which this ruling applied included the acquisition and fortification of the frontier castles, the administration of obediences and the making of pacts on oath. These have been seen as new checks on the master, and it has been argued by Riley-Smith that ‘after the crisis of 1170 no Master could act in any important matter without the advice of his convent and his actions were limited by the laws of his predecessors’. It is true that the pope’s decree provides the earliest surviving reference both to an oath demanded of a new master and also to the obligation to seek council on certain issues; but the reduction in the master’s theoretical authority was possibly not as radical as might appear. Given the widely accepted concept of the supremacy of law, no ruler of this period could have felt completely free to disregard all existing law and custom: the oath may therefore be regarded as formalising what had before been an unexpressed obligation. On the question of counsel, it may be pointed out that the seeking of advice was already a common practice in the Hospital, as elsewhere, and that it was obligatory concerning some matters even before the crisis. The Rule of the Hospital, which was drawn up not later than 1153, was issued with the counsel of the whole chapter, and the early letters and charters issued in the name of the master indicate that he normally took counsel before making decisions. And although the Hospitaller Rule, unlike those of the Temple and the Teutonic Order, does not contain any general pronouncements on the necessity of taking counsel, it was clearly assumed in the Rule that counsel would be sought when justice was dispensed and when certain posts were filled. The words from Alexander III’s decree which have been quoted above seem, however, to imply that from 1172 the master was obliged not merely to seek counsel but also to act in accordance with the will of the whole convent or of the majority, and this is borne out by Alexander’s further command that the master should not enter into pacts ‘sine assensu capituli aut majoris et sanioris partis’. But it would appear that in some matters the theoretical powers of the master were already limited in this way. In chapter nine of the Rule it had been decreed that a brother who returned to the Hospital after being expelled for fornication should be treated as a stranger for a year, ‘et in hoc spatio videant fratres satisfactionem suam, postea faciant quod melius sibi videbitur’: this wording suggests that the decision was not taken by the master alone but depended upon the will of all the

4 Ibid., i. 300–1 doc. 434. The ‘chapter’ mentioned here was the central convent, not the general chapter. Where Delaville Le Roulx reads ‘C[asti]' in this document, the initial should be G, referring to Gilbert d’Assailly.
6 Cartulaire, i. 62–8 doc. 70.
7 Ibid., i. 20, 69–70, 111–12, 138–9, 149–50, 189–90, 222–4, 272–3 docs. 18, 72, 136, 177, 192, 250, 309–10, 399.
8 La Règle du Temple, ed. H. de Curzon, Paris 1886, 42–3; M. Perlbach, Die Statuten des Deutschen Ordens, Halle 1890, 49.
9 Cartulaire, i. 62–8 doc. 70 caps. 7, 9, 10, 12.
brothers. Alexander M's decree was apparently not introducing a completely new practice, but merely extending the number of issues on which the master was obliged to seek and accept advice.

The statutes issued at the general chapter held at Margat, probably in 1206, have been seen as marking the next stage in the growing predominance of the chapter general and convent. On some issues these statutes certainly defined the master's rights in an unfavourable manner: appointments made at the time of the chapter general, for example, were to be decided by a committee on which the master did not sit. But it may be questioned whether new restrictions were then being imposed on the master. The preamble to the decrees clearly implies that existing customs were being set down:

>cognitis antiquis consuetudinibus testimonio fratrum antiquorum et sapientium, fuit statutum pariter et preceptum...quatenus hec omnia, secundum facultates sacre domus Hospitalis, cum integritate de cetero observentur.*

The setting down of customs did not, of course, preclude the introduction of innovations, as became apparent a few years later in England when Magna Carta was compiled, but it can be demonstrated that at least some of the decrees of the Margat chapter were based on earlier precedents. The clause stating that a newly elected master should promise to observe the good customs and statutes of the Hospital and to take counsel had its antecedents in Alexander M's decree, although in the latter the promise covered only the observance of customs and statutes. The provision that the master should be elected by a committee of thirteen was similarly foreshadowed in the election which took place about the year 1170, when Gilbert d'Assailly and twelve other electors chose a new head for the Order. Some sections of the Margat statutes are, moreover, in the past tense, as though they are a record of what had been customary. Since the early Rule of the Hospital is concerned with the ordering of the daily routine rather than with the government of the Order, it is obviously difficult to determine how much in the Margat statutes was new, but the evidence that does survive points to a repetition of earlier usages rather than the promulgation of new rulings. These statutes may well have been preceded by tensions within the Order - the issuing of these decrees is in itself significant in this respect, although it should be remembered that they are not all concerned with the master's authority - but the purpose seems

---

10 A judicial decision to be made by the chapter is mentioned in chapter 10.
11 Ibid., ii. 31-40 doc. 1193.
12 Riley-Smith, Knights of St John, 121, accepts that these statutes 'do not appear to have been altogether original'. E. J. King, The Rule, Statutes and Customs of the Hospitalers, 1099-1310, London 1934, 7-8, thinks that they contained 'nothing definitely new'; see also Der Johanniter-Orden: Der Malteser-Orden: Der ritterliche Orden des Hl. Johannes vom Spital zu Jerusalem, ed. A. Wienand, Cologne 1977, 244. Cartulaire, i. 276-9 doc. 409.
13 That Alfonso of Portugal, who was then master, had little regard for customs and statutes which limited magisterial power is suggested by the rumours current at the end
to have been to set down customs, some of which had presumably been
ignored, rather than to impose new restrictions on the master.

An innovation more clearly occurred in 1278 when it was decreed that
a new seal should be made in the name of both the master and the convent
and that this seal should be used to authenticate documents recording
transactions and decisions in which the convent was supposed to participate.
It was to be kept by the treasurer under the seals of the master and several
leading officials. This measure did not, as has been suggested, render
the master's seal powerless, for it was explicitly stated that documents other
than those specified were still to be authenticated with the master's lead
or wax seal. The intention of the decree could have been partly the
avoidance of confusion, since a conventual seal already existed in addition
to those of the master; but the reference in the statute to the master's
seals implies that the use of these was being restricted. The decree was in
fact a practical measure, whose chief purpose was to ensure that counsel
was taken before documents concerning important matters were issued.
This was made clear a few decades later by William de Sancto Stephano
in his compilation of Hospitaller laws and customs, for there he defined
its objective as: 'a ce que riens ne soit bulle se non ce qui est acorde au
conseill et por conseill des prodeshomes'. It did not seek to alter the
theoretical division of power between the master and the convent, but
merely to guarantee that the existing regulations about counsel were
observed.

A decree issued in 1283 has been seen as a further attempt to place checks
upon the master. This stated that 'magister teneatur audire mense
quolibet compotum thesauri una cum quadam fratrum et procerum
quantitate omnium communiter lingarum'. But since earlier practice
and the circumstances in which it was issued are unknown, its purpose and
effect are not clear. If the purpose was to ensure that the master acted

of the century that he resigned because the convent would not obey an order given by
him and that his resignation was occasioned by a dislike of the Margat statutes: W.
Dugdale, Monasticon anglicanum, vi, London 1830, 797; Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, MS
Fr. 6049 fo. 233.

1 Riley-Smith, Knights of St John, 295.
10 Cartulaire, iii. 368–70 doc. 3670 caps. 1, 2. Both the Latin and French texts state that
the new seal was to be kept under the seals (sous la bulle, sub bullis) of certain officials,
although they do not agree on the officials in question. A more usual arrangement was
for a seal to be kept under several locks, with the keys held by various individuals: the
Hospitallers had themselves adopted this practice for the custody of priors' seals: ibid., iii.
225–9 doc. 3396 cap. 22; and in the Teutonic Order the capitular seal was similarly kept
under several locks: Perlbach, Die Statuten, 103. If the 1278 decree is to be taken
literally — and there are parallels which can be quoted — the treasurer was presumably not
supposed to break the seals without the knowledge of the officials concerned, and the
Hospitaller William de Sancto Stephano, in commenting on this statute, said that these
officials douent estre present quant aucune chose sero bullee de la dite bulle: B.N., MS Fr. 6049 fo. 344.

15 Cartulaire, ii. 565 doc. 2224; E. Strehlke, Tabulae Ordinis Theutonici, Berlin 1869, 69
doc. 87; Riley-Smith, Knights of St John, 295.
16 B.N., MS Fr. 6049 fo. 244.
17 Cartulaire, iii. 450–5 doc. 3844 cap. 2.
with counsel, it could be seen merely as an application of Alexander III's ruling that important business should not be conducted without counsel. But the inclusion of the phrase 'omnia communiter lingarum' suggests that the decree could have been occasioned by conflict between the various groups of brothers in the convent: it ensured that all tongues would be represented. If, on the other hand, the intention was to guarantee regular audits, the master's freedom of action was being reduced, but the task of auditing accounts was being assigned to him rather than to others, and in this respect his authority was being maintained. If this was the decree's purpose, it need not have been preceded by tensions between the master and the convent: it could have resulted merely from the realisation on the part of all that regularity in financial matters was desirable and that a month was a suitable period for accounting purposes.²⁰

More far-reaching proposals were published in 1295, when there was discontent with the conduct of the master, Odo des Pins. A group of Hospitallers, including the grand commander of Outremer and the prior of St Gilles, suggested that one brother should be chosen from each tongue to be a diffinitor, with the master acting as the diffinitor for his own tongue. The government of the Order would then be entrusted to the seven diffinitors thus appointed, with the decisions being taken on a majority vote. Although this proposal assigned wider and more permanent powers to diffinitors than was usual in other orders which had officials of this name, the effect which it would have had on the master's theoretical authority should not be exaggerated, for—as has been seen—already in 1172 Alexander III's decree had implied that the master was bound to act in accord with the majority opinion of the convent on important issues.²¹ The intention of the reformers was rather to provide a more effective check on the master in practice, and they sought to do this by altering the structure of the central government. It is perhaps not insignificant in this respect that the leading reformers were Hospitallers in the West and not members of the central convent. Yet, although the plan was presented to the pope,²² it was not put into effect, and the only restriction actually imposed upon the master at this time was that contained in a letter sent by the convent in 1296 to the newly elected William de Villaret, who was chosen as master.

²⁰ Accounts were rendered monthly in the Teutonic Order as well: Perlbach, Die Statuten, 107.
²² B.N., MS Fr. 6049 fo. 259v (the reference is given wrongly in Cartulaire, iii. 657 note 8).
after the death of Odo des Pins: William was informed that his election would be confirmed when he had promised to abide by the good customs and usages of the Hospital; but in demanding this promise the members of the convent were merely enforcing Alexander’s decree and the Margat statutes.

William de Villaret stayed in the West after his election and held a chapter general there in 1297. But his continued absence from Cyprus and his proposal to hold another chapter at Avignon in 1300 provoked conflict with the convent in the East. In the dispute which ensued the convent made no pretensions to innovate or to place new restrictions on the master: it sought to base its demands firmly on past custom and past decrees. It thus asserted that in the past the master had always lived with the convent and that, according to Hospitaller statutes, the chapter general should be held in Cyprus, where the Order’s headquarters were. Its arguments on the latter point were, however, of doubtful validity. The convent could admittedly find support for its claim in the statutes enacted at Marseilles in 1297, when it had been decreed that general chapters should not be held in the West. The convent did mention this enactment, but placed little emphasis on it. It sought rather to rely upon the decrees of the Margat chapter held early in the thirteenth century. But the convent’s interpretation of the Margat statutes was forced, and the master was able to rely on the same decrees to justify his summoning of a chapter general at Avignon in 1300. And, although the convent interpreted the Margat decrees in this way in 1299, two years earlier it had been prepared to send representatives to the chapter at Marseilles. The members of the convent sought to extricate themselves from their apparent inconsistency by arguing that the master had assured them that the assembly at Marseilles would be beneficial to the Order: they had therefore decided to send representatives, even though the summons had been contrary to regulations. In an effort to provide additional proof that the assembly in 1297 had contravened Hospitaller custom, the members of the convent in 1299 also pointed out that the Marseilles chapter had been marked by a revolt of Castilian brothers and that God ‘a fait si grant demostrance por nos chastier, qu’il a soufert que nos avons veu...si grans escandles’. The weakness of the convent’s arguments about the holding of chapters in the West was made further apparent in 1300 when it was considered necessary, despite the Margat decrees, to enact new legislation, stating that as long as the Order was based in Cyprus general chapters should be held at

---

22 Ibid., iii. 681–3 doc. 4310; this document is misinterpreted on this point by Riley-Smith, Knights of St John, 207, 298. 24 Cartulaire, iii. 766–79 docs. 4461–3.
23 Ibid., iii. 769–76 doc. 4462.
25* Of course, if the convent’s interpretation of the Margat decrees were accepted, the legality of the 1297 assembly would be thrown into doubt. The quashing of the decrees passed in 1297 by the chapter general in 1300 was the logical consequence of this line of argument: ibid., iii. 810–16 doc. 4515 cap. 20.
26 Ibid., iii. 769–76 doc. 4462.
Limassol. It may thus be argued that, in spite of its claims to be adhering to past law and custom, the convent was placing a new interpretation on existing law and was doing this without the master. But it was not asserting any right to innovate: it was merely arguing that statute and custom should be observed.

What have been regarded as the constitutional crises in the Hospital during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries did not, therefore, in most instances alter the theoretical rights enjoyed by the master or the convent and chapter general. The crisis following the resignation of Gilbert d’Assailly was probably the only occasion when restrictions of any significance were imposed on the master, and his theoretical rights remained largely unaffected by later disputes.

It is, of course, possible that changes in theoretical authority took place at other times or more gradually, although there is little evidence to indicate that this occurred on any scale. One sphere, however, in which the master’s role does appear to have been reduced by the early thirteenth century is that of appointments. While in 1172 it was decreed by Alexander III that the master should take counsel in administering obediences, in the Margat statutes and the Hospitaller Usances it was stated that appointments to offices made at the time of the general chapter were to be decided by a committee which did not include the master. But, on the one hand, it should be pointed out that the master had some control over the composition of the committee and that his opinion was to be sought by it, and, on the other, it should be remembered that, since the master in 1172 had been ordered to act on the advice of the majority, his freedom of action was already severely limited. Attention should also be drawn to the first of the Usances, which envisages a more limited obligation of obedience than is found in the Hospitaller Rule. Brothers were to be obliged to obey the master’s orders only if these commands were in accord with the usages and customs of the Order; if they were not, then esgart des frères was to be sought. The date of this Usance is unknown, although it may well have had its origin in one of the periods of conflict. Yet it did not further restrict the master’s theoretical authority, since he was already bound to act in accordance with Hospitaller law and custom. Like the decree concerning seals in 1278, the procedure laid down in the Usance was a measure designed to ensure that the master kept within established

---

28 Ibid., iii. 810-16 doc. 4515 cap. 9.
29 Riley-Smith, *Knights of St John*, 301, argues that by demanding esgart des frères regarding the master’s summons to a chapter in the West the convent was rejecting the statute of 1265 and re-introducing a right of formal rebellion: *Cartulaire*, iii. 118-21 doc. 3180 cap. 10; and, no doubt, if the master had acceded to this demand it could have been used as a precedent. But it would not in fact have implied the rejection of the 1265 decree, for that statute—strictly interpreted—concerned only brothers in the West, and the demand for esgart des frères in 1299 was made by the convent in Cyprus.
30 *Cartulaire*, ii. 536-61 doc. 2213 cap. 109.
31 Ibid., ii. 536-61 doc. 2213 cap. 88.
32 It was not earlier than the Margat decrees, which it mentions.
CONFLICT IN THE HOSPITAL OF ST JOHN

limits. And even this procedure was not maintained permanently, for in 1265 brothers in the West were forbidden to question magisterial commands.88

Although the master’s theoretical position was not affected by most of the crises which occurred in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, it is nevertheless clear that in these conflicts the views of the convent or chapter general usually prevailed. No marked change or development is noticeable in this respect. The papal decree of 1172 represented the opinions of the convent, and in 1300 William de Villaret was obliged to go out to the East and hold a chapter in Cyprus and not at Avignon, while statutes such as that passed in 1278 show that in the chapter general the master was obliged to accept the views of the majority. And by means of some enactments measures were devised to ensure that in practice the master observed the limitations on his rights. Such decrees, moreover, once enacted became part of the law of the Hospital: they were not quickly followed by a Dictum of Kenilworth or a Statute of York. The master’s freedom of action, therefore, became hedged by a number of restrictions of a practical nature.

Yet the conflicts themselves also reveal that the practical safeguards did not in fact prevent the master from acting in an arbitrary way. In most instances little is known in detail about the background to the crises, but the conflicts of the 1290s provide some explicit statements about the master’s conduct. In the scheme put forward in 1295 it was claimed that:

les bons usages et les profitables establimens, par les quels la religion solloit estre enlumine et resplandir ancienement, troverent tant corrumpus et defaillis que poi estoient tenus per force de raison mais a soul plaisir,84

and in the same year Boniface VIII informed Odo des Pins that he had received complaints that the master had acted ‘trop descovenablement et sens nul profit, ces por ce les foables usages et les honestes establimens et les coveignables ordenations et afferables de ta religion et de ton orde non gardant’...85 But the most precise criticism occurs in the letter which the convent sent to the new master, William de Villaret, in 1296. This contains a long catalogue of complaints about abuses committed by previous masters and lists grievances upon a variety of matters, including the recall of officials, the alienation of property and the retention of houses and priories under direct magisterial control.86 Clearly the measures taken to enforce the theoretical limitations on the master’s authority were ineffective, and the master of the Hospital was as capable of arbitrary action at the end of the thirteenth century as Gilbert d’Assailly had been in the middle of the twelfth. And, although the convent and general chapter usually prevailed in the end when there was conflict, these bodies at the close of the thirteenth century still did not themselves possess the

88 Cartulaire, iii. 118-21 doc. 3180 cap. 10. 84 Ibid., iii. 655-7 doc. 4267.
85 Ibid., iii. 672-3 doc. 4293. 86 Ibid., iii. 681-3 doc. 4310.
power to coerce a stubbornly recalcitrant master: although William de Villaret was persuaded to go out to the East in 1300, five years earlier the convent had turned to the pope for assistance in restraining Odo des Pins.

It would obviously be difficult, whatever safeguards were introduced, altogether to prevent the master from acting arbitrarily; but the attitudes displayed by members of the convent and chapter general meant that the master's freedom of action was greater than it need have been. The convent and chapter general seem usually to have been prepared in practice to allow the master a considerable independence and did not seek to maintain a constant supervision over his actions. It is clear, for example, that the statute about seals enacted in 1278 was not in fact used to keep an effective check upon the master, for in 1302 the chapter saw the necessity of decreeing that documents to be sealed with the conventual seal should first be read and examined and then sealed in the presence of the grand commander, marshal, hospitaller and treasurer; and at the same time it was also considered necessary to stipulate that the officials in question should not absent themselves unless they were sick. Those to whose keeping the conventual seal had been entrusted had evidently not used their position to ensure that it was employed by the master only for the proper purposes. The statutes passed in 1265 also indicate a readiness to allow independence to the master: in these it was decreed that if a brother in the West sought esgart des freres concerning an order given by the master, the brother was to be summoned to the East and to lose his habit. Presumably the right to demand esgart had been abused and employed too freely by members in the West, and it was therefore felt necessary to place a check on such questioning of the master's orders. In other thirteenth-century statutes, moreover, decisions on a number of topics were left to the master's discretion. The master was not regarded merely as a figurehead to be kept under close control. This is made apparent in the writings of William de Sancto Stephano, who — although as commander of Cyprus he was one of the leading opponents of William de Villaret in 1299 — likens the Hospital to a body of which the master was the head and to a ship of which he was the pilot:

Por quoy en nostre religion qui est I. cors fu ordene diuers membres pour le sauvement et acroissement dou dit cors, dont le maistre fu le chief, qui est le premier office ordene au sauvament et au croissement de nostre religion. Apres sont ordenes les autres ordenes diuersement selonc que les parties dou cors por le portexion dou quel tous les autres sont adrescies. Est le nostre maistre le chief par quoy tous les officials doint estre proueus et adrescies... Tote la naue generalment doit estre a la proueence dou nouchier et par lui adrecee. De quoy Tullus dit au lieuure de rectorique que celle

---

81 Ibid., iv. 36-41 doc. 4574 cap. 111.
82 Ibid., iii. 116-21 doc. 3180 cap. 10. Only the Latin version refers explicitly to the esgart.
83 E.g. ibid., iii. 186-8 doc. 3317 cap. 6; 225-9 doc. 3396 caps. 5, 24; 450-5 doc. 3844 caps. 7, 18.
84 Ibid., iii. 780 doc. 4464.

24
CONFLICT IN THE HOSPITAL OF ST JOHN

The dispute in 1299 itself emphasises the importance of the master’s role. Although much of the argument was concerned with the summoning of a chapter in the West, the convent’s claim on this point was apparently no more than a means of bringing the master out to the East, since the convent had earlier been prepared to send representatives to the Marseilles chapter, and in 1299 its envoys were instructed to raise the subject of the chapter only if the master ignored the request that he should travel to Cyprus. The Order could not function properly in the prolonged absence of its head.

The occasions when conflict did arise in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries suggest that the desire to enforce close supervision over the master or to coerce him existed only when his actions were endangering the welfare of the Order: participation in government and decision-making was for the convent not so much an end in itself as a means, to be used — when necessary — to prevent the Hospital from being harmed. The demands made of Gilbert d’Assailly, which led to Alexander III’s decree of 1172, were occasioned in part by the serious financial position in which the Hospital found itself as a result of Gilbert’s military policies. He had hoped to obtain rich rewards from the conquest of Egypt, but the gamble had failed. The harm done to the Order by magisterial actions was also stressed in the letter sent to William de Villaret in 1296: because of the financial demands made by previous masters, for example, ‘l’estat des maisons et les raisons des priors estoient mout bleeies’. And in 1299 the convent expressed concern about the troubles which would afflict the Order if the master prolonged his stay in the West.

Yet even in these circumstances the members of the convent and general chapter appear to have been slow to act. The list of grievances presented to William de Villaret in 1296 refers not just to one infringement or to the arbitrary actions of just one master, but to a series of abuses committed by a number of previous masters. And it is pertinent to note that William de Sancto Stephano included this document in his work not only for the purpose of warning masters to be prudent in their conduct but also so that:

les prodeshomes dou couent aient exemple de mostrer as maistres les defautes des quels il se doit garder. Et quant clarite et chose deue a caus sera se, lors que les defautes seront faiites par les maistres, ne les lieisent enueillir, mas tant tant le dient et le facent

B.N., MS Fr. 6049 fo. 263r–263v; published by L. Delisle, ‘Maitre Jean d’Antioche, traducteur, et frère Guillaume de Saint-Etienne’, Histoire littéraire de la France, xxxiii, Paris 1906, 30–1, where it is pointed out that treschant should read tres sachant.
43 Cartulaire, iii. 776–9 doc. 4463.
44 According to William of Tyre the Order’s debts at this time amounted to 100,000 besants: Historia rerum in partibus transmarinis gestarum, xx. 5, in Recueil des historiens des croisades: historiens occidentaux, i, Paris 1844, 948–9.
45 Cartulaire, i. 275–6, 283 docs. 402, 409.
46 Ibid., iii. 681–3 doc. 4310.
These words would scarcely have been necessary if the convent had always maintained a rigorous check upon the master’s actions.

Even when they did act, the convent and chapter general did not take their claims as far as they might have done. At the time of Gilbert d’Assailly’s resignation, it was at one point asserted that the master could not resign without the consent of the convent, but in fact one group was ready to accept the action taken by the master, while others stressed that it was from the pope that permission to resign should be obtained. There was no serious attempt made at this time to establish a right for the convent in this matter, although it could of course be argued that in this instance it was not in the parties’ interests to press claims on this issue. More importantly, however, the Hospitaliers were apparently not anxious to assert a right to depose a master, even though this power was enjoyed by the members of some other orders. Admittedly it was stated at the end of the thirteenth century that Alfonso of Portugal had been deposed because he had summoned a chapter to meet at Margat outside the kingdom of Jerusalem, but this claim is of doubtful validity: the statutes issued at Margat give no indication of any such action; according to other sources Alfonso resigned, and the circumstances in which the assertion was made render it suspect, for it formed part of the convent’s protest against the proposal to hold a chapter at Avignon. The proposals advanced in 1295 did certainly envisage the possibility that a master might be deposed, but this was to happen only if he suffered a loss of his mental faculties or was found guilty of offences such as sodomy or heresy, for which the normal penalty was expulsion from the Order. The only measure that was actually taken against Ode des Pins in 1295 appears to have been a request that the pope should call the master to order. Apparently it was not until 1317 that the first attempt to depose a master was made.

Thus, although theoretically the authority of the master of the Hospital was subject to severe limitations from an early period, in practice throughout the twelfth and thirteenth centuries he continued to enjoy a considerable freedom of action, and there seems to have been no desire

46 B.N., MS Fr. 6049 fo. 254v; published by Delisle, ‘Maître Jean d’Antioche’, 31–2, where it is suggested that the beginning of the second sentence should read ‘Et grant charité est chose deue a eaus sera faite...’
47 Cartulaire, i. 276–9 doc. 403.
49 Cartulaire, iii. 769–76 doc. 4462.
50 Dugdale, Monasticon, vi. 797; B.N., MS Fr. 6049 fo. 233.
51 Cartulaire, iii. 672–3 doc. 4293.
52 J. Delaville Le Roulx, Les Hospitaliers à Rhodes jusqu’à la mort de Philibert de Neillac (1310–1421), Paris 1913, 12.
on the part of the convent and chapter general to exercise a close and permanent supervision over him or to curb his power at every opportunity. The stance adopted by the convent and chapter general can be explained in several ways. In the chapter general the development of any corporate spirit must have been hampered by the infrequency of meetings and the lack of continuity in membership. Clearly this could not be said of the convent itself, but probably the members of that body were influenced both by the Hospital's monastic inheritance and by the example of the secular world. The vow of obedience taken by every recruit may have exercised a restraining influence on many brothers, despite the reservations made in the first of the Usances; and the master continued to occupy the paternal role traditionally assigned to abbots: in 1299 the members of the convent still addressed William de Villaret as their spiritual father and referred to themselves as his children.* A constant reminder of the reverence owed to the master was, moreover, provided by certain signs of respect which were customarily accorded to him. In 1299 the convent was careful to warn its envoys to observe these:

Traitez vous chapeaux de bonet, por l'usage qui est par dela. Et quant est d'autres reverentes, les [faites] si com les prodestomes dou covent le font au maistre quant il est avec eux.**

Nor did the example provided by the secular nobility encourage the convent to seek permanently a larger role in the government of the Order. Nobles in the western kingdoms were of course concerned to safeguard individual rights and privileges against encroachment by rulers, but they displayed little desire to exercise as a group any constant control over central government. Although baronial demands for greater participation in central government were made in countries such as England and Aragon in the thirteenth century, these were merely short-lived responses to particular sets of circumstances, when the crown was pursuing unpopular or unsuccessful policies, and were not attempts to place permanent curbs on royal power: the demands of this kind which gave rise to the Provisions of Oxford or the PRIVILEGIO DE LA UNIÓN were quickly forgotten. The only right which the western baronage sought constantly to uphold in this sphere was that of consent to extraordinary taxation.

It might, of course, be argued that, because of the High Court's powers, the kingdom of Jerusalem was exceptional in this respect and that the Hospitallers in the central convent would be particularly influenced by what happened there. But certain doubts may be expressed on this point. Most Hospitallers serving in the Holy Land had been reared in the West, and evidence from the Temple suggests that the members of the military orders in the East often had little experience of the politics of that region.

---

* Cartulaire, iii. 766-76, 780 docs. 4461-2, 4464.
** Ibid., iii. 776-9 doc. 4463.
Of the 76 Templars interrogated in Cyprus in the early fourteenth century, at least 52 had joined the Temple in 1300 or later and had thus been in the Order for eight years or less when they were arrested; and as most of them had been recruited in the West they had served in the East for an even shorter time. That periods of service in the East were usually brief is also apparent from the comments of some Templars arrested in western Europe. Certainly it might be maintained that the central officials in either the Temple or the Hospital would have had more experience of the politics of the Holy Land or later of Cyprus, but it has been suggested that for most of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries conventual offices in the Hospital were held by comparatively young men, and although a change apparently took place after 1291 and central offices came to be occupied by more experienced brethren, these had not necessarily spent much time in the East before their appointment: Gerard de Gragnana, for example, who held the post of hospitaller and then marshal in 1303, had been prior of Pisa in 1299 and prior of Venice in 1301.

The Hospitallers in the Holy Land certainly gave little outward sign of sympathy with the baronial cause. It has been argued, in fact, that in the political conflicts of the thirteenth century the Hospitallers pursued a consistently royalist policy and that it was the Temple which assisted the 'baronial' faction. This clear-cut distinction between the orders is not altogether acceptable, but the Hospitallers clearly cannot be said to have supported baronial claims.

This is obviously not the place to discuss in any detail the relations between the baronage in Acre and the crown or its representatives, some aspects of which still await satisfactory elucidation, but in a consideration of any possible influence on the Hospitallers certain aspects of that relationship should be noted. For most of the thirteenth century there was no resident monarch in the Holy Land: the kingdom of Jerusalem did not, therefore, provide an obvious model for the Hospitallers to follow. Nor did the Jerusalem barons consistently uphold their claims: their acceptance of Charles of Anjou's representative, Roger de San Severino, in 1277 has, for example, been seen as marking the abandonment of their constitutional principles. And when they were earlier pursuing their claims more vigorously there was little sign of any repercussions on the Hospitallers: as has been noted, in 1265— at about the time that the Livre de Jean d'Ibelin...
Conflict in the Hospital of St John was being compiled – the checks on the master were being reduced. Conflict in the Hospital between the master and the convent occurred mainly in the last decades of the century, when most Hospitallers in the East would have had little recollection of the struggles between the Jerusalem nobility and the Hohenstaufen.

That Hospitaller relationships were strongly affected by the secular politics of the Holy Land may therefore be doubted. Other influences were at work and these made the Hospitallers ready to allow the master a considerable freedom of action and even to tolerate for a time measures which conflicted with statute and custom.
THE ORDER OF MOUNTJOY

The military order which was known first as Mountjoy, then as the Hospital of the Holy Redeemer and lastly as Montfragtie was among the less successful of those founded in the twelfth century. For most of its brief life of some sixty years its existence was precarious, and its military activities have left no trace. Nevertheless it has not been altogether neglected by historians. It is mentioned by many of the early writers on the military orders, and more recently it has been the subject of several studies, of which the most important are those by Delaville Le Roulx, Blásquez y Jiménez and Gazulla. But the aim of the early historians was usually to give a brief account of all the military orders, and the only information based on documentary evidence that their discussions of Mountjoy contain is that taken from Rades y Andrada’s *Chronicde las tres Ordenes y Caballerías de Sanctiago, Calatrava y Alcántara*, which includes a small amount of material drawn from documents which Rades found in the archive of Calatrava. Modern accounts of the Order have been based on a wider range of sources, but none has employed by any means all the surviving material or discussed all the phases of the Order’s history: Delaville Le Roulx was over-optimistic when he claimed that the documents which he had discovered at Alcalá de Henares “permettent de reconstituer l’histoire entière des frères de Montjoye.” A further examination of the Order’s history may therefore be justified, especially as it illustrates several of the factors which could bring about the decay of a religious foundation and some of the difficulties encountered when an attempt was made to abolish a declining institution.

* The founder of the Order was the Leonese Count Rodrigo Alvarez. He had succeeded to the county of Sarria in 1167, but some four years later he entered

1 E.g. F. Mennenius, *Deliciae equestrium sive militarium ordinum* (Cologne, 1618), pp. 86-87; A. Mendo, *De ordinibus militaribus disquisitiones canonicae, theologicae, morales et historiae* (Lyon, 1668), p. 8; B. Giustinian, *Historia cronologica dell’origine degli ordini militari e di tutte le religioni cavalleresche* (Venice, 1692), ii, 467-470; A. Schoonebeek, *Historie de tous les ordres militaires ou de chevaleris* (Amsterdam, 1699), i, 286.


3 Toledo, 1572, fol. 38b-39v.

4 Loc. cit., p. 43. These documents are now in the AHN (Archivo Histórico Nacional, Madrid).

5 Spanish names are given in a modern Spanish form; names of non-Spanish or uncertain origin have been anglicised.

6 It was held until February 1167 by Sanche, the mother of Rodrigo and widow of count Alvaro: J. González, *Regesta de Fernando II* (Madrid, 1948), p. 190. The first reference to Rodrigo as count of Sarria occurs in July of that year: ibid., p. 935. Sanche has sometimes been identified as the daughter of Alfonso VI of Leon and Castile or as the sister of Alfonso VII. But Alfonso VI’s daughter of that
the Spanish military order of Santiago and he is mentioned as a member of that Order in two documents issued by the Portuguese king in September 1172/3. By the early part of 1174, however, Rodrigo had sought permission from the Cardinal Deacon Jacinth, then papal legate in Spain, to leave Santiago so that he could follow a stricter rule of life. One cause of his discontent was the practice in Santiago of allowing members to be married. The legate gave his approval, and Rodrigo with some followers established a new community which adopted the Cistercian rule, modified to allow the new establishment to perform the functions of a military order. According to a later report, the general chapter of Citeaux opposed Rodrigo’s adoption of its rule, “noting and pointing out his inconstancy,” and his plan was accepted by the abbot of Citeaux without the consent of the chapter. By the end of 1175, however, the general chapter appears to have accepted Rodrigo’s proposals, for when (apparently in December of that year) Alexander III confirmed the count’s transfer and took the new community under his protection he referred to relaxations of the Cistercian rule made for Rodrigo by the general chapter of Citeaux. The new community was thus sim-
ilar to Calatrava in being affiliated to the Cistercian order, but unlike Calatrava it may have been made directly subject to the abbot of Citeaux himself.\textsuperscript{18}

The earliest known grants to the new community were made in Aragon in 1174. In July of that year the Aragonese King Alfonso II gave Rodrigo the recently conquered stronghold of Alfambra, on the condition that the count and his followers assisted the Aragonese ruler against the Moors;\textsuperscript{19} and in the next month Pedro, bishop of Zaragoza, granted rights over the church of Alfambra and over other churches in the territory attached to that castle.\textsuperscript{20} Early in the next year Alfonso made the further donation of Fuentes Calientes, to the north of Alfam-
bra.\textsuperscript{21}

When the pope approved Rodrigo's transfer from Santiago he imposed the condition that the count should not accept into his community any members of the Order of Santiago or receive any strongholds over which disputes with the other Order could arise; and González has argued that it was this ruling which led Rodrigo to leave Leon, where Santiago had its possessions, and to go to Aragon.\textsuperscript{22} Yet the papal prohibition was issued after the earliest grants in Aragon had been made. It is, of course, possible that the papal legate had earlier imposed similar conditions when he agreed to Rodrigo's proposals; but by 1180, when Alexander III issued two confirmations of the Order's possessions, it had received a number of grants in Leon, and these indicate that Rodrigo had not been obliged to sever contacts with the Leonese kingdom.\textsuperscript{23} He had probably sought patronage from all the rulers in the Peninsula and was fortunate in finding a willing patron in Alfonso II.

The explanation of Alfonso's favor is perhaps to be found in his relations with the Templars at that time. By the terms of an agreement made in 1148 with Ramón Berenguer IV they had the right to a fifth of all lands gained from the Moors by the Aragonese rulers.\textsuperscript{24} Yet they were not assigned any estates in the lands

\textsuperscript{18} In 1180 the pope referred to the reverence and obedience owed by the community to the abbot of Citeaux: Delaville Le Roulx, loc. cit., pp. 51-54.

\textsuperscript{19} M. Albareda y Herrera, El fuero de Alfambra (Madrid, 1925), pp. 96-97; Gazulla, loc. cit., ix, 870-871. Alfambra lies to the north of Teruel. Alfonso's grant also included the neighbouring villages and hamlets of Camañas, Celadas, Malvecino, Miravete and Perales.

\textsuperscript{20} Albareda y Herrera, op. cit., pp. 97-98.

\textsuperscript{21} Gazulla, loc. cit., ix, 971.

\textsuperscript{22} El reino de Castilla, i, 585.

\textsuperscript{23} In 1180 the pope referred to the reverence and obedience owed by the community to the abbot of Citeaux: Delaville Le Roulx, loc. cit., pp. 51-54; 23 November 1180: Bullarium ordinis de Calatrava, pp. 14-16; Blázquez y Jiménes, loc. cit., pp. 165-166; Velo y Nieto, op. cit., pp. 111-115. As some of the grants are said to have been made by Fernando II, it is difficult to understand how Delaville Le Roulx, loc. cit., p. 46, could assume that all the possessions in Spain mentioned in the confirmations lay in southern Aragon. The Order's Leonese possessions in 1180 apparently consisted of Villagarcia, the monastery of Nava, Linares del Rey, Padornelo, Daucosco, Necosco, Sta María de Nogares, San Juan de Agera, Sta Eulalia, San Andrés, half of Ribadeuva and Gasa. It is not easy, however, to identify these places: either the names cannot be traced or there is more than one place of the same name. But it may be noted that there are places called Padornelo, Villagarcia and San Juan de Agiteira not far from Sarrías.

\textsuperscript{24} Colección de documentos inéditos del Archivo General de la Corona de Aragón, ed. P. de Bofarull y Mascarió, iv (Barcelona, 1849), 98-99, doc. 48; Marquis d'Albon, Cartulaire général de l'Ordre du Temple, 1119?-1160 (Paris, 1913), pp. 204-206, doc. 914.
The Order of Mountjoy

conquered by Alfonso II in the district of Teruel. Alfonso was apparently becoming reluctant to entrust the defence of frontier strongholds mainly to a large and powerful international order, which might (as in the Holy Land) pursue an independent policy contrary to royal interests. It was probably for this reason that he preferred to favor in the conquered districts a smaller order, which he could more easily control, while at the same time encouraging other Spanish military orders to establish themselves there as well.

Although the earliest evidence about the new Order comes from Aragon, it nevertheless took its name from a hill near Jerusalem which, according to mediaeval descriptions of the Holy Land, was called Mountjoy because from there pilgrims gained their first sight of the city of Jerusalem. Gazulla has noted that this name is not given to the Order until 1180. In that year it is called Mountjoy in the two papal confirmations and these also refer to possessions in the East, including Mountjoy itself. Gazulla has therefore argued that between the time of the early grants in Aragon and 1180 Rodrigo went to the East and received the places mentioned in the papal bulls. Several of the acquisitions in the East can in fact be dated and all of these, as Gazulla suspected, belong to the later 1170s. Between October 1176 and June 1177 Reginald of Chatillon gave land to the Order and this grant was confirmed by Baldwin IV of Jerusalem on the condition that Rodrigo and his followers fought continuously against the infidel in the East; later in 1177 Sibylla, the sister of Baldwin IV and countess of Ascalon and Jaffa, granted Rodrigo towers, land and rents at Ascalon; and in September of the following year a donation was received from the prior of the Holy Sepulchre. This evidence, coupled with the statement in the papal confirmations in 1180 that Rodrigo had begun to build a chapel at Mountjoy, which was not then completed, leaves little room for doubting that the link with the Holy Land dates from this time. A theory has admittedly at times been advanced that Rodrigo went to the East in the middle of the twelfth century, founded the Order of Mountjoy then and later revived it in Spain after leaving Santiago. But not only does this theory lack any documentary support; as it has been set out, it also involves some curious misconceptions about the history of the kingdom of Jerusalem. The desire to fight against the infidel in the East was not uncommon

In 1179 Alfonso granted Alcanis to the Order of Calatrava: Bullarium ordinis de Calatrava, pp. 13–14.
Loc. cit., ix, 97–98.
J. Delaville Le Roulx, "Inventaire de pièces de Terre Sainte de l'Ordre de l'Hôpital," Rerum de Orient Latin, iii (1883), 61, no. 116; R. Rüthricht, Regesta Regni Hierosolimitani (Innsbruck, 1898–1904), ii, 33, no. 539. In the eighteenth-century inventory from which this grant is known Rodrigo is erroneously referred to as master of the Order of Avis.
S. Pdoll, Codice diplomatico del secolo militare ordine percoslimitano, 1 (Lucca, 1783), 68, doc. 63.
Ibid., i, 247–248, doc. 265.
Velo y Nieto, op. cit., pp. 35–36, 46–47; Muñoz de San Pedro, loc. cit., p. 71. Both of these writers seem to assume that Saladin's conquests in the kingdom of Jerusalem occurred before 1170.
among Spaniards at least in the early twelfth century, when many felt that they should direct their crusading activities towards Jerusalem. And because of the shortage of troops in the East, the Franks settled out there were very ready to welcome Rodrigo, just as in 1180 the prince of Antioch was willing to grant castles to the Order of Santiago if it undertook to fight in the East.

The papal confirmations of the Order of Mountjoy issued in 1180 may well have been obtained by Rodrigo when travelling back to Spain from the Holy Land. In these Alexander III, besides confirming the possessions of Mountjoy and renewing the promise of papal protection, granted the Order extensive privileges, which like those enjoyed by the other military orders indicate the importance attached by the papacy to such institutions in the twelfth century. Alexander decreed that the Order should be answerable only to Rome; no one could pronounce a sentence of excommunication or suspension on its members except on papal authority. And whereas most religious houses were at this time exempted from the payment of tithes only on demesne novales, Mountjoy like other military orders and Citeaux was freed from payment on all lands which it worked with its own labour or at its own expense. The concessions granted by the pope also included the right to celebrate divine offices in times of general interdict, provided that this was done behind closed doors and without any ringing of bells and provided that those who were excommunicate or under interdict were excluded.

These privileges are common to both of the confirmations issued in 1180; but there are certain points of difference between the two bulls. In the earlier confirmation, issued in May, two references are made to Citeaux, but in the second bull, drawn up in November 1180, the wording is changed and both references are omitted. There were apparently therefore fresh tensions in 1180 between Mountjoy and Citeaux and the link between them seems to have been temporarily severed; but no further details about the relations between the two at this time are known. The bull issued in November also differs from that published in May by referring to land in Lombardy granted to Rodrigo by the marquis of Monferrat. Presumably during the summer of 1180 the count had sought the patronage of the marquis, to whom he had no doubt been recommended by Sibylla, whose first husband had been the marquis's eldest son.

In November 1180 Rodrigo also secured a further privilege from the pope, allowing the Order to accept Brabanzons, Aragonese and Basques as members, provided that they were not married or of servile condition or already attached to another order and provided that they had obtained absolution from their bish-

---

27 At the turn of the eleventh and twelfth centuries Spanish rulers had found it necessary to obtain papal bulls prohibiting Spaniards from going to the East: e.g. J. P. Migne, Patrologia Latina, clxxxii (Paris, 1884), 66, 69-75, docs. 26, 44; cf. also A. Ubieto Arteta, "La participación navarro-aragonesa en la primera cruzada," Príncipe de Viana, viii (1947), 387-398.

Alexander was here referring to the mercenary soldiers against whom decrees had been passed at the Lateran Council in 1179. Rodrigo had apparently encountered difficulty in obtaining recruits and therefore sought permission to use such men and, in an attempt to divert the energies of these soldiers to a better cause, the pope agreed. From this privilege and from the other bulls issued in 1180 it is clear that the qualification for entry into Mountjoy, as into the Temple, was free birth; it is not known, however, whether a distinction was made between knights and sergeants, as happened in the Temple.

Whether or not Rodrigo was more successful in finding recruits in the years following 1180, in these years the Order continued to gain property both in Italy and Spain. In 1181 two sons of the castellan of Susa, near Turin, gave land to the Order on the condition that they should be given the habit if they asked for it. In the following year the Order received the lordship of Orrios, near Alfambara, from Alfonso II of Aragon and that of Villaviudas from Alfonso VIII of Castile, while a series of grants was made at this time by the family of the Castilian noble Lope Díaz de Haro.

Nevertheless in September 1186 an attempt was made to amalgamate the Order with the Temple. Peter of Ciliis, representing Mountjoy, granted all the possessions of the Order to Gilbert Eral, who was the Templar provincial master in Provence and north-eastern Spain. Gasulla links this grant with events in the Holy Land and asserts that the confusion which followed the death of Baldwin IV led to a migration of some members of Mountjoy (Peter of Ciliis, Fralmo of Lucca and other non-Spaniards) from the East to Spain; and these were responsible for the grant to the Temple. But it is difficult to find any evidence of a migration in 1186: Fralmo of Lucca was already in Spain in 1182 and 1183, to-
gether with Hildebrand of Lucca. Nor is it easy to understand why such a migration should have been completed by the autumn of 1186, for the conquests by Saladin did not take place until after the battle of Hattin in the following year. The grant was in fact probably made in Spain because Mountjoy, like the Order of Santiago, did not effectively establish itself in the East and was centered all the time in Spain. Count Rodrigo was in the Peninsula in May and November 1181 and also in April and July 1182; he was probably there as well in December of that year and in the early part of the next; and after 1180 the eastern sources are silent about the Order of Mountjoy. Had the Order been centered in the East after 1180, it would have been natural for the grant of 1186 to have been made in the Holy Land to the grand master of the Temple. If the proposed amalgamation with the Temple cannot be explained by events in the Holy Land, there is no evidence either to suggest that it should be attributed to dissensions within Mountjoy; those who later found themselves on opposite sides were in 1186 still acting together. Nor, in view of the continued growth of the Order’s property, is a lack of material resources likely to have occasioned the decision taken in 1186. It is possible, on the other hand, that (despite Alexander’s privilege of 1180) the Order had failed to attract a sufficient number of recruits to carry out its functions properly. But note must also be taken of the absence of Count Rodrigo in 1186. He may by then have been dying, for he was dead by the autumn of the next year. Alternatively his absence and his setting up of Peter of Ciliis to act in his place may be a further indication of the inconstancy of which the general chapter of Citeaux had complained. The man who had joined Santiago but then left it to found his own order, who had established a community in Spain but then decided to extend his interests to the East but who then apparently failed to carry out his plan, may now have lost interest in Mountjoy. Whatever the reason, the Order was deprived of Rodrigo’s leadership, and this may have influenced the decision taken in 1186.

The amalgamation with the Temple was not, however, carried through at that time. The condition had been made that the union would have to be confirmed by the grand master of the Temple and by the king of Aragon, and it is probable that the proposal was vetoed by Alfonso II, who was still trying to prevent the

---

256

---

30 ACA, reg. 310 fol. 26-26; AHN, San Juan, Cast. de Amposta, legajo 38, doc. 87; Real Academia de la Historia, 12-6-1/M-88, doc. 37. Fralmo had been in Italy in 1181, when the grant near Turin was made.

31 Gazulla himself later, loc. cit., xx, 102, writes of a migration after the fall of Jerusalem.

32 González, Regesta, pp. 477, 480-481; AHN, San Juan, Cast. de Amposta, legajo 38, doc. 87; J. López Agurleta, Vida del venerable fundador de la Orden de Santiago (Madrid, 1731), p. 195.

33 González, El reino de Castilla, ii, 683-685, doc. 596; ACA, reg. 310 fol. 26-26; AHN, San Juan, Cast. de Amposta, legajo 38, doc. 87.

34 Admittedly Rodrigo González, who was later the leader of a faction in the Order, is not listed among those who agreed to the amalgamation; but it is not known whether by 1186 he was one of the leading members of the Order. Juan Garcez, who was later one of his chief supporters, is among those listed.

35 The wording of the document recording the proposed amalgamation in September 1186 implies that he was still alive when it was drawn up.
The Order of Mountjoy

Templars from gaining influence in southern Aragon. His desire to maintain and support the Order of Mountjoy is illustrated by his grant to it in November 1187 of the lordship of Villel, near the Moorish frontier to the south of Alfambra.*

Nevertheless in October 1188, only two years after the abortive attempt to amalgamate Mountjoy with the Temple, the Order was joined to the Hospital of the Holy Redeemer at Teruel, situated between Alfambra and Villel. This was an institution recently founded by the Aragonese king. The earliest reference to it is found in a document issued by its preceptor in April 1188,* and a confirmation of the Hospital was granted by Clement III in July of that year. Alfonso had given the right of proprietas over the institution to the papacy, and the pope in this bull took the Hospital's possessions under papal protection, besides granting it exemption from the payment of tithes on demesne labores and on the food of its animals. The bull also states that the primary purpose of the foundation was the redemption of captives: ten morabetinos were to be contributed towards the ransom of each prisoner. The Hospital thus foreshadowed the later Order of Mercy, but it was not the first institution to concern itself with the ransom of captives. The Order of Santiago had already undertaken this work in addition to its military duties.* According to Clement's bull the Hospital was furthermore not to contain more than thirteen brothers (presumably so that the greater part of its revenues could be devoted to the ransom of captives) and these were to wear the habit of the regular canons and follow the customs of the Knights Hospitaller.*

Although the Hospital of the Holy Redeemer was thus founded before the autumn of 1188, the document recording its union with Mountjoy is worded partly as a foundation charter of the ransom hospital: Alfonso states that
cordi nobis est de his que nobis divina clemencia contulit aliqua in pias causas erogare redimentes tempus quoniam dies mali sunt et ob reverenciam sancti Redemptoris domum construere invocacione sancti Redemptoris nuncupatam, quatinus illa bona que pietate deo illi hospitali evenerint in redemptionem captivorum, in hospitalitatem fratrum, in expensas militum contra inimicos crucis Christi dimicantium distribuantur... Igitur...
in villa de Terol domum hospitalis a prima radice hedificare dispono.

---

* Gazulla, loc. cit., ix, 375.
* Ibid., x, 39-40; this version is based on a transcript in the ACA; the original, which shows only minor differences, is in the Hospitaller Archivo del Gran Priorado de Catalufia (now housed in the ACA), parchments of Barberá no. 127.
* Gazulla, loc. cit., ix, 106. M. Pallarés Gil, "La restauración aragonesa bajo Alfonso el Casto," Boletín de historia y geografía de Bajo-Aragón, III (1909), 279, states that the Hospital of the Holy Redeemer had been founded by 1184, but this assumption arises from a mis-dating of the grant of Villarluengo to the Holy Redeemer, which was not made until 1194.
* On other institutions which adopted the customs of the Hospitallers, see L. Le Grand, "Les Maisons-Dieu, leurs statuts au XIIIe siècle," Revue des questions historiques, lx (1900), 104 ff. The information provided in Clement's bull shows that Gazulla, loc. cit., ix, 106-107, is obviously wrong in claiming that the house at Teruel from the beginning formed part of the Order of Mountjoy.
Kehr has therefore suggested that the date of the document is inaccurate and that it was drawn up in 1187. But this suggestion creates difficulties: the document is dated both by the year of the Incarnation and by the Spanish Era; Ricardo, bishop of Huesca, who is among the witnesses was apparently not appointed until November 1187; and if the document had been drawn up in 1187 Clement III's bull of July 1188 would have been out of date when it was issued. The form of the document is more easily explained by the fact that much of the foundation charter was still valid and could be used as the basis for the document recording the union with Mountjoy. Thus the document of union includes the clause about the payment of ten morabetinos towards the ransoming of captives, which is found in the papal confirmation of July 1188 and which the papal scribes had undoubtedly copied from the original foundation charter. The scribe in October 1188 seems therefore to have copied a large part of the foundation charter and inserted a section beginning

Addiderunt etiam assensu et voluntate nostra magister Alfambre et fratres sui in augmentum ordinis sui et in augmentum hospitalis sancti Redemptoris, ita tamen ut in eodem hospitali ordo et religio fratrum Alfambre observetur, Alfambrem cum omnibus pertinentiis suis ubicunque fuerint ultra mare vel citra mare, interveniente assensu et voluntate Rodrici Gonzalvi comendatoris in Castella et locum precipui magistri in Alfambra obtinentis et Johannis Garzez comendatoris in Alfambra et insuper tocius conventus.

The members of Mountjoy saw the necessity of linking themselves with another foundation and secured that their own rule, the Cistercian, was to be followed, although the center of the Order was to be at Teruel. It was further agreed between the king and the members of Mountjoy that a quarter of the revenues of the joint Order should be used for the ransoming of captives. The document of union also includes a number of concessions made by Alfonso, including the grant of Castellote, powers of lordship over one man from every hundred subject to the king and exemption for the Order from customs and tolls, but it is not clear which of these were new concessions.

The union with the Hospital of the Holy Redeemer did not bring an end to the troubles of Rodrigo's foundation. Although several acquisitions of property from private individuals are recorded in the years following 1188 and although the Aragonese king continued his patronage of the Order with the gift of the Puente de Fraga in 1189 and of the deserted place of Villarluengo in 1194,
which the Order immediately resettled, Alfonso II found himself obliged early in April 1196 to surrender all the possessions of the Holy Redeemer in his kingdoms to the Temple. At the end of the same month Fralmo of Lucca, master of the Holy Redeemer, on behalf of the members of the Order granted all its possessions in Aragon and elsewhere to the Templars. On this occasion the transfer was to a large extent carried out. Lists have survived recording the property which the Temple gained from the Holy Redeemer in Aragon in 1196; in August of the same year Celestine III confirmed the incorporation; and before the end of the year Templar officials appear in the former Aragonese houses of the Holy Redeemer. But the union was not accepted by all members of the ransom hospital. Although Fralmo had the support of eight commanders, including those of Villel, Alfambra, Castellote and Orrios, Rodrigo González led a group which refused to accept the amalgamation and which established itself in Castile at the castle of Montfragüé on the river Tajo near the Moorish frontier. This group, which adopted the name of Montfragüé, turned to the pope for aid.

In 1198 each side gave Innocent III a version of the events leading up to the surrender to the Temple. The representatives of the group at Montfragüé claimed that Fralmo of Lucca, who had been master, had by the common consent of the brothers of the Order been removed from office because of his failings, and a certain R. (undoubtedly Rodrigo González) had been unanimously and canonically set up in his place. In the new master's absence, Fralmo with the consent of Alfonso II and with the connivance of some members of the Order, had seized the possessions in Aragon and usurped the office of master again. Then on the authority of papal letters (now alleged to have been obtained by fraud) Fralmo and his supporters had transferred themselves to the Temple and surrendered to it most of the Order's possessions. On the strength of this grant the provincial master of the Temple in Leon had seized what the Order had possessed in that kingdom. Fralmo in his defence stated that long after count Rodrigo's death he had been made master and had restored the Order, which had been in a state of collapse. Certain brothers, however, including Rodrigo González and Juan Garces, had left taking horses, arms and other goods with them, and the Order again

---

64 AHN, cód. 699, p. 54, doc. 45. The date of this document is given as 1184, but it must belong to 1194.
65 Gazulla, loc. cit., x, 99–100.
67 AHN, Calatrava, signatura 1341-C, fols. 185–86.
69 E.g. Guillermo de Peralta in October 1196 was commander of Alfambra and Villel: AHN, cód. 466, p. 294, doc. 178.
70 The title of commander was commonly given in the military orders to anyone who exercised authority and it is not clear which of these were heads of convents and which were merely bailiffs.
71 It is not known when Montfragüé was obtained. Alfonso VIII still held the castle in 1189: González, El reino de Castilla, ii, 691–693, doc. 580. If, as seems likely, the castle of “Fraga” mentioned in a bull issued by Innocent III is to be identified with Montfragüé, then it was apparently not acquired before 1196: ACA, reg. 309, fols. 13–14; AHN, cód. 1814, pp. 98–104, doc. 62.
fell into decay. Alfonso II, fearing that the frontier castles held by the Order would not be defended, commanded him to surrender them to the Crown or give them to an order which could protect them. Seeing no alternative, Fralmo with the approval of the members of the Order and with papal consent made the surrender to the Temple, which Count Rodrigo had promised to join even before he had entered the Order of Santiago. 

The accuracy of these statements can to some extent be tested by examining them in conjunction with the fragmentary evidence which survives from the years up to 1196, as can the interpretation placed upon them by Gazulla, who is inclined to distrust Fralmo, and with the aid of these statements and the other evidence the background to the unions of 1188 and 1196 can be partly filled in. In the earliest surviving version of the grant of Villel (probably a contemporary copy) the name of the master of Mountjoy is illegible except for the first letter “F”, but in two fourteenth-century transcripts (one in the Hospitaller Cartulario Magno and the other in the Liber testamentorum, privilegiarum, statutorum et gratiarum in the Aragonese Crown archive) it is given as “Framo” and “Flamerio.” Fralmo had therefore succeeded Count Rodrigo before the end of 1187 and was not appointed only shortly before 1196, as suggested by Gazulla, who bases his assertion on Fralmo’s remark that he was appointed long after the death of Count Rodrigo. The long period to which Fralmo refers could have been as much as a year, and this delay in appointing a successor to Rodrigo, coupled with Fralmo’s statement that he found the Order in a state of collapse, shows that the failure to unite with the Temple in 1186 led to a period of uncertainty and instability, during which central direction was lacking. This was soon followed by schism. In the document recording the grant of Villel in December 1187 Fralmo is linked with Juan Garcez, commander of Alfambra. Yet in the charter of October 1188 concerning the union between Mountjoy and the Holy Redeemer, the distinction is drawn between the master (unnamed) and his brothers on the one hand and Rodrigo González, commander of Castile and tenens-locum of the master, Juan Garcez and the whole convent on the other. Thus by the autumn of 1188 there was a schism in the Order of Mountjoy, and it had apparently begun since the end of 1187. It has been suggested that the split was racial in character and that the group in opposition to Fralmo consisted of the Castilian and Leonese members of the Order. But the names of those who agreed to the amalgamation with the Temple in 1196 do not reveal any clear racial grouping; nor does the fact that the malcontents in 1196 went to Castile necessarily provide any indication of their nationality, for in view of Alfonso II’s attitude, those who opposed the union with the Temple, whatever their country of origin, could not hope to maintain themselves in Aragon and were inevitably obliged to seek support else-
where. If the statements made in 1198 can be trusted, the dispute was of a more personal character and arose from discontent with Fralmo's leadership. In 1188 Rodrigo González and his followers had power in Alfambra, the headquarters of the Order at that time, and therefore their claim that Fralmo had been expelled is more accurate than the latter's assertion that they had deserted him, but on the other hand Rodrigo González is not called master in 1188 or in later documents and the representatives of Montfragüe were wrong in claiming in 1198 that he had been appointed to that office. Possibly in 1188 Fralmo sought the union with the Hospital of the Holy Redeemer because he saw in it an opportunity to reassert his position, while his opponents agreed because they envisaged that they would continue to exercise authority and that the fortunes of Mountjoy would be restored by the acquisition of the ransom hospital's property, after the disruption which the schism in Mountjoy must have caused. Following the union authority clearly in fact remained in the hands of Rodrigo González, since Alfonso II's confirmation of the possessions of the Holy Redeemer and his gift of the Puente de Fraga in 1189 were made to him. But Fralmo was not completely deprived of power, for in 1190 land at Villel was sold and pledged to him. These transactions show that his authority was at that time recognised in some places, such as Villel and Teruel, but they do not imply that he had by then regained complete control over the Order in Aragon: in December 1194 Juan Garcez, a supporter of Rodrigo González, was still commander of Alfambra. By the end of 1194, however, Alfonso II seems to have realised that nothing was to be gained from further support of the Order, since his will drawn up in December of that year makes no reference to the Holy Redeemer, even though it includes a bequest of 1,000 marabetinos to be used in the ransoming of Christian captives from the Moors. He must by then have been considering taking action over the Holy Redeemer, for in reply to a royal petition Celestine III in March 1195 gave Alfonso permission to grant to the Temple a “certain house" which the Aragonese king had built on the Moorish frontier. The Holy Redeemer is not mentioned by name in Celestine's bull, but there is no record of another grant of a similar kind to the Templars at this time, and this papal letter is written in terms similar to those found in two confirmations of the union with the Temple issued by Celestine in August 1196, in which the name of the Holy Redeemer is not given but in one of which the chief places concerned are listed and Fralmo is mentioned by name. This is thus the papal approval which the representatives of Montfragüe claimed had been obtained by deceit and the existence of which Gazulla has doubted on the grounds that no reference is made to it in the acts of union.

\[^{67}\] In the charter recording the grant of the Puente de Fraga he is referred to as “qui nunc estis in loco magistri." When Alfonso II in 1189 issued a confirmation of the Order's possessions he called Rodrigo González by the title of "preceptor": ACA, reg. 910, fol. 28v.

\[^{68}\] AHN, cód. 468, p. 203, docs. 170, 171. These documents were drawn up by the scribe of the Hospital of the Holy Redeemer at Teruel.

\[^{69}\] AHN, cód. 467, pp. 431–432, doc. 604.

\[^{70}\] Colección de documentos inéditos del Archivo de la Corona de Aragón, iv, 390–411, doc. 168.

\[^{71}\] Kehr, Papsturkunden in Spanien, i: Katalanien, p. 560, doc. 254.

\[^{72}\] Ibid., pp. 577–580, docs. 267, 270.
Gazulla has further asked why Fralmo did not subject his Order to one of the other military orders and asserts that the Temple had taken no part in the struggle against the Moors in southern Aragon. On this last point no evidence can be adduced because Alfonso II's campaigns are inadequately covered in both Christian and Arab sources. But that there was, as Fralmo claimed, little alternative to amalgamation with the Temple is shown by Alfonso's agreement to the plan, because the union meant the abandonment of his policy of excluding the Templars from southern Aragon, which until then he had been trying to maintain; the king recognised, as he stated when writing to Celestine, that the Temple could protect frontier strongholds better than anyone else. Little is now known of the extent of the Hospitalers' military activities in Aragon,²² but clearly the Spanish military orders of Santiago and Calatrava were concentrating their activities in other parts of the Peninsula, and were at that time only beginning to interest themselves in Aragon.

The dispute which began in the papal curia in 1198 dragged on in the early years of the thirteenth century. In October 1198 Innocent III ordered the bishops of Osma and Zaragoza, together with the abbot of Veruela, to investigate the case,²³ but their activities are obscure. In 1204 the bishop of Zaragoza confirmed to the Temple the churches formerly held by the Hospital of the Holy Redeemer in his diocese.²⁴ Yet in April 1209 Innocent wrote to the archbishop-elect of Toledo, the bishop of Sigüenza and the archdeacon of Talavera saying that the bishop of Zaragoza, with the counsel of the other judges appointed in 1198, had ordered the Templars in the diocese of Zaragoza to surrender into his custody the castles of Alfambra, Castellote and Villel and the other places in dispute; they had refused and had been excommunicated.²⁵ This sentence was still in force in 1209. It had presumably been imposed after the bishop's confirmation issued in 1204, but it is difficult to understand why the bishop issued this confirmation. Possibly the judges delegate had not by that time started to hear the case, or possibly the dispute was concerned first with the Order's possessions in Leon (the wording of Innocent's bull of October 1198 could be interpreted in this sense) and only later came to involve the possessions in Aragon as well.

The pope ordered the archbishop-elect of Toledo to enforce the bishop of Zaragoza's sentence until the Templars gave satisfaction. The prelate summoned them to appear at Sigüenza at the end of November 1209,²⁶ but no further record of the dispute has survived. It is clear from Templar sources, however, that the

²² The lack of evidence is stressed by M. L. Ledesma, "Notas sobre la actividad militar de los hospitalarios," Príncipes de Viana, xxv, (1964), 51-56. S. Garcia Larragueta, "La Orden de San Juan en la crisis del imperio hispánico del siglo XII," Hispania, xxi (1964), 433-534, argues that the Hospitalers took little part in the Reconquest, but his argument is based mainly on the absence of evidence.


²⁴ AHN, San Juan, Cast. de Amposta, legajo 59, docs. 61, 67.

²⁵ AHN, San Juan, Cast. de Amposta, legajo 158, doc. 1.

²⁶ Ibid.
Temple maintained possession of the rights in dispute. The group established at Montfragiie were obliged to support themselves mainly from the rights which they had acquired since 1196. These included rents from salt pans at Talavera and land at Magán, given by Alfonso VIII of Castile, besides other property obtained from the Castilian king in exchange for the lordship of Segura. This was not, however, enough to maintain the group at Montfragiie, and at the Lateran Council in 1215 the master of Calatrava reported that the members of the Holy Redeemer who had not joined the Temple now wanted to enter his own Order. The consent of the pope was obtained, as was that of the chapter of Citeaux.

This proposal provoked a new dispute with the Temple. The master of the Templars in Castile and Leon protested that the head of the Hospital of the Holy Redeemer and members of that house had received the habit of the Temple and surrendered all their possessions; the Temple was in peaceful occupation of these except a few, which the Templars now demanded. The representative of Calatrava replied that nearly all the possessions which the members of Montfragiie then held had been acquired since 1196 and that in these the Temple could claim no right; he therefore petitioned that leave should be granted to the remaining members of the ransom hospital to join Calatrava, taking with them all the possessions which they then held. Innocent issued his decision in June 1216. Taking into account the fact that the former master of the Holy Redeemer had transferred to the Temple with most of the members and possessions of his Order, the pope judged that the Temple should have all the lands which the Holy Redeemer had held in 1196, including any that had been withheld from the Temple since that date; whatever the members of Montfragiie had acquired since 1196, they should retain.

Innocent's decision was confirmed by Honorius III at the beginning of 1217, but it was not until 1221 that the amalgamation of Montfragiie and Calatrava was carried out. In that year Fernando III, "considerans penuriam et annulationem ordinis de Montfrag, qui licet quondam magnus fuerit a miniculo indiget iam extremo," assigned the possessions of Montfragiie to Calatrava. As in 1196,
objections were raised by some members of the Order, and dissensions within Montfraglie may have been responsible for the delay in carrying out the union proposed in 1215 until Fernando, like Alfonso II earlier, felt obliged to take action to ensure the defence of frontier lands.

The quarrel between Calatrava and those who objected to the union in 1221 was referred for arbitration to the bishops of Burgos and Palencia and the archdeacon of Valpuesta. But partly because the bishop of Burgos was too busy and possibly partly because of pressure from the Castilian king, who was said to be favouring Calatrava in the matter, the arbiters took no action, and the malcontents appealed to Honorius III. In 1225 he appointed the bishop, dean and archdeacon of Burgos to investigate the dispute; they were to settle it if they could or else report their findings back to the papal curia. The dispute was in due course referred back to Rome, but when the parties were summoned the representatives of Calatrava failed to appear. Instead of giving judgement against Calatrava, however, Pope Gregory IX decided that it was a matter which should be settled by compromise, and therefore at the end of May 1234 he ordered the judges delegate to try to bring agreement between the two parties and to proceed to judgement only if a settlement could not be reached by other means. But the representatives of Montfraglie immediately made another petition to the pope, alleging that the union with Calatrava had been achieved by bribery and without papal approval. This plea led Gregory to issue a further instruction to the judges delegate on 5 June 1234, ordering them to restore the possessions of Montfraglie to those who opposed the union, provided that their claims were well-founded. Although there are again no further records of the dispute, it is clear that the union was not in fact revoked, for in 1245 the castle of Montfragile was included among places given by Calatrava in an exchange to Fernando III.

The Order founded by Count Rodrigo had at last disappeared, but at least in Aragon it was not forgotten because the possessions which the Temple had gained from it continued to be known as the lands and rights once held by the Holy Redeemer, and the last episode of the Order’s history did not take place until the early fourteenth century. When the Aragonese King Jaime II was trying to prevent the Hospitallers from obtaining the Aragonese possessions of the Temple after the abolition of the latter Order, the suggestion was made that the Order of Mountjoy or the Holy Redeemer should be revived and should be given the Templar lands, together with the castle of Montesa which would be its headquarters. But although Montesa became the center of a military order,
The Order of Mountjoy

which was assigned the possessions of the Temple and Hospital in the kingdom of Valencia, the new Order was known by the name of Montesa and not by that of Mountjoy or of the Holy Redeemer.

The decline of Count Rodrigo's Order has parallels in the histories of many other religious houses and orders, and it was by no means the only decaying institution which was incorporated into the Temple. Religious houses and orders which were independent of other regular institutions were frequently being founded, especially during movements of reform or when a new kind of regular life was being evolved. Such new foundations were particularly liable to be affected by the troubles that afflicted Mountjoy during the course of its history: a failure of leadership, internal dissensions, a lack of material resources and possibly an insufficiency of recruits; and these factors brought the decline of many institutions.

The proliferation of new orders may have been hindered by the decree passed in the Lateran Council in 1215, which stipulated that anyone who wished to found a new religious house should adopt the rule and institutions of an existing house or order. But the history of Mountjoy shows the continuing difficulty of dealing with existing foundations which fell into decay. Those who had enjoyed a considerable degree of power and independence in their own house or order would often be reluctant to be swallowed up in a larger organisation: thus while the union of Mountjoy with the Holy Redeemer in 1188 was accepted, there was opposition to the unions with the larger military orders in 1196 and 1221. And it is clear from the history of Mountjoy that a quick settlement of subsequent disputes was not likely to be achieved by the procedures in use in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries: the proceedings which were instituted following the unions of 1196 and 1221 were in each case not concluded until at least thirteen years after the amalgamations had taken place. The practice of appealing to the pope, which was the inevitable consequence of grants of exemption and papal protection, in itself took time and a case had then to be referred back to local judges delegate or dealt with in the papal curia, which necessitated the summoning to Rome of the parties involved; and it is apparent from the disputes following the amalgamations of 1196 and 1221 that neither of these procedures was a speedy one. The delegation of cases helped to relieve the curia of work and meant that the parties did not have to be summoned to Rome, but it must often have added considerably to the burdens imposed on local prelates and this factor besides the normal delays to which justice was subject must have caused the prolongation of disputes. Nor was the settlement of cases likely to be expedited by the issuing of conflicting orders by the papal chancery, as happened in May and June 1234. The sending of new instructions following the receipt of a petition

---


from one of the parties, even though the arguments put forward by each side had earlier been fully examined, shows that papal officials might issue bulls without taking into account earlier papal letters on the same subject and suggests that the volume of business coming into the papal curia was too great for it all to be dealt with efficiently. In these circumstances the settlement of a dispute might take decades rather than years and in this way an order might, like Mountjoy, die a slow and laborious death.
The military order of St Thomas of Acre

The orders which devoted themselves from the twelfth century onwards to fighting the enemies of Christendom had by no means all originated as military foundations. Some had been first established as hospitals and charitable institutions, and had only later become militarized. In some instances the transformation resulted partly from a desire to give new life to an ailing institution; among other motives was no doubt the wish to provide additional resources for the struggle against the infidel. The Hospital of St John of Jerusalem is, of course, the best known of the charitable foundations which became military orders; among those less familiar is the Order of St Thomas of Acre.

Although this Order did not emerge as a military establishment until towards the end of the third decade of the thirteenth century, its origins can be traced back to the later years of the preceding century. As the cult of Becket was then rapidly growing, it is not surprising that a foundation dedicated to St Thomas the Martyr should have been established at that time in the Holy Land, but chroniclers and historians have failed to agree about the identity of the founder or the exact date of foundation. The earliest account of the Order’s origins is contained in Ralph of Diceto’s Imagines historiarum, written at the end of the twelfth century. Ralph tells that the foundation resulted from a vow taken at the time of the third crusade by his own chaplain, who was apparently beset on his way to the East by the common dread of the sea:

Circa dies istos cum primum obsessa fuisse Acon, Gwilellmus quidam Anglicus natione, capellanus Radulfi de Diceto decani Lundoniensis, dum tenderet Jerosolimam, astrinxit se voto, quod si prospero cursu portum intraret Acon, Sancto Thomae martyri sumptibus suis juxta facultatem possiblitatem capellam construeret, et procuraret ibidem ad honorem martyris cimiterium consecrari. Quod et factum est.1

This account was copied almost word for word by Roger of Wendover and by Matthew Paris in his Chronica majora.2 Yet an

1. Opera historica, ed. W. Stubbs, ii (Rolls Ser., 1876), 80–81.
2. Roger of Wendover, Flores historiarum, ed. H. G. Hewlett, i (Rolls Ser., 1886), 173–9; Matthew Paris, Chronica majora, ed. H. R. Luard, ii (Rolls Ser., 1874), 360.
entry for the year 1231 in the Dunstable annals asserts that the Order had originally been constituted by Hubert Walter, who had taken part in the third crusade; and when Matthew Paris came to write his Historia Anglorum he provided a different account of the Order's origins from that contained in his Chronica. When recording the events of the year 1190 he narrates that Richard I himself

in mari promisit, votum martiri faciendo, unam capellam fabricare in honorem ipsius in Terra Sancta, ut ci dux esset et tutor in terra et mari; quod adimplevit postea apud Achon, prout dictetur;

and the actual founding of the chapel by the English king is mentioned among the events of the year 1192. It is, of course, quite possible that all three individuals mentioned in these sources had a share in establishing the new foundation, but it was Richard who came to be remembered as the founder. When members of the Order later asked Gregory IX to confirm its new status as a military institution, they informed the pope that the house in Acre had been established by Richard I, and throughout the rest of the Order's history Richard continued to be regarded as its founder.

Yet while these medieval sources indicate that St Thomas of Acre was founded at the time of the third crusade and that Richard I played a significant part in its establishment, some more recent writers have sought to take its origins further back. Stubbs considered it just possible that the foundation might have been linked with the penance of maintaining 200 knights for a year in the Holy Land which was imposed on Henry II after the murder of Becket. This opinion has been repeated—and in the process of repetition the possibility has become a probability—while it has also been suggested that the foundation might have stemmed from the penance imposed on the actual murderers of Becket. But apparently the only

1. Annales monastici, ed. H. R. Luard, iii (Rolls Ser., 1866), 126.
2. Ed. F. Madden, ii (Rolls Ser., 1866), 14, 38.
3. In her article on Becket in the Dictionary of National Biography, K. Norgate suggested that Richard in 1192 enlarged or restored a chapel founded two years earlier by Ralph of Diceto's chaplain. Yet it is not clear exactly when Ralph's chaplain is supposed to have founded his chapel. But if it was before the fall of Acre in July 1191, the foundation would later have been re-established on a site within the city.
medieval source which links the Order with Becket's murder is a fifteenth-century chronicle of the Teutonic Order, and this work reveals its unreliability by assuming that the English king was doing penance for the murder at the time of the fall of Acre in 1291.¹ As St Thomas of Acre was not originally a military order the attempt to link it in this way with Henry's penance is in any case not very plausible.

The chief argument for a foundation date before the third crusade, however, concerns the Order's house in London, established on land formerly held by Becket's father, for according to all modern accounts this house was founded by Thomas fitz Theobald of Helles and his wife Agnes, the sister of Becket, before the capture of Acre in 1191. Stow, who was followed by eighteenth-century writers, said that the house was founded in Henry II's reign.² In 1864 Stubbs wrote that 'the house of S. Thomas of Acre in London was founded in connexion with this order by Thomas Fitz Theobald of Helles, and Agnes his wife, sister of Thomas Becket, which points to an earlier origin than the siege of Acre'; and Stubbs's opinion has been repeated in subsequent works, so that it has again recently been affirmed that the London house was founded before the capture of Acre.³

There are nevertheless difficulties in accepting this dating for the foundation of the house in London. The sole surviving copy of Thomas fitz Theobald of Helles's charter bears no date, but one of the witnesses was the bishop of London, Eustace of Fauconberg, who occupied the see from 1221 until the autumn of 1228; and in the charter the word militia is used to describe St Thomas of Acre, which suggests that the Order had already become militarized and that

¹. A. Matthaeus, Veteris aevi analecta (Hague, 1738), v. 751; Scriptores rerum prae- scriptionum, v (Leipzig, 1874), 105. Stubbs sought to draw a tenuous link between the penance and the Order by pointing out that the 200 knights were to fight under the Templars and that according to Matthew Paris, Chronica majora, iii (1876), 490, St Thomas of Acre was affiliated to the Temple: Chronicles and Memorials, i, p. cxxii, n. 5. But on this point the chronicler was incorrect: infra p. 7. A vow by Henry to found a house of regular canons in honour of St Thomas is mentioned in the Gesta Regis Henrici Secundi, ed. W. Stubbs, i (Rolls Ser., 1867), 134–5, but it is linked there with the installing of regular canons at Waltham. Some early historians of the military orders were of the opinion that Henry II visited the East in 1174 and on his return founded a military order in England: J. Micheli y Marquez, Tenore militar de cavalleria (Madrid, 1642), fo. 55; A. Mendo, De ordinibus militaribus disquisitiones canonicalis, theologicae, morales et historicas (Lyon, 1668), p. 8.


therefore the document should not be dated earlier than 1227. To obviate the difficulty caused by the dating of the charter, it has been suggested that it is merely a confirmation of an earlier document. But no references to a foundation in London before the late 1220s survive, and between 1231 and 1241 property rights were assigned by Terricus of Alegate to the brothers of the Order who were living in the city "in novo loco constructo". A document issued in the name of Thomas of Haverell, which therefore almost certainly belongs to the first two decades of the thirteenth century, casts further doubt on a foundation date before the third crusade, for this document refers to the possibility of acquiring the site of Becket's birthplace so that a chapel might be built there in his honour. A date in the later 1220s would moreover be more consistent with what can be discovered about the founder and his family. The name Theobald of Helles occurs in the records of a number of lawsuits involving property in Kent and Essex between 1200 and 1219, and on one occasion his son Thomas acted as his attorney; Theobald of Helles, sometimes with his son Thomas, also appears at this time as a witness to charters included in the cartulary of the priory of St Gregory, Canterbury; and between 1225 and 1231 Alice, the widow of Theobald of Helles, is recorded to have brought two actions concerning her dos, and in these Thomas fitz Theobald of Helles was involved. There can be little doubt that the individuals mentioned in these sources are to be identified with the founder of the London house and his family, and it is clear from this evidence that Thomas is more likely to have founded

1. Mercers' Company, London, Register of Writings, i, 1-17. On the date of the militarisation of the Order, see infra p. 488.
3. British Library, Cotton MS, Titus C vi, fo. 153-153r. Terricus' charter, which is undated, was later confirmed by Geoffrey of Lucy, the dean of St Paul's, who occupied that office until 1241: ibid. fo. 153v-154. Terricus had received this property in 1218 from the dean and chapter of St Paul's at an annual rent of five marks: ibid. fo. 152-152v; in 1231 this rent had been reduced to 438. 4d.: Early Charters of the Cathedral Church of St Paul, London, ed. M. Gibbs (Camden Society, 3rd ser., vol. lviii, 1939), pp. 256-7 doc. 321; and it was the latter amount that according to Terricus' charter the house of St Thomas was to pay to St Paul's.
5. Pleas before the King or his Justices, 1198-1212, ed. D. M. Stenton, iii (Selden Society, 1967), 242, 249, 253, 264, 290 nos. 1691, 1712, 2798, 1897, 2151; Curia Regis Rolls, i, 192, 206, 343; iii, 278; iv, 68, 124, 174, 234, 262, 311; v, 212; vii, 141, 272; viii, 13.
7. Carta Regis Roll, xii, 309, 494; xiii, 66, 139; xiv, 169, 302.
the house in London towards the end of the third decade of the thirteenth century than at a date before the siege of Acre.

It may be objected, of course, that Becket's sister could scarcely have been still alive in the later 1220s. But it is to be noted that Thomas fitz Theobald of Helles's charter makes no reference to the founder's wife, and similarly no wife is mentioned in the confirmation of this charter issued by Edward III in 1340; and although in 1315 it was said that the London house had been founded by relations and friends of Becket, the earliest surviving statement that Agnes, the sister of Becket, was the wife of Thomas fitz Theobald of Helles is apparently that made in a petition which the Order presented to the king in 1444. The land on which the London house was established admittedly appears at one time to have been held by Agnes Becket, but it is noteworthy that in his foundation charter Thomas fitz Theobald of Helles did not attempt to establish any direct link between himself and the Becket family: although he stated that the property had belonged to Gilbert Becket and that the archbishop had been born there, the only person he mentioned as a relation in the document was his father Theobald of Helles. It may be suggested therefore that the fifteenth-century claim that Agnes was the founder's wife was an inaccurate tradition which had probably grown up through the desire to create as close a link as possible between the house in London and its patron saint.

And while in the fifteenth century it was held that Agnes was the wife of the founder of the London house, it was also then asserted that in founding the establishment in London Thomas fitz Theobald of Helles was imitating the example of Richard I. Thus despite the claim about Agnes Becket, it was still thought that the house in London had been established after the time of the third crusade. The only link with the period before that crusade which can be established is that soon after its foundation the house of St Thomas
in Acre appears to have taken over an older institution there, for in 1209 Innocent III issued a privilege in favour of the prior of St Thomas the Martyr of Acre and of St George de Sisto, in which he referred to concessions made by his predecessor Alexander. These must originally have been granted to the foundation of St George de Sisto, which was then amalgamated with St Thomas of Acre, although nothing further seems to be known of this earlier establishment. There seem therefore to be few grounds for rejecting what the medieval sources say about the date of the foundation in Acre: the military order of St Thomas, like the Teutonic Order, had its origins in a house established at Acre at the time of the third crusade.

In its early days St Thomas of Acre housed a group of regular canons, and according to Ralph of Diceto his chaplain became the first prior. The activities of the canons are variously described in the sources. Ralph tells that they concerned themselves with the care of the poor and the burial of the dead; in 1207 the English king referred to their ransoming of captives in the Holy Land; and at some date before 1213 Geoffrey fitz Piers, the earl of Essex, saw fit to give them two hospitals in Berkhamsted, one of them that of St John the Evangelist — being a leper hospital.

But while pursuing charitable activities such as these the institution did not flourish. Gregory IX was informed by its members that Richard I had been prevented by death from endowing the foundation to the extent that he had intended and that therefore 'canonici domus eiusdem non habuerunt unde possent commode sustentari, et eadem, pasperiate depressa et vicina periculo, diutius fluctuavit'. Any new religious foundation might find itself confronted by the problem of securing adequate endowments, but a new establishment in the Holy Land at this time faced especial difficulties in this respect, since it could expect little patronage in the East, where the Franks held only a narrow coastal strip of territory; nor could it easily attract support in the West, where it would scarcely be known and where it would have no dependencies. A foundation like St Thomas of Acre might receive a few benefactions from those who visited the Holy Land and saw something of its work there; but otherwise all that the members of St Thomas could do was to send envoys to the West, as happened in 1207, in the hope that the widespread

2. Ralph of Diceto, Opera historica, ii. 81. On the character of the members, see Cotton Tib. C v, fos. 261-2; Registres de Grégoire IX, ii. 254 doc. 2944; Calendar of Charter Rolls, 1200-1326, pp. 399-400.
3. Ralph of Diceto, ii. 81; Rotuli literarum patentium, i (1835), 76; Dugdale, vi. 647.
4. Registres de Grégoire IX, ii. 254 doc. 2944.
6. Rotuli literarum patentium, i. 76.
cult of Becket would allow them to compete successfully with local claimants to patronage.

In the early thirteenth century the foundation did obtain some grants in the West, for it is known to have acquired land and other property in France and England, as well as gaining the three churches of St Mary, St Peter and St Nicholas de Campo Anglorum in Acre itself. But its acquisitions in England – where most of its gains in the West were situated – apparently brought little help to the establishment in the Holy Land. Geoffrey fitz Piers had decreed that the revenues of the hospital of St John the Evangelist in Berkhamsted were to be expended there and not elsewhere. He was seemingly more concerned with guaranteeing the future of his hospital by affiliating it to another institution than with providing resources for the Acre foundation. And although the advowson of the church of Somerton in Oxfordshire was gained from the English noble Robert Arsic and a presentation to it made by St Thomas of Acre in 1222, nine years later Robert’s heirs brought a successful action of darrein presentment against the Acre foundation, and after that the advowson was in dispute only among the heirs.

It was the poverty of the establishment, coupled with the dissolutio and incuria of the canons, that persuaded Peter des Roches, the bishop of Winchester, to effect a reform when he was in the Holy Land during the later 1220s. He removed the canons and transformed the foundation into a military establishment, whose members were to follow the rule of the Teutonic Order. The motive for the decision to create a military order is not given in the surviving sources, but the change is presumably to be explained primarily by the attitudes and outlook of Peter des Roches himself, who had often played the part of the warrior bishop and who at this time also contributed towards the costs of restoration work on the defences of Jaffa and Sidon. The transformation was moreover undertaken with the advice of the patriarch of Jerusalem and of the magnates of the kingdom, and the latter would no doubt have stressed the military needs of the crusading states. The choice of the Teutonic rule is not surprising, for while in the main it adopted Templar observances, “with regard to the poor and the sick” it followed the customs of the Hospitallers: it was therefore a suitable choice if

2. Dugdale, vi. 647.
5. Registres de Grégoire IX, ii. 234 doc. 2944.
6. Annales monastici, iii. 126.
the reformed establishment was to continue charitable activities in addition to its military duties.

The bishop at the same time changed the site of the house in Acre. This had originally been situated on the eastern side of the city near the German hospital, and was now transferred to what was described as a more suitable location near the sea in the northern quarter of Montmusart, where it is shown in one of Matthew Paris’s maps of Palestine. Lastly, Peter des Roches used some of his own wealth to restore the fortunes of the foundation. The bishop’s reforms were not confirmed by the papacy until 1236, but the changes had probably been made in the later part of the year 1227 or early in 1228, for Peter des Roches is known to have been in the Holy Land by the autumn of 1227 and the reforms had apparently occurred well before the autumn of the following year, since that is the latest date for Thomas fitz Theobald of Helles’ charter which refers to the militia of St Thomas. Thus, while it is difficult to trace the militarization of the Hospital of St John, the emergence of St Thomas of Acre as a military order can be followed fairly closely.

Its importance as a military order during the rest of the thirteenth century was not, however, sufficient to attract the attention of most chroniclers of the struggle against the infidel, and only a few references of doubtful value have survived concerning its participation in that conflict. Ludolph of Sudheim, writing in the middle of the fourteenth century, mentioned the Order of St Thomas among those which had been based in Acre and fought continuously against Islam, and this comment is repeated in Hermann Korner’s Chronica novella in an entry for the year 1291, while a fifteenth-century chronicle of the Teutonic Order maintains that the master of the Order had five thousand men under his command at the

3. Annales monastici, iii, 126; Matthew Paris, Chronica majora, iii, 490, where the bishop is said to have provided 100 marks.
4. Registres de Grégoire IX, ii, 254 doc. 2544. In the same year Gregory IX gave the members permission to wear a half-red, half-white cross, so that they might be distinguished from the Templars: ibid. ii, 282 doc. 2005.
5. Roger of Wendover, Flores historiarum, ii (1887), 324–7; Matthew Paris, Chronica majora, iii, 128–9. The change occurred when the sees of Tyre and Acre were vacant, but the exact duration of these vacancies is not known.
defence of Acre in 1291. But the Order of St Thomas is not even mentioned in the main contemporary sources on the fall of Acre. To thirteenth-century writers in fact the Order seems to have been more noteworthy for the part which it played in the squabbles within Acre than for its importance in fighting against the infidel.

But if the Order could not emulate the larger military orders in the conflict with Islam, it could to some extent imitate them in structure and terminology. Officials came to be known by the titles of 'master', 'preceptor' and 'commander', and among the members a distinction was made between milites and presbiteri, although no references have survived to the rank of sergeant, which existed in other military orders. The beginnings of a provincial organization, similar to that evolved by the Hospitallers and Templars, are found in the British Isles, for the master of the London house had control of the Order's properties throughout England and Ireland and appointed subordinate preceptors to administer some of the more distant of them.

This development in organization was made necessary by the acquisition of further property rights in the West. The Order came to hold lands in various parts of western Europe, but it is only for its possessions in the British Isles that detailed documentary evidence survives. There during the rest of the thirteenth century a considerable number of acquisitions — individually of usually only minor importance — were gained from a variety of persons: the Order did not depend on the support of any one section of the community. By no means all of the gains resulted from straightforward gifts: some rights were purchased, and transactions recorded as donations often provided for a payment by the Order to the donor. Money to

1. Matthaeus, v. 731, 736; Scriptores rerum prussicarum, v. 103, 105.
2. The author of the De excidio urbis Aconis refers to the presence in the siege of the militia Spatae and the militia Sancti Spiritus: E. Martène, U. Durand, Veterum scriptorum et monumentorum amplissima collectio (Paris, 1729), 765-6; and these were identified by R. Rohricht, Geschichte des Königreichs Jerusalem (Innsbruck, 1898), p. 1014, as the orders of St Thomas and St Lazarus. But the militia Sancti Spiritus is more plausibly to be identified with the confraternity of that name to which references are found earlier in the century and which had military functions: J. Riley-Smith, 'A Note on Confraternities in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem', Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research, xliv (1971), 302, 305-6; and no reason has been put forward for identifying the militia Spatae — the name usually given to the Order of Santiago — with St Thomas of Acre. Perhaps the author was referring to the Acre confraternity of St James, which was affiliated to the Hospitallers: cf. ibid. pp. 302, 307.
4. On the subordination of Irish properties to London and the existence of preceptors in Ireland, see Calendar of Patent Rolls, 1272-1281, pp. 11, 373; CPR, 1301-1307, p. 377; Brooks, ubi supra pp. 36-37 doc. 18. In the later thirteenth century the Order had a brother as custos at Coulson in Surrey: Cotton Tib. C vi, fos. 242v-243, 243v-246. One other development in organization that is recorded is the emergence of a chapter general for the Order: PRO, S.C. 8/331/15661.
5. L. de Mas Latrie, 'Documents nouveaux servant de preuves à l'histoire de l'île de Chypre sous le règne des princes de la maison de Lusignan', Mélanges historiques, iv (Paris, 1882), 360-2.
pay for such acquisitions was obtained from the revenues of property given to St Thomas, but the Order was also able to use for this purpose gifts of cash: in 1239, for example, Henry III gave 200 marks specifically for the purchase of land.1 Following the establishment of the London house, many acquisitions were made in and around the city, particularly in the parish of St Mary Colechurch, where the hospital of St Thomas was situated. In the middle of the century Philip Marmion surrendered the rents which he enjoyed from the land on which the hospital was built,2 and other land close by was given by the prioress of Haliwell and by Henry III, who in 1268 made a grant of land between the hospital and the church of St Olave so that the hospital’s precincts might be enlarged.3 In 1247/8 the advowson of St Mary Colechurch was obtained, and the church was later impropriated.4 Shops, houses and parcels of land were also gained in other parts of the city,5 while near London by the end of the century the Order’s property included lands at Wapping, Stepney,6 Stratford,7 and in the neighbourhood of Coulsdon in Surrey, where shortly after the foundation of the London house land held of Chertsey Abbey was given.8 Acquisitions in and around London were to be expected after the London house had been established, for there Becket was a patron saint, whose image appeared on the city seal,9 and the London foundation could claim through its location a particularly close link with him. But, as in the period before it became a military order, St Thomas of Acre also gained rights in other places. The Order already possessed property in Doncaster before it became militarized,10 and its holdings there were considerably extended when in the later 1230s the Poitevin Peter of Mauley granted his rights over the hospital of St James.11 It was not unusual for military orders which undertook charitable work to be granted existing hospitals, and several more were gained by St Thomas of Acre during the rest of the century. One at Buckingham was given by Matthew of Stratton, archdeacon of Buckingham,12 and two others

---

1. Calendar of Liberate Rolls, 1226-1240, p. 596. 2. Reg. Writings, i. 2-3. 3. Ibid. i. 57-6. 4. Ibid. i. 7-8. 5. Ibid. i. 46-48, 52-54, 55-57, 98-99, 109-114, 181-187, 190-190. 6. Documents concerning the Order’s property in Wapping and Stepney are contained in Cotton Tib. C v, fos. 152-62. 7. VCH, Essex, vi (Oxford, 1973), 90-91; Catalogue of Ancient Deeds, i. 57, 62, 87 nos. A. 481, 522, 735. 8. On the Order’s rights in and near Coulsdon, see Cotton Tib. C v, fos. 235-234, especially 235-236. 9. Brooke, plate 34. 10. Most of the documents concerning properties in the district of Doncaster are undated, but some grants were made to the canons of St Thomas: Cotton Tib. C v, fos. 260-260, 261-262. 11. Ibid. fo. 255. The grant was made after the death of Peter’s wife, Isabella of Turnham, who died apparently between 1235 and 1238: Chronica monasterii de Meisa, ed. E. A. Bond, ii (Rolls Ser., 1867), 39; Calendar of Charter Rolls, 1226-1237, p. 233. 12. VCH, Buckingham, iii (London, 1925), 486.
were acquired in Ireland. That of St John the Baptist at Kilkenny, which had been established by William Marshal, earl of Pembroke, was granted by the founder’s son Gilbert; and about the middle of the century John, son of Geoffrey of Norragh, subjected to St Thomas of Acre the hospital dedicated to St John the Evangelist which William of Cantelo had founded at Carrick-on-Suir. It is not possible to trace the precise reasons for most of these gifts outside London, but clearly once property had been gained in a district further benefactions were likely to follow, while the Order would also seek to extend existing holdings through purchase.

Besides increasing its property, the military order of St Thomas consolidated and extended its papal privileges. Because of the papacy’s commitment to the crusades, all military orders could expect considerable favours from Rome. Papal protection had already been promised to the canons of St Thomas by Innocent III and Honorius III, but it is not until later that reference is found to privileges of a financial nature. A bull issued by Alexander IV in 1256 mentions the concession that individuals entering into the confraternity of St Thomas and making an annual benefaction to it were to be released from a seventh of the penance imposed upon them; to collect these benefactions members of the Order were to be received into churches once a year; on this occasion churches which were under interdict could be opened; and confratres who belonged to a church which was under interdict were not to be denied a Christian burial unless they were under personal sentence or usurers. This was, of course, a privilege which had been enjoyed for over a century by the Templars and Hospitallers. Alexander’s bull of 1256 did not attempt to define in detail the Order’s tithe privileges, but it does indicate that it was exempt from the payment of tithes on its animals and their food. Another papal bull issued in Alexander’s pontificate gave the Order the right to bury in its cemeteries any who sought interment there, but this may merely have confirmed an earlier ruling, for when in 1248 the bishop of London issued a licence for the Order’s cemetery in the city he stated that anyone could be buried there. St Thomas of Acre could thus derive financial benefit in various ways from the privileges conferred by the papacy. Furthermore, like other military orders, it could hope by means of another papal privilege to obtain temporary clerical recruits, for it was decreed that such clerics were not in the meantime to be deprived of their benefices. But it is not altogether

1. Brooks, ubi supra pp. 31-32, 35 docs. 9, 15.
2. For other acquisitions in Ireland, see ibid. pp. 28-36; documents concerning properties in the Doncaster district are in Cotton Tib. C v, fos. 255-71.
5. Reg. Writings, l. a.
clear whether St Thomas also gained the exemption from episcopal jurisdiction that was enjoyed by the major military orders. When Gregory IX confirmed the transformation of the Order in 1236, he made the reservation *ita quod locus ipse per hoc in nullo a jurisdictione diocesani sit exemptus*; but the implication of this statement seems merely to be that the Order should not base any claim to exemption on the fact that the change had been effected by the bishop of Winchester and confirmed by the pope, without reference to the diocesan. In a letter to the English king later in the century the master claimed the privilege of exemption, but on the other hand in 1279 Archbishop Pecham of Canterbury was taking action against the London house for refusing to submit itself to visitation, and in the same year he was threatening excommunication and ordering the master of the London house to appear before him on a charge of forcibly seizing two clerics in the church of St Clement Danes. And although in 1320 John XXII referred to the Order as subject to Rome *nullo medio*, throughout the fourteenth century the London establishment was included in diocesan visitations.

Yet while the Order progressed in several ways during the rest of the thirteenth century, the transformation effected by the bishop of Winchester had failed to produce a flourishing institution. In 1257 Alexander IV allowed the impropriation of St Mary Colechurch because he had been informed that

pro terre sancte subsidio ac pauperum et infirmorum ad hospitale vestrum confluentium sustentacione magna vos subire oportcat onera expensarum, nec ad hoc proprie vobis suppetant facultates.

But in 1279 it was still necessary for the Order to seek the aid of Edward I, and it was pointed out to him as evidence of need that although the building of the Order's church in Acre had been started long beforehand, it had still not been completed. The members of the Order explained their plight by saying that *terra Cypri et Assirie de frustibus temporalibus permansit hiis temporibus infecunda*. But if they derived small profit from their rights in the East, their holdings in the West appear to have brought little assistance to the Holy Land either, and it was to a large extent on western properties that all military orders in the East depended in the thirteenth century. Although nothing is known of the system of supply from western Europe, there are various indications that the Order's

establishments in the West were in no position to bring much aid to the East. Revenues in the West, derived from many small acquisitions, were not large: in 1291 the income of the London house from its properties in the city and neighbouring counties was assessed at less than £10, a much smaller sum than the revenues of the more important Templar and Hospitaller commanderies. From these western resources had to be deducted not only the costs of administration in western Europe but also the expenses of charitable work undertaken there. Although the hospitals gained at Doncaster and Buckingham were apparently not kept in existence, by no means all of the establishments of this kind were closed. Gilbert Marshal had given the hospital of St John the Baptist at Kilkenny "ad sustentacionem militum et fratrum hospitalis sancti Thome in terra Ierosoll", but he had also specified that "in dicta domo sancti Iohannis de Kilkennia congruentem sustinebunt hospitalitatem infirmorum sicut a bone memorie Willemo Marescallo patre nostro et Isabella matre nostra fuit provisum"; and the Order was under a similar obligation at Carrick-on-Suir as well as at Berkhamsted. Some grants moreover were made for the establishment of chantries; once the military orders had dependencies in the West, patrons expected them to perform the same functions as other religious houses; establishments in western Europe were not viewed merely as administrative centres for the collection of revenues.

The demands made on a limited income brought some of the Order's establishments into debt in the later thirteenth century. Short-term loans were, of course, common at this time and not necessarily a sign of serious financial hardship, but the 164 marks owed by the London house to the Hospital of St John in 1289 appear not to have fallen into this category, for in the following year the master of the London foundation was seeking permission from the king to alienate land at Coulsdon and Buckingham to the Hospitallers; and a few years later the newly-appointed head of the house in London was instructed to use incoming revenues

1. Taxatio ecclesiastica Angliae et Walliae auctoritate P. Nicholai IV (1802), pp. 9, 13, 25, 47, 52; Watney, p. 121.
2. Among these costs were the considerable expenses of litigation and buying off claims to property.
3. VCH, Buckingham, iii. 486. When Peter of Mauley granted the hospital of St James in Doncaster, he specified merely that a chaplain should be maintained there to celebrate for the souls of himself and his wife; none of the documents in Cotton Tib. C v, fos. 255-71 which mention the hospital of St James can be dated with certainty as being later than Peter's grant; and supposed later references to the hospital of St James are ambiguous: W. P. Baildon, Notes on the Religious and Secular Houses of Yorkshire, i (Yorkshire Archaeological Society, Record Ser., vol. xvii, 1895), 57; VCH, York, iii (London, 1913), 306. In the sixteenth century there was only a chapel there: Watney, p. 124.
4. Brooks, ubi supra p. 32 doc. 9. 5. Ibid. p. 35 doc. 15.
6. Reg. Writings, i. 55r-54, 55-55v; Cotton Tib. C v, fos. 160v-161.
7. Calendar of C[lose] R[olls], 1289-1296, p. 49; Rot. parli., i. 62; PRO, C. 145/14/5.
to lighten the burden of debt. It was apparently the weak financial position of the Order — possibly coupled with troubles arising from prolonged absences of the Order's master — that led in the later thirteenth century to proposals for the amalgamation of St Thomas of Acre with the Temple. The first reference to such a scheme is found in a draft letter drawn up on behalf of the English king Henry III towards the end of his reign. It had been reported to him that the Templars were seeking to take over the Order, and Henry — as a descendant of the founder of St Thomas of Acre and himself a benefactor — protested against the proposed amalgamation, which, he argued, would destroy the character of the foundation and divert its resources into the hands of others. The king's objection probably helps to explain why the amalgamation was not then achieved, though it is perhaps also to be attributed to differences of opinion within the Order, for according to Henry's letter the master was in England at the time and had not been consulted; the proposed union was apparently being negotiated just by a section of the members of the Order. Despite the failure of these proposals, in 1279 the members of the Order could report to Edward I that they had received assistance from the Templars. It may have been in return for such help that the bond was created with the Temple which was mentioned in another letter sent by the master and brothers of the Order to the English king shortly before the fall of Acre. They stated that they held their chief house in Acre in fee of the Temple at a fixed annual rent and that they were bound by charter not to sell or alienate that house to anyone but the Templars. The purpose of the letter, however, was to obtain the English king's support for a further project of union with the Temple, involving the surrender of the Order's property and the assumption of the Templar habit by its members. On this occasion agreement is known to have been reached between the Temple and St Thomas of Acre, for on the basis of this settlement the Templars sought to take over the house of St Thomas in London. Despite this agreement, however, the Order of St Thomas of Acre

1. Rot. parl., i. 287. For other evidence of debts at this time, see Reg. Writings, i. 465–48; Catalogue of Ancient Deeds, i. 87 no. A. 735; Feet of Fines for Essex, ii (Essex Archaeological Society, 1913–28), 46.
2. In 1279 members asked Edward I to persuade the master to return to the East 'cum ex sui absencia vestra pauperrima domus Acconensis sustineat [necessitatem]': Mas Latrie, Histoire de Chypre, ii. 81–83; cf. Matthew Paris, Chronica majora, v. 630–1; PRO, S.C. 112/117. 3. Ibid.
5. PRO, S.C. 8/333/15661. The letter is not dated, nor is the name of the English king given. But it is clear from subsequent events that negotiations were being conducted at this time, and there are several indications that the letter was not linked with the earlier proposals for union in Henry III's reign: the master himself was now involved; the English king's approval was being sought, which had not been the case in Henry III's time; and it was stated that papal consent to the union had been obtained long before.
6. Rot. parl., i. 287.
continued to maintain a separate existence in the East during the years following the fall of Acre. Presumably some of its members there opposed the union, just as a century earlier a faction in the military order of Mountjoy had resisted amalgamation with the Templars.\(^1\)

This certainly happened in England, where the members of the London house appealed to Edward I to support them against Templar claims. The king in response committed the London foundation to the custody of Henry of Dunholm, and when the latter died Edward again intervened early in 1304 to appoint Edmund of London, a clerk in the king's household and apparently a member of the Becket family.\(^2\) And at the beginning of the next reign the establishment in London was made subject to the convent of Bonhommes at Ashridge. Edward II, claiming to be the rightful patron, forced Edmund of London to resign and decreed that the London foundation should be assigned to the Ashridge convent, where the king had spent several days in 1301, when parts of the convent's founder, Edmund earl of Cornwall, had been interred.\(^3\)

The members of the London house were, not surprisingly, as unwilling to accept subjection to Ashridge as they had been to consent to Templar control, and since they could expect no sympathy from the king they appealed this time to the pope, asserting that their house belonged to the Order of St Thomas of Acre. Early in 1311 representatives of Ashridge were cited by Clement V to appear at the papal curia, and there they had the support of Edward II who wrote towards the end of the year protesting his rights as patron of the London house.\(^4\) The suit in the papal court clearly dragged on, for the English king wrote again in support of Ashridge early in 1313; yet no final solution was reached at Avignon, and in 1315 the members of the London house brought their case before the king's council.\(^5\) There the decision went in favour of the petitioners. It was recognized that the London house was not a royal foundation, and it was held that the founder's intentions would be ignored if the establishment were subjected to the Ashridge convent, which was of 'another order and profession'. It was further decided that the king's clerk Robert of Bardelby should have the custody

---

2. Rot. parl., i. 287; Calendar of Chancery Warrants, 1284-1326, p. 203; CPR, 1301-1307, p. 208. The date of Henry of Dunholm's appointment is not known, but the preceding master in London, Roger of Bagghishoure, was still in office in July 1289: CCR, 1288-1296, p. 49. In 1286 Henry of Dunholm had been placed in charge of the hospital of St Giles in London: CPR, 1281-1292, pp. 252, 271.
5. Ibid.
of the house during the absence abroad of Richard of Southampton, who had earlier been elected as master, presumably by the members in London.¹

Richard of Southampton had represented the London house at the papal curia in the dispute with Ashridge, but while he was at Avignon he was also seeking to assert his own authority over those members of the Order who were still in the East and who had migrated to Cyprus after the fall of Acre. In 1309 he nominated John des Roches, a Winchester cleric, as his representative in the kingdom of Cyprus, giving him power over all the Order's houses and possessions on the island and authorizing him to arrest and detain falsarios suspectos fratres.² Richard of Southampton no doubt felt that after the agreement with the Temple there could be no properly constituted master of the whole Order in the East, and that, as most of the Order's possessions were in the British Isles, he could put forward a claim to supremacy. For the next few years, however, the members of the Order in Cyprus maintained a separate existence under their own master.³ But their situation was precarious. Questions must soon have been asked there about the future role of a minor military order once the last foothold in the Holy Land had been lost, especially when it no longer controlled its chief properties in the West. The dilemma facing those in Cyprus was clearly revealed towards the end of the second decade of the fourteenth century, when at least some of them sought to transfer their headquarters to London, a step that would inevitably have involved the abandonment of the Order's military role.

The first indication of the proposed change is a writ of aid issued in September 1318 by Edward II in favour of the master in the East, Henry of Bedford, who was then coming to England.⁴ As soon as he arrived Henry appears to have ousted the former head of the London house, Richard of Southampton, for in December of the same year the king was ordering Richard's arrest, after Henry of Bedford had denounced him as a vagabond.⁵ The master did briefly return to the East, for he was on his way back to England in May 1322 when he was robbed of money and other goods which he was bringing from Cyprus⁶: the bulk of the Order's movable possessions were apparently then being transferred to England. In 1323 Henry of Bedford — once more resident in London — nominated John of Parys, a priest in the Order, as prior and custos of the chapel of St Nicholas in Nicosia; and the notification of this appointment, which was sealed with the seal of the Cyprus chapter, included

¹ Rot. parl., i. 287; CPR, 1313-1317, p. 293.
² Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Instrumenta miscellanea, no. 468.
³ Henry of Bedford was elected to the post in 1310, following the resignation of William of Glastonbury: ASV, Instrumenta miscellanea, no. 510.
⁴ CPR, 1317-1321, p. 205; CPR, 1321-1324, p. 358.
provisions about the hospitality to be given to any members visiting Nicosia. Henry of Bedford thus seems to have intended to reduce the establishment in Cyprus to a minimum, for although on several occasions in the fourteenth century St Thomas of Acre was described as being based in the diocese of Limassol, and although it did have a footing there, all the documents emanating from the Order in Cyprus in the fourteenth century were drawn up in Nicosia, where in practice its headquarters on the island seem to have been located.

Henry of Bedford had, however, incurred the enmity of the brothers remaining in Cyprus. In 1324 they set up one of their number, Nicholas of Clifton, to act on their behalf in all disputes, and especially *in causis quas movere intendunt contra fratrem Henricum qui se dicebat magistrum dicte domus*. Their criticism seems to have been aimed at Henry himself rather than at his transfer of the Order’s headquarters to London, for they gave their representative power to act with the London chapter in appointing a new master: they appear to have been ready to accept that the Order’s headquarters were now established in the West. Judgment against Henry of Bedford was obtained from the bishop of Limassol on charges which included simony and wasting the Order’s property, but a successor was not immediately appointed. In July 1325, however, the pope intervened at the request of the brothers in Cyprus and assigned the task of selecting a new master to the vicar of the patriarch of Jerusalem, who then had charge of the diocese of Limassol; and he chose Nicholas of Clifton. The brothers in Cyprus had no doubt adopted this course of action in order to strengthen their hand against Henry of Bedford, for he was not prepared to accept the sentence against him and maintained his position in London. He was still recognized in England in March 1328, when he received a writ of aid from Edward III, and in July of that year the pope was obliged to write to the bishop of London, ordering that Nicholas of Clifton be put in possession of the London house. It was not until November 1328 that the royal writ of aid for Henry was revoked, after the bishop of London had informed the king that he had nominated John of Parys as head of the London house, presumably as the representative of Nicholas of Clifton.

Although the circumstances surrounding Nicholas of Clifton’s appointment suggest that there was once more a master residing

---

4. ASV, Registra avenionensia, reg. 23, fo. 284v; reg. 30, fo. 608; summarized in Jean XXII. Lettres communes, v. 410 doc. 23712; vii. 318 doc. 41772.
5. CPR, 1327-1330, p. 251.
7. CPR, 1327-1330, p. 355.
in Cyprus, in England there were some who, at least for a time, continued to regard the head of the London house as having authority over the whole Order. Thus Ralph of Coumbe, who was in charge of the London foundation from 1329 until 1332, was described in one document as magister generalis; and Edward III sent a letter on his behalf to the king of Cyprus, seeking Hugh IV's favour for Ralph, his colleagues and their possessions on the island. Yet there is no clear evidence that the next known master of the London house, Bartholomew of Colchester, claimed authority over the whole Order. He was in office from 1333 until 1344, and from the latter year a letter written in Nicosia survives, in which Robert of Kendale described himself as miles and as 'general preceptor of the whole order of the militia of St. Thomas the Martyr in the kingdom of Cyprus, Apulia, Sicily, Calabria, Brindisi, England, Flanders, Brabant, Scotland, Wales, Ireland and Cornwall and of all the houses in other regions or kingdoms in various parts of the world'. In 1344 there was thus a knight in Cyprus claiming to be master of the whole Order, and two years later an English traveller on his way to the Holy Land reported that the master of St Thomas of Acre resided near Limassol. The wording of the 1344 letter shows further that Robert of Kendale was seeking to maintain the foundation's status as a military order, since he referred to its usefulness 'pro Terra Sancte subsidio contra inimicos catholice fidei et blasphemos'. The purpose of Robert of Kendale's letter, however, was to nominate two representatives, who were to seek gifts of land and other goods for the sustenance of the Order. Clearly, if military operations were to be conducted against the infidel from a base in Cyprus, considerable resources were necessary. But while such expeditions were possible for the Hospitallers, with their properties all over the West, the Order of St Thomas needed to increase its wealth if it was to make a worthwhile contribution. Its difficult financial position in the later thirteenth century had scarcely been improved in the early decades of the fourteenth, for at that time the Order had suffered a series of setbacks whose effects may not have been merely temporary. In the middle of the second decade of the fourteenth century, when there were apparently no members of the Order resident in Ireland, St Thomas of Acre had lost Irish property through Edward II's grant of Carrick-on-Suir to Edmund Butler and his gift of Kildare to John fitz Thomas, for these donations

1. Ibid. p. 400; CCR, 1339-1333, p. 555.
2. Reg. Writings, i. 100-1.
3. Mas Latrie, Histoire de Chypre, ii. 81-82, where the English king is mistakenly identified as Edward I. Ralph of Coumbe had earlier been Henry of Bedford's deputy in Ireland: CPR, 1324-1327, p. 287.
4. CPR, 1330-1334, p. 472; Reg. Writings, i. 175-175.
included rights belonging to the Order; and it was only in 1324, following the presentation of petitions, that Edward issued a confirmation of some of the Order’s rights in Ireland.\(^1\) Lands in Ireland were temporarily lost again, however, in 1338, when the king’s escheator intervened following the death of the brother who had charge of the Order’s rights there.\(^2\) The conflicts involving Henry of Bedford had obviously added to difficulties, for in 1327 the mayor and commonalty of London had petitioned the Westminster parliament, claiming that the house of St Thomas there was destroyed by bad care of those who were masters of the said house, and the chanteries which were invented by men of London and others were destroyed by the said masters, to the great scandal of the holy church.

The city authorities were given power to survey the state of the house and remedy any defects found,\(^3\) but in 1330 the house was still being spoken of as consumpta and devastata.\(^4\) The Order was certainly still able to attract patronage in the West in the mid-fourteenth century, but many of the gifts made at this time were for the establishment of chantries or for the fabric of the London house.\(^5\) Two and a half centuries after the first crusade not many patrons were concerned to provide resources for the conflict against the infidel.

It was therefore not long before the Order’s military role was abandoned, and the headquarters established permanently in London, although it cannot be stated precisely when there ceased to be a master in the East. In 1357 Hugh of Corteys was preceptor in Cyprus and ten years later there was still a commander there,\(^6\) but it is not clear whether these individuals were claiming authority over the whole Order. But nothing more is heard of a master in Cyprus after this time; and in 1379 the head of the London house was again calling himself head of the whole Order. In a document

\(^{2}\) CPR, 1337-1339, p. 455; cf. CPR, 1330-1334, p. 235.
\(^{3}\) Rotuli parliamentorum Angliae baronum inediti, MCCCLXXXIX-MCCCLXXXIII, ed. H. G. Richardson, G. O. Sayles (Camden Society, 3rd ser., vol. li, 1935), pp. 155-6; CPR, 1327-1330, p. 58; M. Weinbaum, London unter Edward I und II (Vierteljahresschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, Beihet 29, 1933), pp. 259-60. The theft of property from the house in London and from Coulsdon which was being investigated early in 1328 was perhaps connected with the conflicts touching the mastership: CPR, 1327-1330, p. 280.
\(^{4}\) Reg. Writings, i. 126-127.
drawn up in that year Richard Alrede used the title "magister domus sancti Thome martiris dicte de Acon Londonia et in quibuscumque mundi partibus generalis"; and one of the clauses in the document stated that in future the brothers of the house at Carrick-on-Suir were to elect their own preceptor\(^1\); the centralization necessary in a military order was no longer being maintained. The title magister generalis was also used by Richard's successor in England, William Bovyngton,\(^2\) and the London master's authority over the whole Order was confirmed in 1458.\(^3\) But the account of the transfer of the Order's headquarters to the West which was given to the pope at that time is vague and reveals merely that the members had preserved no accurate historical record; it is of no use for tracing the final establishment of the Order's headquarters in London.

Although it is not the purpose of the present paper to give a detailed account of the history of St Thomas of Acre after it had finally abandoned its military role, it may be appropriate in conclusion to consider briefly the Order's character and functions in the later fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, in order to show how the foundation adapted itself to changed circumstances. Up to the middle of the fourteenth century the brothers had presumably continued to live according to the Teutonic rule,\(^4\) but this was apparently now abandoned, for later evidence shows the members following the rule of St Augustine. Exactly when the change occurred is not known, but by the mid-fifteenth century it had been forgotten that any other rule had ever been followed in the London house.\(^5\) Some papal documents of the middle years of the fifteenth century state that the foundation had by that time become part of the Order of Cruciferi,\(^6\) but there is no reference to any affiliation of this kind in the documents emanating from St Thomas, and mistakes of this nature in papal sources are not uncommon.\(^7\) In the later middle ages the Order of St Thomas of Acre in fact remained an independent institution, living now according to the rule of St Augustine. The sources for the later part of the Order's history are concerned more with property than with the brothers' activities, but clearly in the West no fundamental change in their way of life was necessary.

3. CPapR, xii. 32-34.
4. In 1320 John XXII confirmed Gregory IX's bull approving the adoption of the Teutonic rule: Jean XXII, Lettres communes, iii. 193 doc. 13434. When the same pope twelve years later took the hospital of St John the Evangelist at Carrick-on-Suir under his protection he spoke of it as belonging to the Augustinian Order: Brooks, ubi supra p. 39 doc. 22; but this statement may have been based on earlier documents dating back to the time before the hospital had been taken over by St Thomas of Acre.
5. Rot. parl., v. 74.
6. CPapR, xi. 114, 575; xii. 508; xiii. 659.
after St Thomas had ceased to be a military order. The members in western Europe had earlier performed a variety of functions, and their activities in the later fourteenth and fifteenth centuries were merely a continuation and development of these, although not all of the earlier charitable work was sustained. In the fourteenth century nothing more is heard of the hospital of St John the Baptist at Kilkenny, and although in 1379 there was a community at Carrick-on-Suir, this had clearly not been continuously in existence in the earlier part of the fourteenth century; nor was it seemingly long maintained after 1379. The lands and house there were soon seized again by the king's escheator and in 1392 they passed into the hands of Peter Stonham; it was only in 1411 that the king was taking action to restore the property to the Order. But it seems doubtful whether a community was re-established at Carrick, for a description of the Order's property belonging apparently to the first half of the sixteenth century speaks of it as 'being all vast without building or occupying this hundred year and above', and in the 1530s the property was being leased at an annual rent of only a few shillings. On the other hand, the hospital of St John the Evangelist at Berkhamsted, over which St Thomas of Acre had only limited control, survived until 1515/6, when the inmates voluntarily departed, and the hospital of St John the Baptist there may similarly have lasted into the sixteenth century. There is little evidence, however, to show that the London house devoted itself to the care of the poor and sick. It was only when an individual made a specific bequest for the maintenance of the poor that reference was made to charitable activities of this kind. Nevertheless the brothers in London did provide hospitality for noble patrons when they stayed in the city, and on a number of occasions they undertook the wardship of minors. Furthermore, at a time when interest in education was increasing, a grammar school was established at St Thomas of Acre in London; this is

2. Ibid. pp. 36-37 doc. 18; PRO, S.C. 8/10/4462; S.C. 8/359/12926; see also supra p.498, there was, however, a community there apparently in 1332: Brooks, ubi supra p. 39 doc. 22.
4. Ibid. p. 27; Calendar of Ormond Deeds, ed. E. Curtis, iv (Dublin, 1937), 341-6.
5. Ibid. iv. 137-40 no. 155; Brooks, ubi supra p. 27.
7. Sharpe, ii (1890), 291-2; PRO, E. 135/3/257, fos. 75-76, 88-92. In 1538 Richard Gresham, the lord mayor, wrote to the king about several hospitals in or near the city, which had been founded for helping 'the poor and impotent, who were not able to help themselves', and which were not fulfilling their functions properly. Among them he named the hospital of St Thomas, and it has sometimes been assumed that he was referring to St Thomas of Acre; but this is by no means certain: G. Burnet, History of the Reformation of the Church of England, iii (Oxford, 1865), 247; VCH, London, i. 494.
8. Calendar of Ancient Deeds, i. 561 no. C. 1756.
9. Sharpe, i. 644; ii. 42-43, 56; Calendar of Plea and Memoranda Rolls of the City of London, A.D. 1364-1381, p. 262.
known to have been in existence in the early sixteenth century and may have had its origins in a petition presented to the king in 1447.\(^1\)
The London house was, moreover, becoming responsible for an ever increasing number of chantries and obits, as many leading citizens made gifts for the remembrance of their souls.\(^2\)

The devotion to Becket which helps to explain such gifts also gave the London house a part in the ceremonial life of the city during the later middle ages. Each year the newly elected mayor processed with the aldermen from St Thomas of Acre along West Cheap to St Paul's, where they visited the Becket family grave, and they then returned in a torchlight procession to St Thomas's, where offerings were made.\(^3\) Similar processions were also held on All Saints' Day and several other festivals, while on 28 and 29 December - the latter being the feast of St Thomas the Martyr - the mayor, aldermen and sheriffs attended services at the London house.\(^4\) A role in the more routine life of the city was provided by the custom that the wicket gates remained shut until the bell for Prime sounded at St Thomas's, while markets in the vicinity were closed when the bell for Vespers there was heard.\(^5\) The London house was a familiar landmark and it is not surprising that it came to be increasingly used as a place where debts were settled. The indenture by which Thomas, son of Thomas Frembaud of Badlesdon, agreed in 1361 to pay £200 to William of Holbeche at St Thomas of Acre, was typical of many agreements made in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.\(^6\)

A more important link with the economic life of the city, however, resulted from the establishment of ties between the London house and the Mercers' Company. In the later fourteenth century the Company was holding its meetings and worshipping at St Thomas of Acre, and at the beginning of the next century it was negotiating for a chapel and hall there.\(^7\) And when the house was in financial difficulties early in the sixteenth century the Company provided funds so that debts could be repaid and necessary building operations undertaken.\(^8\) It was also at that time that the Company became the

By the time that the London house was dissolved, the Order of St Thomas of Acre had had a fairly long and varied existence. It had never achieved any great distinction: its emergence as a military order had probably occurred too late in time — especially when it lacked a forceful and influential master — for it to be able to secure the support and resources that were necessary for a prosperous and successful fighting institution. St Thomas of Acre was therefore beset by the characteristic problems of minor religious foundations: financial hardship, the dangers arising from personal differences, and resistance to proposed amalgamations. But it managed to survive for some three hundred and fifty years, and its varied history reflects some of the changing interests and concerns of people living between the twelfth and sixteenth centuries.

The Crusading Vows of the English King Henry III

Although the English king Henry III never went to the Holy Land, he took the cross on three occasions. Of his three crusading vows, the second—taken in 1250—has attracted the attention of a number of historians, but those who have written on the subject have been interested only in certain aspects of it: thus some have been primarily concerned with papal taxation or have considered the vow mainly in the context of Henry's European policies. In the following pages an attempt is therefore made to survey more comprehensively the history of Henry's crusading plans, and at the same time the views which have been expressed on Henry's second vow are examined and on some points new interpretations suggested.

Henry first took the cross at the very beginning of his reign. This early crusading vow, which has usually escaped the notice of historians of Henry's minority, was apparently taken at about the time of his coronation at the end of October 1216, for the pope knew of it at the beginning of the following year. When writing to the archbishop of Bordeaux on 17th January 1217 Honorius III referred to the English king as crucesignatus, and in a further letter to Henry himself written three days later the pope noted with joy that Henry had received the sign of the cross and undertaken to fulfil the crusading vow which his father had taken in 1215. As Henry was at this time only nine years old and as the country was still in the throes of civil war, it was scarcely an opportune moment for considering a royal crusade. The point could of course be made that, although votive obligations had been thought of as essentially personal, it was coming to be accepted by the early thirteenth century that an individual who could not fulfil a crusading vow might in some instances entrust his obligation to his heir. There is, however, no evidence to indicate that John had placed on Henry the obligation of fulfilling the crusading vow which he had taken in 1215. Yet it was not only coming to be accepted that an individual might command his heir to fulfil a vow on his behalf; there are also indications that


3 T. Rymer, Foedera, conventiones, litterae et cujuscunque generis acta publica, i (London, 1816), 144.
ecclesiastical opinion was moving towards the idea—later expressed by Innocent IV—that if a person was unable to fulfil a vow to aid the Holy Land, his heir was automatically under an obligation to do so. When in 1223 Honorius III asked Henry III to give assistance to the Holy Land, he added weight to his appeal by pointing out that

It is possible therefore that in 1216 Henry was persuaded by the papal legate Guala that it was his duty to fulfil his father’s vow. Even when the civil war was brought to an end, however, Henry was still much too young to undertake a crusade; and according to a statement made many years later he obtained an absolution ad tempus from his vow. This absolution was apparently given in the early 1220’s, for after that time the pope ceased to refer to Henry as crucesignatus.

It was not until March 1250, when he was forty-two years old, that Henry again took the cross. In the meantime he or those acting in his name had done some of those things to assist the Christian cause in the East which would be expected of any western ruler of the time. Individuals going on expeditions to the Holy Land were given assistance in various ways. Their property was placed under royal protection, and the financing of their expeditions was aided by exemptions from dues and taxes, advance payments of fees, licences to pledge land and by gifts. A visiting king of Jerusalem or Latin Emperor of Constantinople also received gifts from Henry; and an envoy sent by al-Mu'azzam, the Ayubite ruler of Damascus, was given letters seeking the release of Christian captives. But until 1250 Henry gave no indication that he would himself go on a crusade to the Holy Land. He was unmoved by the appeal which Innocent IV sent to western rulers at the beginning of 1245, following the fall of

* Villey, op. cit., p. 126; Brundage, op. cit., p. 98.

* Foedera, 1, 172–173. Before this time, of course, some individuals had considered themselves to be under a moral obligation to fulfil vows which others had not been able to carry out: Louis VII was said to have taken the cross in 1145 partly because his brother had died with a crusading vow unfulfilled: Otto of Freising, Gesta Friderici I Imperatoris, I, 35, ed. G. Waitz (Hanover, 1884), p. 43.

* Foedera, I, 288; C[loselive] R[olls], 1251–1253, p. 448. This statement was made in 1253.

* The latest reference I have found was made in 1221: Foedera, I, 167, where the date is given inaccurately.

* Matthew Paris, Chronica Majora, ed. H. R. Luard, V (Rolls Ser., 1880), 101. Both F. A. Gasquet, Henry the Third and the Church (London, 1905), p. 276, and A. L. Smith, Church and State in the Middle Ages (Oxford, 1913), p. 158, maintain that Henry undertook to go on a crusade three years earlier, but the sources to which they refer will not bear this interpretation.


* E.g. CR, 1231–1234, p. 408; CR, 1234–1237, p. 82.


* E.g. CR, 1234–1237, pp. 390, 391; Patent Rolls, 1225–1232, pp. 120, 122, 169, 188.

* E.g. CLR, 1226–1240, pp. 93, 217, 219; CLR, 1240–1245, p. 313.


* Foedera, I, 187; CR, 1227–1231, p. 94. These letters were written early in 1228, but al-Mu'azzam had in fact died in November 1227. The envoy on this occasion was a Christian; when in 1238 a Saracen envoy arrived in England Henry had him confined in Canterbury castle so that he could not spy out the land: Foedera, I, 235; CR, 1237–1242, p. 136.
Jerusalem to the Khwarismians,\footnote{Foedera, I, 254-255. For letters sent to other rulers at this time, see M. Fernández de Navarrete, ‘Disertación histórica sobre la parte que tuvieron los españoles en las guerras de ultramar o de las cruzadas’, Memorias de la Real Academia de la Historia, V (1817), 168-170, doc. 12; H. d’Arbois de Jubainville, Histoire des ducs et des comtes de Champagne, V (Paris, 1863), 403, no. 2689.} and he did not respond to the call for a crusade made later in the same year at the Council of Lyons.

Of course, a crusade was not an enterprise to be lightly undertaken; those who hoped for frequent large-scale expeditions to the Holy Land were expecting too much. Crusades were costly; there was always business to attend to at home; and a crusader's lands and authority might be endangered by an absence which lasted years rather than months. Thus according to Matthew Paris, Henry in 1245 argued that he could not take the cross because


But the significance of such considerations depended to some extent on the strength of a person's desire to aid the Holy Land, for the problems and dangers attaching to a crusading expedition could be exaggerated. A thirteenth-century crusader, especially if he was a king or prince, could hope to finance a considerable part of his expedition through grants from the papacy of ecclesiastical taxes, redemption payments, legacies and other dues. Henry's brother Richard of Cornwall had received a number of grants from Gregory IX when he undertook a crusade, and Joinville reported that it was being said of the French king Louis IX when he reached Acre in 1250 after the failure of his Egyptian crusade that he had not then spent any of his own money, but only that obtained from the Church.\footnote{Histoire de Saint Louis, cap. 83, ed. N. de Wailly (Société de l'Histoire de France, 1868), p. 151. J. E. Strayer, in History of the Crusades, ed. K. M. Setton, II (Philadelphia, 1962), 491, argues that as the total cost of Louis IX's expedition was estimated at 1,537,570 livres and as the ecclesiastical tenth alone should have produced about 950,000 livres ‘it is evident that the French clergy paid by far the largest share of the expenses’. But neither of these figures can be relied upon.} It should also be remembered not only that the lands of a crusader were placed under papal protection but that there was also in practice some acceptance of the principle that a crusader's property should remain unharmed: at the end of the previous century the French barons had refused to attack Richard I's lands while he was on crusade.

Yet far from responding to Innocent IV's appeal, Henry through his actions in the years between 1245 and 1250 hindered rather than aided the cause of the Holy Land. After the Council of Lyons he continued the opposition which he had been voicing to papal taxation by raising objections to the taxes imposed at the Council in aid of the Holy Land and the Latin Empire of Constantinople.\footnote{W. E. Lunt, Financial Relations of the Papacy with England to 1327 (Cambridge, Mass., 1939), pp. 251-253; cf. pp. 210-219. At one time Henry maintained that he was himself unwilling to resist papal demands and that he was taking action only because of baronial wishes: CR, 1242-1247, p. 337; but his own ability to tax the Church was affected by papal demands.} Further, apparently in order that there should be a separate English expedition, Henry in 1247 sought to delay the departure of English crusaders until a year after Louis IX had sailed for the East.\footnote{Les registres d’Innocent IV, ed. E. Berger, I (Paris, 1884), 615-616, docs. 4054-4056; cf. ibid., II (1887), pp. civii–clix. According to Matthew Paris, the bishop of Beirut who came to England after the Council of Lyons to preach the cross received a very discouraging welcome from Henry: Chron. Maj., IV, 488-489.} Henry's assumption of the cross in 1250, like that in 1216, therefore requires explanation.

Contemporaries attributed various motives to the English king. According to Alphonse of Poitiers' chaplain, many thought that his purpose was merely to delay the departure to the East of English crusaders, who would be going to the aid of
Louis IX. But, as has been pointed out by Lunt, this charge is not made by any English chronicler, even though after he had taken the cross Henry did try to ensure that English crusaders did not leave before he was ready. Matthew Paris does mention as one of the reasons for Henry's wishing to delay the departure of the crusaders the fact that they would be going to assist the French king, but he does not say that this was why Henry had taken the cross. Nor is it the only reason for delay which he mentions, for he also argues that Henry was motivated by a natural desire to be accompanied by a large force. And since Henry had not deemed it necessary to take the cross in 1247, when he had sought to delay the departure of earlier crusaders, it may be doubted whether considerations of this kind were now of any significance. The opinion put forward by Alphonse of Poitiers' chaplain is probably to be explained in terms of the strained relations existing between England and France. The French would inevitably tend to view Henry's actions against this background, and would therefore be ready to believe that Henry had taken the cross merely in order to prevent aid from coming to Louis in the East.

When describing the events of the year 1250 Matthew Paris says that some thought that Henry had taken the cross merely in order to obtain money. At this point in his narrative, however, he points out that discreet and more reasonable people reserved their opinion on this question. Yet in his account of the events of the year 1252 he puts into the mouths of the clergy a speech which includes the statement

\[ \text{jam ab omnibus creditur et dicitur, quod non ob aliud, ut videtur, se crucesignavit, nisi ut hoc novo modo substantiolam in Anglia que remansit valeat asportare.} \]

This was by no means the first time that it had been claimed that a crusader had taken the cross out of avarice: the charge had been made, for example, by Conon of Béthune before the end of the twelfth century. But accusations of this kind might sometimes spring merely from resentment at having to pay crusading taxes. The view that Henry saw his crusading vow as a means of obtaining money has, however, been accepted by many modern writers, although this conclusion has often been reached without any very thorough examination of the evidence. Nevertheless the suspicion that the king had financial motives might at first sight seem justified. Henry was in the first place experiencing financial difficulties. He could not obtain grants of extraordinary taxes unless he gave way to baronial demands, and no general taxes on moveables had been exacted since 1237. That he may have looked upon crusading money as a means of overcoming his financial problems is first suggested by his actions in the year 1247, when he rather suspiciously petitioned the pope to grant him the sums which had been collected in England in the form of legacies for the Holy Land and redemption pay-

---

33 Matthew Paris, Chron. Maj., V, 102-103, 134-136; VI, 200-201, doc. 97; idem, Historia Anglorum, ed. F. Madden, III (Rolls Ser., 1869), 72-73; Annales Monastici, I (1864), 141; CPR, 1247-1258, p. 79. The pope was willing to co-operate with Henry on this point only to the extent of forbidding the early departure of those who had taken the cross after Henry.
34 Chron. Maj., V, 102.
35 Ibid., V, 327.
ments for crusading vows, in order—as he claimed—that he might expend them according to his wishes in aid of the Holy Land. When he did take the cross in 1250, his first concern seems to have been to obtain as much money as he could through papal grants and to gain it as quickly as possible. Immediately on taking the cross Henry petitioned the pope to grant him a tenth of ecclesiastical revenues. He appears also at this time to have approached the English clergy to obtain their consent to a tax, for by the time that Innocent IV granted the tenth in April 1250 he had received a request from the English clergy to provide for Henry’s expedition. But perhaps more significantly Henry had already petitioned the pope for a tenth even before he had taken the cross. In his letter of 11th April 1250, in which he granted the tenth, Innocent revealed that Henry had earlier requested the tax and that he had replied saying that he was prepared to induce the English clergy to render financial assistance when the English king had taken the cross. Henry had earlier sought the tenth apparently on the pretext that he was fitting out an expedition in aid of the Holy Land, and it might be argued that he took a crusading vow only after it had been made clear that he could not hope for any money unless he actually assumed the cross. Admittedly the date of Henry’s earlier request and of Innocent’s reply are not known. But there is no evidence to suggest, as Lunt claims, that Henry took the cross before he had received a favourable reply from Innocent. On the contrary, the fact that Henry apparently approached the English clergy at the time of taking the cross suggests that he had already received the pope’s first reply, for in this it was made clear that the assent of the English clergy to a tax would be necessary, just as the consent of the French Church had been obtained when a tenth had been granted to Louis IX for his crusade.

For the next two years Henry’s activity with regard to the crusade continued to be limited primarily to the financial sphere. He sought a number of further financial concessions from the papacy, including a tenth from Scotland and other crusading monies from there and Ireland as well as from England. He also at this time began his efforts to hasten the collection of the tenth. Innocent in April 1250 had ordered that the collection of this tax should begin two years before the date of Henry’s departure, which in April 1252 was fixed at 24th June 1256. On 16th February 1251, however, the pope agreed to bring forward the date of collection and requested the English clergy to permit the collection of the tenth to begin three years before Henry’s departure. In the following years Henry made a number of attempts to secure the clergy’s assent to Innocent’s request. It appears to have been this issue which caused prolonged dispute rather than the question of consent to the tax itself, as has usually

---

25 Dehio, op. cit., p. 47, assumes that negotiations with the English clergy had already been conducted by the pope, but in his letter in April 1250 Innocent made clear that he was ready to act only after the cross had been taken by the English king.
26 The ‘cum’ in the clause ‘cum crucisignatus esses’ used by Innocent could be translated as ‘since’ rather than ‘when’; but in fact there was not time for two separate embassies to be sent to the pope between 6th March, when Henry took the cross, and 11th April.
27 Valuation, p. 56.
28 Foedera, I, 276, 277, 278, 280; CR, 1247–1251, p. 528; Registres d’Innocent IV, II, 151, doc. 4868.
29 Foedera, I, 274, 282.
been argued. This had already been given in 1250.** Henry may have raised the issue of an earlier collection as soon as he received the pope's letter, for the Abingdon chronicler reports that at an assembly at Reading on 12th March 1251 many bishops and abbots affixed their seals to a certain document concerning the tax, but that the bishops of London, Lincoln and Worcester were unwilling to do so.** The king's actions in the following year are better recorded. On 25th April 1252—only a few days after he had fixed the date for the start of his crusade—Henry wrote to the archbishop of Canterbury pointing out that the pope had originally conceded that the collection of the tax should start two years before the king's departure but in later letters had granted that the collection might begin three years before the start of his expedition. The king then proceeded to argue that

it was necessary to begin the collection earlier than the time stated in the pope's original letter, and he therefore requested the archbishop to obtain the assent of his clergy for the collection of the tax to begin at Michaelmas 1252, which would have been in fact three and three-quarter years before the date assigned for Henry's departure.*** Three weeks later Henry wrote again to the archbishop saying that he had summoned the clergy of the southern province and asked them to allow the collection of the tax to start three years before the date of departure. They had maintained that they could not reply in the absence of the archbishop. Henry therefore asked the archbishop to give his consent to the earlier date of collection and to inform his clergy of his decision.** Henry also approached the northern clergy, who met to consider the 'hastening' (maturatio) of the king's business, but they replied in September 1252 that as the matter touched the whole of the English Church they could not give an answer by themselves.*** Further discussions with the clergy were held towards the end of 1252 and early in the following year. Information about these meetings is found only in the chronicles, and these at first sight give the impression that the issue was consent to the tenth itself and not to the date of collection. But it is difficult to understand why the question of consent to the tenth should then have been raised when earlier in 1252 dispute had turned merely on the date when the collection of the tax should begin; and although the chroniclers write as though consent to the tenth was the issue, parts of their narratives hint that something else was at stake. In describing the assembly held in October 1252 Matthew Paris—who is the only source for this meeting—says that the king's agents and messengers

-so quod subveniendi Sancte Terre ardens in nobis desiderium accenditur

calculate the date of the assembly is given wrongly by Lunt, Valuation, p. 59.

** The consent of the English clergy to the tax is mentioned not only in Innocent's letter of 11th April 1250, but also in another bull sent at the end of April to the archbishops of Canterbury and York and the bishops of Durham, Ely and Hereford: in this the tenth was said to have been given 'de vestro et aliorum regni ejusdem assensu': *Fœderæ*, I, 274. Dehio, op. cit., p. 48, argues that the consent given by the prelates bound only themselves. If it is accepted that in 1250 consent was obtained only from the prelates, it may be argued that once the pope had made his grant no further consent was necessary. When in France a few years earlier the archbishop of Narbonne and his suffragans claimed that they were exempt from the payment of a tenth because they had not been present at the Council which had granted it, Innocent—although at first allowing their claim—later stated that as he had granted the tenth to Louis IX they should be compelled to pay it: *Registres d'Innocent IV*, I, 297, doc. 2492; 460, doc. 3093. 602, doc. 3980: cf. ibid., II, pp. cxxxvii—cxxxviii. F. M. Powicke, *King Henry III and the Lord Edward* (Oxford, 1947), I, 367, when arguing that the consent of all was needed, mentions only Innocent's first decision. It may further be noted that later negotiations between Henry and the English Church appear at no time to have been concerned merely with obtaining the assent of the lesser clergy, and that what has sometimes been taken to be consent to the tax was given in 1253 only by some prelates: see below, note 42.

**Councils and Synods, with other Documents relating to the English Church, ed. F. M. Powicke and C. R. Cheney, II (Oxford, 1964), 448-449. The date of the assembly is given wrongly by Lunt, Valuation, p. 59.


****Ibid., p. 217.

*****Shirley, op. cit., II (1866), 94-95, doc. 494; *Councils and Synods*, II, 450.
vulpina calliditate exigebant quod, soluta pecunia duorum annorum secundum papale
mandatum, pecunia tertii anni ante peregrinationem, licet hoc in papali mandato autentico
non continetur, pecunia totaliter, secundum formam pretaxatam collecta, solvatur
peregrinatu.\textsuperscript{41}

and in recording the agreement made in May 1253 he states

concessa est igitur regi decima pars proventuum ab ecclesia recipienda, cum iter
Jerosolimitanum arripseret, per visum magnatum in viaticum distribuenda, per triennium.\textsuperscript{42}

and this wording seems to imply that Henry was to receive the tax for the whole three
years when he set out for the Holy Land.

These activities of Henry in the financial sphere do not of course necessarily imply
that he had taken the cross for mercenary reasons. A successful crusade could not be
undertaken without a plentiful supply of money, and it would obviously be convenient
to have all available sums collected before the start of an expedition. But Henry's
efforts to obtain as many papal grants as possible and to hasten the collection of the
tenth, coupled with the lack of other preparations for a crusade, could also be taken
to indicate that Henry was interested in the crusade only as a means of gaining money
and that he hoped to appropriate for his own use the sums collected.

The diversion of part of the crusading tenth was in fact suggested early in 1254,
when money for Gascony was being sought by the regents. In January the prelates
offered to give the king financial assistance but informed the regents that their clergy
could probably not be induced to give any aid unless the first year's tenth was remitted
and the tenth for the other two years not collected until two years before the king's
departure.\textsuperscript{43} Nothing was decided at the time, but the issue was raised again in April,
when the lower clergy agreed that the tenth for one year should be used as a subsidy
for Henry, provided that the pope agreed to this, provided that Gascony was in fact
invaded by Castile, provided that the liberties of the Church were respected and that
the money was collected according to the old assessment.\textsuperscript{44} Such conditions meant of
course that the diversion did not take place. It is not clear, however, on whose initiative
the diversion was suggested. The lower clergy would no doubt be ready to consider
it as a means of escaping additional taxation, just as a few years later they hoped to
avoid payment of the tenth by opposing the diversion of crusading funds to Sicily. But
the proposed diversion is not, as Lunt seems to suggest,\textsuperscript{45} to be explained merely as an
attempt by the clergy to escape additional taxation, for when the issue was first raised
in January the lower clergy had not been consulted.\textsuperscript{46} The suggestion was made in the
first place either by the prelates or by the regents, but it is not known which of these
put forward the idea or whether, if it was the regents, they were acting on orders
received from Henry in Gascony. All that is recorded is that in April 1254 the grant
was made at the petition of the prelates and the king's councillors. But it may be noted

\textsuperscript{41} Chron. Maj., V, 325.

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., V, 374-375. Lunt, Financial Relations, p. 256, points out that only the consent of
some of the greater prelates was obtained and that part of the clergy opposed the grant. This
situation perhaps explains Innocent's letter in September 1253 ordering the clergy to allow
the collection to begin: Matthew Paris, Chron. Maj., VI, 296-297, doc. 147; Registres
d'Innocent IV, III (1897), 316, doc. 6989. In a letter written in September 1252 Innocent had
stated that the collection of the tax should begin two years before Henry's departure, but
possibly this resulted from a scribal error: Foedera, I, 285.

\textsuperscript{43} Shirley, op. cit., II, 101-102, doc. 499; Councils and Synods, II, 481-482.

\textsuperscript{44} W. E. Lunt, "The Consent of the English Lower Clergy to Taxation in the Reign of
1931), pp. 142-143; Councils and Synods, II, 482-483.

\textsuperscript{45} Valuation, p. 63.

\textsuperscript{46} This is clear from the records of the January assembly; see also CR, 1253-1254, p. 115.
that there is little evidence of other attempts by Henry to divert crusading monies from their intended purposes. Yet even if it were accepted that the diversion of funds suggested in 1254 was proposed by Henry, long-term profits could be made on a large scale out of his crusading vow only if he did not actually go on a crusade; and it has certainly been argued by some writers that Henry did not have any intention of going to the Holy Land. Yet although for two years after taking the cross Henry gave little indication that he would actually go to the East, in 1252 and 1253 various preparations were being undertaken for the expedition. Grants of money and privileges were made by Henry to those who were to accompany him on the crusade; arrangements were made for the preaching of the cross and for the payment of those who undertook the work of preaching; some prohi homines of Marseilles were summoned to discuss the proposed passage, and letters were also sent to the military orders in the Holy Land asking them to have ships in readiness a year before the king’s departure so that horses, arms and other goods could be transported in advance; indulgences were obtained from the pope for those who were being sent to prepare the way; and papal protection was sought for Henry, his family and his kingdom during the period of his expedition.

Possibly these preparations were not sincere. But they must have involved Henry in a considerable amount of expenditure. It must also be remembered that if Henry tried to use the crusading monies in his own interests without going to the Holy Land he would incur severe papal displeasure, and his reaction to papal threats about taxation in 1246 and about Sicily in 1258 raises a doubt whether he was the sort of man who would willingly place himself in such a situation. If Henry did intend to set out, he may have thought in terms of a merely token expedition—comparable with that undertaken some fifteen years later by the Aragonese king Jaime I—which would leave some of the crusading money unspent; otherwise the financial gain which he could derive from his crusading vow was likely to be limited to short-term benefits, involving the temporary use of crusading money, for a full-scale expedition would probably cost at least as much as was collected in crusading taxes and dues. The temporary use of some crusading funds was certainly being sought early in 1254, for the crusading dues collected in Ireland were being borrowed on the queen’s command in order to provide resources for Henry in Gascony. Yet if Henry was thinking of reaping a merely temporary financial benefit by taking the cross, it is surprising that he delayed until 1252 before announcing his departure date, since he was aware from 1250 that the collection of the tenth could not start before the date of his expedition.

In the autumn of 1254, before the pope had decreed that the crusading money should be used for the Sicilian enterprise (see below, p. 245), Henry was authorizing payments from the tenth to cover expenses incurred in connection with the Sicilian question; CPR, 1247-1258, pp. 343, 358; Rôles gascons, ed. F. Michel, I (Paris, 1885), 529, no. 4214; cf. Diplomatic Documents, ed. P. Chaplais, I (London, 1964), 189-190, doc. 278. But by then there was at least the possibility that the pope would order the diversion of crusading funds.

W. Stubbs, The Constitutional History of England, II (Oxford, 1877), 66; Denholm-Young, op. cit., p. 73. At the time when Henry took the cross Innocent had been reluctant to let him go to the East because of the political situation in Europe; Foedera, I, 272; but before the end of the year 1250 he was urging Henry to set out, and further exhortations were made by the pope in the following years: Lists and Indexes, XLIX (London, 1923), 237; Annales Monastici, I, 293-295, 298-299.


Foedera, I, 282, 289.

Ibid., I, 285.

Ibid., I, 286.

CR, 1253-1254, p. 20. An attempt was made at the same time to borrow papal funds collected in Ireland, but this was done in the form of a request: ibid., pp. 46-47, 134.
was made known. It could be argued that he was trying to secure as many financial concessions as possible before finally committing himself; but it would then be still surprising that in 1252 he announced a date over four years ahead, for this meant that the collection of the tenth could not begin for over a year. The possibility that a financial motive was uppermost in Henry's mind at the time when he took the cross cannot be ruled out, but the evidence is by no means convincing or conclusive.

Other possible explanations of Henry's crusading vow which have been put forward include a desire to emulate Louis IX, whose capture of Damietta became known in England in the autumn of 1249. This can be neither proved nor disproved, although it may be noted that Henry did not take the cross until some six months after hearing of Louis's success in the East. It is clear, however, that in 1252 Henry was hoping to derive a political advantage from his proposed crusade. Louis, who had remained in the Holy Land after the failure of his Egyptian campaign, had written to the English king urging him to hasten to the East. Henry replied in June 1252 that he had fixed a date for his departure but would bring it forward if Louis would restore the lands which he and his predecessors had taken from the English. Henry made the same point in a series of letters to the prelates, magnates, and military orders in the East, who in their desire to obtain help were obviously intended by Henry to exert pressure on Louis to accept the English terms. This was not the first time that Henry had written in this vein, but it is difficult to believe that political considerations of this kind could have been in Henry's mind when he took the cross, for it could scarcely then have been known that Louis would remain in the East long enough for another expedition to be fitted out and to come to his assistance.

It is obviously difficult to determine exactly why an individual took the cross, and this is especially so in the case of someone like Henry III. It cannot be positively demonstrated that he took the cross primarily for personal or material reasons. Yet his readiness to bargain about his crusade with Louis, together with his other actions both before and after he had taken the cross, implies that his concern for the Holy Land was limited and that his interests were in fact of a more material or more personal kind. It was only in words that he displayed any obvious enthusiasm for the Christian cause in the East. That the fortunes of the Holy Land did not greatly move him was further shown in 1254, for he was then planning to fulfil his crusading vow elsewhere.

The proposals made in 1254 to divert Henry's expedition mark the beginning of a new stage in the history of the English king's second crusading vow, which now became a pawn in European diplomacy. In the early part of that year simultaneous negotiations were being conducted to divert Henry's crusade both to Africa and to Sicily. The terms on which the bishop of Hereford and John Mansel were on 8th February 1254 empowered to make peace with Alfonso X of Castile included an undertaking by Henry to try to obtain from the pope permission to divert his crusade in order to assist Alfonso in Africa; and in the middle of February Henry was dispatching to the pope an embassy which was to seek permission for him to fulfil his crusading vow in Africa. The timing of Henry's announcement can scarcely be explained in political terms, for in the spring of 1252 the problem of Gascony was again coming to the fore.

Dehio, op. cit., p. 49, argues that Henry was not so anxious about the tenth once he had been promised other crusading dues, such as legacies and redemption payments; he also maintains that these dues involved considerable sums and that up to 1252 40,000 marks had been collected in Ireland. But it is not clear from exactly what sources this sum was obtained; and Henry could scarcely have been encouraged by Richard of Cornwall's experience with regard to these dues: cf. Lunt, 'Financial Relations', pp. 432-434.

The proposals made in 1254 to divert Henry's expedition mark the beginning of a new stage in the history of the English king's second crusading vow, which now became a pawn in European diplomacy. In the early part of that year simultaneous negotiations were being conducted to divert Henry's crusade both to Africa and to Sicily. The terms on which the bishop of Hereford and John Mansel were on 8th February 1254 empowered to make peace with Alfonso X of Castile included an undertaking by Henry to try to obtain from the pope permission to divert his crusade in order to assist Alfonso in Africa; and in the middle of February Henry was dispatching to the pope an embassy which was to seek permission for him to fulfil his crusading vow in


Foedera, 1, 282. Matthew Paris, Historia Anglorum, III, 85, maintains that Louis was ready to restore the former English possessions but that he was prevented from doing so by the French nobility.

Sicily. The proposal to divert the crusade to Africa arose when Henry was seeking to obtain from Alfonso a renunciation of Castilian claims to Gascony, which would not only avert any danger of a Castilian invasion, but also stop Gascon rebels from turning to Alfonso for support. Henry was offering a marriage alliance between his son Edward and Alfonso’s sister Leonor, but the Castilian king, who since the beginning of his reign had been planning an expedition to Africa, saw the opportunity of gaining Henry’s help in the south, just as a few years later he tried to persuade Hakon of Norway to carry out his crusading vow in Africa, and an undertaking on Henry’s part to seek in good faith the commutation of his vow was included in the treaty between England and Castile drawn up at the beginning of April. The proposal concerning Sicily was linked with Henry’s acceptance of that kingdom for his younger son Edmund. On 12th February 1254 Henry had appointed proctors to receive the grant of the kingdom from the papal notary Albert of Parma, and the gift was made by him at Vendôme on 6th March and confirmed by Innocent IV on 14th May.

A year earlier, when Innocent had first been considering the possibility of offering Sicily to Henry or his son, the pope had given Albert of Parma the power to commute Henry’s vow so that it could be fulfilled in Sicily, but by the time that Henry’s envoys were seeking the commutation of his vow to the Sicilian project in the spring of 1254 the political situation had been changed by the death on 21st May of the Hohenstaufen claimant Conrad. Innocent on 31st May therefore replied that Conrad’s death had lessened the difficulty of obtaining Sicily and that once Sicily had been gained the Holy Land could more easily be aided: he had for these reasons found it difficult to agree to the commutation, but consented to it if Henry strongly desired it.

Henry did not, however, have his vow commuted to the Sicilian venture at this time, and in September 1254 he dispatched William of Fraxino to the pope, accompanied by Alfonso’s envoy, the bishop of Morocco, to seek permission to divert his crusade to Africa. The new pope, Alexander IV, in March 1255 refused the request on the pretext that the Holy Land then required urgent help, but the real grounds for the refusal are revealed in two further bulls issued early in May 1255, for in these the pope gave the archbishop of Canterbury and the papal nuncio Rostand the power to commute Henry’s crusading vow into a Sicilian undertaking.

According to some contemporaries the commutation was this time carried out. The Burton annalist states that because Henry had promised to go personally to Sicily he obtained from the pope an absolution of his vow to go to the Holy Land, and when the keeper of papal bulls drew up a list of papal documents concerning Henry’s proposed crusade and the Sicilian affair, he said that the vow had been commuted to

---


**** Poëdera, I, 298.


******* Poëdera, I, 304.


********* Poëdera, I, 316.

********** Ibid., I, 319–320.
the 'Sicilian business'. This view has been commonly accepted by modern writers, who speak of Alexander commuting Henry's vow, not just giving his delegates the power to do so. Yet in January 1256 English envoys who were being dispatched to Castile were instructed to make clear that Henry had not commuted his crusading vow to the Sicilian venture; although he had been called upon to do so by the bishop of Bologna, who had arrived in England in the autumn of 1255 to invest Edmund with Sicily, he had not commuted his vow and would not do so without Alfonso's consent. And while later letters to the Castilian king did not state specifically that Henry had not commuted his vow, they still bore this implication. In July 1256 Henry granted his envoys power to give to Alfonso letters guaranteeing that he would seek to obtain permission to commute his crusading vow so that it could be fulfilled in Africa. In June 1258 he wrote to the Castilian king stating that he would go to Africa if the pope would give his permission for the commutation proposed in the 1254 treaty, but that the pope would not allow him to undertake anything else until the 'Sicilian business' was completed. That an African expedition could be envisaged after the fulfillment of Henry's obligations in Sicily implies that the English king had not commuted his vow. And in 1262 Henry wrote saying that he could not do anything for the present about Africa because of the disturbed state of his kingdom, but that when order had been restored in England

libenter super hoc faciemus quod honori vestro et nostro noverimus convenire. Powicke has argued that Henry was trying to mislead the Castilian king; he claims that in 1256 'his promises were disingenuous, for . . . he did not point out that the new pope, Alexander IV, had already commuted his vows in favour of the Italian adventure'. But it would have been difficult for Henry to maintain this pretence when Castilian envoys were frequently visiting both the English and the papal court, and when Henry was suggesting that Alfonso might himself approach the pope on the subject of the commutation. That Henry had not in fact commuted his vow to the Sicilian venture is made clear by a bull issued by Alexander IV in September 1256, in which the pope ordered Rostand and the bishop of Worcester to fix a new date for Henry's departure to the Holy Land. It has admittedly been maintained that this bull refers to the Sicilian expedition, but the letter not only refers to the Holy Land by name but also mentions the date on which Henry should have set out for the East—24th June 1256—and not the date by which help should have been sent to Sicily; and decisions about extending the term for sending forces to Sicily were taken by the pope himself a few weeks later. And it may further be noted that when making these decisions in the autumn of 1256 Alexander still did not insist on Henry's personal

79 Annales Monastici, I, 348–349.
81 Foedera, I, 343.
86 Foedera, I, 347.
participation in an expedition to Sicily, as would have been expected if his vow had been commuted. Henry was still either to go himself or to send a force to gain the Sicilian kingdom. Such evidence must outweigh the comments of a chronicler or of the keeper of papal bulls, who was writing some years later.  

Henry's actions from 1254 onwards with regard to his crusading vow obviously require an explanation, and to begin with an attempt must be made to explain why two sets of negotiations were being conducted at the same time in the spring of 1254. When only the results of discussions and not the discussions themselves are recorded, it is clearly not easy to discern the motives behind actions. Conclusions about motive have to be derived from what actually happened. Powicke has come to the conclusion that Henry was at this time interested only in the proposed commutation of his vow to the Sicilian venture. While his envoys 'were promising on his behalf that he would endeavour to join Alfonso in his crusade against the Moors, he was already looking forward to the mutation of his crusading vow to the conquest of a kingdom for his son', and before the treaty with Castile had been concluded the idea of an African expedition had become 'utopian'. Viewed in this light the African expedition was an unwelcome proposal forced upon Henry and the English king's petition to the pope to have his crusade diverted to Africa—which the pope could be expected to refuse—was merely an empty formality made necessary by the signing of the treaty with Castile. Yet doubt is thrown on this interpretation by the fact that Henry did not commute his vow into an obligation to give aid in Sicily, and his failure to do so suggests that in the early months of 1254 he was not so committed to the Sicilian project as Powicke suggests. It could, of course, be argued that early in 1254 Henry had a definite plan of action, whose difficulties only later became apparent. But even in the months immediately following the agreements made in the spring of that year with Castile and the papacy Henry does not seem to have had very definite expectations with regard to Sicily. When in the summer of 1254 Albert of Parma asked the English king to make speedy preparations for a Sicilian campaign, Henry replied that he had no money and did not think that he could pursue the Sicilian project unless he was assigned the tenth that had been granted in England. At this time it was not being taken for granted that the tenth would be spent on the Sicilian enterprise. And Henry was slow to take action on some of the decisions reached in the spring of 1254. Although the envoys who had negotiated the treaty with Castile had returned at least by the early part of July, it was not until September that an embassy was being dispatched to the pope to request that Henry should be allowed to fulfil his crusading vow in Africa; and although it is not altogether clear when the agreement concerning Sicily was made known to Henry, there was obviously a delay before the king sought to complete negotiations, for it was not until October that the bishop of Hereford was being sent to Rome to negotiate in detail the conditions on which the Sicilian kingdom was to be held. Such delays would hardly have been expected if the English king had had a clearly formulated plan of action.

In the early months of 1254 Henry may in fact have been toying with two possibilities for commuting his crusading vow and employing it in the interests of himself and his family. The reason for this would be that the outcome of the negotiations with the papacy about Sicily and with Castile about Gascony was not altogether certain.

---

44 Johnson, loc. cit., p. 135, assigns the list compiled by the keeper of papal bulls to the year 1269 or a little before, but Lunt, Financial Relations, p. 265, note 4, suggests that it was drawn up in the period 1261-1263, when Henry was seeking to revive English claims to Sicily.

45 The Thirteenth Century (Oxford, 1953), p. 120.

46 Henry II and the Lord Edward, I, 236.

47 Registres d'Alexandre IV, III, 93, doc. 3036; MGH, Epistolae Saeculi XIII, III, 411, doc. 446.

48 CPR, 1247-1258, p. 316.

49 Ibid., p. 343; Rôles gascons, I, 526, nos 4187, 4188; 528, 529, nos. 4212-4214; cf. F. Mugnier, Les Savoyards en Angleterre au XIIIe siècle (Chambéry, 1890), p. 109.
Since the death of Frederick II in 1250 the papacy had varied its Sicilian policy according to the circumstances of the moment, at times trying to impose its own direct lordship, at others searching for a champion and seeking to establish a new ruling house. In 1254 the papacy was still not committed to a single policy, and when Albert of Parma gave Sicily to Edmund in March of that year, he made the reservation that

si dictus dominus papa regni eiusdem collationem nostram huiusmodi ratam et gratam habuerit ac ex certa scientia presentium litterarum tenorem de verbo ad verbum suis duxerit litteris inserendum, valida sit et firma, alioquin cassa et irtita habeatur et nullius penitus sit momenti."

But even when Innocent had confirmed the grant the negotiations concerning Sicily were not complete, for the conditions on which the kingdom was to be held had still to be decided in detail." It may similarly not have been altogether obvious in the early months of 1254 that a peaceful settlement with Castile was about to be completed. Admittedly Matthew Paris claims that by the beginning of that year there was no great threat to Gascony from Alfonso and that in January Henry gave a misleading impression of the situation when he sought military service and financial aid to repel an expected attack;" and the chronicle's opinion has been accepted by some modern writers." But Matthew Paris was writing with the advantage of hindsight, and his comments on relations with Castile are not altogether consistent, for he states elsewhere that the negotiations were brought to a conclusion cum inaestimabilibus laboribus et sollicitudinibus

and that even when terms had been agreed Henry was wary of sending Edward to Castile for fear that he might be detained as a hostage; and Matthew Paris makes the comment: 'nec mirum'." Certainly the English clergy and nobles in January 1254 promised to provide aid only if the king of Castile did invade," but this does not necessarily imply that there was no doubt about Castile's intentions. Such a reservation might be expected when there was a reluctance to serve abroad and to grant taxes, and when an attack would not be made until the spring. It is perhaps rather to be noted that they did not give an outright refusal to the royal demands and that they agreed to a further meeting after Easter." And some of the actions of Henry in Gascony and of the regents in England at the end of 1253 and the beginning of 1254 imply that they still thought that Alfonso might attack. When the Gascon rebel Amanieu of Albret made his peace with Henry in December 1253, the king promised his protection if Gascony was invaded by Castile," and in England the regents at the end of January 1254 issued orders for the commissioning of ships to transport English troops to Gascony to repel the expected invasion from Castile, and in February they were

"Registres d'Alexandre IV, III, 91, doc. 3036; MGH, Epistolae Saeculi XIII, III, 408, doc. 446.

C. Rodenberg, Innocenz IV und das Königreich Sicilien, 1245–1254 (Halle, 1892), p. 163, wrongly assumes that the conditions had been formulated by 6th March 1254.

Chron. Maj., V, 423–425. Although the king's request was discussed in January, it had been made rather earlier, for Henry's letters containing the demand had been received in England at Christmas: ibid., VI, 282–284, doc. 139; but Henry apparently repeated his request through envoys who arrived in England early in February: Shirley, op. cit., II, 101–102, doc. 499.


Chron. Maj., V, 397.

Ibid., VI, 282–284, doc. 139; Shirley, op. cit., II, 101–102, doc. 499.


seeking to obtain paid troops in England as well as unpaid levies.\textsuperscript{66} This concern could have been occasioned in part by rumours of Alfonso’s intention of moving north from Sevilla in the new year, even if in fact in the spring of 1254 he did not go farther than Toledo, and even if any intended march north was aimed at Navarre rather than Gascony.\textsuperscript{67} It might of course be argued that even if Henry was in any doubt about Alfonso’s intentions at the beginning of the year, the issue could scarcely have been in doubt by February, when Henry empowered his negotiators to make peace on terms which were almost identical with those contained in the actual treaty and which were obviously acceptable to Alfonso. Thus Powicke has argued that although Henry was at first alarmed, he had realized by this time that the threatened invasion was a myth, but could not resist the temptation to make a little capital out of the scare.\textsuperscript{68} But the making of peace may not have seemed so certain to Henry. The slowness of communications meant that there was an inevitable delay between Henry’s agreement to make peace on certain terms and the actual drawing up of a treaty, and Henry may have feared that Alfonso had no real desire for peace, for the latter had while negotiating given his support to the Gascons and the negotiations had been difficult, a fact noted by the Dunstable annalists as well as by Matthew Paris.\textsuperscript{69} The treaty was not completed as quickly and easily as Powicke implies.\textsuperscript{70} It is not known when negotiations were begun, although it is clear that the embassy of John Mansel and the bishop of Bath which was being prepared in the spring of 1253 was not the first step, and that envoys had already been sent in the previous year;\textsuperscript{71} and although Mansel and the bishop of Bath had been empowered by Henry to contract a marriage between Edward and Alfonso’s sister Leonor,\textsuperscript{72} when they returned in January 1254 they brought back only further proposals.\textsuperscript{73} Uneasiness about Alfonso’s intentions on the part of Henry may have been increased by the fact that in the spring of 1254 resistance was being maintained by many Gascons, who looked to Alfonso for assistance. Opposition in Gascony was not altogether collapsing. Although Henry’s grant of a pension to the count of Comminges in March 1254 has usually been interpreted as marking the surrender of a rebel, according to the historian of Comminges the count had never taken part in the revolt;\textsuperscript{74} and although in February Henry was negotiating a truce with Gaston of Béarn and the inhabitants of La Réole, it was not until August that these, together with other rebels such as the viscounts of Fronsac and Castillon, were received back into the king’s peace.\textsuperscript{75} Henry may thus not have been lying when he wrote to England on 24th March 1254 saying that although messengers were going


\textsuperscript{67} A. Ballesteros y Beretta, Itinerario de Alfonso el Sabio (Madrid, 1935), pp. 45 ff.; idem, Alfonso X el Sabio, pp. 88-89, 1064, 1065.

\textsuperscript{68} Henry III and the Lord Edward, I, 235.

\textsuperscript{69} Annales Monastici, III, 188.

\textsuperscript{70} Henry III and the Lord Edward, I, 232-233.

\textsuperscript{71} CLR, 1251-1260, p. 80; CLR, 1267-1272, p. 259, no. 2296A. The wording of some of the documents drawn up in the spring of 1253 also makes it clear that there had been earlier negotiations: Foedera, I, 290.

\textsuperscript{72} Ibid., I, 290; CR, 1251-1253, pp. 475-476.

\textsuperscript{73} Baylen, loc. cit., p. 487.

\textsuperscript{74} C. Higounet, Le comté de Comminges de ses origines à son annexion à la Couronne (Toulouse, 1949), I, 123, note 55.

\textsuperscript{75} Rôles gascons, I, 313, no. 2396; 339-339, nos. 4281-4283: J. P. Trabat-Cussac, "Un rôle de lettres patentes émanées du prince Édouard pendant son premier séjour en Gascogne (mai-octobre 1254)", Recueil de travaux offert à M. Clovis Brunet (Paris, 1955), II, 563. Gaston of Béarn continued to be named in Castilian documents as a vassal of the king of Castile for some twenty years after 1254: Memorial histórico español, I (Madrid, 1851), passim; but he was freed by Alfonso from his oath of allegiance in December 1254: P. de Marco, Histoire de Béarn (Paris, 1640), p. 601.
to and fro he still feared that Alfonso would attack at Easter. In such a situation of uncertainty Henry may therefore in the early months of 1254 have been considering two possibilities for the commutation of his crusading vow, each of which would serve his own interests.

Once the treaty with Castile had been made, however, he found himself obliged to seek the pope's consent to a diversion of his crusade to Africa and he could not act on the permission granted by Innocent IV in May 1254 to commute his vow to the Sicilian venture. When Alexander had refused Henry's request about Africa, there was nothing in the actual terms of the Castilian treaty to prevent the English king from raising again the question of fulfilling his crusading vow in Sicily. Yet Henry seems not to have made any further request for a commutation of this kind. The proposals made in 1255 to commute Henry's vow to the Sicilian venture appear—as is implied by Henry in a letter to John Mansel at the beginning of 1256—to have emanated from the pope. In the papal letters issued in May 1255 providing for the commutation there is no reference to any petition from Henry, such as is found in the earlier papal bulls of May 1254 about Sicily and March 1255 about Africa. Instead, in the bull issued on 3rd May 1255 Alexander stated merely that as Sicily had been granted to Edmund he was giving the archbishop of Canterbury and Rostand the power to commute Henry's vow; and in the second, issued on 7th May, he stated that as it was necessary for Manfred's power to be destroyed, he had provided that the aid of Henry should be invoked and therefore gave the archbishop and Rostand power to commute Henry's vow. That the initiative came from the pope is also suggested by the fact that at the same time he provided for the commutation to the Sicilian affair of the crusading vow of Hakon of Norway, who had taken the cross for the second time after the fall of Jerusalem.

The commutation of Henry's crusading vow into a Sicilian undertaking would inevitably have thrown serious doubt on the good faith of Henry's efforts to have his crusade diverted to Africa, and the situation existing in 1255 made acceptance of the pope's proposal particularly undesirable. At about the time when Rostand and the bishop of Bologna reached England in the autumn of that year, an embassy also arrived from Castile, whose purpose was to secure the execution of the terms of the Anglo-Castilian treaty. Alfonso was at this time continuing to make preparations for his African expedition, and the Castilians were already beginning to assert that Henry had not made a serious attempt to obtain the pope's permission to fulfill his crusading vow in Africa. There were also a number of other issues on which Henry's compliance was sought by Alfonso's envoys, including the question of restitutions in Gascony and the proposed marriage of Henry's daughter Beatrice to one of Alfonso's brothers, which should have taken place within a year of the signing of the treaty. It was necessary for Henry to ensure that the treaty was observed as far as was possible,

---

108 Foedera, I, 319-320.
110 Foedera, I, 325, 328; CR, 1254-1256, pp. 114, 132-133, 212; CLR, 1251-1260, p. 234; Matthew Paris, Chron. Maj., V, 509; Annales Monastici, I, 348-350; III, 196. One of Alfonso's envoys was his brother, the archbishop-elect of Toledo.
111 Dufourcq, loc. cit., pp. 32-33; A. López, Obispos en el África septentrional desde el siglo XIII (Tanger, 1941), pp. 32-33.
so that Alfonso had no occasion to revive Castilian claims to Gascony and restore the relationship which had previously existed with the Gascon rebels; and to have accepted a commutation of his vow to the Sicilian venture would, particularly at this time, have placed an added strain on Anglo-Castilian relations.

Yet if Henry could not risk the commutation of his crusading vow to the Sicilian project, he could argue that he had tried to obtain permission to fulfil his vow in Africa and had therefore carried out the terms of the treaty; and at the beginning of the year 1256 Henry attempted to use this argument to gain improved terms from Castile. He asserted that he had tried to his utmost to obtain from the pope the commutation proposed in the 1254 treaty, but had failed. His obligation to Alfonso was therefore according to the treaty at an end. But he offered to make further efforts to have his vow commuted after the Sicilian enterprise was completed if Alfonso would make concessions on other matters, such as the question of restitutions in Gascony and the marriage of Henry's daughter to one of Alfonso's brothers.113 This manoeuvre, however, produced no result, for although Alfonso's letters of the following years have not survived, it is clear from the English correspondence that the Castilian king continued to maintain that Henry had not really tried to obtain a commutation of his vow so that he could fulfil it in Africa. In the later part of the decade there also continued to be other problems over the execution of the treaty. It was probably at the end of 1255 that Alfonso—in accordance with the terms of the treaty—sought Henry's aid against Aragon,114 and in 1257 he requested the English king's assistance against Richard of Cornwall, who was Alfonso's rival for the imperial throne, and this request was repeated in the following years. Henry could only reply that he had not known of Alfonso's candidature and give evasive answers about providing aid.115 In addition, difficulties about the execution of the clauses of the treaty concerning Gascony continued to arise, and there was from Henry's point of view in this sphere the further problem that the execution of the treaty served to maintain links between Alfonso and those who had taken part in the Gascon revolt, for they appealed to the Castilian king to ensure that their claims were met.116 The execution of the 1254 treaty with Castile was thus a cause of repeated concern, and according to Matthew Paris the Castilian king was in 1256 even considering an invasion of Gascony.117 Whether or not

113 See the sources mentioned in the preceding note.  
114 Diplomatic Documents, I, 191-192, doc. 280. Alfonso's envoy was being given money for his expenses home in April 1256: CLR, 1251-1260, p. 281. On the relations between Castile and Aragon at this time, see Ballesteros, Alfonso X el Sabio, pp. 114 ff.; F. Valls Taberner, 'Relacions familiars i polítiques entre Jaume el Conqueridor i Anfós el Savi', Bulletin hispanique, XXI (1918), 23-26.  
115 CR, 1256-1259, pp. 284-285, 314-315; CR, 1259-1261, pp. 166-167; CR, 1261-1264, pp. 172-173; Foedera, I, 397-398, 420-421. Alfonso's candidature for the imperial throne also meant that he could put forward a claim to Sicily, and in a treaty between Alfonso and Pisa in 1256 the acquisition of Sicily by Castile was envisaged: MGH, Constitutiones et acta publica imperatorum et regum, ed. L. Weiland, II (Hanover, 1896), 494, doc. 394.  
116 CR, 1256-1259, pp. 118-120, 135, 310, 314-315. In many cases individuals were said to have been freed or lands restored at the request of Alfonso, to whom appeals for help had obviously been made: e.g. Rôles gascons, I, 490-491, nos. 3925, 3929; CPR, 1247-1258, p. 506; cf. E. C. Lodge, Gascony under English Rule (London, 1926), p. 48.  
117 Chron. Maj., V, 585. In 1256 Henry gave refuge to Alfonso's exiled brother Enrique, and he possibly did this partly in order to have a counter with which to bargain with the Castilian king. Matthew Paris says that Enrique came to England to seek aid in obtaining a pardon from his brother: Chron. Maj., V, 575; but Enrique is not mentioned in any of the surviving letters sent to Alfonso by Henry, and from the middle of 1256 Enrique and his followers were given maintenance by the English king. The first payment appears to have been made in August 1256: CLR, 1251-1260, p. 318; and information about some later payments is provided by J. P. Trabut-Cussac, 'Don Enrique de Castille en Angleterre (1256-1259)', Mélanges de la Casa de Velázquez, II (1966), 51-58. Trabut-Cussac's argument that Anglo-Castilian relations worsened in 1257 and improved in 1260, and that these developments were linked with Enrique's arrival in England and his later departure for Africa is, however, open to doubt. At one time Henry nominated Enrique to lead an expedition to Sicily on his behalf: Foedera, I, 359-360.
his remark is accurate, relations with Castile were difficult and the commutation of Henry's vow to the Sicilian project was obviously still inadvisable.

The commutation would, moreover, involve a risk which it was not very necessary to take. Although Henry did not commute his vow to the Sicilian venture, Alexander IV had in 1255 authorized him to use the crusading money for the Sicilian enterprise, and thus gave Henry assistance in solving his financial problems in this sphere. The chief material benefit to be obtained from commutation had therefore been gained. This meant that Henry was still under an obligation to undertake an expedition to the Holy Land, while the money allocated for this crusade had been diverted to another end; but the pope in the circumstances was not likely to press Henry to fulfill his undertaking: as has been seen, in September 1256 the task of fixing a new departure date was left in the hands of the bishop of Worcester and Rostand, who were no doubt expected to consult Henry on the matter.

Alfonso's main action in Africa took place in 1260, when Salé was briefly occupied, and although he appears to have been considering a further expedition in 1262, when he again sought Henry's help, nothing more was heard after this of a joint African crusade. But if after 1262 the Castilian king was no longer pressing Henry to participate in an expedition to Africa, there was no possibility that the English king might at last have his vow commuted to the Sicilian project, for his presence was no longer desired in Sicily either. Although Henry was reluctant to abandon English claims to the Sicilian kingdom, the papacy had lost interest in an English claimant. In 1258 Alexander had declared himself no longer bound by the agreement made with Henry, and Urban IV turned for help to Charles of Anjou. If Henry's crusading vow was to be fulfilled it would have to be in the East.

The Holy Land was certainly in need of help at this time, for it was being seriously threatened by the Mameluk sultan Baibars, who ruled in both Syria and Egypt, and the remaining Christian strongholds were gradually being lost. Faced by this situation the papacy on several occasions in the 1260's sought to arouse crusading zeal in England. In 1263 Urban IV ordered the preaching of the cross there, while three years later the papal legate Ottobuono was commanded to undertake the work of preaching for a crusade with increased vigour. At the same time the French king Louis IX tried to persuade Henry to fulfill his crusading vow. In 1266 he wrote to Henry urging him to make peace with Simon de Montfort's sons so that the English king could then go on a crusade; and after Louis had taken the cross again in 1267 he invited Henry to meet him in order to discuss a proposed expedition to the Holy Land. But for much of the decade the political situation in England precluded the

110 Annales Monastici, I, 351.
111 On this expedition, see A. Ballesteros, 'La toma de Salé en tiempos de Alfonso X el Sabio', Al-Andalus, VIII (1943), 89-128; A. Huici Miranda, 'La toma de Salé por la escuadra de Alfonso X. Nuevos datos', Hesperia, XXXIX (1952), 41-74.
115 Registres d'Urban IV, II, 187, doc. 397; 225, doc. 466; 228-230, doc. 468.
possibility of a crusade led by the English king, and it must have seemed unlikely that Henry would fulfil his vow. Although in 1262 he did mention the possibility of going to the Holy Land, on 13th May 1264—the day before the battle of Lewes—he stated that the sum of 2,000 livres which he had given to aid the Holy Land from the money due to him under the terms of the treaty of Paris should be regarded as a partial compensation for his crusading obligation, if by any unexpected chance he could not go in person to the East. Almost four years later Clement IV wrote to Louis IX saying that he had advised Henry’s son Edward not to undertake a crusade since the peace in England was very fragile; and a few months later, in April 1268, because he considered the king’s presence in England was necessary, the pope gave Ottobuono the power to absolve Henry from his vow, provided that he sent his son Edmund in his stead on an expedition to the Holy Land.

Yet towards the end of the decade peace was being restored, and in the summer of 1268 both Edward and Edmund took the cross. By the following year Henry himself seems to have been considering the fulfilment of his vow, for in May 1269 it was decreed that the Jews should be free from tallage for three years unless in the meantime the king or his sons went on an expedition to the Holy Land. Henry clearly did not at this time in fact decide to go to the East, for in August 1269 Edward agreed to accompany Louis IX to the Holy Land. But by the early months of the following year Henry announced his intention to go to the East with his sons, and on 20th May 1270 he summoned an assembly to meet at Westminster in June so that he could obtain approval for his expedition from the prelates and magnates and make provision for the government of the country after his departure, which was to take place on 25th June. Nevertheless when the expedition finally set out in August 1270 it was led by Edward and not Henry, for at the beginning of August the king announced that because the prelates and magnates considered it inadvisable for both the king and his eldest son to be absent from the kingdom, he was committing the business of the cross and the sign of the cross to Edward.

Henry’s statement is the only direct evidence which survives about his decision not to go to the East, and the circumstances in which the decision was made are not known in detail. In view of events earlier in Henry’s reign, the sincerity of his professed desire to aid the Holy Land inevitably falls into doubt. But there was clearly no possibility of Henry’s gaining any financial benefit through his actions in the year 1270. Consent to the twentieth levied for the crusade had been obtained at least from the

101 CPR, 1258-1266, pp. 233, 317.
102 Registres de Clément IV, pp. 418-419, doc. 1288.
103 Ibid., p. 212, doc. 609.
105 CPR, 1266-1272, p. 345.
106 Foedera, I, 481; Diplomatic Documents, I, 293-295, doc. 419.
107 CPR, 1266-1272, p. 411.
108 Foedera, I, 483.
110 It was still being stated on 13th July that Henry was proposing to go to the East: Foedera, I, 483; CPR, 1266–1272, p. 440. If, however, a royal letter about the twentieth sent to the sheriff of York on 10th July 1270 is to be believed, Henry had apparently already by then decided not to go, for the letter states that the money was needed because Edward was about to set out: Shirley, op. cit., II, 338, doc. 578.
111 According to the Liber de Antiquis Legibus, pp. 123–124, in a sentence of arbitration between Edward and the earl of Gloucester pronounced on 27th May 1270 Richard of Cornwall decreed that Henry would give the earl 8,000 marks ‘si dictus comes pro domino regis, qui crusignatus est, volesant illud iter arripere’. But the terms of the sentence were in fact somewhat different: J. Raine, Historical Papers and Letters from the Northern Registers (Rolls Ser., 1873), pp. 27–30; Register of Walter Giffard (Surtees Society, 1904), pp. 237–240.
laity before Henry decided to participate in the expedition. If Henry did not go to
the Holy Land, the money would be used for Edward's expenses, while Henry's
participation in the venture would mean merely that additional expense would be
incurred. Nor did Henry for the sake of appearances need to go through a pretence
of wishing to fulfil his crusading vow, for he had already received permission from
the pope to pass on his obligation to his son. It is perhaps rather to be noted that
when Henry made his decision to go to the Holy Land early in 1270 he was sixty-two
years old and obviously nearing the end of his life. It would not then be surprising
if at this time he was thinking of his spiritual rather than his material welfare, and
it may be suggested that his decision to undertake an expedition to the Holy Land was
dictated by a consideration of the spiritual rewards gained by a crusader. The reasons
given by Henry for not in fact setting out can then be accepted.

There are fewer problems attaching to Henry's third crusading vow, which was
taken in the following year. In the early months of 1271 he was dangerously ill, and
his life was despaired of. It was then that he assumed the cross for the third time and
vowed that if he recovered he would undertake a crusade to the Holy Land. And
when his health began to be restored he made arrangements to reduce expenditure in
preparation for the proposed expedition and even gave the Council power to regulate
the Household. But he survived only one more year and died, like his father, with
a crusading vow unfulfilled.

The long and varied history of Henry III's crusading vows probably caused little
surprise among contemporaries, for it fitted easily into the pattern of crusading in the
thirteenth century. Men took the cross for divers reasons. An expedition to the Holy
Land was still looked upon by most people as a meritorious act, which found favour
in the eyes of God, and among the motives which commonly led men to assume the
cross were the desire for spiritual reward and the wish to make recompense for divine
favours. Sickbed crusading vows were by no means unusual, and when faced by death
in 1271 Henry III did merely what Louis IX had done in 1244. But the motives of
many other crusaders were different and of what might be considered a less worthy
kind. And although men continued to take the cross, concern for the Christian cause
in the East was declining. The needs of the Holy Land were constantly being voiced in
the West and most western Christians would no doubt have acknowledged a duty to
aid the Holy Land, but in the thirteenth century fewer expeditions were launched, and
a growing number of those who did vow to go to the aid of the Christians in the East
either did not fulfil their vows in person or fulfilled them elsewhere, for crusades were
at this time being employed in an increasing variety of situations, many of them not
involving conflict with the infidel at all. The crusade was tending in fact to become
just another means of obtaining men and money for any undertaking which had the
support of the Church, and in the papacy's conflict with the Hohenstaufen many
precedents could be found for the proposal that Henry should fulfil his vow by fighting
against the pope's Christian enemies.

117 CR, 1268-1272, p. 245. It is difficult to trace clearly the history of the negotiations
concerning this tax; see S. K. Mitchell, Studies in Taxation under John and Henry III (New
Haven, 1914), pp. 295-299; J. A. C. Vincent, Lancashire Lay Subsidies, 1 (Lancashire and
Cheshire Record Society, 1893), 91-96.
118 Foedera, 1, 488; CPR, 1266-1272, p. 531. On the carrying out of these arrangements,
see ibid., pp. 574, 622; CR, 1268-1272, p. 585.
ADDENDA

I p. 175: R. Hiestand, ‘Kardinalbischof Matthäus von Albano, das Konzil von Troyes und die Entstehung des Templerordens’, Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte, XCIX (1988), 295–325, has argued convincingly that the Council of Troyes was held in 1129, not 1128; the foundation date of the Temple is therefore more likely to have been 1120 than 1119.


IV p. 72: See also M. Echaniz Sans, Las mujeres de la orden militar de Santiago en la edad media (Salamanca, 1992).

VI pp. 263–4: A Templar interrogated in 1311 also claimed that, when a brother was captured by the Muslims, nothing but a belt was given for his freeing: J. Michelet, Procès des Templiers, I (Paris, 1841), 219.


XII pp. 483–5: Dr Susan Reynolds has kindly drawn my attention to entries in British Library, Harleian MS 4757, fols. 5v–6, comprising extracts from a lost Bermondsey cartulary, and suggests on the basis of these that Theobald of Helles may have been a son or, more likely, a nephew or, possibly, a stepson of Becket’s sister Agnes.

The following abbreviations are used to indicate the orders to which individuals belonged:

- BVM Blessed Virgin Mary
- FJC Faith of Jesus Christ
- H Hospital of St John
- M Mountjoy
- S Santiago
- STA St Thomas of Acre
- T Temple
- TO Teutonic order

Acerra, Thomas of: VII 13
Acornbury: IV 70, 76–7, 84, 91
Acre: VII 16; VIII 319–20; XII 481–3, 485–9, 492, 494–6
Adalbero, bishop of Laon: I 182–3
Adrian IV: V 210; VII 10
Alfonso I Henriques of Portugal: V 199, 216–17
Alfonso II of Portugal: V 202
Alfonso III of Aragon and Navarre: V 197–9; IX 82, 85
Alfonso IX of Leon: IV 72, 88; V 215, 217–18, 220; VI 270
Alfonso X of Castile and Leon: V 201–2, 225, 233; VI 272; XIII 237–45
Algars: V 209
Algarve: V 204
Algarve: IV 71, 75–6, 79, 81, 83–7, 89–91
Alhambra: V 212
Alharilla: V 204
Aliaga: V 203
Alice, wife of William Fitzmuriel (H): II 152
Aljustrel: V 204
Almenara: V 205
Alrede, Richard (STA): XII 500
Aluindo, Pons of (T): III 8
Alvarez, Rodrigo, count of Sarria (M): XI 250–6, 258–60, 264–5
Alvarez Alvito, Pedro (T): XI 263
Amanieu, archbishop of Auch: VII 7
Amposta: V 200, 202–3, 207; IX 82, 85; castellan, castellany: IV 71, 81–91; VII 11
Ampurias, Hugh of (T): VI 262–3
Anastasius IV: III 2
Andaló, Loderengo degli (BVM): VII 8–9
Andravdha, hospital of St James: II 162; VII 3
Angera, Bernard of: I 188
Anjou, Blanche of: VII 19
Anna: V 203
Antioch: I 189; VI 265, 278; IX 82; XI 254
Aquinas, St Thomas: I 186, 191, 194; VII 2
INDEX

Aragon: II 141, 149, 159; IV 69–71; V passim; VI 268, 275; VII 11, 14–15, 19, 21–2; IX 85; XI 252–3, 259–62, 264; XIII 244
Argentens: III 15
Armengol VI of Urgel: V 198
Armenia: I 182; II 140; VIII 335
Arnaud, archbishop of Narbonne: VII 10
Arsic, Robert: XII 487
Artah: VI 261
Ascalon: VI 278; IX 76–7, 81–3; XI 253
Ascó: V 209
Ashridge: XII 495–6
Assailly, Gilbert d' (H): IX 87–9; X 16, 18, 22–3, 25–6
Assassins: I 177
Atalaya: V 217
Augustinian rule: IV 84; XII 500
Aurembaix, countess of Urgel: IV 65
Auvergne: IV 85, 89
Auzon: II 156
Avignon: X 21, 23, 26
Avila: II 167; V 218
Avis: V 202; order: II 153; III 1, 4; V 201–2, 204, 218; VI 273
Ayamonte: V 204
Bachelor, William le (T): VIII 329
Baeza: V 227
Baggishoure, Roger of (STA): XII 495
Baibars: VI 259, 276; XIII 245
Baixo Alentejo: V 204
Baldwin I, Latin emperor: VII 2
Baldwin II, Latin emperor: V 225; VII 3
Baldwin I of Jerusalem: I 177
Baldwin II of Jerusalem: IX 75
Baldwin III of Jerusalem: IX 81
Baldwin IV of Jerusalem: XI 253, 255
Barbará: IV 66; V 198
Barbastro: V 198
Barbastro, Peter of (H): II 159
Bardelby, Robert of: XII 495
Bargota: IV 64
Ba’rin: IX 82
Batea: V 209
Baugy: IV 69
Bauzan, Geoffrey (H): II 166
Beaujeu, Humbert of (T): II 152; VII 18
Beaujeu, William of (T): II 143; V 227; VI 265; VII 22
Beaujeu: IV 71, 75, 77, 79, 83, 85, 87, 89
Becket, Thomas: XII 481–3, 487, 490, 502
Bedford, Henry of (STA): XII 496–9
Bent-Jibrin: IX 82–4
Belchite: I 180; V 197; IX 81
Belissén, Bernard (T): II 150
Bellinval: II 152
Belver: V 204
Belvoir: VI 260
Benavente: V 213
Benedict, cardinal of St Susanna: VII 2
Berenguier, Rostanh: II 164; VIII 326
Berkhamsted: XII 486–7, 493, 501
Beringerode, Bruno of (TO): II 166
Bernard, St: I passim; IX 80
Bernehus, Nicholas (T): II 158
Blanquefort, Bertrand of (T): VI 260
Blessed Virgin Mary, order: III 1, 4; VII 8–9
Blois, Peter of (T): II 151
Bohemund III of Antioch: V 220, VIII 318
Bohemund VII of Antioch: VII 13
Bologna: VII 8–9
Bonats, Julian (H): I 156
Boncelli, William (T): III 11
Boniface VIII: IV 84; V 233; VI 273; VII 14, 16–17, 19; VIII 321; X 23
Bono Opere, Pons de (T): II 151
Bonomel, Ricaut (T): VII 23
Bordeaux: III 8
Bourbonton, Nicholas of (T): II 167, 170
Bovyngton, William (STA): XII 500
Brie, Simon of: VII 16–17
Brenne, John of: VII 12
British Isles: I 145; VIII 327; XII 489, 496
Bromyard: VII 259
Buckingham: XII 490, 493
Buckland: II 152; IV 67–8, 70, 73, 79–82, 89–91
Bures, Odo of (T): III 13
Burriana: V 218, 229–30
Cabañas: V 205, 207
Cahors: IV 87
Calatrava: IV 73; V 199, 204, 213–15, 222; IX 84; order: I 185; II 141–3, 147–8, 153; III 1, 4, 6; IV 63, 67–8, 72–3, 83, 87–8; V passim; VI 265, 273; VIII 320, 331; XI 250, 252–3, 262 4
Cambellani, Amaury (T): II 146
Cantavieja: V 209–10, 219
Capela, Gualardus la (T): II 149
Capilla: V 205
Capua: IV 88
Caracuel: V 213
Carbrook: IV 73
Carmogente: V 224
Carrick-on-Suir: XII 491, 493, 498, 500–1
Cartagena: V 202
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Page(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Castelnuou</td>
<td>V 211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Castellote</td>
<td>IV 69; V 209–10; XI 258–9, 262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Castelo Branco</td>
<td>V 203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Castiel</td>
<td>VI 269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Castrotoraf</td>
<td>VI 269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cauquen, Gerald of (T)</td>
<td>III 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Celestine III</td>
<td>V 220; XI 259, 261–2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cervera (Castilla)</td>
<td>IV 71, 76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cervera (Valencia)</td>
<td>V 218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Châlons, John of (T)</td>
<td>II 156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chamberau</td>
<td>II 170; III 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Champagne, Hugh of (T)</td>
<td>I 176, 180, 190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles I of Anjou, and of South Italy and Sicily</td>
<td>VII 11, 14, 16–20, 23; XIII 245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles II of Naples</td>
<td>VII 4, 14, 16; VIII 321–3, 333–4, 336, 338, 341, 343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charny, Geoffrey of</td>
<td>II 169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chartres, Ivo of</td>
<td>I 176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Châtillon, Gerard of (H)</td>
<td>VI 263, 279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Châtillon, Regnald of</td>
<td>XI 253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chippenham</td>
<td>IV 80; VIII 330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chivert</td>
<td>V 211, 219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christ, order</td>
<td>VIII 325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ciliis, Peter of (M)</td>
<td>XI 255–6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cintruénigo</td>
<td>IV 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citeaux, Cistercians</td>
<td>I 190; II 148, 150; III 1, 4, 9; IV 73, 75, 78, 83; V 215; VII 8, 16; VIII 332; IX 84; XI 251–2, 254, 256, 258, 263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clement III</td>
<td>II 149; VI 271; XI 257–8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clement IV</td>
<td>VII 1, 8–9; IX 14, 16–18, 20–1; XIII 246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clement V</td>
<td>VIII 321, 326, 331, 333, 342; XII 495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cluny</td>
<td>I 182; III 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coblenz</td>
<td>II 162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colchester, Bartholomew of (STA)</td>
<td>XII 498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comnenus, Isaac Dukas</td>
<td>VI 278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conrad, landgrave of Thurngria (TO)</td>
<td>II 164, 167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conrad, son of Frederick II</td>
<td>II 153; VII 12; XIII 238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constance, widow of William of Anglesola (S)</td>
<td>IV 75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consuegra</td>
<td>V 204, 216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corbera</td>
<td>V 209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corbins</td>
<td>V 210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corteys, Hugh of (STA)</td>
<td>XII 499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coulson</td>
<td>XII 489–90, 493, 499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coumbe, Ralph of (STA)</td>
<td>XII 498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crac, William de</td>
<td>IX 83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crac des Chevaliers</td>
<td>VI 260, 275; IX 82–4, 88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crato</td>
<td>V 202, 204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cripitana</td>
<td>V 207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cruisfani, order</td>
<td>XII 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuenca</td>
<td>V 218; VI 268; 270, 273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>II 140, 144–5, 158, 161; VII 12–13; VIII 327, 332, 335, 342; X 21–3, 25, 28; XII 492, 496–9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damascus</td>
<td>IX 76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damatta</td>
<td>II 142; VI 267; XIII 237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dante Alighieri</td>
<td>VII 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darbsak</td>
<td>VI 264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dauphin, Guy (T)</td>
<td>II 149, 157, 163, 166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denney</td>
<td>VIII 330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destriana</td>
<td>IV 72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diaz de Haro, Lope</td>
<td>XI 255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diceto, Ralph of</td>
<td>XII 481–2, 486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doncaster</td>
<td>XII 490–1, 493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dubois, Peter</td>
<td>VIII 321, 326, 332, 335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dunholm, Henry of (STA)</td>
<td>XII 495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dusburg, Peter of</td>
<td>II 164, 167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ebro, river</td>
<td>V 202, 209, 212; VI 268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edmund, son of Henry III</td>
<td>XIII 238–9, 241, 243, 246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edward I of England</td>
<td>XII 492, 494–5; XIII 238, 241–2, 246–7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edward II of England</td>
<td>XII 495–6, 498–9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edward III of England</td>
<td>XII 485, 497–8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egly, Philip of (H)</td>
<td>VII 11, 20–1, 23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>VI 262–4, 277; IX 88; X 25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>II 140, 145, 158; IV 66–8, 70, 79–80, 90; VII 1, 23; VIII 321, 330; XII, XIII passim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enguera</td>
<td>V 203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enrique, brother of Alfonso X</td>
<td>XIII 244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entenza, Bernard William of (H)</td>
<td>II 168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Espejel</td>
<td>V 206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eterpigny</td>
<td>IV 64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eugenius III</td>
<td>IX 79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evora</td>
<td>VI 273; see also Avis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extremadura</td>
<td>V 205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Page Numbers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fabre, John (T)</td>
<td>III 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Fadil</td>
<td>VI 264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faith and Peace, order</td>
<td>II 141; IV 63, 72, 75; VII 7–9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faith of Jesus Christ, order</td>
<td>VII 6–7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faverolles, Anircus of (T)</td>
<td>II 162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fécamp, John of</td>
<td>I 183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Felicium</td>
<td>IX 84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fernando II of Leon</td>
<td>V 217–18; XI 252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fernando III of Leon and Castile</td>
<td>V 205, 218, 224, 227, 230; VI 269; XI 263–4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feuillant</td>
<td>VII 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fieux</td>
<td>IV 71, 81, 83, 85, 89–90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florence</td>
<td>VII 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fortanete</td>
<td>V 219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>II 140–1; IV 70–1; V 206, 211; VI 277; VII 6, 8–12, 14–15, 20–1, 23; VIII 321, 342; XII 487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frederick II, emperor</td>
<td>II 153–4; VI 261; VII 12–13, 15, 20, 23; VIII 318; X 28; XIII 241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frederick of Sicily</td>
<td>VII 20; VIII 341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuentes Calientes</td>
<td>XI 252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fulk of Anjou and Jerusalem</td>
<td>I 180, 190; IX 82–3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furstenfeld</td>
<td>II 156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaeta</td>
<td>VI 267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gallerceo, Bernard of (T)</td>
<td>VII 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gandesa</td>
<td>V 209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garcez, Juan (M)</td>
<td>XI 256, 258–61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gardeny</td>
<td>IV 64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garsendis, viscountess of Béarn</td>
<td>IV 72, 75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gascony</td>
<td>VII 7; XIII 235–6, 238, 240–4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaston VII of Béarn</td>
<td>XIII 242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaudin, Theobald (T)</td>
<td>VI 265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza</td>
<td>VI 264; see also La Forbie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geoffrey Fitz Piers</td>
<td>XII 486–7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>II 140, 159–60; V 208; VII 15, 23; VIII 321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gify, Ponsard of (T)</td>
<td>IV 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glaber, Raoul</td>
<td>I 188–9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glastonbury, William of (STA)</td>
<td>XII 496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>González, Rodrigo (M)</td>
<td>XI 256, 258–61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gragnana, Gerard de (H)</td>
<td>X 28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Granada</td>
<td>V 224, 227, 234; VI 272; VIII 322, 338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grandmont, Stephen of</td>
<td>I 188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grañena</td>
<td>V 198–9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece, Greeks</td>
<td>VII 2–3, 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gregory VIII</td>
<td>VI 270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gregory IX</td>
<td>IV 77, 90; V 207–8; VI 267, 272; VII 3, 7–8, 12–13, 15, 19–20; XI 264; XII 482, 486, 488, 492, 500; XIII 231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gregory X</td>
<td>VII 8, 19; VIII 340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gregory XI</td>
<td>VIII 329–30, 333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grisén</td>
<td>IV 71, 79, 81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guadalquivir, river</td>
<td>V 205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guala, papal legate</td>
<td>XIII 230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guasc, Bertrand (T)</td>
<td>II 166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guido, Catalano di (BVM)</td>
<td>VII 8–9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gutiérrez, Garcia</td>
<td>IV 73, 88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hakon of Norway</td>
<td>XIII 238, 243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hampton</td>
<td>IV 70, 73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hattin, battle</td>
<td>II 161; V 226; VI 259–60, 264; XI 256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Havelberg, Anselm of</td>
<td>I 192–3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helles, Theobald of</td>
<td>XII 484–5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helles, Thomas Fitz Theobald of</td>
<td>XII 483–5, 488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry I of Cyprus</td>
<td>VII 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry II of England</td>
<td>II 158; IV 70; XII 482–3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry III of England</td>
<td>II 157, 166; IV 70; VI 265; VII 1; XII 490, 494; XIII passim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hesse</td>
<td>II 143–4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hohenlohe, Frederick of (TO)</td>
<td>II 167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hohenlohe, Henry of (TO)</td>
<td>II 167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hohenlohe, Hermann of (H)</td>
<td>I 147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honorius III</td>
<td>II 153–5; III 10; V 210, 220; VI 267; VII 6, 12; XI 263–4; XII 491; XIII 229–30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honorius IV</td>
<td>VII 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horta</td>
<td>V 209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital of St John, Hospitallers</td>
<td>I 176, 191; II passim; III 2, 7, 9–10, 13–14, 16; IV, V passim; VI 259–67, 274–9; VII, VIII, IX, X passim; XI 257, 262, 264–5; XII 477, 489, 491, 493, 498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huesca</td>
<td>II 149; IV 64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huete</td>
<td>VI 268, 270–1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hugh IV of Cyprus</td>
<td>XII 498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>VII 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibelin, John of</td>
<td>VII 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iberian peninsula</td>
<td>II 140–2, 145, 160–1, 169; V passim; VI 260–1, 265–8, 279; IX 85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibn al-Athir</td>
<td>VI 259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilberstedt, John of (TO)</td>
<td>II 167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imad ad-Din</td>
<td>VI 259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Innocent II</td>
<td>I 182, 185–7, 193; II 153; III 2–3; IX 78–9, 86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Innocent III</td>
<td>I 182; II 153, 155; III 9; IV 79, 84, 88; V 222; VI 267, 271; VII 2–3, 5, 10, 12, 18–19; XI 251, 259, 262–3; XII 486, 491</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INDEX

Innocent IV: II 154; V 208, 210, 221, 231; VI 269, 272; VII 5, 12-15, 20, 23; VIII 327; XIII 230-1, 233-6, 238, 241, 243
Irland: VIII 329; XII 489, 491, 498-9; XIII 233, 236-7
Italy: II 140; VII 8, 10-11, 20; VIII 321; XI 255
Jacinth, papal legate: XI 251
James (Jaime) I of Aragon: V 203, 218-19, 221, 223, 225, 227-31; VIII 327; XIII 236
James (Jaime) II of Aragon and Sicily: IV 69, 84; V 206, 208, 215, 224-5, 227, 230-4; VI 262-3; VII 11, 14, 17, 22; VIII 324-5, 332, 334-5, 341; XI 264
James II of Mallorca: VII 11-12
Jerusalem, city: I 181; VI 274; XI 253; canons of the Holy Sepulchre: V 200; IX 85; king, kingdom: VII 12, 19; VIII 332-5, 337-8, 341-2; X 27-9
Jiménez, Lope (H): VI 262
Jiménez de Luscia, Oria (H): IV 80
Jiménez de Luscia, Sancha (H): IV 80
Jiménez de Rada, Rodrigo: V 213, 222-3
Jiménez de Urgia, Sancha (H): IV 80
Jiménez de Urgia, Teresa (H): IV 84
Joanna, wife of Richard of Chaldefelde: IV 66
John of England: XIII 229
John XXII: V 232; VIII 331; XII 492, 500
Joinville: VI 264, 277; XIII 231
Kendale, Robert of (STA): XII 498
Kiev, Daniel of: I 176
Kildare: XII 498
Kilkenny: XII 491, 493, 501
La Cenia: V 212
La Forbie, battle: II 159, 161; V 226; VI 261-2, 265-6
La Sauve: I 219
Lacum: IX 84
Lacy, Margaret of: IV 70, 76
Lamia: VII 3
Las Navas de Tolosa, battle: V 222-3, 228-9
Lateran Council: (1179) II 158; V 208; XI 255; (1215) II 155; XI 263, 265
Latin Empire of Constantinople: V 225; VII 2-5
Leon: V 215-18, 229; VI 269; XI 252, 259, 262-3
Leonor, sister of Alfonso X: XIII 238, 242
Lérida: II 145, 150-1
Libros: V 209
Liège, Wazo of: I 179
Liège, William of (T): II 166
Limassol: X 22; XII 497-8
Linares, Lope of (H): VI 263
Livonia: II 140, 143, 160; III 1, 9; VII 2, 5, 23
Livonia, Henry of: VII 4
Longchamps, Nigel of: II 169
López de Haro, Diego: V 228
Lora: V 205
Lorach, Berengaria of (T): IV 66
Louis IX of France: VI 262, 264-5, 277; VII 21; VIII 340; XIII 231-4, 237, 245-7
Lucca, Fraimo of (M): XI 255, 259-62
Lucca, Hildebrand of (M): XI 256
Lucius III: II 154
Lucy, sister of Bohemund VII: VII 13, 21
Lull, Raymond: VII 3; VIII 320, 322-3, 333-41, 344
Lyon, council: (1245) XIII 231; (1274) VIII 319, 321, 324, 326, 328
Mainau: II 152, 165
Maire, William le: VIII 332
Mafrisi: VI 262
Malagón: V 213
Malberg, Gerhard of (TO): II 154
Mallorca: II 159; V 223-4, 226-8
Manfred, son of Frederick II: II 153; VII 9, 23; XIII 243
Mansel, John: XIII 237, 242-3
al-Mansur: V 213
Map, Walter: I 176, 180
Marburg: II 163; VII 15
Marchant, Hugh of (T): II 157
Margat: VI 260; X 18-19, 21-2, 26
Marienburg: VIII 343
Marmion, Philip: XII 490
Marseilles: X 21, 25
Marshall, Gilbert: XII 491, 493
Martel: IV 71
Martin IV: VII 11, 14, 17, 19
Martin Alfonso: IV 72
Martínez de Luna, Mary (H): IV 84
Martorell, William (T): III 5
Martos: V 205
Mas-Deu: VII 11
INDEX

Mauley, Peter of: XII 490, 493
Medina Sidonia: V 202
Mepham, Richard of: VIII 326, 328
Mercy, order: V 201; VI 267, 272, 279; XI 257
Mértola: V 204
Mézières, Philip of: VIII 324, 344
Miravet: V 203, 209
Moclin, battle: II 160; V 208, 226-7
Modies, Peter of (T): II 146
Molay, James of (T): VIII 323-4, 340-2
Moncada, Peter of (T): VI 261
Montalbán: V 216, 229, 231
Montesa: XI 264; order: VIII 325; XI 264-5
Montfort (Syria): VI 260
Montfort, Amaury of: VII 6-7
Montfragüe: XI 259, 263-4; order: XI 259, 261, 263-4
Montornés: V 219
Montredón, Guillermo de (T): XI 263
Monzón: IV 64, 69
Morea: II 140; VII 2
Morimond, abbot of: II 143; V 221
Mormant: II 162
Moulines, Roger des (H): II 149
Mountjoy, order: II 140-1, 157-8, 162; V 201, 203, 206, 208-9, 215-16, 219; VI 269, 271-2; VII 9; XI passim; XII 495
Moura: V 204
Moya: VI 268, 270, 272-3
Murcia: V 212, 228
Narsac, Hugh of (T): II 156
Nasr, son of Abbas: VI 275
Navarino: VII 2
Navarre: II 144; IX 85; XIII 242
Neocastro, Bartholomew of: VII 22
Neuilly, Peter of (T): II 170
Neuville: III 8
Nevsky, Alexander: VII 4
Nicholas III: VII 13; VIII 328
Nicholas IV: VII 11-14, 21-2; VIII 321-2, 326, 329, 344
Nicosia: XII 496-8
Nogaret, William of: VIII 329, 332
Nogent, Guibert of: I 187; II 170
Norragh, John of: XII 491
Novillanas: V 209
Nur ad-Din: VI 259, 261
Nürnberg, Conrad of (TO): II 165; IV 67

Oberwetter, Gerhard of (TO): II 142
Odo, abbot of Cluny: I 183
Oise: III 13
Olmos: IX 82
Oreja: V 204
Oropesa: V 219
Orrios: V 209; XI 255, 259
Ortiz, Garcia: V 210
Ottobuono, papal legate: XIII 245-6
Padua, Fidentius of: VIII 318-19, 340
Paris, Matthew: II 159, 161; VI 261, 264-5; VIII 318, 325; XII 481-2, 488; XIII 231-2, 234-5, 241-2, 244
Parma, Albert of: XIII 238, 240-1
Parys, John of (STA): XII 496-7
Paul, bishop of Tripoli: VII 13
Payns: IV 66
Payns, Hugh of (T): I 178, 180, 188, 190-1
Pechar, John: VIII 318, 322, 328, 339; XII 492
Pedro, bishop of Zaragoza: XI 252
Pedro II of Aragon: V 201, 212, 214, 216, 219-220; VII 15
Pedro III of Aragon: VII 11, 15, 19
Peñíscola: I 149
Penna: IV 88
Péragors, Hermann of (T): II 156
Peralta, Guillermo de (T): V 209; XI 259
Pérez Correa, Pelay (S): V 222, 232; VI 273; VII 3
Peter the Venerable: I 190; II 152; III 1; VII 18
Philip III of France: VII 19
Philip IV of France: II 140; VII 11, 14; VIII 317, 321, 326, 332, 334-5, 337, 342
Piedrabuena: V 213
Pinell: V 209
Pins, Odo des (H): X 20-1, 23-4, 26
Pons d'Artigues: VII 8
Ponthieu: III 11
Porta, Audebert of (T): II 156
Portugal: V 198-9, 202-4, 223
Portugal, Alfonso of (H): X 18, 26
Provence: II 140
Provins: III 148
Prvins, Guiot of: II 169
Prussia: II 139, 143, 164-5; III 9; VII 2
Puente de Fraga: XI 258, 261
Puigreig: V 212
Puisset, Hugh de: IX 81
Pulpis: V 219
Puy, Raymond du (H): IX 75-6, 80, 87-88
Puvlaures, Gilbert de: IX 83-4
Puylaurens, William of: VII 15
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>References</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quentin, Thomas of (T)</td>
<td>III 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Queralt, Peter of</td>
<td>II 149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rafaniyah</td>
<td>IX 82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rasquera</td>
<td>V 209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raven, William (T)</td>
<td>III 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raymond VI of Toulouse</td>
<td>VII 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raymond VII of Toulouse</td>
<td>VII 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raymond II of Tripoli</td>
<td>IX 81-2, 84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raymond III of Tripoli</td>
<td>VI 276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raymond (Ramón)-Berenguer III of Barcelona</td>
<td>V 198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raymond (Ramón)-Berenguer IV of Barcelona and Aragon</td>
<td>I 185; V 199-200, 202-3, 207, 214, 223; IX 81-2, 85; XI 252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reims, council</td>
<td>VIII 332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renard II of Dampierre</td>
<td>VI 276-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renneville</td>
<td>III 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revel, Hugh (H)</td>
<td>VII 20, 23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ribarroja</td>
<td>V 209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ribelles, Raymond of (H)</td>
<td>VII 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ribston</td>
<td>XIII 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard, earl of Cornwall</td>
<td>XIII 231, 237, 244, 246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard I of England</td>
<td>XII 482, 485-6, XIII 231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ridefort, Gerard of (T)</td>
<td>VI 259, 264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riuoduelles</td>
<td>V 211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert of Naples</td>
<td>VIII 341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rocaberti, Dalmau of (T)</td>
<td>VI 262-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roche, Amaury of (T)</td>
<td>VII 11, 21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roches, John des</td>
<td>XII 496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roches, Peter des</td>
<td>XII 487-8, 492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romans, Humbert of</td>
<td>VIII 340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rostand, papal nuncio</td>
<td>XIII 238-9, 243, 245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rouergue</td>
<td>II 149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruad</td>
<td>VI 260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia, Russians</td>
<td>VII 4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saewulf</td>
<td>I 176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safed</td>
<td>VI 259-60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Abraham, Hugh of</td>
<td>IX 83-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Armand, Odo of (T)</td>
<td>VI 263-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St George de Sisto</td>
<td>XII 486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St-Georges, Humbert of (T)</td>
<td>III 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Gilles</td>
<td>II 145; IV 83; VII 23; IX 78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St-Just, Baldwin of (T)</td>
<td>III 8, 11-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St-Just, John of (T)</td>
<td>III 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St-Just, Robert of (T)</td>
<td>III 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Thomas of Acre, order</td>
<td>II 140-1, 162; III 1; VI 274; XII passim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saladin</td>
<td>VI 259, 263-4; XI 256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salamanca, hospital of the Holy Spirit</td>
<td>VI 269-70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salisbury, John of</td>
<td>I 184, 186; IX 76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salvatierra</td>
<td>V 207, 213, 229; VI 273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salza, Hermann of (TO)</td>
<td>II 165; VII 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Felices de los Barrios</td>
<td>IV 67, 72, 79, 83, 87-88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Jorge de Alfama, order</td>
<td>V 201, 216, 218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Justo, Berenguer of (T)</td>
<td>VII 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Pedro de la Piedra</td>
<td>IV 72, 75-6, 79, 81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Salvador de Isot</td>
<td>IV 71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Vicente de Junqueres</td>
<td>IV 72, 75, 80, 84; VII 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sancha, daughter of Alfonso IX</td>
<td>IV 88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sancha of Aragon</td>
<td>IV 76, 78, 82, 90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sánchez, Martin (T)</td>
<td>III 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sancho III of Castile</td>
<td>V 215; IX 84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sancho VI of Navarre</td>
<td>VI 261-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sancho I of Portugal</td>
<td>IV 72, 76; V 217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sancho II of Portugal</td>
<td>V 202, 204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sancho, infante</td>
<td>V 202, 233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sancto Stephano, William de (H)</td>
<td>X 19, 24-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Cruz</td>
<td>V 205, 207, 213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Eufemia de Cozuelos</td>
<td>IV 72, 79, 81, 88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Maria de España, order</td>
<td>II 160; V 201-2, 208, 226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santiago, order</td>
<td>I 175, 184-6, 192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santos-o-Vello</td>
<td>IV 72, 76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanudo, Marino</td>
<td>VIII 327, 341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saule, battle</td>
<td>II 160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Savary, P. (FJC)</td>
<td>VII 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saverteis, Berenguer (H)</td>
<td>II 158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>II 145; IV 80; VIII 330; XII 498; XIII 231, 233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Segura</td>
<td>XI 263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Segura de la Sierra</td>
<td>V 205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serpa</td>
<td>V 204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Setefilla</td>
<td>V 205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sevilla</td>
<td>V 211, 213, 218, 222, 224, 226-7; XIII 242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shahinshah</td>
<td>VI 265, 275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sibylla, sister of Baldwin IV</td>
<td>XI 253-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sicily</td>
<td>VI 262; VII 11, 14, 18-23; XII 498; XIII 235-41, 243-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sigena</td>
<td>II 149, 157, 159; III 2-3; IV 71, 73, 76, 78-80, 82-91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smaragdus, abbot of St-Mihiel</td>
<td>I 182, 188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sollavientos</td>
<td>V 214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sommereux</td>
<td>III 8; IV 65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soure</td>
<td>V 198-9, 203</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INDEX

Southampton, Richard of (STA): XII 496
Spain: see Iberian peninsula
Standon: IV 73
Stanegrave, Roger of (H): VI 263, 279
Sterzing: IV 67
Stratton, Matthew of: XII 490
Subirats, Adaladis of: IV 66
Sudheim, Ludolph of: XII 488
Sutri, Bonizo of: I 184
Swordbrethren, order: II 140, 160; III 1; VII 4–5

Talavera: VI 268; XI 263
Téllez, Alfonso: V 220
Temple, order, Templars: I, II, III passim; IV 63–6, 68–9, 91; V, VI, VII, VIII passim; IX 76–7, 79, 81, 85–7; X 17, 27–8; XI 252, 255–7, 259–65; XII 483, 487–9, 491, 493–6
Teresa, countess of Portugal: V 198
Teutonic order: II, III passim; IV 63, 66–8; V 201; VI 260; VII 1–5, 13, 15–16, 20–1; VIII 320, 343; XII 483, 486–8, 500
Thémines, Bonsom of: IV 71
Thémines, Guibert of: IV 71
Theoderich, margrave of Meissen: II 164
Thuringia: IT 143–4
Tilleyo, Matthew of (T): III 13
Toledo: VI 268–73
Torve, Peter of (T): III 8
Tomas: V 203
Tortigny, Robert of: VI 263, 265
Tortosa (Spain): V 200; VI 275; IX 77, 82
Toulouse: II 157; VII 10, 15
Trinitarians: VI 267, 271–2, 275, 278–9
Tripoli: II 161; VI 261–2; VII 13, 21–2; IX 84
Troyes, council: I 179–80, 190; IX 86
Troyes, James of (T): II 163
Trujillo: V 213; order: V 205, 207
Tunis: VII 18

Tyre, William of: I 177, 190; II 157; VI 261; IX 77, 82–3, 89
Uclés: V 204–5, 229; VI 268, 270
Urach, Conrad of: VII 6–7
Urban III: IV 270
Urban IV: III 1, 4; VII 1, 8–9, 16, 20–1; XIII 245
Valduerna: V 217
Valencia, city: IV 69; V 221, 225, 230; kingdom: V 203, 219–21, 224, 229, 231; XI 265
Valois, Charles of: VII 11, 14
Vaucelles, James of (T): II 152
Venetians: VIII 343
Ventoses: IX 82
Vere, Gilbert of (H): IV 90
Vienne, council: VIII 321, 325–6, 336
Villafranca: V 217
Villafranca, Bartholomew of (T): VI 262
Villaiba, G. of (T): VI 262–3
Villaret, Fulk of (H): VIII 342–3
Villaret, William of (H): IV 71; X 15, 20–1, 23–5, 27
Villarluengo: V, 209; XI 257–8
Villavudas: XI 255
Villehardouin, Geoffrey I of: VII 4
Villehardouin, Geoffrey II of: VII 3
Villiel: V 209–10, 219; VI 274; XI 257–62
Villemoisson: III 13
Villena: V 219
Vitre, James of: I 192, 194; II 165; VII 2; VIII 325; IX 85
Vladistias of Bohemia: IX 88
Wales: II 145, 158; IV 80; VIII 330; XII 498
Walter, Hubert: XII 482
Wendover, Roger of: XII 481
William VII of Montpellier: II 162–3
Zaragoza: II 148; IV 65; VI 268
Zuéruela: V 205, 207